Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881

The Negotiable instruments Act (XXVI of 1881) section 3(b), 46, 63 The appellant Bank is a trustee and the relationship existing between him and the appellant Bank is that of a debtor and creditor; the appellant Bank, being a schedule Bank and owned by the Government is a "person" within the meaning of article 102 of the Constitution and was duly bound to pay the proceeds of the FDR to the respondent No.1 but it having failed the respondent No.1, being denied of the right to property guaranteed under Article 42 of the Constitution, was entitled to invoke writ jurisdiction seeking necessary relief for a direction upon the appellant Bank. Agrani Bank vs Ansarul Hoque (Md. Tajazzul IslamJ) IADC 383 Negotiable Instruments Act [XXVI of 1881] Sections 5 and 6 The impugned cheque was given without filling up all space, Le. (a) name of the payee, (b) date of Issue, (c) amount of money and (d) signature of the drawer. This nature of blank cheque is not a cheque in the eye of law according to section 6 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The definition of section 5 of the Negotiable Instruments Act the cheque actually a bill of exchange which will be written by the drawer himself, without issuing the same as per provision of section 6 read with section 5 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the definition of section 5 of the Negotiable Instruments Act the cheque actually a bill of exchange which will be written by the drawer himself, without issuing the same as per provision of section 6 read with section 5 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. [2023] 29 ALR (HCD) 68 Section 6, 138, 141- We are of the view that the operation of section 138 of the Act, 1881 cannot be obstructed or, in any way, circumvented by the mere fact of filing of a suit by the drawer of the dishonoured cheque in civil Court whatever allegations may be in the plaint about the same and the relief prayed for therein, because such a device shall totally make the section itself nugatory. However, if a holder or the payee gets hold of a dishonoured cheque by fraudulent means or forgery, the drawer of the cheque shall have the liberty to take such defence during the trial. Consequently we find no reason to interfere with the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court Division. This petition is dismissed. ...Arif-Uz-Zaman(Md.) =VS= The State, [8 LM (AD) 614] Sections 7 and 138(1)-From a bare reading of section 138(1) of the Act, it is mani- festly clear that the cheque drawn by a person on any account must be maintained by him. For the purpose of section 138(1) of the Act, the account has to be maintained by the drawer of the cheque. The expression 'drawer' is defined in section 7 of the Act. As per that section, the maker of a bill of exchange or cheque is called the drawer. Shahnaj Begum Munni vs State 63 DLR 279. Section 48 From reading of section 48 of the Act we do not find that institution of this case under Penal Code is barred under section 48 of the Act by an explicit provision of this Act. Salah- uddin vs State 51 DLR 299. Sections 43 and 138-Trial Court has ample power to allow the accused to take any defence as provided for under sections 4, 6, 8, 9, 43, 58 and 118 of the Act. The complaint petition should contain the circumstances of obtaining such cheque and reasons for issuing cheque by the issuer so that the accused can take a meaningful defence stand at the trial under all circumstances. However, even in the absence of any such statement in the complaint there is no embargo under the Act, to take any defence by the accused person in the light of sections 4, 6, 8, 9, 43, 58 and 118 of the Act and that the trial court shall give the accused persons adequate opportunity to take any such defence during the course of trial. Shafiqul Islam vs Bangladesh, 68 DLR 283 Section 79, 80, 117 It also appears that considering the situation which arose in view of the Order 37 providing for filling special kind of suit and special procedure for an adjudication and also considering many instances in which application could not be filed within time, in many states of India, by amendments, provisions have been made either allowing applications under section 5 of the Limitation Act or giving power to the Court to condone the delay. National Bank Ltd vs M.S. Khan (Md. Tafazzul Islam J)(Civil) 2ADC 742 (ক্রস-চেক / অ্যাকাউন্ট পেয়ি চেকও একটি চেক যার সম্পর্কে হস্তান্তরযোগ্য দলিল আইনের ধারা ১৩৮ (১) এ বর্ণিত আছে। আই চেকের হস্তান্তরযোগ্যতা বিলুপ্তির মাধ্যমে চেকের সাধারণ চরিত্রকে পরিবর্তন করা হয় মাত্র। কিন্তু এই চেক ১৩ ধারায় যেসকল হস্তান্তরযোগ্য দলিল এর কথা বলা হয়েছে সেই দলিলের মর্যাদা হারায় না। প্রকৃতপক্ষে, ১২৩ ক (১) (ক) ধারাটি একই ধারার (খ) ক্লজ দিয়ে পড়তে হবে। ধারা ১২৩ক (১) এর (খ) ধারার বিধানে বর্ণিত আছে "অ্যাকাউন্ট পেয়ি" চেকে উল্লিখিত পরিমাণ কীভাবে এনক্যাশ করতে হবে। এই বিধানের পাশাপাশি আমাদেরকে উল্লিখিত আইনের ১২৬ ধারার বিধানও অনুসরণ করতে হবে। যেহেতু complaint petition এ বর্ণিত account payee চেকটি হস্তান্তরযোগ্য দলিল এর মর্যাদা হারায়নি সেহেতু উক্ত চেক হস্তান্তরযোগ্য দলিল আইনের ১৩৮(১) ধারায় বর্ণত "যেকোন চেক" এর আওতায় পড়ে কারণ চেক অর্থ account payee চেক কেও অন্তর্ভুক্ত করে) MOHAMMAD ALI VS. THE STATE AND ANOTHER, 3 LNJ (2014) 853 অপরদিকে ধারা ১১৮ (ছ) সহজ সরল পাঠে এটি কাঁচের মত স্পস্ট যে, ভিন্ন কিছু প্রমাণিত না হওয়া পর্যন্ত বিনিময় যোগ্য দলিলের ধারককে যথাবিহীত ধারক মর্মে গণ্য করতে হবে। তবে শর্তে বলা হয়েছে যে ক্ষেত্রে দলিলটি উহার বৈধ স্বত্বাধিকারীর কিংবা আইনগত হেফাজতকারীর নিকট হতে, অপরাধমূলে বা প্রতারণামূলে (Fraudulently) অর্জিত হবে, অথবা উহা প্রস্তুতকারী বা সম্মতিদাতার নিকট হতে অপরাধমূলে বা প্রতারণামূলে বা বেআইনী পণের বিনিময়ে অর্জিত হবে, সেই ক্ষেত্রে দলিলের ধারক যে একজন যথাবিহীত ধারক তা তাকেই প্রমাণ করতে হবে। অর্থাৎ বিনিময় যোগ্য দলিলের ধারক তথা চেকের ধারক একজন যথাবিহীত ধারক কথাটি শর্তহীন (Unconditional) নয়। অপর কথায় বলা যায় যে, যথাবিহীত ধারক (holder in due course) কথাটি সম্পূর্ণরূপে শর্তযুক্ত। ধারা ১১৮ এর মোতাবেক চেক এর বৈধ স্বত্বাধিকারী কিংবা আইনত হেফাজতকারীর নিকট হতে প্রতারণামূলকভাবে (fraudulently) অভিযোগকারী পেয়েছে মর্মে আসামী দাবী করলে অভিযোগকারীকেই প্রমাণ করতে হবে যে তিনি প্রতারণামূলকভাবে এটি প্রাপ্ত হন নাই বরং যথানিয়মে ধারক। অর্থাৎ যখনই কোন চেক সংশ্লিষ্টতায় আসামী পক্ষ দাবী করবে যে এটি জাল কিংবা প্রতারণামূলক ভাবে অভিযোগকারী কর্তৃক অর্জিত হয়েছে সেক্ষেত্রে অভিযোগকারীকেই প্রমাণ করতে হবে আলোচ্য চেকটি আসামী তাকে ভয়ভীতি কিংবা অন্যের প্ররোচনা ব্যতিরেকে প্রদান করেছে। ধারা ১১৮(ছ) এর শর্ত মোতাবেক বিনিময়যোগ্য দলিলের তথা চেকের যথাবিহীত ধারক প্রমাণের দায়িত্ব পরিবর্তিত হয়ে যিনি ধারক তার উপর ন্যাস্ত হয়। ধারা ১১৮(ছ) মোতাবেক সাধারণভাবে যখন কোন বিনিময়যোগ্য দলিল বা চেক আদালতে উপস্থাপন করা হবে তখন এর ধারককে যথাবিহীত ধারক গণ্য করা হবে। কিন্তু চেকটি প্রতারণামূলকভাবে বা বেআইনীভাবে বিনিময়ে অর্জিত হলে ধারা ১১৮(ছ) এর শর্ত মোতাবেক এর ধারককে আর যথানিয়মে ধারক বলে গণ্য করা যাবে না। 17. অপর কথায় বিনিময়যোগ্য দলিল তথা চেকটি এর বৈধ স্বত্বাধিকারী কিংবা আইনগত হেফাজতকারীর নিকট হতে অপরাধমূলকভাবে বা প্রতারণামূলকভাবে অজির্ত হয়েছে মর্মে অভিযোগ করা হলে অথবা এর প্রস্তুতকারী বা সম্মতিদাতার নিকট হতে অপরাধমূলকভাবে বা প্রতারণামূলকভাবে বা বেআইনী পণ্যের বিনিময়ে অর্জিত হয়েছে মর্মে অভিযোগ করা হলে, বিনিময়যোগ্য দলিলের তথা চেকের ধারককেই প্রমাণ করতে হবে যে তিনি উহার যথাবিহীত ধারক। [31 BLT (HCD) 27] 21. উদ্ভূত পরিস্থিতিতে The Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 এর ধারা ১৩৮ মোতাবেক চেক প্রত্যাখ্যানের মামলার আমলী আদালত ও বিচারিক আদালতের বিচারকদের কতিপয় নির্দেশ প্রদান জরুরী বিধায় নির্দেশ প্রদান করা যাচ্ছে যে, (১) চেক প্রত্যাখ্যানের মামলায় দাখিলকৃত আরজী তথা অভিযোগনামা তথা নালিশী দরখাস্তে চেকটি আসামী কর্তৃক অভিযোগকারীকে কি ধরনের পণ বা প্রতিদানের বিনিময়ে প্রদান করেছিল তৎমর্মে অভিযোগনামায় সুস্পষ্ট ও সুনির্দিষ্ট দাবীর বিস্তারিত বর্ণনা না থাকলে আদালত উক্ত অভিযোগ গ্রহণ না করে সরাসরি প্রত্যাখ্যান করবেন। (3) অত্র মোকদ্দমার গর্ভে বর্ণিত The Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 এর ধারা ১১৮(ক) এবং ধারা ১১৮ (ছ) এর শর্তের বিচার বিশ্লেষণ সামনে রেখে প্রত্যেকটি চে প্রত্যাখ্যানের মামলা সর্বোচ্চ সতর্কতার সাথে নিষ্পত্তি করবেন। (৩) প্রথমেই আদালত ধরে নিবেন চেকটি পণ বা প্রতিদানের বিনিময়ে প্রদত্ত। (৪) যদি আসামী দাবী করেন যে, তিনি চেকটি সম্পাদন করেছেন কিন্তু চেক প্রদানের বিনিময়ে কোন পণ বা প্রতিদান প্রাপ্ত হন নাই, সেক্ষেত্রে আসামীকে সাক্ষ্য প্রমাণ দিয়ে প্রমাণ করতে হবে যে, তিনি চেক প্রদানের বিনিময়ে কোন পণ বা প্রতিদান প্রাপ্ত হন নাই। যদি আসামী প্রমাণ করতে সক্ষম হন। যে, তিনি তর্কিত চেক এর বিনিময়ে কোন পণ বা প্রতিদান প্রাপ্ত হন নাই সেক্ষেত্রে উক্ত চেকের মামলাটি সাক্ষ্য প্রদাণের ভিত্তিতে কারণ উল্লেখে আদালত খারিজ করবেন। (৫) যদি আসামী দাবী করেন যে, চেকটি তিনি সম্পাদন করেছেন সঠিক কিন্তু চেকটি তিনি পণ বা প্রতিদানের বিনিময়ে প্রদান করেন নাই বরং চেকটি জামানত স্বরূপ প্রদান করেছেন সেক্ষেত্রেও আসামীকে প্রমাণ করতে হবে যে, তিনি কোন পণ বা প্রতিদান এর বিনিময়ে তর্কিত চেকটি প্রদান করেন নাই। যদি আসামী তা প্রমাণ করতে সক্ষম হন সেক্ষেত্রে আদালত উক্ত চেকের মামলাটি খারিজ করবেন। (৬) যেক্ষেত্রে আসামী অভিযোগ করবেন চেকটি তিনি আদৌ সম্পাদন করেন নাই অর্থাৎ চেকটি জাল জালিয়াতিমূলকভাবে সৃষ্ট সেক্ষেত্রে প্রমাণের দায়িত্ব পরিবর্তিত হয়ে চেক গ্রহীতাকেই প্রমাণ করতে হবে যে চেকটি জাল কিংবা জালিয়াতিমূলকভাবে তিনি প্রাপ্ত হন নাই কিংবা চেকটি সৃজিত নয় কিংবা চেকটি প্রতারণামূলকভাবে তিনি প্রাপ্ত হন নাই। [31 BLT (HCD) 28] Criminal - Quashing of proceedings - Cheque bounce - Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 - Petition filed for quashing of proceedings in case under Section 138 of Act - Whether Petitioner made out case for quashing of proceedings - Held, it did not appear that prosecution story was preposterous - Proceedings could not be quashed on ground of preposterousness - Payee was required to satisfy Court conditions at time of taking cognizance - Complainant placed cheque within six months of its issuance of cheque and same was presented for encashment - Requirement of Section 138 of Act has been satisfied - Initiation of proceedings on basis of second notice was not legal and taking cognizance of complaint by Magistrate was also not legal - Continuation of proceedings was an abuse of process of Court - Proceedings quashed - Rule made absolute. [8], [14], [16], [20] 70 DLR (2018) 303 SM Anwar Hossain v. Md Shafiul Alam reported in 51 DLR (AD) 218 wherein their Lordships held: "Subsequent allegation will not save limitation because the requirement under the law is that the complaint against non-payment of money has to be filed within one month of the date on which the cause of action arises under clause (c) of the Proviso to section 138 of the Act." 70 DLR (2018) 303 Initiation of the impugned proceedings on the basis of the second notice being not legal, taking cognizance of the complaint by the Magistrate is also not legal and, thus, we hold that: the continuation of the proceedings is an abuse of the process of the Court. 70 DLR (2018) 303 Section 118-Whenever a person will be holder in due course he must become holder in due course for consideration and section 118 of the Act has given more privileges to the holder in due course which provides that until the contrary is proved it is to be presumed that every negotiable instrument was made or drawn for consideration, that is, the law itself prescribed a privilege in favour of the holder of a cheque that for consideration the cheque was drawn in his favour but this presumption is a rebutable presumption. Shariful Alam (Babu) (Md) vs State, 67 DLR 182 Section 118-Ends of justice would be served if the accused petitioner is given a chance to place his defence case before the trial Court for examination which the law has allowed him to rebut a presumption in favour of the complainant as laid down in section 118 of the Act. Shariful Alam (Babu) (Md) vs State, 67 DLR 182 Section 118(a)-The presumption is that the negotiable instrument was drawn for consideration but, of course, that presumption is a rebuttable presumption. But this presumption can only be rebutted by adducing evidence to the contrary at the trial. Parvin Akhter vs Bangladesh, 70 DLR 413 Sections 123A & 138- Crossed cheque The legislative mandate as used in clause (a) of sub-section (2) of section 123A of the Act, 1881 that when a cheque is crossed "account payee" shall cease to be negotiable means it cannot be negotiated or encashed with any other person except the person in whose favour the same was issued. To make it clearer, a crossed cheque "account payee" must be enchased through the account of the holder in whose favour it was issued. So, by no means, a crossed cheque "account payee" loses its character as a negotiable one within the meaning of section 138 of the Act, 1881. Section 138 Therefore, while we accept the submissions of the learned advocates that there is in fact an anomaly being created by such administrative orders of the Sessions Judges in their respective Sessions Divisions, this anomaly may easily be cured a common approach to be adopted by all the Sessions Judges in the said Sessions Divisions. Thus, our considered view is that all such cases under Section 138 of the NI Act should be sent to the Joint Sessions Judges for trial, and the concerned Sessions Judges of the respective Divisions should adopt this similar approach in distributing those cases. Regard being had to the above, we do not find any reason to interfere into the proceedings concerned in the aforesaid cases. We are of the view that the practical anomaly that has been surfaced because of the inconsistent administrative orders by different Sessions Judges in different Sessions Divisions may be cured by the common approach as stated above. Thus, the Rules in these writ petitions should be discharged with such direction. [73 DLR 176] Section 135 and 141-Quashing- Initiation-Since there is no legal bar against the initiation and continuation of the proceedings and, as such, the proceedings do not amount to an abuse of the process of the Court. Raj Kumar Khetan vs Mercantile Bank Ltd, 64 DLR 272 Negotiable Instruments Act [XXVI of 1881] Section 138 Since it is a special law and it should be construed strictly, cognizance court should apply its legal acumenship at the initial stage. By complying all these the lower courts should take cognizance of offence under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The mi court can take another measure, that is complainant of section 138 cases, complainant must file an affidavit of facts regarding the Impugned cheque had been drawn by the sccined himself not by the complainant. Rensons are that If the cheque is drawn by the complainant he face criminal prosecation for alle allegation of making false affidavit. If this measure are takes the case under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act will be considerably reduced in the initial stage. Negotiable Instruments Act [XXVI of 1881) Section 138 Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is special law. This special law shall override general provision of law and if anything mentioned in the special law the general law will not be applicable. [2023] 29 ALR (HCD) 68 Section 138 and 140 If the complainant claims before the Magistrate that no reply to the demand notice was made by the accused and, later on, at the stage of framing charge the accused can satisfy the trial Court that in spite of her/his reply detailing her/his non-involvement in the conduct of the business of the company upon appending document in its support, the complainant had not produced it before the Magistrate or despite of its production before the Court, the cognizance-taking Magistrate failed to consider it, in that scenario, the trial Court would be in a position to discharge her/him from the charge or, if s/he approaches this Court directly, this Court may quash the proceedings so for as it relates to the aforesaid accused who had clarified her/his position by replying to the demand/legal notice by denying any involvement in the conduct of the business of the company upon enclosing the authentic document/papers in substantiating the aforesaid claim. Engineer Sirajul Islam and another -Vs.- The State and another (Criminal) 2019 ALR (HCD) Online 230. ধারা ১৩৮ এবং ১৪০ যদি অভিযোগকারী ম্যাজিস্ট্রেটের সামনে দাবি করেন যে, চাহিদাপত্রের জবাব অভিযুক্ত ব্যক্তি প্রদান করেননি এবং পরবর্তীতে অভিযোগ গঠনের পর্যায়ে অভিযুক্ত ব্যক্তি বিচারিক আদালতকে সন্তুষ্ট করতে পারেন যে, তিনি তার জবাবে কোম্পানির ব্যবসায় পরিচালনার সাথে তার/তার অনসম্পৃক্ততার বিস্তারিত বর্ণনা দিয়ে সমর্থনকারী নথি সংযুক্ত করেছেন, কিন্তু অভিযোগকারী তা ম্যাজিস্ট্রেটের সামনে উপস্থাপন করেননি বা আদালতের সামনে তা উপস্থাপন করা সত্ত্বেও, বিচারগ্রহণকারী ম্যাজিস্ট্রেট তা বিবেচনা করতে ব্যর্থ হন, সে ক্ষেত্রে বিচারিক আদালত তাকে অভিযোগ থেকে অব্যাহতি প্রদানের ক্ষমতায় থাকবেন অথবা যদি তিনি সরাসরি এই আদালতে আবেদন করেন, তবে এই আদালত উক্ত অভিযুক্ত ব্যক্তির বিরুদ্ধে কার্যক্রম বাতিল করতে পারেন, যিনি আইনগত/চাহিদাপত্রের জবাব দিয়ে কোম্পানির ব্যবসায় পরিচালনার সাথে তার কোনো সম্পৃক্ততা অস্বীকার করেছেন এবং তার দাবি প্রমাণ করার জন্য যথাযথ নথি/প্রমাণ সংযুক্ত করেছেন। ইঞ্জিনিয়ার সিরাজুল ইসলাম এবং অন্যজন বনাম রাষ্ট্র এবং অন্যজন (ক্রিমিনাল) ২০১৯ ALR (HCD) Online 230. Section 138 and 140 It is important to bear in mind that in the cases under Sections 138 and 140 of NI Act, the accused is entitled to seek discharge relying upon the contents of a reply to the demand/legal notice, for, the same is a prosecution material and, accordingly, the accused is also competent to approach this Court on the basis of the said material in addition to any other prosecution material, subject to the condition that the contents of the reply together with its annexed document are either conceded by the complainant or, if disputed by the complainant, it appears to the trial Court/this Court that the same does not require any formal proof through producing evidence before the trial Court. Engineer Sirajul Islam and another -Vs.- The State and another (Criminal) 2019 ALR (HCD) Online 230. ধারা ১৩৮ এবং ১৪০ এটি মনে রাখা গুরুত্বপূর্ণ যে, এনআই আইনের ধারা ১৩৮ এবং ১৪০ এর অধীনে মামলাগুলিতে, অভিযুক্ত ব্যক্তি চাহিদাপত্র/আইনি নোটিশের জবাবের বিষয়বস্তুর উপর নির্ভর করে অব্যাহতি দাবি করার অধিকার রাখেন, কারণ এটি একটি প্রসিকিউশন উপাদান। সুতরাং, অভিযুক্ত ব্যক্তি এই উপাদানের ভিত্তিতে এবং অন্যান্য প্রসিকিউশন উপাদানের ভিত্তিতে এই আদালতে আবেদন করতে সক্ষম, তবে শর্ত থাকে যে জবাবের বিষয়বস্তু এবং এর সাথে সংযুক্ত নথি হয় অভিযোগকারীর দ্বারা স্বীকৃত বা, যদি অভিযোগকারী তা অস্বীকার করেন, তবে বিচারিক আদালত/এই আদালতের কাছে এটি প্রমাণের জন্য আনুষ্ঠানিক প্রমাণাদির প্রয়োজন হয় না বলে প্রতীয়মান হয়। ইঞ্জিনিয়ার সিরাজুল ইসলাম এবং অন্যজন বনাম রাষ্ট্র এবং অন্যজন (ক্রিমিনাল) ২০১৯ ALR (HCD) Online 230. Negotiable Instruments Act (xXVI of 1881) Section 138 Issuing and signing of the cheques would be proved at the trial. Whether he managed the affairs of the company or not is a disputed question of facts. The High Court Division was not justified in passing the impugned judgment considering the documents submitted before it. The High Court Division was based upon disputed question of facts and defence mate- rials, those materials were not submitted at the trial Court, rather, directly submitted before the High Court Division for consideration in the proceedings under section 561A of the Code. The complainant has no occasion to know about the transfer of shares because it is the internal affairs of the accused and his company which ought not have scrutinized by the High Court Division while exercising its inherent jurisdiction. On the basis of such defence material quashing of the proceedings of the 3(three) cases out of 5(five) is serious error of law.. (27 & 28) [74 DLR (AD) (2022) 40] In the case of Islami Bank Bangladesh Ltd. vs Ferdous Khan @ Alamgir and another reported in 22 BLC (AD) 209, it has been held that: "The person, who issued the cheque, whether on his own behalf or on behalf of a The company of which he is in charge or for which he is responsible cannot escape liability under the Act. In such circumstances, To the proceeding against the accused cannot be quashed. The matter will be decided upon trial whether or not the omission of the as accused is fatal to the company as prosecution of the Managing Director of the company, who issued the cheques on behalf of the company". [74 DLR (AD) (2022) 40] Dishonouring of cheque Dishonouring of the cheque itself does not constitute the offence of cheating. As re- gards the argument that the accused petitioner issued a cheque knowing full well that he had no money in the account and that conduct amounts to cheating it is held that dishonour- ing of the cheque itself does not constitute the offence of cheating. On this point reliance was placed on the principle laid down in the case of Md. Asaduzzaman Vs. Salamatullah, reported in 19BLD (1999) (HCD)461 Md Motaleb Hossain. Vs. The State, 20BLD (HCD)573 Dishonouring of cheque Dishonouring of the cheque itself cannot be considered as an ingredient of the offence of cheating unless there is evidence to show that after issuing it, the accused has done something more to defraud the payee. Even such a cheque issued with the knowledge that he has not such amount in the Bank account at the moment it will no amount to cheating if he has intention to deposit the money before the cheque is presented for encashment. Mohiuddin Md. Abdul Kader Vs. The State and another, 20BLD (HCD)499 Section 138 Whether there is any justification to pass stay order under section 344 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in a proceeding under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act till disposal of the subsequent Civil Suit instituted for money where the cheque in question is also an issue. Pendency of civil suit is not a reasonable ground to stay criminal proceedings until the decision of the civil suit. The High Court Division relying upon the Case of Zafar Ahmed -vs- Mir Iftekharuddin and another reported in 61 DLR 732, their lordships observed that: "The proceeding under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act appears to be quite independent in nature with a very limited scope for adjudication which is not at all related to the issues involved in the Civil Suit. Moreover, at the fag end of trial of the criminal case, such an application praying for stay order was not at all justified and entertainable. The object of section 344 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not commensurate with the prayer for stay in the present case. Policy of law is that the criminal case should be disposed of with the least possible delay. Even mere pendency of earlier Civil Suit, connected with the matter, is no ground to stay the criminal proceedings initiated subsequently." The High Court Division is also respectfully agreement with the same view taken above and held that: "Pendency of civil suit is not a reasonable ground to stay criminal proceedings until the decision of the civil suit." Court below committed no illegality. The High Court Division finds no merits in these rules. In the result, these Rules are discharged. Md. Aminul Islam and another Vs. The state and another (Criminal) 21 ALR (HCD) 198-199 Section 138-According to section 138A of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the convict-petitioner has no other option but to prefer an appeal against the said judgment and order by depositing 50% of the amount of the dishonored cheque. If he has failed to prefer an appeal within the stipulated time as laid down in the law, he ought to have preferred an appeal by depositing 50% of the cheque amount with an application for condonation of delay wherein he has ample scope to show the reason of delay. But the convict- petitioner, ignoring the provision of law for preferring the appeal, moved appli- cation under sections 435/439 read with section 426(2A) of the Code of Criminal Procedure which is not sustainable in law. Considering the pandemic situation of the covid-19, the High Court Division ordered that the convict-petitioner be enlarged on ad-interim bail in connection with Sessions Case No. 2008 of 2016 arising out of C.R Case No. 1288 of 2015, under section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881 for a period of 02 [two] months from the date of his release from jail, on furnishing bail bond subject to the satisfaction of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Narayangonj with a direction to pay 50% of the cheque amount, which is the pre-requisite condition to prefer an ap- peal against an order of conviction under the said Act. If the convict-petitioner fails to prefer an appeal by depositing 50% of the cheque amount within the aforesaid 02 [two] months after his release from jail, then the order of ad-interim bail shall stand cancelled and the convict-petitioner shall have to surrender before the trial court to serve out the sentence. Thus the application is disposed of. Md. Matin -Vs. The State. (Criminal) 19 ALR (HCD) 255-256 Sections 138(1) and 138A Since at that relevant time the petitioner was not the Managing Director, he had nothing to do with the affairs of the company. Consequently, no ingredients of section 138 of the Act attracts the accused petitioner to be tried in a criminal prosecution. The High Court Division held that the accused petitioner transferred his share in the company on 23.08.2009, said fact is not disputed by the opposite party. In the given context, it is apparent that the petitioner has transferred his share in the company much before the cheques were issued and dishonoured. With the transfer of the share of the accused petitioner the relationship between the accused petitioner and the company ceased to exist on and from 23.08.2009. Since the said transfer of share has been approved by the company and duly notified to the Registrar of Joint Stock Companies before the date of issuance of the cheques in question, the accused petitioner had no authority to sign any cheque on behalf of the company at the relevant time as he was nobody to the company. These facts leave no manner of doubt to find that on the date the offence was committed by the company and since at that relevant time the petitioner was not the Managing Director, he had nothing to do with the affairs of the company. Consequently, no ingredients of section 138 of the Act attracts the accused petitioner to be tried in a criminal prosecution. Md. Shahidul Islam Vs. The State and another (Criminal) 23 ALR (HCD) 141 Section 138 The circular of the Bangladesh Bank has a direction upon the scheduled bank not to issue any Non-MICR cheque after 31.10.2010 but admittedly the instant cheques were issued much earlier and those were given as the security for the borrowed amount which were returned unpaid due to insufficient fund. Therefore, the cheques cannot be considered as illegal or inoperative when those cheques were used for the purpose of getting back the borrowed money from the petitioner. The High Court Division opined that the petitioner submits that the petitioner issued 2 Non-MICR cheques on 23.12.2012 but the Bangladesh Bank has issued a circular on 31.10.2010 under the heading of "আঞ্চলিক নিকাশঘর সমূহের অন্তর্গত ব্যাংক হতে MICR যুক্ত ইন্সট্রুমেন্ট ইস্যু করা প্রসঙ্গে। therefore, the present 2 cheques became illegal or inoperative after the said circular. In this regard, the High Court Division has carefully considered the said circular referred by the learned Advocate and the High Court Division is of the view that the purpose of issuing above circular by the Bangladesh Bank is to phase out the Non- MICR cheques by the replacing MICR cheques. MICR cheques are the cheques known as Magnetic Ink Character Recognition. The High Court Division consider that the Bangladesh Bank intended to improve the standard of the cheques from Non-MICR to MICR by the scheduled bank. In the instant case, admittedly the petitioner issued Non-MICR cheques in the year of 2010 and those cheques were used in the year of 2013. In the High Court Division opinion, cheques which were issued prior to the circular dated 31.10.2010 would remained valid until the cheques are issued or exhausted i.e. the pages cheque books were finally used. The High Court Division also consider that the circular of the Bangladesh Bank has a direction upon the scheduled bank not to issue any Non-MICR cheque after 31.10.2010 but admittedly the instant cheques were issued much earlier and those were given as the security for the borrowed amount which were returned unpaid due to insufficient fund. Therefore, the cheques. mentioned above cannot be considered as illegal or inoperative when those cheques were used for the purpose of getting back the borrowed money from the petitioner. In view of the above discussions, the High Court Division does not find any illegality to continue the above two Sessions Cases against the accused- petitioner, therefore, the High Court Division is not inclined to interfere upon the proceeding of the Sessions Case No. 1282 of 2014 and Sessions Case No. 3466 of 2013, now pending in the Court of the learned Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Chattagram. Accordingly, the High Court Division does not find merit in these two Rules. In the result, both the Rules issued in the Miscellaneous Case No. 22733 of 2014 and Miscellaneous Case No. 9453 of 2014 are discharged. Md. Didarul Alam -Vs. The State and another (Criminal) 23 ALR (HCD) 27 Sections 138 As per provisions of section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, prima-facie case against the petitioner had been made out. Since there is no bar to get the loan amount realized by producing issued cheques for encashment, the instant proceeding were not liable to be quashed. The Appellate Division observed that it is not disputed that the petitioner issued cheques. The objects of issuance of those cheques were to pay the loan amount. Definitely, the petitioner issued those che- ques in favour of the complainant to recover the outstanding by producing those cheques in the Bank for encashment. Accordingly in order to realize the loan, the complainant produced the cheques in the Bank for encashment which were bounced by the Bank. In such situation, the complainant issued legal notice giving the petitioner an opportunity to pay the de- faulted amount but the petitioner failed to pay the same within the stipulated period. Thus, as per provisions of section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, prima- facie case against the petitioner had been made out. The High Court Division held that since there is no bar to get the loan amount realized by producing issued cheques for encashment, the instant proceeding were not liable to be quashed. The Appellate Division does not find any illegality in the judgment and order of the High Court Division which calls any interference by the Appellate Division. Accordingly, all the petitions are dismissed. Ehetasamul Haque -Vs. State and another (Criminal) 20 ALR (AD) 156-157 Section 138-Whether the Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881 is demand notice was defective as because a part payment was made. 2) Whether the part payment of cheque is enough to defect the entire cause of action? The High Court Division held that once the cheque is dishonored, the offence is committed and any payment subsequent there to will not absolve the accused of liability of criminal offence. It is seen that petitioner and her partner jointly issued cheque and part payment was made, more so, the complaint made in writing for payment of the cheque amount by issuing notice to the accused and her partner those are factual aspect and taking into consideration those facts. Besides, the complaint shows that the cheque in question was issued by the Joint signature of the accused and her partner. It's involved serious disputed question facts which requires consideration of evidence which is not on record, will not normally be entertained by a court in the exercise of extra-ordinary jurisdiction under section 561A of the Code. Thus, the proceeding of the case is not abuse of the process of the court and therefore, the same is not liable to be quashed. The Rule having no merit is liable to be discharged. In the result, the rule is discharged. Asma Begum -Vs. The State and another (Criminal) 18 ALR (HCD) 200-203 Section 138-Whether the proceedings under section 138 of the Act, can be continued when a Artha Rin suit is pending against the accused-petitioner on a loan transaction [double jeopardy theory] and whether a blank cheque as security by filling up with a date and amount to bank's liking can be used for encashment of the same. The High Court Division held that the sub-section (3) of section 138 of the Act, 1881 has clearly provided that notwithstanding in sub-section (1) and (2), thereof, the holder of the cheques shall retain his right to establish his claim through civil court if whole or any part of the value of the cheques remain unrealized. So there is no bar to proceed with the criminal proceeding against a person, who has taken loan from the cheque holder's Bank, if a suit for realization of loan money is pending with the Artha Rin Adalat. Once a cheque is issued and if dishonored, then a distinct offence appears to have been committed by the maker of the dishonored cheque under section 138 of the Act, 1881. Because it is a separate criminal offence apparently committed by the drawer as he has failed to make payment of the disho- nored cheque's amount even after knowing-fully about the refusal of the cheque amount by the concerned bank. There is nothing to do with the recovery of the loan according to sub-section (1) of section 138 of the Act, 1881. The question whether a blank cheque deposited as security by filling up with a date and amount to bank's liking can be presented for encashment of the same, is purely a disputed question of fact. The accused- petitioner can raise this point at the time of trial by adducing evidence. In the above discussions, facts and circumstances of the case the High Court Division finds no merit in the rules issued by the High Court Division. Accordingly, these rules are hereby discharged. Md. Golam Mowla-Vs.- The State and another (Criminal) 19 ALR (HCD) 162-165 Sections 138 and 141(1)(C) Whether the trial as held by the court of Additional Metropolitan Session Judge would be without jurisdiction and void, the scheme of the Code, relating to the trial of a case. The High Court Division held that the intention of the legislature as been shown from section 141(1)(C) of the N.I. Act is that no Court other than Court of Session would try an offence punishable under sec- tion 138 of the N.I. Act. But from the discussion the High Court Division has reached a definite conclusion that "Court of Session" includes not only Session Judge but also Additional or Assistant Sessions Judge. If the case under section 138 of the N.I. Act has been made over to any Court of Additional/ Assistant Sessions Judge for trial and the trial of the said case is held by either of them would not be held without jurisdiction, void and abinitio would not necessarily render the findings reached on such a trial completely illegal or void. Regard being had to the above law, facts and circumstances, the High Court Division finds no merit in this rule to quash the proceeding. In the result, this Rule is discharged. Mohammad Moazzem Hossain -Vs. The state and another (Criminal) 20 ALR (HCD) 110-113 Section 118-The documents in question, which the defence seeks to be produced and given in evidence by the prosecution, are confidential and it is for the prosecution to decide whether it would volunteer to produce the documents in the Court. The High Court Division has observed that the documents in question, which the defence seeks to be produced and given in evidence by the prosecution, are confidential and it is for the prosecution to decide whether it would volunteer to produce the documents in the Court. There- fore, the High Court Division hold that the trial Court rightly rejected the accused-peti- tioner's application albeit not on point of law, nevertheless laws discussed hereinbefore are of no assistance to the accused-petitioner. Hence, the High Court Division does not find merit in the Rule. In the result, the Rule is discharged. Alamgir Kabir Vs. The State and another (Criminal) 15 ALR (HCD) 159-162 Sections 43 and 138(a) Applying the 'preponderance of probability' test, it is highly unlikely that in the prevalent circumstances the complainant lent taka 2 crore in cash in early 2016 to the accused for business purpose. The defence has succeeded in establishing its case that the cheques were not given to the complainant to repay the loan, but as part payment under the bainanama. Again, the bainanama could not come into effect. Hence, this Court takes the view that the defecne has successfully rebutted the presumption of consideration as laid down in Section 118(a). The prosecution, in its turn, failed to prove passing of consideration against the cheques. Therefore, the accused-appellant has no legal obligation to pay the value of the dishonoured cheques to the complainant as per provisions of Section 43. The High Court Division held that the trial Court rightly found that the complainant could not prove that he had lent money to the accused for business purpose, but wrongly observed that the cheques were drawn for consideration in respect of payment of purchase price under the bainanama. The trial Court further observed that the cheques ought to have been issued in favour of the complainant's son. The observation of the trial Court in respect of passing of consideration cannot be sustained for the reasons discussed above. Hence, both the appeals succeed. The Court below is directed to return the deposit to the appellant which he made in the trial Court before filing the appeals forthwith. Engr. Mohammad Aminul Islam -Vs.- The State and another (Criminal) 23 ALR (HCD) 31 Section 138 The lendering bank has every right to file a case under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 by using collateral cheque issued in favour of the lender bank. The High Court Division held that there are some admitted factual aspects in these 2 Rules are that the Premier Bank Limited, Khatungonj Branch, Chattagram issued some loan facilities to the present accused- petitioner and those facilities were availed by the present accused-petitioner. However, at certain point of time the accused- petitioner became a defaulter. The opposite party No. 2-bank took steps to file an Artha Rin Case being Artha Rin Case No. 223 of 2014 in order to realize the borrowed money including interest accrued therefrom. At the same time the bank took initiative to use the collateral security of cheque in order to recover the money, as such, 2 C. R. Cases have been filed. The High Court Division has already decide in earlier cases that the lendering bank has every right to file a case under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 by using collateral cheque issued in favour of the lender bank, however, the bank is under an obligation to take initiative first for recovery of borrowed money by exhausting the contractual obligation by way of mortgaged deed as per provision of the Artha Rin Adalat Ain, 2003. In the instant case the bank has already exhausted that forum by filing the Artha Rin Case No. 223 of 2014 in an appropriate Court. Therefore, the High Court Division is of the opinion that the proceeding pending in the Sessions Court against the present petitioner under section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 cannot be considered as illegal because the settled principle is that Artha Rin Case is not a bar to the case under the provision of Act, 1881. Md. Didarul Alam - Vs. The State and another (Criminal) 23 ALR (HCD) 27 Section 138 and 140(1) The High Court Division held that that the cheques were issued by the company as drawer. The accused petitioner was an authorized signatory of the cheques. From plain reading of the complaint itself High Court Division finds that no averments regarding status of the accused petitioner has been made in the complaint connecting him with the business of the company. In the absence of any averment being made about the signatory of the cheques connecting him with the business of the company the requirement of section 140(1) of the Act cannot be said to be satisfied and as such, the Court cannot take cognizance of the offence under section 138 of the Act. Md. Shahidul Islam -Vs.- The State and another (Criminal) 23 ALR (HCD) 141 Section 138 Document are beyond suspicion or doubt and not disputed by the opposite party. The High Court Division considered view that if before the issuance of cheques the accused had transferred his entire shares and ceased to be the Managing Director of the company then he cannot be held liable for the offence of section 138, where cognizance taken, the trial is yet to take place and the materials relied upon by the accused and the complainant which are in the nature of public document are beyond suspicion or doubt and not disputed by the opposite party. In the circumstances, this can be looked into by this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under section 561A of the Code. Md. Shahidul Islam - Vs. The State and another (Criminal) 23 ALR (HCD) 141 ধারা ১৩৮ একই ঘটনা থেকে উদ্ভুত দেওয়ানী এবং ফৌজদারী উভয় মামলা একসাথে চলতে কোন বাধা নাই। অর্থাৎ একই অভিযোগে যুক্তপৎভাবে দেওয়ানী মোকদ্দমা এবং ফৌজদারি মোকদ্দমা চলতে কোন আইনগত বাধা নাই। হাইকোর্ট বিভাগ এই মর্মে সিদ্ধান্ত গ্রহণ করেন যে, বর্তমান মামলায় আসামী-দরখাস্তকারী পক্ষে একমাত্র যুক্তি হল যেহেতু অত্র আসামী দরখাস্তকারী কর্তৃক তর্কিত চেকটির বিষয়ে দেওয়ানী আদালতে মামলা করেছেন যা এখনও বিচারাধীন (প্রথম আপিল ১১৫ (২০১৫) সেহেতু উক্ত দেওয়ানী মামলা চলাকালীন বর্তমান ফৌজদারী মামলা নং এস টি ৭৪৯/২০১৫ এর কার্যক্রম চলতে পারে না। আপিল বিভাগ কর্তৃক প্রদত্ত উপরোক্ত সিদ্ধান্ত সমূহ পর্যালোচনায় এটা কাঁচের মত সুস্পষ্ট যে, একই ঘটনা থেকে উদ্ভুত দেওয়ানী এবং ফৌজদারী উভয় মামলা একসাথে চলতে কোন বাধা নাই। অর্থাৎ একই অভিযোগে যুক্তপৎভাবে দেওয়ানী মোকদ্দমা এবং ফৌজদারি মোকদ্দমা চলতে কোন আইনগত বাধা নাই। সার্বিক বিচার বিশ্লেষণ পূর্বক তথা নথিপত্র পর্যালোচনা এবং মহামান্য আপিল বিভাগের রায়ের আলোকে অত্র রুলটি খারিজযোগ্য। অতএব, আদেশ হয় যে, রুলটি বিনা খরচায় খারিজ করা হল। মাষ্টার আব্দুল কাদের -বনাম- রাষ্ট্র এবং অপর একজন (Criminal) 23 ALR (HCD) 62 Section 138 The complainant-leave-petitioner failed to prove the case as made out in the complaint-petition against accused- respondent No. 1 beyond all reasonable doubt and as such, the impugned judgment and order of conviction and sentence called for interference. The Appellate Division held that admittedly, accused-respondent No. 1 was given in marriage to the son of the complainant-leave-petitioner and as soon as respondent No. 1 divorced her husband, the complaint-petition was filed against respondent No. 1. Having gone through the record, the Appellate Division is fully satisfied that the complaint-petition was filed in order to harass respondent No. 1 for divorcing the son of the complainant-leave- petitioner. In the light of the findings made before, the Appellate Division does not find any substance in this criminal petition. Accordingly, this criminal petition is dis- missed. Sheikh Wahiduzzaman Dipu. -Vs.- Tanima Afrin Kumkum and another. (Criminal) 21 ALR (AD) 44-46 Section 138 read with Artha Rin Adalat Ain [VIII of 2003] Section 5 Sub-section (1) of section 138 has not made any qualification of the cheque so returned unpaid either post dated given as a security for repayment of the loan availed by the loanee has alleged by the accused or any other cheque issued by the drawer for encashment currently. When the legislature has not made any difference between a post-dated cheque issued as security for the repayment of the loan availed by the loanee, the petitioner, being the loanee has issued a cheque for encashment currently, the High Court Division does not see any scope of making any such difference. According to the provision of Artha Rin Adalat Ain, 2003, Artha Rin suit relates to realization of loan or debt by a financial institution while dishonour of cheque relates to an offence by the loanee against the lender such dishonour has been created a distinct offence and made punishable offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, which is both penal and procedural law. The offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to thrice the amount of the cheque or both. Sub-section 2 of section 138 provides for payment to the holder of the cheque any amount upto the face value of the cheque as far as is covered by the fine realized from the accused. To appreciate the grounds taken by the accused-petitioner that the petitioner took loan from the complaint-Bank and issued a cheque against repayment of the loan as security and as such the present proceeding against the petitioner under Section 138 and 141 are liable to be quashed. On plain reading of sub-section (1) of section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 shows that an of- fence under the section shall be deemed to have been committed the moment a cheque is drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with a banker for payment of any amount of money to another person from out of that account is returned by the bank unpaid on any of the grounds mentioned therein. Sub-section (1) of section 138 has not made any qualification of the cheque so returned unpaid either post dated given as a security for repayment of the loan availed by the loanee has alleged by the accused or any other cheque issued by the drawer for encashment currently. When the legislature has not made any difference between a post-dated cheque issued as security for the repayment of the loan availed by the loanee, the petitioner, being the loanee has issued a cheque for encashment currently, the High Court Division does not see any scope of making any such difference. In this respect reliance may be placed on the decision reported in 17 BLC (AD) 177. It is pertinent to note that in the decision reported in 24 BLC (AD)-139 their lordship held-that "question of fact as to the issuance of the cheque as security or advance or post dated can only be decided upon recoding evidence." Which is not liable to be quashed having regard to the facts and circumstances, the decisions cited above, the High Court Division finds no merit in the rule. In the result, the Rule is discharged. Md. Haroon Vs. Bank Aisa Limited and another (Criminal) 21 ALR (HCD) 10-13 Section 138 Whether a Criminal Appeal abate on the death of the appellant. The High Court Division held that the accused-appellant died on 29.01.2016 as such the Criminal Appeal abates on the death of the accused-appellant. An Appeal against a sentence of fine shall not abate by reason of death of the accused-appellant because it is not a matter which affect his person but on which affect his estate. Hence part of the appeal which relates to the sentence of imprisonment shall abate on the death of the accused-appellant but other part relating to the sentence of fine shall not abate. The balance dues of the cheque amount are recoverable and shall be realized from the estate of the deceased ac- cused-appellant. M.A. Motin -Vs. The State and another. (Criminal) 21 ALR (HCD) 89- 91 Section 138 There is no legal bar of filing a single case against the drawer of the cheques if the notice is served within the period of limitation intimating the fact of dishonour of the cheques with a request to pay the amount involved in those cheques within a period of thirty days. The Appellate Division has already settled that there is no legal bar of filing a single case against the drawer of the cheques if the notice is served within the period of limitation intimating the fact of dishonour of the cheques with a request to pay the amount involved in those cheques within a period of thirty days. As observed above, the dishonour of a cheque does itself not constitute an offence under section 138. If the drawer of such cheque fails to make payment of the amount of money to the payee within thirty days of receipt of the notice, the cause of action for constituting the offence will arise, and if a complaint is filed within one month of the date on which the cause of action arises, the court shall take cognizance of the offence. So, the cause of action will arise if the drawer fails to make payment as above to the payee. Now, if the same drawer fails to make payment of the amount of money covered by the cheque(s) within the stipulated time, does it constitute no cause of action? It does. If it does constitute a cause of action, there will be no legal bar to file a case for prosecuting the drawer for the said cause of action. Here the cause of action is not distinct but the same. Similar fact was involved in Bilakchand Gyanchand Co. V. A. Chinnaswami, (1999) 5 SCC 693. In that case, the accused did not even challenge the propriety of filing of one case against the dishonour of six cheques. Six cheques were issued by the Shakti Spinners Ltd. and were signed by its Managing Director. The cheques were dishonoured with an endorsement that 'sufficient funds were not available and exceed arrangement'. After service of notice the drawee filed a complaint and consequently, process was issued against the Managing Director. On an application moved for quashing the proceedings, the High Court quashed the proceedings on the ground that no notice was served upon the company. The Supreme Court set aside the judgment on the ground that the High Court fell in error in quashing the proceedings, inasmuch as, there is no 'infirmity in the notice issued under section 138 addressed to A. Chinnaswami, who was a signatory of the cheques'. Therefore, the Appellate Division finds no merit in these appeals. The Appellate Division would, however, like to observe that the complainant(s)/drawee(s) of the cheques may, if so advised, arraign by adding the Companies in the category of accused if they feel that for getting effective relief in the cases the presence of the companies is necessary in the cases. The appeals and the petitions are dismissed without, however, any order as to costs. Mohammad Eusof Babu and others Vs. Johan Provanjon Chowdhury (Criminal) 23 ALR (AD) 58 Section 138 Whether if a company incorporated under the Companies Act commits an offence punishable under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 is excluded from prosecution, can a director, manager, secretary or other officer of the company be prosecuted for that offence, and secondly, whether if more than one cheques issued by the same drawer can be prosecuted in a single case. Mohammad Eusof Babu and others -Vs.- Johan Provanjon Chowdhury (Criminal) 23 ALR (AD) 58 Sections 138 and 141(c) The anomaly that has been surfaced as regards forum of appeal and revision may easily be cured by a common administrative approach by the Sessions Judges concerned in all districts in Ban- gladesh through allocation of the cases under Section 138 of the NI Act for trial to the Joint Sessions Judges. Therefore, according to it, merely on the ground of administrative anomaly and inconsistent approach of different Sessions Judges in different districts in distribution of the cases of this nature, the proceedings should not be quashed or declared to be without lawful authority. All such cases under Section 138 of the NI Act should be sent to the Joint Sessions Judges for trial, and the concerned Sessions Judges of the respective Divisions should adopt this similar approach in distributing those cases. The High Court Division does not find any reason to interfere into the proceedings concerned in the aforesaid cases. The High Court Division is of the view that the practical anomaly that has been surfaced because of the inconsistent administrative orders by different Sessions Judges in different Sessions Divisions may be cured by the common approach as stated above. Thus, the Rules in these writ petitions. should be discharged with such direction. Accordingly, the Rules are discharged. All Sessions Judges in all Sessions Divisions in Bangladesh are directed to allocate the cases under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881 for trial to the Courts of Joint Sessions Judges only. The cases which have already been transferred or distributed to the Courts of Additional Sessions Judges, or Sessions Judges, in any Sessions Division should immediately be retransferred/reallocated to the Joint Ses- sions Judges of the said Division and the concerned Joint Sessions Judges shall continue the trial of such cases from the stage reached by the said Additional Sessions Judges or Sessions Judges. Registrar General of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh and the Registrar of the High Court Division of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh are directed to issue necessary circulars in this regard asking the concerned Sessions Judges for allocation of cases under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act for trial to the Joint Sessions Judges of divisions concerned within 15 (fifteen) days from the date of receipt of such circular. Let a copy of this Judgment be sent to the Registrar General of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh as well as the Registrar of the High Court Division of the Supreme Court of Bangladesh for taking necessary steps in this regard. A A M Ziaur Rahman -Vs- Bangladesh and others (Spl. Original) 20 ALR (HCD) 102-107 Sections 138 and 140 read with Code of Criminal Procedure [V of 1898] Section 561A Under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act an offence is committed, if a cheque is dishonoured and if payment is not made within 30 days after receipt of a legal notice, which is well present in this case. Since the cheque issued by the accused-petitioner was dishonoured for insufficient of fund and the petitioner failed to pay the amount of the dishonoured cheque in time, offence under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act has been dis- closed against the accused petitioner. On the basis of defence plea or materials the criminal proceedings should not be stifled before trial, when there is a prima-facie case for going to the trial. On scrutiny of the record, it appears to the High Court Division that admittedly, the accused-petitioner issued a cheque of Taka 45,00,000/- (forty five Lac) in favour of the complainant opposite party No. 2 on 02.01.2012 and the said cheque was placed for encashment in bank on 18.01.2012 but the same was returned unpaid as there was no sufficient fund to honour the cheque and thereafter, the complainant opposite party No. 2 issued a legal notice asking to pay the cheque's money within 30 days but the accused petitioner did not turn to pay the cheque's amount. Under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act an offence is committed, if a cheque is dishonoured and if payment is not made within 30 days after receipt of a legal notice, which is well present in this case. Since the cheque issued by the accused-petitioner was disho- noured for insufficient of fund and the petitioner failed to pay the amount of the dishonoured cheque in time, offence under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act has been disclosed against the accused petitioner. The plea as taken in this application and supplementary affidavit dated 01.04.209 appears to be defence plea or materials, based on bundle of facts, which can be adjudicated at the trial. Be that as it may, the proposition of law is by now fairly established that on the basis of defence plea or materials the criminal proceedings should not be stifled before trial, when there is a prima-facie case for going to the trial. Taking into consideration of overall facts, circumstances and materials on record, the High Court Division is of the view that the petition of complaint undoubtedly discloses that the accused petitioner is liable for the offence under section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act. In framing the charge under section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act against the accused peti- tioner, the learned Joint Metropolitan Sessions Judge, 6th Court, Dhaka did not commit any illegality whatsoever. Therefore, the High Court Division does not any merit in this Rule. In the result, the Rule is discharged. Air Commodore (Retd.) Sayed Gilani -Vs. The State and another. (Criminal) 16 ALR (HCD)123-125 Section 138 Section 44 provides for a pro tanto reduction of the amount where there is a partial absence or partial failure of consideration. To ensure a proportionate reduction in liability against the instrument, partial absence or partial failure of consideration must be capable of being ascertained or calculated with a fair degree of certainty. The High Court Division held that sub- section (2) of Section 138 provides, "Where any fine is realised under sub- section (1), any amount up to the face value of the cheque as far as is covered by the fine realised shall be paid to the holder". Thus, the criminal proceeding under Section 138 serves two purposes: firstly, to punish the offender and secondly, to recover the value of the cheque. The object of adding sub-section (2) to Section 138 is to alleviate the grievance of the com- plainant. There can be no dispute insofar as the sentence of imprisonment is concerned that it should commensurate with the gravity of the crime. Court has to deal with the offenders by imposing proper sentence by taking into consideration of facts and circumstances of each case. It is not only the rights of the offenders which are required to be looked into at the time of the imposition of sentence, but also of the victims of the crime and society at large, also by considering the object sought to be achieved by the particular legislation. Considering facts and circumstances of the case in hand and the object of the law, the High Court Division is of the view that the sentence of imprisonment would be a harsh sentence having no penal objective to be achieved. Hence, the sentence of imprisonment is set aside. Mahmudul Hasan Vs. The State and another (Criminal) 19 ALR (HCD) 315-318 Section 138-It is well settled that the enumeration of specific matter "without prejudice to the generality" of a particular provision does not restrict the general application of that provision to the matters enumerated because the words "without prejudice" have the effect of preserving the full effect of the general provisions and also because the Rule of ejusdeme generis has no universe application. Those words clearly indicate that the provision of section 138 did not make any embargo in the application of other provisions of the Act. Where the amount promised shall depend on some other complementary facts or fulfillment of another promise and if any cheque is issued on that basis, but that promise is not fulfilled it will not create any obligation on the part of the drawer of the cheque or any right which can be claimed by the holder of the cheque. The Appellate Division observed that the High Court Division being last court of facts upon elaborate consideration of the evidence both the oral and documentary has come to the conclusion that the complainant failed to take any step to sell the property of the respondent, rather the respondent and his brother and sister sold the said property to the U.S.A. Embassy and the complainant did not help the respondent in any way in that regard. It is relevant here to quote the evidence of the complainant which he adduced before the trial court as P.W.1 which are as follows: "আমি অত্র মামলার বাদী। আসামী ইমরান রশীদের সাথে ১৩/৩/১২ খ্রিঃ তারিখে রেজিঃকৃত Memo বা Agreement যার নম্বর ১৮৯৮/১২। আসামী ডকে উপস্থিত নাই। উক্ত Agreement এর শর্তানুযারী আগামী ১/৭/১৩ খ্রিঃ তারিখে ১টা cheque দেয় ১ কোটি টাকা। যার নম্বর ০৫৫৯৫৭০ ইহা আমার নামীয় ব্যাংক Account এ বিগত ১৮/৭/১৩ খ্রিঃ তারিখে জমা দেই। কিন্তু stop payment এর কারনে Dishonour হয়। ২৫/৭/১৩ খ্রিঃ তারিখে ইহা পুনরায় জমা দিলে অনুরুপভাবে Dishonour হয়। উক্ত বিষয়ে আমি ১৩/৮/১৩ খ্রিঃ তারিখে আসামীর প্রতি Legal Notice প্রদান করি। কিন্তু আসামী পাওনা পরিশোধ না করার কারণে অত্র মামলা দায়ের করি। অতঃপর ১০/৯/১৩ খ্রিঃ অত্র মামলা দায়ের করি। এই নালিশ (Ext-1) আমার স্বাক্ষর (Ext-1-1) এই সেই cheque (Ext-2), এই সেই দুইটা Dishonour slips (Ext-3 series), এই সেই Legal Notice with postal receipts (Ext 4 series), এবং এই আমার Memo of Agreement (Ext-5) মুল কপি দায়রা ৩০৭৯/১৩ মামলায় দাখিল আছে।" Nowhere in his examination-in-chief the complainant claimed that in terms of agreement (Ext-5) he had brought the purchaser to sell the respondent's property and, accordingly, the same was sold. In his cross examination, the complainant has admitted the fact saying, "আমার memo. of understanding এর ১নং শর্তে উল্লেখ আছে ৯০ কার্যদিবসের মধ্যে" positive out coming নিয়ে আসতে হবে। ২(ধ) শর্তে উল্লেখ আছে বাজার মূল্যে ক্রেতা আনিতে পারিলে আমি (বাদী) কমিশন পাব। (emphasis supplied) He further said that, "কথিত শর্তের কারণে আসামী গং $5.25 M dollar এ ঐ plot বিক্রির প্রস্তাব দেয় মার্কিন দূতাবাসের নিকট।" He further said that, "০৩/০৭/১৩ খ্রিঃ তারিখে sale deed (deed of transfer) সম্পাদন ও রেজিস্ট্রি হয়। তেজগাঁও Registry office Registration nq| H deed এ আমি উপস্থিত ছিলাম না।" That is accused respondent offered the proposal to sell their property to the American Embassy and even, at the time of execution and regis- tration of sale deed, the appellant was not present in the Sub-Registrar's office. Ext.5 would create a liability of the respondent to pay commission under the agreement only when the appellant secured net market price of the res respondent's property by sale what did not happen in this case. In his cross examination the complainant has said, "২(ধ) শর্তে উল্লেখ আছে বাজার মূল্যে ক্রেতা আনিতে পারিলে আমি (বাদী) কমিশন পাব।" There is no such averment, in the petition of complaint or in the evidence that the complainant has stated that he had brought any purchaser who offered market price of the property. From the evidence quoted above it appears that the condition under which the cheques were issued was not ful- filled by the complainant appellant. Thus, the respondent instructed the bank not to encash the impugned cheques. Accordingly, the bank returned the cheques with endorsement, "payment stopped by the drawer". Where the amount promised shall depend on some other complementary facts or fulfillment of another promise and if any cheque is issued on that basis, but that promise is not fulfilled it will not create any obligation on the part of the drawer of the cheque or any right which can be claimed by the holder of the cheque. As such dishonesty or fraud cannot be attributed to the respondent in giving stop payment instructions. Consequently, the question of committing an offence by the accused respondent punishable under section 138 of the Act does not arise. Thus, the Appellate Division is of the view that these appeals do not deserve any consideration. Accordingly, all the appeals are dismissed. Md. Abul Kaher -Vs.- Emran Rashid and another (Criminal) 19 ALR (AD) 56-64 Sections 138 (3) read with Code of Criminal Procedure [V of 1898] Section 561A-Whether the institution of two types of cases in relation to the same amount of money should be allowed to continue. The High Court Division found that the issues raised in an Artha Rin Suit are confined to the realization of money along with the interest thereon. The said suit does not involve any criminal liability. On the other hand, a case under section 138 of the N.I. Act involves a strict criminal liability which means that, the offence thereunder, May not involve a means rea and institution of an Artha Rin Suit does not exempt the offender from the criminal of liability being the penalty of a maximum imprisonment of 1(one) year or specified quantum of fine or both. In view of the above, the High Court Division hold that the institution of the Artha Rin Suit is not valid a ground for quashment of or interference with the proceeding in the Sessions Case under section 138 of the N.I. Act. However the High Court Division like to observe that if any money is realized in the process of the Artha Rin Suit or otherwise the trial Court may consider this aspect subject to production of proper evidence. In the result, the Rule issued in this case is discharged. Md. Nasir Uddin Umar @ Nasir Uddin Mohammad Omar - Vs.- Chowdhury Jahangir Jahural Ambia Al-Baki and another (Criminal) 18 ALR (HCD) 395-397 Section 138-Dispute between the parties in N.I Act proceeding may be resolved out of Court by the parties on compromise and the same should be allowed by the Court at any stage of the proceeding even at appellate and revisional stage. The High Court Division held that the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (shortly N.I. Act) is silent about compromise of offences under the Act. But the Act does not make any provision therein prohibiting such compromise. Be that as it may, since N.I. Act proceeding arises out of monetary transaction and the proceeding is a quasi civil and quasi criminal in nature and maximum sentence under the law is one year inasmuch as that our criminal administration encourages compromise at any stage of the proceeding as well as at appellate and revisional stage, the High Court Division is of the view that the dis- pute between the parties in N.I Act proceeding may be resolved out of Court by the parties on compromise and the same should be allowed by the Court at any stage of the proceeding even at appellate and revisional stage. Since this matter is pending by way of appeal before this Court, the High Court Division has no hesitation in allowing the compromise and as a result, this composition shall have the effect of acquittal of the accused. Accordingly, the application for compromise is allowed and the appeal is disposed of in terms of the compromise petition. Respondent No. 2 will be at liberty to withdraw 50% of the cheque amount from the court below. Md. Jony Chowdhury -Vs. The State and another (Criminal) 18 ALR (HCD) 251-252 Sections 138 and 141 read with Code of Criminal Procedure [V of 1898] Section 561 A-An offence under section 138(1) of the Act, 1881 shall be deemed to have been committed when any cheque(s) drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with a banker for payment of any amount of money to another person from out of that account is returned by the bank unpaid for the reasons stated therein arid such unpaid/dishonoured cheque(s) gives rise to initial cause of action to the payee, or, as the case may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque(s) for filing a petition of complaint as provided in clause (a) of section 141 of the Act, 1881 subject to fulfillment of the conditions as detailed in clauses (a) (b) and (c) of the proviso to sub section (1) of section 138 of the Act, 1981. The High Court Division held that the complainant categorically narrated the manner of crime committed by the accused. The learned Judge after considering the entire materials on record rightly framed charge under Section 138 of the Act against the accused. Moreso, in defence the accused denied the entire allegations. So, when there is such denial, the question of innocence does not arise. With this regard reliance has been placed in the case of Abdur Rahim alias A.N.M. Abdur Rahman Vs. Enamul Haq and another 43 DLR AD)-173. All that is required at the stage of framing charge is to see whether the prima-facie case regarding commission of certain offence is made out. The truth veracity and effect of evidence which prosecution proposes to adduce at the time is not to be meticulously judged at the stage of framing charge. In the instant case the accused stand indicted for offence punishable under Section 138 of the Act. Cognizance has been taken under the said section. The High Court Division has meticulously examined the allegations made by the complainant and we find that the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Act has been clearly disclosed in the instant case against the accused. The High Court Division has gone through the grounds taken in the petition of Misc. case and the High Court Division finds that such grounds are absolutely the disputed question of facts and the same should be decided at trial. The pleas of the petitioner are nothing but the defence plea. Be that as it may the proposition of law is now well settled that on the basis of defence plea or materials the criminal proceedings should not be stifled before trial; when there is a prima-facie case for going for trial. In view of such facts the grounds taken in the petition of Misc. case are not the correct exposition of law. Moreso interruption of the course of Justice will set up a wrong precedent by which the course of justice instead of being advanced readily been stifled inasmuchas the grounds advanced before us are not correct or legal exposition of law. Therefore the High Court Division hold that there are sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused for going for trial under Section 138 of the Act. To that end in view the High Court Division is at one with the learned Judge of the Court below regarding framing of charge against the accused. In view of the above the High Court Division failed to discover any merit in this Rule. Thus the Rule having no merit fails. Moreover, the impugned proceedings in its entirety is well founded in the facts and circumstances of the case. So the grounds advanced by the learned Counsel for the accused petitioners are not the correct exposition of law. On the contrary the submissions advanced by the learned Counsels for the opposite parties prevail and appear to have a good deal of force. In the light of discussions made above and the preponderant judicial views emerging out of the authorities refer to above the High Court Division is of the view that the impugned proceedings suffers from no legal infirmities which calls for no interference by the High Court Division. In view of foregoing narrative the Rule is discharged. Md. Abdul Kadir, Proprietor of M/S. Sonargaon Enterprise, 245. Rangdhanu Reside-ntial Area, Chowkid- ekhi, Sadar, Sylhet. Vs. The State (Criminal) 18 ALR (HCD) 241-248 Section 138 read with Code of Criminal Procedure [V of 1898] Sections 200 and 561A-No bar or illegality in filing the case after bouncing the cheque for the 2nd time on service of legal notice afresh. The petition of complaint shows that the complainant presented the cheque for the last time, while the accused-petitioner assured him that it would be honored. The petition of complaint was filed complying with all d the formalities as were required by the law. The High Court Division held that the order sheet of the trial Court that PW1 was examined on 10.07.2014, while the accused was absent. Its next date had been fixed to 31.08.2014 for hearing argument. On that day the accused appeared with a prayer for bail. The bail was granted, PW1 was re- called and cross examined in part and the next date had been fixed for further cross- examination and examination of the accused under section 342 of the Code. But it appears from subsequent orders passed by the Court that the accused petitioner took adjournments in various pretexts and the approached this Court and obtained this Rule. The petitioner took dilatory tactics in disposing the case. The case is still pending for further cross-examination and for examining the accused under section 342 of the Code. Our Apex Court disapproved quashing the proceedings at this stage of the case. In view of the above position of fact at law, the High Court Division finds no substance in the submission of Mr. Islam. The Rule thus bears no substance. Consequently, the Rule is discharged. Sahadat Hossain Chowdhury -Vs.- Aziz Uddin Chowdhury and another (Criminal) 18 ALR (HCD) 75-77 Sections 138 and 140 read with Code of Criminal Procedure [V of 1898] Section 561A-The petition of complaint was filed offer more than 30 days, whether it is violation of section 141(b) of the Negotiable Instrument Act "Court of Session" includes not only Session Judge but also Additional or Assistant Sessions Judge. The High Court Division held that if the case under section 138 of the N.L. Act has been made over to any Court of Additional / Assistant Sessions Judge for trial and the trial of the said case is held by either of them would not be held without jurisdic- tion, void and abinitio would not necessarily render the findings reached on such a trial completely illegal or void. Moreover the other points to the effect that the case is time barred is a matter of fact which needs to be assessed upon taking evidence during trial. An application under section 561A of the Code of Criminal procedure contains no scope to consider the disputed question of fact. Md. Selim Zaman -Vs. The state and another (Criminal) 18 ALR (HCD) 13-16 Section 138 read with বিশেষ আদালত (অতিরিক্ত দায়িত্ব) আইন, ২০০৩ Sections 4, 6 and 8 The trial held by Special Judges Court whether corum non-judice. As the Special Judges Courts established at M.P. Hostel in the National Parliament area have been abolished from long ago and as those Special Judges Court created at that time have no existence at all, trial of the case held by any one of such courts is illegal and without jurisdiction. The High Court Division held that the learned Metropolitan Sessions Judge. Dhaka ought not to have noted the said S.R.O. No. 67-Law/2008 long nine years after the proclamation of such S.R.O. He could have normally transfer the record of the case for trial and disposal to any court of Special Sessions Judge in view of the provision laid down in section 8 of the বিশেষ আদালত (অতিরিক্ত দায়িত্ব) আইন, ২০০৩. But for this subtle wrong done by the learned Metropolitan Sessions Judge at the time when he was transferring the case record for trial and disposal, the entire proceedings including the judgment and order of conviction and sentence passed after conclusion of trial can not be made liable to be quashed not because the case record was transferred to and received by a Judge of without jurisdiction as per S.R.O. 67-Law/2008, it is because the Special Judge and Special Sessions Judge, Court No. 8, Dhaka was quite competent to try the case in terms of section 4,6 and 8 of the বিশেষ আদালত (অতিরিক্ত দায়িত্ব) আইন, ২০০৩। Ashraf Hossain Bokaul. -Vs- The State and another (Criminal) 17 ALR (HCD) 127-129 Section 138 The provisions of sub-section (1A) of section 138 of the Act, 1881 which are (1A) The notice required to be served under clause (b) of sub-section (1) shall be served in the following manner- (a) by delivering it to the person on whom it is to be served; or (b) by sending it by registered post with acknowledgment due to that person at his usual or last known place of abode or business in Bangladesh; or (c) by publication in a daily Bangla national newspaper having circulation. a wide From the above provisions of law, there are three modes to serve a notice upon the accused-opposite party with a demand to repay the money, to make him aware before initiation of a criminal proceeding under the Act, 1881. The above modes of service of notice are not alternative to each other, rather any one of the above modes is enough and exhaustive. Md. Anis -Vs.- Md. Anam Miah and another (Criminal) 17 ALR (HCD) 95-97 Sections 138 and 140 read with Code of Criminal Procedure [V of 1898] Section 265(Ga)-It is now as well settled law that criminal proceeding can be proceeded independently of the civil suit and there is nothing in law precluding a criminal case on account of a civil suit pending against the petitioners on the same facts. The criminal case stands for the offence, while the civil suit is for realization of money. Both can stand together. The High Court Division considered in the case of Khondaker Mahtabuddin Ahmed Vs. State reported in 49 DLR (AD)-132 where there Lordship held thus; "There is nothing in law precluding a criminal case on account of a civil suit pending against the petitioners on the same facts. The criminal case stands for the offence, while the civil suit is for realization of money. Both can stand together." In light of the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case and ratio decidendi, the High Court Division does not find merit in this Rule. In the result, the Rule is discharged without any order as to cost. Mr. Nur Alam Mahadi -Vs.- IDLC Finance Limited and another (Criminal) 16 ALR (HCD)162-163 Sections 138 and 140 read with Code of Criminal Procedure [V of 1898] Section 561A-It is well settled that there is no bar to proceed with the case under section 138 of the Act, 1881, if it is claimed that the alleged cheque is blank and security cheque because it is disputed question of fact and it can only be decided upon recording evidence. The High Court Division taking the relevant portion of the judgment passed by the Appellate Division which are as follows: "Another important issue is issuance of a blank cheque without mentioning the date and amount will come within the definition on cheque or not. If the cheque is not drawn for a specified amount, it would not fall within the definition of bill of exchange. Filling up amount portion and debt are material. Any alteration without the consent of the party who issued the cheque rendered the same invalid. However, question of issuance of blank cheque and fraudulent insertion of larger amount than actual liabilities is a question of fact. Insertion of larger amount in blank cheque than actual liability is an ingredient of fraud which can not be approved since fraud goes to the root of the transaction. Where there is an intention to deceive and means of the deceit to obtain an advantage, there is fraud. The High Court Division on an application under section 561A of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not authorized to quash a proceeding adjudi- cating a disputed question of fact. Once issuance of cheque and signature thereon are found to be genuine, the court shall proceed with the proceeding. Question of fraud or fraudulent insertion can only be determined by recording and considering evidence by the trial Court after holding trial. However, if blank cheque is issued towards liability or as security, when the liab-ility is proved, if the cheque is filled up and pres-ented to the bank, the person who had drawn the cheque can not avoid criminal liability. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, our considered opinion is that the disputed question of fact as to the issuance of the cheque as 'security' of 'ad- vance' or 'postdated' can only be decided upon recording evidence". On perusal of the impugned order dated 06.6.2016 passed by the learned Joint Metropolitan Sessions Judge 3rd Court, Dhaka in Metro session case No. 475 of 2013 the High Court Division finds that the said order is well reasoned and amply supported by the settle principles of law. In view of discussions made above and the judicial view emerged referred to above, the High Court Division is of the view that the impugned order suffers from no illegality which calls for no interference by The High Court Division. Thus the Rule. having no merit fails. In the result, the Rule is discharged. Md. Moslem Uddin Bulu Vs- The State and another (Criminal) 16 ALR (HCD)218-220 Sections 138 and 141-Whether a proceeding under section 138 of the 'Act, 1881 would lie against the drawer of the unpaid/ dishonoured cheque(s) when it/he obtained the loan by creating equitable mortgage and the complainant company had the option to recover the loan money by selling the mortgaged property even the cheque(s) returned unpaid. The High Court Division held that an offence under section 138(1) of the Act, 1881 shall be deemed to have been committed when any cheque(s) drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with a banker for payment of any amount of money to another person from out of that account is returned by the bank unpaid for the reasons stated therein arid such unpaid/ dishonoured cheque(s) gives rise to initial cause of action to the payee, or, as the case may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque(s) for filing a petition of complaint as provided in clause (a) of section 141 of the Act, 1881 subject to fulfillment of the conditions as detailed in clauses (a) (b) and (c) of the proviso to sub section (1) of section 138 of the Act, 1981 and attain its maturity alter the drawer of such unpaid/dishonoured cheque(s) fails to make the payment of the amount of money of such cheque(s) within the period of thirty days of the receipt of the notice served under clause (b). In this regard, it is also significant to note that sub-section (3) of section 138 of the Act, 1881 has clearly provided that notwithstanding any thing contained in sub-sections (1) (1) and (2) thereof, the holder of the cheque(s) shall retain his right to establish his claim through civil Court if whole or any part of the value of the cheque(s) remains unrealized. Md. Hossain Vs. The State (Criminal) 16 ALR (HCD)242-248 Section 138-On the basis of defence plea or materials the criminal proceedings should not be stifled before trial; when there is a prima-facie case for going for trial. The High Court Division held that in the instant case the accused stand indicted for offence punishable under Section 138 of the Act. Cognizance has been taken under the said section. The High Court Division has meticulously examined the allegations made by the complainant and the High Court Division finds that the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Act has been clearly disclosed in the instant case against the accused. The High Court Division has gone through the grounds taken in the petition of Misc. case and the High Court Division finds that such grounds are absolutely the disputed question of facts and the same should be decided at trial. The pleas of the petitioner are nothing but the defence plea. Be that as it may the proposition of law is now well settled that on the basis of defence plea or materials the criminal proceedings should not be stifled before trial; when there is a prima-facie case for going for trial. In view of such facts the grounds taken in the petition of Misc. case are not the correct exposition of law. Moreso interruption of the course of Justice will set up a wrong. precedent by which the course of justice instead of being advanced readily been stifled inasmuchas the grounds advanced before the High Court Division are not correct or legal exposition of law. Therefore the High Court Division hold that there are sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused for going for trial under Section 138 of the Act. To that end in view the High Court Division is at one with the learned Judge of the Court below regarding framing of charge against the accused. In view of the above the High Court Division failed to discover any merit in this Rule. Thus the Rule having no merit fails. Md. Hossain -Vs.- The State (Criminal) 16 ALR (HCD)242-248 Sections 138 and 141(1)(b)-Whether the proceeding initiated under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act 1881 against the accused petitioner is barred by section 141(1)(b) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 as the complainant earlier issued legal notice in the 'Daily Azadi' on 14.07.2011 for dishonour of the cheques on 28.06.2011 but the complainant without taking recourse to the appropriate remedy within the time fixed under section 141(b) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 again issued legal notice published in the daily 'Jugantor' on 17.11.2011 for dishonour of self same cheques on 02.11.2011 and filed the instant case on 21.11.2011 under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 on the basis of second notice published in the daily 'Jugantor' long after the expiry of the period of limitation. The procedural limitation provided in section 141 (b) cannot take away the substantive right accruing to the beneficiary of a cheque to prosecute any number of subsequent presentation of the cheque on its dishonour. Similarly, each dishonour will give rise to a concomitant right to serve notice under proviso (b) to section 138 (1) of the Act and demand pay- ment, failing which the bearer of the cheque will have the right to make a complaint in writing in accordance with section 141 (a) of the Act. It will be entirely up to the bearer of the cheque to proceed in respect of any particular dishonour of the cheque, keeping in mind that each step of the process has to be taken within the period stipulated by the law. It is the considered view of the Appellate Division that there is no conflict between proviso (c) to section 138(1) and section 141(b). Sections 138 and 140 of the Act are substantive provisions of law giving details of the offence, when the offence is committed and who is liable; section 141 of the Act describes the proce- dure to be followed. The intention of the legislature in enacting section 141(b) is to provide a time limit within which the complaint against the defaulting drawer of the cheque is to be made. This section does not preclude the holder of the cheque from presenting the cheque to the bank again for payment, subject only to the condition that the second and subsequent presentation of the cheque must be within six months from the date on which the cheque was drawn in order to be able to prosecute the drawer of the cheque criminally under section 138 of the Act. Upon subsequent presentation of the cheque for payment, if it is again disho- noured another opportunity will accrue to the beneficiary to take action as provided under section 138(1) of the Act, and again. in accordance with the provisions of section 141, the beneficiary of the cheque will be obliged to make complaint against such subsequent dishonour within a period of one month from the cause of action arising under proviso (c) to section 138 (1) of the Act. The offence is committed each time the cheque is dishonoured on presentation for payment. There is nothing in section 141(b) to suggest that the cause of action cannot arise more than once under clause (c) of the proviso to section 138(1). The procedural limitation provided in section 141 (b) cannot take away the substantive right accruing to the beneficiary of a cheque to prosecute any number of subsequent presentation of the cheque on its dishonour. Similarly, each dishonour will give rise to a concomitant right to serve notice under proviso (b) to section 138 (1) of the Act and demand payment, failing which the bearer of the cheque will have the right to make a complaint in writing in accordance with section 141 (a) of the Act. It will be entirely up to the bearer of the cheque to proceed in respect of any particular dishonour of the cheque, keeping in mind that each step of the process has to be taken within the period stipulated by the law. Hence, the Appellate Division holds that decision in the case of Dr. Md Mofizur Rahman and ors vs Md Bashirullah and another, 55 DLR 630 was incorrect and is accordingly overruled. In view of the above discussion, the opinion of the Appellate Division is that the appeals have no merit and are accordingly dismissed. For the same reasons the criminal petition for leave to appeal is also dismissed. Nizam Uddin Mahmud Hossain Vs. The State and another (Criminal) 16 ALR (AD) 3-11 Section 138 read with Code of Criminal Procedure [V of 1898] Section 561A-Whether a commercial bank can file a case under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (in short, the Act) in respect of dishonour of a post dated cheque taken from a borrower despite taking collateral security from the borrower. The High Court Division on an application under section 561A of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not authorized to quash a proceeding ad- judicating a disputed question of fact. Once issuance of cheque and signature thereon are found to be genuine, the court shall proceed with the proceeding. The Appellate Division held that the question of fraud or fraudulent insertion can only be determined by recording and considering evidence by the trial Court after holding trial. However, if blank cheque is issued towards liability or as security, when the liability is proved, if the cheque is filled up and presented to the bank, the person who had drawn the cheque cannot avoid criminal liability. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances the Appellate Division considered opinion is that the disputed question of fact as to the issuance of the cheque as 'security' or 'advance' or 'post dated' can only be de- cided upon recording evidence. Accordingly, the Appellate Division does not find any substances in the appeals and petitions. Thus, all the appeals and petitions are dismissed. Mohammad Alauddin Vs. The State, represented by the Deputy Commissioner, Chittagong and others: (Criminal) 16 ALR (AD) 113-117 Sections 138 and 140-The complainant issued 3 times legal notice asking to pay the cheque's amount whether the prolongation of the case amounts to an abuse of the process of the Court and the impugned proceeding is liable to be quashed. The High Court Division held that the accused-petitioner on various pretext again and again requested the complainant to place the cheque before the bank and accordingly the complaint on good faith placed the cheque in bank for 3 times for encashment but the cheque in question was returned unpaid in each time. The case as revealed from the petition of complaint that the complainant issued 3 legal notices time to time lastly on 13.09.2017 as per request of the accused petitioner on good and the cheque in question was bounced all along. In the facts and circumstances of the case and law bearing on the subject, it is difficult to hold that there is any legal bar of the impugned proceeding or the continuation of the impugned proceeding will amount to an abuse of the process of the Court. Md. Abdul Awal -Vs.- The State and another. (Criminal) 15 ALR (HCD) 20-21 Sections 138 and 140 read with Code of Criminal Procedure [V of 1898] Section 561A-Disputed question of fact to be ascertained at the trial on taking evidence and when evidence is required to settle the dispute, the pro- ceeding cannot be quashed. The proposition of law is well settled that on the basis of defence plea or materials, the criminal proceedings should not be stifled before trial, when there is a prima-facie case for going to the trial. The High Court Division is of the view that the petition of complaint undoubtedly discloses that the accused petitioner is liable for the offence under section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act and as such, the question of quashing the proceeding does not arise at all. In framing charge under section 138 of the Negotiable In- strument Act, the learned Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge, 1st Court, Narayangonj did not commit any illegality whatsoever. Whether a proceeding under section 561A of the Code Criminal Proce- dure is to be quashed depends upon the facts of the case itself. Md. Abdul Awal - Vs. The State and another. (Criminal) 15 ALR (HCD) 20-21 Sections 138 and 140 read with General Clauses Act [X of 1898] Section 27 read with Code of Criminal Procedure [V of 1898] Section 561A-The complainant has admitted that he served legal notice upon the accused on 21.09.2010 which was returned undelivered on 06.10.2010 with a remark that the receiver was not found which is a valid service of notice under section 27 of the General Clauses Act whether publication of further legal notice in the daily 'Purbo Kone' and lodging complaint petition on 15.11.2010 are contrary to the provisions of section 138(1) and 141(b) of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The High Court Division held that section 138(1) of the Negotiable Instruments Act provides that the cheque has to be presented to the bank within a period of 6 (six) months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of validity whichever is earlier; the payee or the holder in due course of cheque as the case may be, will make a demand for the payment of the amount by giving a notice in writing to the drawer of the cheque, within 30 days of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding return of the cheque as unpaid and if the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment to the holder in due course of the cheque within 30 days of the said notice the complainant can lodge complaint petition within one month of the date on which cause of action arose under clause (c) of the Proviso to section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act. If the High Court Division takes the statement of the complaint in to that the first legal notice served on 21.09.2010 which was returned undelivered on 06.10.2010 then also the High Court Division finds that the complaint petition lodged on 15.11.2010 by the complainant is very much within the time prescribed by law. Apart from that, it is already settled by apex court that the date of receipt legal notice is a disputed ques- tion of fact to be ascertained at the time of trial and non-disclosure of such fact in the complaint petition cannot render the proceeding liable to be quashed to the great prejudice of the complainant who is entitled to prove his case on evidence. In the facts and circumstances of the case and for the reasons stated above, the High Court Division does not find any merit in the rule. Mohammad Shawkot Iqbal Chowdhury -Vs.- Mohammad Abdur Rashid Miazi and State (Criminal) 15 ALR (HCD) 22-25 Sections 138 and 141 read with Code of Criminal Procedure [V of 1898] Section 561A-Whether the petitioner can initiate present miscellaneous case challenging the conviction and sentence dated 29.04.2015 passed against him by the Sessions Judge, Cox's Bazar in S.T. Case No. 1303 of 2014 arising C.R. Case No. 847 of 2013, convicting the petitioner under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and sentencing him 1 year imprisonment and a fine of Tk. 1,60,00,000.00, which was already decided in Writ Petition No. 12580 of 2015 discharging the Rule by Full Bench of High Court Division by judgment dated 07.09.2016. Whether in the judgment and order passed by the Full Bench of High Court Division in Writ Petition no. 12580 of 2015 made any observation giving scope to the petitioner to file a criminal miscellaneous case under section 561A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, where specific provision was made under Section 138A of the Negotiable Instruments Act to file an appeal against the judgment and order of conviction passed by the sessions judge and in that case the convicted person must deposit 50% of the dishonoured amount before filing the appeal. The High Court Division held that since the legislature created forum of appeal by depositing 50% of the cheque amount challenging the Judgment and Order of conviction and sentence hence by way of such legislation, legislatures expressly curtailed the avenue to challenge the pro- priety of Judgment and Order of conviction and sentence passed in a case under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 without depositing 50% of the cheque amount and as such this instant Rule is liable to be discharged being not main- tainable. Tofayel Ahmed -Vs.- The State and another (Criminal) 15 ALR (HCD) 81- 89 The High Court Division further held that remedy under Section 561A is not available where there remains alternative remedy prescribed under Section 138A of the Negotiable Instruments Act to file appeal. The convict petitioner had ample opportunity to file appeal by depositing 50% of the amount of money of the dishonoured cheques. Thus the present application under Section 561A is not maintainable and the Rule is liable to be discharged. Tofayel Ahmed -Vs.- The State and another (Criminal) 15 ALR (HCD) 81- 89 The High Court Division further held that the Negotiable Instruments Act is a special law. Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act provided certain pre- condition for bringing prosecution against the drawer of the unpaid cheque. Under Section 138(c) of the Act, 30 day's time is given for payment of the amount due under the cheque from the date of receipt of notice regarding dishonor of cheque issued by the payee. The payee has to wait for 30. days anticipating payment of the amount by the drawer. After expiry of 30 days, if the drawer does not pay the amount, the cause of action starts 31st day onwards. The limitation of file a complaint as prescribed under Section 141(b) of the Act is one month. It is relevant to point out here that the petitioner have knowledge about the filing of the case. Primarily he challenged the judgment of order and sentence dated 29.04.2015 in Writ Petition No. 12580 of 2015 but same was discharged by Full Bench of the High Court Division on 07.09.2016. But without preferring appeal as provided under the special law, the petitioner again filed the present application under Section 561A of the Code of Criminal Procedure on 03.11.2016 without stating any cause and reason in his application under Section 561A of the said Code and not to pay his liability for Tk. 80,00,000/- which was admittedly received by him to sell of immovable property to the complainant- opposite-party no. 2. Section 141, clause (c) of the Negotiable Instruments Act has provided for trial of such case by a senior Court, namely the Court of Sessions. Thereafter, by a subsequent amendment dated 09.02.2006, the earlier Section 138A, regarding filing of appeal against the judgment of the trial Court, has also been replaced and substituted by a new Section 138A of the Negotiable Instruments Act. In the new Section, restriction has been imposed in preferring appeal against any order of sentence under section 138 (1) of the Act unless an amount of not less then 50% of the amount of the dishonoured cheque is deposited before filing the appeal in the court which awarded the sentence, no appeal would be admissible. As such, the intention of the legislature is very much clear that the Negotiable Instruments Act, being a special law, special provision has been inserted to restrain lingering of the disposal of such cases and also to discourage preferring frivolous appeals. This piece of legislation by its nature is a beneficial one and the cheque-defaulter should not be indulged in a manner so that the legislative intent is allowed to be frustrated. Tofayel Ahmed -Vs. The State and another (Criminal) 15 ALR (HCD) 81- 89 Sections 138 and 140 read with Code of Criminal Procedure [V of 1898] Section 561A-The grievance of the learned Advocate that the complainant served a legal notice giving 15 days time instead on 30 days as per new amended provision of law, which is question of fact or mere omission or irregularity not an illegality and the impugned proceeding cannot be quashed on that count, the complainant is entitled to prove his case on evidence. On the basis of defence plea or mate- rials, the criminal proceedings should not stifled before trial, when there is a prima-facie case for going to the trial. Whether a proceeding under section 561A of the Code Criminal Procedure is to be quashed depends upon the facts of the case itself. The High Court Division has carefully studied the provisions of section 138 of the the Negotiable Instrument Act to the best of our ability and find the provision with regard to serve notice in the well circulated Bangla National Newspaper is mere directory not mandatory, since there is no legal mandate to stop or dismiss the case, if notice is not served through a daily Bangla National Bangla newspaper having wide circulation. Furthermore, the complainant- opposite party published a legal notice through the daily newspaper named "গণসংহতি" which is a wide circulated daily Bangla National Newspaper or not that is a disputed question of fact to be ascertained at the trial on taking evidence and when evidence is required to settle the dispute, the proceedings cannot be quashed. The grievance of the learned Advocate that the complainant served a legal notice giving 15 days time instead on 30 days as per new amended provision of law, which is question of fact or mere omission or irregularity not an illegality and the impugned proceeding cannot be quashed on that count, the complainant is entitled to prove his case on evidence. The proposi- tion of law is now well settled that on the basis of defence plea or materials, the criminal proceedings should not stifled before trial, when there is a prima-facie case for going to the trial. Whether a proceeding under section 561A of the Code Criminal Procedure is to be quashed de- pends upon the facts of the case itself. Therefore, the High Court Division finds no substance in either of the contentions as raised by the learned Advocate for the accused petitioner. In view of the High Court Division discussions made in the foregoing paragraphs it is by now clear that the instant Rule must fail. In the result, the Rule is discharged. Md. Jalal Sarder. -Vs.- The State and another (Criminal) 15 ALR (HCD) 127-129 Section 138 read with Code of Criminal Procedure [V of 1898] Section 561A-Since the charge has already been framed in the case, the accused petitioner has/had every opportunity to agitate his grievances before the Trial Court by adducing proper evidence. Before trial the High Court Division cannot examine the disputed question of facts under the inherent jurisdiction of this Court under Section 561A of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The High Court Division has given its anxious consideration to the said submissions and thereby the High Court Division has gone through the materials available on record; particularly, the petition of complaint, order sheets of the case and other annexures as annexed with the supplementary affidavits. It appears from the record that the complainant bank upon maintaining all legal formalities and procedure filed the instant case against the accused petitioner under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881. And after framing of charge while the case was pending for prosecution witnesses, the accused petitioner taking adjournment there from rushed to the High Court Division for quashing the said proceeding which has been discouraged. Md. Golam Faruque Chowdhury. -Vs. Islami Bank Bangladesh Ltd. and another. (Criminal) 15 ALR (HCD) 139-141 Section 138 read with Code of Criminal Procedure [V of 1898] Sections 265(1), 435 and 439-A Court should not be unmindful of the fundamental principle of criminal administration of justice that in a criminal proceeding the initial burden of proof lies upon the prosecution. Thus, in a proceeding under Section 138 of the N.I. Act, the prosecution has to prove beyond reasonable doubt as to facts regarding dishonour of cheque, issuing legal notice etc. which are mandatory requirements to initiate the criminal proceeding under the section. The High Court Division held that the N.I. Act being a special law providing rebuttable presumption against the accused under section 118 by using the word 'shall' that the cheque was drawn for considera- tion, the prosecution has to state facts, purpose being to assist the Court, from which it shall make presumption as to con- sideration inasmuch as a presumption is not in itself evidence, but only makes a prima facie case for a party for whose benefit it exists. In such an eventuality, the question of calling upon the prosecution to formally prove the statement does not arise. If the fact is of such type that no presumption can be made as to consideration, the defence has to disprove nothing. Alamgir Kabir - Vs.- The State and another (Criminal) 15 ALR (HCD) 159-162 Section 138 read with Code of Criminal Procedure [V of 1898] Section 410 The accused-appellant filed the instant appeal without depositing money of cheque amount which fall the appeal unmaintainable due to non-deposit of 50% of the amount of dishonoured cheque as contemplated under provisions of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act. The High Court Division held that depositing of 50% of the face value of the dishonoured cheque cannot be said to be unscriptural in case of a pending case ended up in conviction and sentence. So, the instant appeal filed by the accused- appellant against the impugned judgment and order of conviction under sub-section (1) of Section 138 shall not lie, unless an amount of not less than fifty percent of the amount of the dishonoured cheque is deposited before filing the appeal. In the result, the appeal is dismissed without any order as to cost. Miah Md. Jaman Mehe- ruzzaman -Vs. The State and another (Criminal) 15 ALR (HCD) 192-195 Section 138 read with Code of Criminal Procedure [V of 1898] Section 561A-The date of issuance of the cheque is a question of fact to be ascertained at the time of trial. Non- disclosure of such fact in the petition of complaint or in the legal notice cannot offer the proceeding liable to be quashed. It is immaterial as to whether civil dis- pute is present or not in connection with the transactions. The question is only the cheques which have been returned unpaid to the complainant and accor- dingly he sought redress by filing the above cases following the provision of the Act. The High Court Division finds that the petitions of complaint filed with the concerned court below, examination of the complaint, order of the trial court declining or inclining to frame charge, are the mate- rials of the prosecution. The High Court Division may verify these materials to ascertain as to whether the complainant is harassing the accused-petitioner by filing false and frivolous cases one after another. In the present cases in hand, it is found that the complainant having trusted the accused-petitioner had given Tk. 1,42,00,000/-[one core forty two lakh] at a time to him in connection with supplying 'rice bran' and three options were given to the accused-petitioner as mentioned in the contract so that he could easily perform contractual terms and conditions without any pain but he has failed to do so. It is immaterial as to whether civil dispute is present or not in connection with the transactions. The question is only the cheques which have been returned unpaid to the complainant and accordingly he sought redress by filing the above cases following the provision of the Act. He has come before the court with clean hand upon refusal of the cheques unpaid by the concerned Bank of the accused-petitioner. In the above discussions, facts and circumstances of the case the High Court Division finds no merit in those rules issued by this Court. Accordingly, these rules are hereby discharged. Al-Haj Md. Fazlul Hoque -Vs. The State and another (Criminal) 15 ALR (HCD) 230-233 Section 138-Whether the Court shall examine the authenticity of the cheque only or it shall examine and consider the bonafide of the claim of the complainant and the defence case appeared in mate- rials available on record. Chapter XXIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure consisting of sections 265A to 265L deal with the procedure to be followed when the case is tried. Those provisions cast a duty upon the Sessions Judge to apply his judicial mind in considering the materials and evidence adduced by the prosecution in order to come to a decision whether charge framed against accused person is proved or not. If after recording evidence and on perusal of the same and hearing the parties the Sessions Court considers that the evidence adduced by the prosecution are not sufficient and reliable to convict the accused, the Court shall record order of acquittal under section 265H of the Criminal Procedure Code. Since the case under section 138 of the Act is Sessions triable case, the trial Judge shall follow the aforesaid provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure for holding trial. Md. Abul Kaher Vs. Emran Rashid and another (Criminal) 19 ALR (AD) 56-64 Section 138 The settled principle of law is that the lender bank has every right to file a case under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 when a cheque issued in its favour is dishonoured. However, the bank is under an obligation to take initiative first for recovery of the loan amount by filing Artharin suit. Artharin Suit is not a bar to a complaint case under the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. Artha Rin Suit under the Artha Rin Adalat Ain 2003 and complaint case under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 can run simultaneously as both the laws are special laws. Moreover, exclusion under section 5 of the Artharin Adalat Ain 2003 does not include a criminal case under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act 1881 but a case filed in any other Civil Courts for realization of the defaulted loan. The High Court Division held that after amendment of the Negotiable Instruments Act, in the year of 2000 "the words for the discharge in whole or in part of any debt or liability" were repealed. As such the trial court is not under any obligation to look into as to whether the cheque was blank or security cheque or even post dated. Moreover the date of the cheque in question and whether it is a blank or post dated or security cheque being question of fact, this can only be decided by the trial court after taking evidence. Therefore the High Court Division does not find any illegality or abuse of process in the proceeding pending in the trial court. As such the High Court Division is not inclined to interfere with the proceeding of Sessions Case No. 544 of 2012 arising out of C.R. Case No. 1486 of 2011. Accordingly, the High Court Division does not find merit in the Rule. In the result, the Rule is discharged. Mohammad Ali -Vs.- The State and another (Criminal) 23 ALR (HCD) 40 Section 138 According to the provision of Artha Rin Adalat Ain, 2003, Artha Rin suit relates to realization of loan or debt by a financial institution while dishonour of cheque relates to an offence by the loanee against the lender such dishonour has been created a distinct offence and made punishable offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, which is both penal and procedural law. The offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to thrice the amount of the cheque or both. Sub- section 2 of section 138 provides for payment to the holder of the cheque any amount upto the face value of the cheque as far as is covered by the fine realized from the accused. The High Court Division observed that on plain reading of sub-section (1) of section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 shows that an offence under the section shall be deemed to have been committed the moment a cheque is drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with a banker for payment of any amount of money to another person from out of that account is returned by the bank unpaid on any of the grounds mentioned therein. Sub-section (1) of section 138 has not made any qualification of the cheque so returned unpaid either post dated given as a security for repayment of the loan availed by the loanee has alleged by the accused or any other cheque issued by the drawer for encashment currently. When the legislature has not made any difference between a post-dated cheque issued as security for the repayment of the loan availed by the loanee, the petitioner, being the loanee has issued a cheque for encashment currently, the High Court Division does not see any scope of making any such difference. In this respect reliance may be placed on the decision reported in 17 BLC (AD) 177. It is pertinent to note that in the decision reported in 24 BLC (AD)-139 their lordship held-that "question of fact as to the issuance of the cheque as security or advance or post dated can only be decided upon recoding evidence," Having regard to the facts and circumstances, the decisions cited above, the High Court Division finds no merit in the rule. In the result, the Rule is discharged. Md. Haroon -Vs- Bank Aisa Limited and another (Criminal) 21 ALR (HCD) 372-374 Section 138(1A)(b) read with Section 265C CrPC By way of any one of the above three modes mentioned in sub-section(1A) of section 138 of the Act, 1881 the accused- opposite party can make him aware before the institution of a case against him under this Act and it is sufficient to fulfill the legal requirement. The High Court Division held that in the instant case that as per provision of sub- section (1A)(b) of section 138 of the Act, 1881 notice was sent to the accused- opposite party No. 1 through registered post with acknowledgment and the same was received on behalf of the accused- opposite party No. 1. It should be mentioned here that no objection was raised by the accused-petioner regarding service of notice upon him in the application under section 265C of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Considering the facts and circumstances it is the High Court Division considered view is that the Trial Court passed the impugned order discharging the accused is not tenable in the eye of law. In the result, the Rule is made absolute. Md. Anis Vs. Md. Anam Miah and another (Criminal) 17 ALR (HCD) 95-97 Section 138(3) If there is a genuine claim of the complainant he can addresses his claim by way of initiating a civil proceeding under section 138(3) of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The initiation and continuation of the trial without ascertaining the statement as to consideration made in the complaint petition is an abuse of the process of the court and it is liable to be quashed. The High Court Division held that the very intention of the legislature was to create honest drawer in the commercial field, and smooth function of financial transaction but day to day the High Court Division finds a different picture, for instances the High Court Division finds in many cases as to the fact that accused had no transaction with the complainant, the cheque was stolen, it was missing, fraudulently obtained by the complaint what not, there is no known device to reduce the nature of the cases, if the courts below at the first instance, try to ascertain the fact of consideration money mentioned in the cheque and very specific statement made in the complaint petition. This attempt may help the learned Magistrate to take decision or to draw his satisfaction to take initial statement and in a fit case to take cognizance. If there is no elaborate statement as to consideration of money She/or he may reject the complaint petition on this very ground of consideration. It is the view of the Apex Court that if there is no consideration the accused had no liability on the cheque. Persuent to above discussion with a view to fulfill the object of the special law, the High Court Division may safely direct the court below firstly: to ascertain the consideration from the statement of the petition of complaint; secondly, the signature/sign on the cheque was given by the accused if he satisfied on the very points and other points he/she shall proceed with the case in accordance with law. On the above discussion the High Court Division finds that this Rule has got merit, which must succeed. In the result, the Rule is made absolute. Mohammad Ali Talukder Vs. The State and another (Criminal) 21 ALR (HCD) 269-273 Negotiable Instruments Act (xXVI of 1881) Section 138 The criminal proceeding under section 138 serves two purposes: firstly, to punish the offender and secondly, to recover the value of the cheque. The object of adding sub-section (2) to section 138 is to alleviate the grievance of the complainant. There can be no dispute in so far as the sentence of imprisonment is concerned that it should commensurate with the gravity of the crime. Court has to deal with the offenders by imposing proper sentence by taking into consideration of facts and circumstances of each case. It is not only the rights of the offenders which are required to be looked into at the time of the imposition of sentence, but also of the victims of the crime and society at large, also by considering the object sought to be achieved by the particular legislation. [73 DLR (2021) 541] Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881) Section 138 Institution of the artha rin suit is not valid a ground for quashment of or interference with the proceeding in the Sessions Case under section 138 of the Act. The issues raised in an Artha Rin Suit are confined to the realization of money along with the interest thereon. The suit does not involve any criminal liability. On the other hand, a case under section 138 of the Act involves a strict criminal liability which means that, the offence thereunder, may not involve a means rea and institution of an artha rin suit does not exempt the offender from the criminal of liability being the penalty of a maximum imprisonment of 1 (one) year or specified quantum of fine or both. [73 DLR (2021) 638] In Suryalakshmi Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Rajvir Industries Ltd. [(2008) 13 SCC 678], the Supreme Court has made the following observations explaining that a cheque is a property in consideration of Section 406 IPC- However, a case for proceeding against the respondents under Section 406 has, in our opinion, been made out. A cheque being a property, the same was entrusted to the respondents. If the said property has been misappropriated or has been used for a purpose for which the same had not been handed over, a case under Section 406 may be found to have been made out. It may be true that even in a proceeding under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the appellant could raise a defence that the cheques were not meant to be used towards discharge of a lawful liability or a debt, but the same by itself in our opinion would not mean that in an appropriate case, a complaint petition cannot be allowed to be filed. Suryalakshmi Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Rajvir Industries Ltd. [(2008) 13 SCC 678] In the decision of our Apex Court, passed in the case of 2Md. Abul Khair Shahin Vs. Imran Rashid and another, reported in 28 BLT (AD)-40 wherein their Lordships held as follows: "When a presumption is rebuttable, it only points out that the party on whom lies the duty of going forward with evidence, on the fact presumed and when that party has produced evidence fairly and reasonably tending to show that the real fact is not as presumed, the purpose of the presumption is over. To rebut the statutory presumptions as accused is not expected to prove his defence beyond reasonable doubt as is expected of the complainant in a criminal trial. The accused may adduce direct evidence to prove that the cheque in question was not supported by consideration. However, the Court need not insist in every case that the accused should disprove the non-existence of consideration and debt by leading direct evidence because the existence of negative evidence is neither possible nor contemplated. At the same time, it is clear that bare denial of the passing of consideration apparently would not serve the purpose of the accused. Something which is probable has to be proof shifted to the complainant. The burden of proof of the accused to disprove the presumption under sections 118 and 138 of the Act is not so heavy. The preponderance of probability through direct or substantial evidence is sufficient enough to shift the onus to the complainant. Inference of preponderance of probabilities can be drawn from the materials on record and also by reference to the circumstances upon which the party relies." (underlined to emphasis) [24 ALR (2022) 119] একই বিষয় নিয়ে দেওয়ানি মামলার পাশাপাশি ফৌজদারি মামলা চলতে আইনি বাধা নেই। একই বিষয় নিয়ে দেওয়ানি মামলা বিচারাধীন রয়েছে বিধায় ফৌজদারি দায়বদ্ধতার জন্য এখতিয়ার সম্পন্ন আদালতে ফৌজদারি মামলা দায়েরে আইনি বাধা নেই। উভয় পক্ষের চুক্তিতে সালিশের ধারা থাকা সত্ত্বেও যদি কোনও ফৌজদারি অপরাধ সংঘটিত হয় তবে সংক্ষুব্ধ ব্যক্তিকে ফৌজদারি মামলা দায়ের করা থেকে বিরত রাখা যায় না। শাহনেওয়াজ আখন্দ বনাম রাষ্ট্র, ১৬ বিএলসি (২০১১) ৪৩৮। cited: [Vide National Small Industries Corporation Limited vs. Harmeet Singh Paintal and Another, (2010) 3 SCC 330]. In the case of Mirza Gorgani Vs. Firm Bhola Mal Nilal Chand, reported in AIR (1934) Lahore 293 (2) it was held as follows: "It is obvious in any case, that the burden of proving the case lay upon the plaintiff, Pirbhu Dayal. We cannot concede in favour of the appellant that any admission, which was made by the defendant regarding the putting of a signature or a thumb-mark on the document in question, amounted to such an admission of execution as to thrust the burden of proving the case upon him. Obviously, there was no admission of execution of the document, upon which the plaintiff relied, when the defendant stated that he had put his signature and his thumb mark on a blank pieces of paper." It was therefore held in the said judgment: "We have no doubt at all that in view of the pleadings it was for the plaintiff to prove the due execution of the document upon which he was suing." [24 ALR (2022) 113] The settled principle of law is that while the presumption of defective consideration is raised and that presumption has not been addressed properly that presumption certainly goes upon the complainant to prove the same again. In that case without supporting evidence a solitary witness is obviously not enough to proof the same. [24 ALR (2022) 113] The burden of proof in certain cases also slightly goes to the accused-appellant who placed the presumption of defective consideration before the trial Court. To that extent our apex Court in the above cited decision, reported in 28-BLT(AD 40 has categorically held that: "At the same time it is clear that bare denial of the passing of consideration apparently would not served the purpose of the accused. Something which is probable has to be brought on record for getting the burden of proof that shifted to the complainant. The burden of proof of the accused to disprove the presumption under section 118 and 138 of the Act is not so heavy. The preponderance of probability through direct or substantial evidence is sufficient enough to shit the onus to the complainant. And then their Lordships of our Apex Court also held: "Inference of preponderance of probabilities can be drown form the materials on record and also by reference to the circumstances upon which the party relies." [24 ALR (2022) 113] In the Mirza Gorgani Case, reported in AIR (1934) Lahore 293 (2), their Lordships held therein their views to the effect that mere putting a signature on a document does not means its full execution and therefore, their lordships hold that- "Obviously, there was no admission of the execution of the documents upon which the plaintiff relied when the defendant stated he had put his signature and his thumb mark on a blank pieces of paper." And then their Lordships finally held "We have no doubt at all that in view of the pleadings it was for the plaintiff to prove the due execution of the document upon which he was suing". [24 ALR (2022) 113] Since the presumption raised about the defective consideration as written in the cheque in question, that has to be proved or disproved by the respective party and in proving their own case they have to be given a chance again to proof their own claim by producing their supporting respective evidence. And to that extent, this Court is inclined to send the case back to the appellate Court below who is the last Court of fact and has ignored the certain admitted facts of the case as well as the grounds taken and placed in appeal before him for deciding the said appeal and as such, he is bound to discover the actual truth as behind the allegation brought in the case and then upon taking the additional evidence he has to make a decision thereto in accordance with law; however, keeping in mind the observations as made above by our apex Court and inasmuch as of the apex Court of this sub continent. Hence, by the empowerment of section 439 read with section 375 inasmuch as following the provisions of section 423 & 428 of the Cr.P.C this Court is inclined to send the case back to the appellate Court below to hold retrial of the case for taking decision upon enabling both the affected parties to place their additional evidence about to prove their own case as well as to prove and disprove the presumption raised herein. [24 ALR (2022) 121] "Whenever a cheque is drawn by a person in order to make payment of any amount. the must be given in it by the drawer of the cheque. Since the amount was not given by the drawer of the cheque having no intention for making any payment, such a cheque cannot be considered as a cheque to serve the purpose of section 138 of the NI Act. So, the conviction and sentence of the appellant under section 138 of the NI Act for the dishonoring of the so-called cheque in question cannot be considered as legal and fair." Dr Shyamal Baidya Vs Islami Bank, 66 DLR (2014) HCD 553 "The question of authority to institute a suit or other proceeding on behalf of a company is therefore not a technical matter as it often affects the policy and finances of the company and unless the power to institute a proceeding is specifically conferred on a particular director, he would have no authority to institute a suit or other proceeding on behalf of the company and such power can be conferred by the Board of Directors only by passing a resolution in that regard." M/S Canara Workshop Limited Vs. Shri Mantesh reported in II(2014) BC 367(Kar.) The mere fact that the petitioner happens to be the spouse of the 1st accused and the account can be operated by either of them cannot, according to me, make the petitioner culpably liable under Section 138 of the N.I. Act for a cheque issued by her husband to the complainant for the discharge of his liability. The averments in the petition clearly show that the petitioner had no liability; that she had not issued the cheque and that she has no personal obligation to discharge the liability to satisfy which the cheque was allegedly issued. The mere fact that the account can be operated jointly by both the accused cannot by any stretch of imagination invite culpable liability under Section 138 of the N.I. Act against the petitioner who was not the drawer and is only a joint account holder. Devi v. Haridas reported in 2004 (3) KLT 355 Therefore, a person who is the signatory to the cheque and the cheque is drawn by that person on an account maintained by him and the cheque has been issued for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability and the said cheque has been returned by the bank unpaid, such person can be said to have committed an offence. Section 138 of the NI Act does not speak about the joint liability. Even in case of a joint liability, in case of individual persons, a person other than a person who has drawn the cheque on an account maintained by him, cannot be prosecuted for the offence under Section 138 of the NI Act. A person might have been jointly liable to pay the debt, but if such a person who might have been liable to pay the debt jointly, cannot be prosecuted unless the bank account is jointly maintained and that he was a signatory to the cheque. Now, so far as the case on behalf of the original complainant that the appellant herein – original accused No. 2 can be convicted with the aid of Section 141 of the NI Act is concerned, the aforesaid has no substance. This Court has repeatedly held that in case of a Director, complaint should specifically spell out how and in what manner the Director was in charge of or was responsible to the accused Company for conduct of its business and mere bald statement that he or she was in charge of and was responsible to the company for conduct of its business is not sufficient. Anita Malhotra Vs. Apparel Export Promotion Council and anr., (2012)1 SCC 520. Section 141 of the NI Act is relating to the offence by companies and it cannot be made applicable to the individuals. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the original complainant has submitted that “Company” means any body corporate and includes, a firm or other association of individuals and therefore in case of a joint liability of two or more persons it will fall within “other association of individuals” and therefore with the aid of Section 141 of the NI Act, the appellant who is jointly liable to pay the debt, can be prosecuted. The aforesaid cannot be accepted. Two private individuals cannot be said to be “other association of individuals”. Therefore, there is no question of invoking Section 141 of the NI Act against the appellant, as the liability is the individual liability (may be a joint liabilities), but cannot be said to be the offence committed by a company or by it corporate or firm or other associations of individuals. The appellant herein is neither a Director nor a partner in any firm who has issued the cheque. Therefore, even the appellant cannot be convicted with the aid of Section 141 of the NI Act. Therefore, the High Court has committed a grave error in not quashing the complaint against the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 138 r/w Section 141 of the NI Act. The criminal complaint filed against the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 138 r/w Section 141 of the NI Act, therefore, can be said to be abuse of process of law and therefore the same is required to be quashed and set aside. Aparna A Shah Vs. M/s Sheth Developers P. Ltd. And another, 2013 (8) SCC 71 and Alka Khandu Avhad Vs. Amar Syamprasad Mishra & Anr. 2021 (4) SCC 675 BLANK CHEQUE Respondent issued a blank cheque without mentioning the date and amount and sent it with a letter requesting complainant to present it after a month – Question whether blank cheque will come within the definition of cheque? – If the cheque is not drawn for a specified amount it would not fall within a definition of bill of exchange – Act of complainant in filling up amount portion and date was a material change and it could not be enforced even though it was issued for a legal liability – Alteration without the consent of the party who issued the cheque rendered cheque invalid. 2004 (1) CRIMES 567 (AP) Admission of signature on the cheque is not equivalent with admission of execution – Right of the accused to contend that a blank signed cheque was mis-utilised by the payee cannot be taken away by such mere admission of signature. AIR 2007 (DOC) 195 (KER.); 2007 (1) KLT 525 (KER) But that observation cannot be understood to mean that admission of signature is equivalent or synonymous with admission of execution. Admission of signature does go a long way in the attempt to prove execution of a document. But the nice legal distinction between admission of signature and admission of execution must always be borne in mind. Admission of signature may in an appropriate case persuade the Court to draw permissive presumptions of fact under S.114 of the Evidence Act. But certainly the right of the accused to contend that a blank signed cheque was mis-utilised by the payee cannot be taken away by such mere admission of signature. Ultimately when the evidence is appreciated the Court shall have to consider whether Admission of signature coupled with the other circumstances is sufficient to prove execution. But the right of the accused is to show that only the signature is his/hers and the other entires are made unauthorisedly by th complainant cannot be taken away. Judgment Link Accused entered into security arrangement with complainant for sale of its product – Accused issued blank cheques as security to security agency agreement – No debt or liability existed when cheques were handed over to drawee complainant – Complaint based on blank cheque issued towards security is not maintainable. AIR 2007 (DOC) 269 (DEL); 2 (2007) B C 69 Negotiable Instruments Act (XXVI of 1881) Section 140 Section 140 of the Act a penal provision creating vicarious liability which must be strictly construed. So far as of the appellants are concerned the provisions section 140 of the Act have no manner of application to the case in hand. Admitted facts clearly establish that the accused company did not take loan from the complainant, but the company's cheque was used to repay the loan which was dishonoured. Evidences on record further establish that the appellants were neither involved nor had any knowledge whatsoever about the loan or issuance of the company's cheque. [73 DLR 336] Moreover, section 138 of Act, 1881 which has defined "Negotiable instrument" has not made any distinction between crossed cheque "account payee" or cheque of other kind such as bearer cheque we ordinarily mean. Thus, we find that section 123A of the Act, in no way, creates any bar in proceeding with a case under section 138 of the Act, 1881. In other words, we do not see any nexus of section 123A with the proceedings to be initiated under section 138 of the Act. Sahab Uddin (Md.) =VS= The State, [3 LM (AD) 592] Section 138- Dishonoured due to insufficient fund- We also find it difficult to accept that if the petitioner had in fact paid the money owed to the complainant in the year 2011, as alleged by him, that he did not take any steps to stop payment of the cheque issued by him earlier, especially when he himself states that the complainant told him that the cheque was lost, keeping in mind that anyone could attempt to encash that cheque. From 24.7.2011, when the petitioner apparently paid Tk.10 lac by Pay Order, till 18.09.2012 when the complaint was lodged, the petitioner did nothing to retrieve the cheque or to stop payment of the cheque. He admitted in his cross examination that he did not file any G.D. in respect of the non-return of the cheque. Moreover, we find from the deposition of the petitioner (D.W.1) that he admitted in cross examination of other transactions between himself and the complainant with regard to sale of land by the complainant and his wife and the payment of money in 2011. M.A. Azam Chowdhury VS A.B.M. Asaduzzamn & another, (1 LM (AD) 591] Section 138- The trial court has completed the cross examination of the P.W.1 on 13-03-2014 and thereafter, the case was fixed for examination of the accused under section 342 of Criminal Procedure Code. These facts prove that the respondent has been adopting dilatory tactics. The High Court Division did not apply its judicial mind in staying the proceeding. The rule itself is not maintainable. Accordingly, the rule is discharged. The trial court is directed to complete the trial within 1 (one) month from the date of receipt of the order. ......Borak Real Estate (Pvt.) Ltd. =VS= Arifur Rahman(Mr.), [3 LM (AD) 543] Section 138- The accused petitioner issued 60 post dated cheques in favour of complainant financial institution. As per provisions of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act, prima-facie case against the petitioner, had been made out. The High Court Division held that since there is no bar to get the loan amount realized by producing issued cheques for encashment, the instant proceedings were not liable to be quashed. Ehetasamul Haque =VS= The State, [3 LM (AD) 552] Section 138- An offence under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is not compoundable, it being a special law. However, in view of the submissions made by the learned Advocates on Record, we are of the opinion that the ends of Justice will be sufficiently met if the sentence of the petitioner is reduced to imprisonment for the period already undergone by him in prison, and the sentence of fine is set aside. We note that the complainant appeared before us to say that he has received his money in full satisfaction. The criminal petition for leave to appeal is dismissed. The conviction of the petitioner under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments act is affirmed with modification of the sentence as mentioned above...... Idris Chowkder (Md.) =VS= The State, [3 LM (AD) 560] Sections 138 and 141(b) Criminal proceeding should not be stifled before trial, when there is a prima facie case for going to the trial- There was no violation of section 141(b) of the Negotiable Instrument Act. The High Court Division further found that the law is now settled on the point that a criminal proceeding should not be stifled before trial, when there is a prima facie case for going to the trial. .....M.K. Bazlur Rahman =VS= Md. Johurul Haque, [3 LM (AD) 586] Section 138-The powers given to the Court is discretionary- Section 138(1) empowers the trial Court to punish with imprisonment for a maximum period of one year, or with fine which may extend to thrice the amount of the cheque or both. The powers given to the Court is discretionary. The language used in the section is not such that the Court must impose fine thrice the amount of the cheque. The legislature has left the matter to the discretion of the trial Court. Shahidur Rahman Khadem =VS= The State, [3 LM (AD) 600] Section-138 The cheques were issued by the respondent which were returned with endorsement, "payment stopped by the drawer". Since the cheques were returned by bank with the endorsement "payment stopped by the drawer" it is to be presumed that those were returned unpaid because the amount of money standing to the credit of that account was insufficient to honour of the cheque as envisaged in Section 138 of the Act. Of course this is a rebuttable presumption. The defence can be considered at the time of holding trial and not in an application under Section 561A of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The judgment and orders of the High Court Division are hereby set aside. The concerned Courts are directed to proceed with the cases in accordance with law. .....S.M. Redwan =VS= Md. Rezaul Islam, [3 LM (AD) 605] Section 138 & 140- If a case is instituted against a company alone, excluding the persons who were responsible to the affairs of the company's, it can be prosecuted and punished- The difference between sections 138 and 140 is that in respect of section 138 the offence is committed by human beings, that is to say, natural person and in section 140 though the expression "the person" is used which is qualified by a company which means "any body corporate and includes a firm or other association of individuals" which is a juristic person or not. It can be prosecuted for the offence under section 138. Section 140 of the Act, we are of the view that for proper and effective adjudication of the cases, the complainant (s) / drawee (s) may add the company as one of the accused in the case but for not impleading the company, the case will not fail. Mohammad Eusof Babu =VS= Jhon Provanjon Chowdhury, [3 LM (AD) 562] Sections 138 and 140 There is a specific provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure for preferring revisional application against the order of rejection of the bail petition filed under Section 426(2A) of the Code of Criminal Procedure–– Appellate Division’s view is that there are specific provision in Sections 426 and 435 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for bail of a convicted person and if bail petition filed by a convicted person under Section 426(2A) of the Code of Criminal Procedure is rejected, then the remedy lies under Section 435 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in “Revisional Jurisdiction”. It appears that the High Court Division without appreciating the scope of Section 561A of the Code of Criminal Procedure and without applying its judicial mind exceeded its jurisdiction in passing the order in exercise of inherent power vide impugned judgment and orders dated 25.10.2022 which calls interference by this Division. The convict Md. Lutful Hasan is in jail custody, it is felt that justice would be best served if he is given an opportunity to file a revisional application in the competent court of jurisdiction under Section 435 of the Code of Criminal Procedure against the impugned orders dated 26.09.2022 passed by the learned Joint Metropolitan Sessions Judge, 5th Court, Chattogram. Accordingly, the convict person i.e. Md. Lutful Hasan may file a revisional application under Section 435 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, if so advised, against the impugned orders dated 26.09.2022 within 30 (thirty) days from the date of receipt a copy of this judgment and order. .....Sajjad Hossain = Md. Lutful Hasan, (Criminal), 2023(1) [14 LM (AD) 599] Section 138- The order of conviction passed by the trial Court was in accordance with the law as by adducing evidence the complainant succeeded in proving that a cheque for Tk. 7,00,000.00 given to him was, when duly presented, dishonoured and that before filing the complaint petition, he complied with the procedural requirements laid down in section 138 of the Act. So, this leave petition is dismissed as it is bound to be. The petitioner has in fact paid all the money due to the complainant. The complainant admitted that he had received the full amount of the cheque from the accused petitioner and that he had no further claim against him. In view of the fact that the leave petitioner has paid the full amount of the cheque, he is exonerated from paying any more and as he has already spent 3 months in prison, he need not go back to prison and the sentence of imprisonment is thus modified to the period already undergone by him in prison. Biplob (Md.) =VS= The State, [4 LM (AD) 364] Section 138- Realization of fine to be paid to the payee Complaint petition filed by an aggrieved person, i.e. the payee, not at the instance of the 'State'; the State is not a 'necessary' party though it may be 'proper' party in case under the Act, 1881: the cheque bears the proprietary and pecuniary interest of the payee and the law rovides for realization of fine to be paid to the payee, vide sub-section (2) of section 138; by way of amendment, done by Act No. III of 2006 (09.02.2006), section 138A has been inserted making provisions to deposit not less than 50% of the amount of the dishonoured cheque, in the trial Court, as a precondition to prefer appeal; there is no similar provision for preferring appeal by a person convicted under any other law; apparently, the Act, 1881 is a piece of beneficial legislation and distinct from other penal law; hence, in appropriate case, costs may be awarded in case under the Act, 1881. Khondker Latifur Rahman =VS= The State, [4 LM (AD) 383] Section 138- Two questions are involved in these appeals and petitions. The first question is whether if a company incorporated under the Companies Act commits an offence punishable under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 is excluded from prosecution, can a director, manager, secretary or other officer of the company be prosecuted for that offence, and secondly, whether if more than one cheques issued by the same drawer can be prosecuted in a single case. Mohammad Eusof Babu -VS- Johan Provanjon Chowdhury, [5 LM (AD) 251] Section 138- Cheque dishonour- There is no legal bar of filing a single case against the drawer of the cheques if the notice is served within the period of limitation intimating the fact of dishonour of the cheques with a request to pay the amount involved in those cheques within a period of thirty days. Mohammad Eusof Babu =VS Johan Provanjon Chowdhury, [5 LM (AD) 251] Section 138- Scope to cross-examine and also be at liberty to examine defence witness- The High Court Division took the right view that the accused should be given scope to cross-examine PW1 allowing 2/3 dates as the Metropolitan Additional Sessions Judge, in the meantime, fixed the respective cases for examination of the accused under section 342 of the Code and accordingly, we endorse the same. We add by saying that the respective petitioners shall also be at liberty to examine defence witnesses, if they so desire, after their examination under section 342 of the Code. The trial Court is directed to conclude the trial as expeditiously as possible, but not later than 2(two) months from the date of receipt of this judgment.......Majad Hossain =VS= The State, [5 LM (AD) 318] Section 138- The offence under section 138 of the Act is not a natural crime like hurt or murder. It is an offence created by a legal fiction in the statute- The offence under section 138 of the Act is not a natural crime like hurt or murder. It is an offence created by a legal fiction in the statute. It is a civil liability, transformed into a criminal liability under restricted conditions by way of an amendment of the Act. Before amendment, offending acts referred to section 138 of the Act constituted only a pure and civil liability. Mohammad Alauddin =VS= The State, [6 LM (AD) 124] Section 138- The cheque is filled up and presented to the bank, the person who had drawn the cheque cannot avoid criminal liability- Once issuance of cheque and signature thereon are found to be genuine, the court shall proceed with the proceeding. Question of fraud or fraudulent insertion can only be determined by recording and considering evidence by the trial Court after holding trial. If blank cheque is issued towards liability or as security, when the liability is proved, if the cheque is filled up and presented to the bank, the person who had drawn the cheque cannot avoid criminal liability. The disputed question of fact as to the issuance of the cheque as 'security' or 'advance' or 'post dated' can only be decided upon recording evidence. All the appeals and petitions are dismissed. ...Mohammad Alauddin =VS= The State, [6 LM (AD) 124] Section 138, 140 and section 141- Section 141 (b) cannot take away the substantive right accruing to the beneficiary of a cheque to prosecute any number of subsequent presentation of the cheque on its dishonour. Similarly, each dishonour will give rise to a concomitant right to serve notice under proviso (b) to section 138 (1) of the Act and demand payment, failing which the bearer of the cheque will have the right to make a complaint in writing in accordance with section 141 (a) of the Act- Section 138(1) and section 141(b). Sections 138 and 140 of the Act are substantive provisions of law giving details of the offence, when the offence is committed and who is liable; section 141 of the Act describes the procedure to be followed. That the second and subsequent presentation of the cheque must be within six months from the date on which the cheque was drawn in order to be able to prosecute the drawer of the cheque criminally under section 138 of the Act. Upon subsequent presentation of the cheque for payment, if it is again dishonoured another opportunity will accrue to the beneficiary to take action as provided under section 138(1) of the Act, and again, in accordance with the provisions of section 141, the beneficiary of the cheque will be obliged to make complaint against such subsequent dishonour within a period of one month from the cause of action arising under proviso (c) to section 138 (1) of the Act. The offence is committed each time the cheque is dishonoured on presentation for payment. The procedural limitation provided in section 141 (b) cannot take away the substantive right accruing to the beneficiary of a cheque to prosecute any number of subsequent presentation of the cheque on its dishonour. Similarly, each dishonour will give rise to a concomitant right to serve notice under proviso (b) to section 138 (1) of the Act and demand payment, failing which the bearer of the cheque will have the right to make a complaint in writing in accordance with section 141 (a) of the Act. It will be entirely up to the bearer of the cheque to proceed in respect of any particular dishonour of the cheque.....Nizam Uddin Mahmud Hossain =VS= The State, [7 LM (AD) 259] Section 138- Where the amount promised shall depend on some other complementary facts or fulfillment of another promise and if any cheque is issued on that basis, but that promise is not fulfilled it will not create any obligation on the part of the drawer of the cheque. As such dishonesty or fraud cannot be attributed to the respondent in giving stop payment instructions- The High Court Division being last court of facts upon elaborate consideration of the evidence both the oral and documentary has come to the conclusion that the complainant failed to take any step to sell the property of the respondent, rather the respondent and his brother and sister sold the said property to the U.S.A. Embassy and the complainant did not help the respondent in any way in that regard. In his cross examination the complainant has said, "2(a) শর্তে উল্লেখ আছে বাজার মূল্যে ক্রেতা আনিতে পারিলে আমি (বাদী) কমিশন পাব।" There is no such averment, in the petition of complaint or in the evidence that the complainant has stated that he had brought any purchaser who offered market price of the property. From the evidence quoted above it appears that the condition under which the cheques were issued was not ful- filled by the complainant appellant. Thus, the respondent instructed the bank not to encash the impugned cheques. Accordingly, the bank returned the cheques with endorsement, "payment stopped by the drawer". Where the amount promised shall depend on some other complementary facts or fulfillment of another promise and if any cheque is issued on that basis, but that promise is not fulfilled it will not create any obligation on the part of the drawer of the cheque or any right which can be claimed by the holder of the cheque. As such dishonesty or fraud cannot be attributed to the respondent in giving stop payment instructions. Consequently, the question of committing an offence by the accused respondent punishable under section 138 of the Act does not arise. All the appeals are dismissed.....Abul Kaher Shahin(Md.) =VS= Emran Rashid, [9 LM (AD) 338] Section 138- Civil and criminal cases shall proceed in accordance with law- The final conclusion of the High Court Division is contradictory to several decisions of this Division wherein it has been clearly held that the pendency of a civil suit will not hinder proceeding of a criminal case and vice versa. In this regard, reference may be made to the cases of Monzur Alam (Md) vs State, 55 DLR (AD) 62, SAB Solaiman Ali vs Rangs Industries Limited, 2004 1 Law Guardian (AD) 20. We are constrained to hold that the impugned judgements and orders of the High Court Division are palpably erroneous set aside. Accordingly, the criminal petitions for leave to appeal are disposed of with direction that both civil and criminal cases shall proceed in accordance with law....Eastern Bank Limited VS Sirajuddula(Md), [9 LM (AD) 566] Sections 138, 140- The disputed questions of facts which should be decided after appreciating the evidence at the trial- The High Court Division in disposing the application under the provision of section 561A of the Code does not require to formulate any disputed question of facts, rather, only to see whether the story of the F.I.R. or petition of complaint discloses the criminal offences or not. Therefore, the High Court Division exceeded the extraordinary jurisdiction by quashing the proceeding. Accordingly, the judgment of the High Court Division is set aside, Ashfaq Hossain =VS= The State, [10 LM (AD) 515] Section 138, 140- According to section 102 of the Evidence Act, 1872 the burden of proof is upon the respondent to prove that though she was the director of the company, the offence has been committed without her knowledge or that she was a non-executive director of the company and she was not involved in day- to-day affairs of the company etc. The innocence of the respondent No.1, the director, has to be proved before the Court by adducing evidence and thus, the director, respondent No.1 has to face the trial. Only after taking evidence during trial if the director, respondent No.1 herein, is found that she was not to be a person-in-charge of the affairs of the company at the relevant time of the issuance of the cheque only then she may be exonerated from the charge....Phoenix Finance and Investment Ltd. =VS Yeasmin Ahmed, [10 LM (AD) 522] PRESUMPTION UNDER SECTION 139 NI ACT Section 139 Negotiable Instruments Act provides: 139. Presumption in favour of holder: It shall be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, that the holder of a cheque received the cheque of the nature referred to in section 138 for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability. “The effect of these presumptions is to place the evidential burden on the accused of proving that the cheque was not received by the complainant towards the discharge of any liability. Because both sections 138 and 139 require that the court shall presume the liability of the drawer of the cheques for the amounts for which the cheques are drawn…it is obligatory on the courts to raise this presumption in every case where the factual basis for the raising of this presumption had been established. It introduced an exception to the general rule as to the burden of proof in criminal cases and shifts the onus on to the accused.” AIR 2001 SUPREME COURT 3897 Section 141- If a company is not prosecuted due to any legal snag or otherwise, the other prosecuted persons can not, on that score alone, escape from criminal liability created through legal fiction envisaged in section 141 of the Act.' Mohammad Eusof Babu -VS- Johan Provanjon Chowdhury, [5 LM (AD) 251] Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (India) Section 138- Appellant is acquitted of the charge under section 138 of the N.I. Act subject to payment Filed a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act in C.C. No.40274/2002 before the XVIII ACMM & XX ASCJ, Bangalore City. The Trial Court by its judgment dated 27.04.2004 acquitted the appellant/accused on the ground that the complainant has not proved the case beyond reasonable doubt as the documentary and also the oral evidence adduced by the appellant/accused substantiates. Being aggrieved, the said complainant preferred appeal before the High Court in Criminal Appeal No.895 of 2004, in and by which the High Court reversed the acquittal and convicted the appellant as aforesaid in paragraph (2). Being aggrieved, the appellant/accused is before us in this appeal by way of special leave. The Court of Small Causes and ACMM, Bangalore, which has at an amicable settlement......A.T. Sivaperumal =VS= Mohammed Hyath, [3 LM (SC) 53] Section-138- The appellants have proved their case by overwhelming evidence to establish that the two cheques were issued towards the discharge of an existing liability and legally enforceable debt. The respondent having admitted that the cheques and Pronote were signed by him, the presumption under S.139 would operate. The respondent failed to rebut the presumption by adducing any cogent or credible evidence. Hence, his defence is rejected. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, the impugned order dated 27.09.2013 passed in Criminal Revision Petition Nos. 1657 and 1658 of 2008 is hereby set aside, and the order of Conviction and Fine passed by the Trial Court is restored......T.P. Murugan =VS= Bojan, (5 LM (SC) 73] Section 138- The cheques issued by him were not ornamental but were meant to be presented if the amount in question was not paid within the extended period- The trial court found the Respondent guilty and accordingly convicted him for the offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and sentenced him to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one year. In addition, court the trial awarded the compensation to the Complainant/Appellant in sum a Rs. 12,00,000/- to be paid within a period of three months. The Respondent preferred Criminal Appeal No.9 of 2010 before Additional Sessions Judge, Kamrup at Guwahati, who, while upholding the conviction of the Respondent modified the sentence awarded to him to payment of a fine of Rs.2,000/- (Rupees Two Thousand only) and, a default sentence of imprisonment for a period of one month, in addition to the amount of compensation awarded by the trial court. The High Court has, as seen earlier, set aside the conviction of the Respondent and allowed Criminal Revision No.41 of 2012. A negotiable instrument is supported by consideration there was no dispute that such a consideration existed in as much as the cheques were issued in connection with the discharge of the outstanding liability against Nazimul Islam. At any rate the endorsement made by the respondent on the promissory note that the cheques can be presented for encashment after 25-09-2007 clearly shows that the cheques issued by him were not ornamental but were meant to be presented if the amount in question was not paid within the extended period. The High Court in our view fell in error in upsetting the conviction recorded by the Courts below who had correctly analysed the factual situation and applied the law applicable to the same. Don Ayengia =VS= The State of Assam, [1 LM (SC) 600] Section 138 & 139- The trial court as well as the Appellate Court having found that cheque contained the signatures of the accused and it was given to the appellant to present in the Bank of the presumption under Section 139 was rightly raised which was not rebutted by the accused. The accused had not led any evidence to rebut the aforesaid presumption. The accused even did not come in the witness box to support his case. No evidence was led by the accused. The defence taken in the reply to the notice that cheque was stolen having been rejected by the two courts below, we do not see any basis for the High court coming to the conclusion that the accused has been successful in creating doubt in the mind of the Court with regard to the existence of the debt or liability. How the presumption under Section 139 can be rebutted on the evidence of PW.1, himself has not been explained by the High court. We are of the view that the High Court committed error in setting aside the order of conviction in exercise of revisional jurisdiction. No sufficient ground has been mentioned by the High Court in its judgment to enable it to exercise its revisional jurisdiction for setting aside the conviction. In the result, the appeal is allowed, judgment of the High Court is set aside and judgment of trial court as affirmed by the Appellate Court is restored. Kishan Rao =VS= Shankargouda, [5 LM (SC) 77] Section 138- Cheque dishonour- The High Court patently erred in holding that the burden was on the appellant- complainant to prove that he had advanced the loan and the blank signed cheque was given to him in repayment of the same. The finding of the High Court that the case of the appellant-complainant became highly doubtful or not beyond reasonable doubt is patently erroneous for the reasons discussed above. The appeals are allowed. The judgment and order of the High Court is set aside. The conviction of the respondent under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is confirmed. However, the respondent- accused is sentenced only to fine, which is enhanced to Rs.16 lakhs and shall be paid as compensation to the appellant complainant. The fine shall be deposited in the Trial Court within eight weeks from the date, failing which the sentence of imprisonment of one year as imposed by the Trial Court shall revive. There shall be no order as to costs.... Bir Singh -VS- Mukesh Kumar, [6 LM (SC) 94] Section 138, 141- Cheque dishonour- The provisions of Section 141 postulate that if the person committing an offence under Section 138 is a company, every person, who at the time when the offence was committed was in charge of or was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished. During the pendency of these proceedings, this Court on 28 November 2008 recorded the statement of the appellant that he was willing to deposit the entire cheque. In our view, having regard to the intent of the order which was passed by this Court on 28 November 2008, it would be appropriate and proper if the amount deposited in this Court, together with accrued interest, is paid over to the respondentcomplainant. The criminal appeal is, accordingly, disposed of. ...Himanshu =VS= B. Shivamurthy, [6 LM (SC) 90] Section 138 and 143A- Section 143A can be applied or invoked only in cases where the offence under Section 138 of the Act was committed after the introduction of said Section 143A in the statute book- In the present case, the Complaint was lodged in the year 2016 that is to say, the act constituting an offence had occurred by 2016 whereas, the concerned provision viz. Section 143A of the Act was inserted in the statute book with effect from 01.09.2018. The question that arises therefore is whether Section 143A of the Act is retrospective in operation and can be invoked in cases where the offences punishable under Section 138 of the Act were committed much prior to the introduction of Section 143A. We are concerned in the present case only with the issue regarding applicability of said Section 143A to offences under Section 138 of the Act, committed before the insertion of said Section 143A. "143A. Power to direct interim compensation. - (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), the Court trying an offence under section 138 may order the drawer of the cheque to pay interim compensation to the complainant - (a) in a summary trial or a summons case, where he pleads not guilty to the accusation made in the complaint; and (b) in any other case, upon framing of charge. (2) The interim compensation under sub-section (1) shall not exceed twenty per cent of the amount of the cheque. (3) The interim compensation shall be paid within sixty days from the date of the order under subsection (1), or within such further period not exceeding thirty days as may be directed by the Court on sufficient cause being shown by the drawer of the cheque. (4) If the drawer of the cheque is acquitted, the Court shall direct the complainant to repay to the drawer the amount of interim compensation, with interest at the bank rate as published by the Reserve Bank of India, prevalent at the beginning of the relevant financial years, within sixty days from the date of the order, or within such further period not exceeding thirty days as may be directed by the Court on sufficient cause being shown complainant. by the (5) The interim compensation payable under this section may be recovered as if it were a fine under section 421 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974). (6) The amount of fine imposed under section 138 or the amount of compensation awarded under section 357 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), shall be reduced by the amount paid or recovered as interim compensation under this section." Ultimate analysis, we hold Section 143A to be prospective in operation and that the provisions of said Section 143A can be applied or invoked only in cases where the offence under Section 138 of the Act was committed after the introduction of said Section 143A in the statute book. Consequently, the orders passed by the Trial Court as well as the High Court are required to be set aside. The money deposited by the Appellant, pursuant to the interim direction passed by this Court, shall be returned to the Appellant along with interest accrued thereon within two weeks from the date of this order. The Appeal is allowed in aforesaid terms....G.J. Raja =VS= Tejraj Surana, [7 LM (SC) 261] Section 138, 139- Cheque dishonour- The oral and the documentary evidence adduced by the complainant are sufficient to prove that it was a legally enforceable debt and that the cheques were issued to discharge the legally enforceable debt. With the evidence adduced by the complainant, the courts below ought to have raised the presumption under Section 139 of the Act. The evidence adduced by the respondent-accused is not sufficient to rebut the presumption raised under Section 139 of the Act. The defence of the respondent that though he made payment for the commodities/rice bags, the blank cheques were not returned by the appellant- complainant is quite unbelievable and unacceptable. The impugned judgment of the High Court cannot be sustained and is liable to be set aside. The impugned judgment of the High Court in Criminal Appeal Nos.53 and 54 of 2006 is set aside and these appeals are allowed. The respondent-accused is convicted under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act and a fine of Rs.2,97,150/- (Rs.53,171/+ Rs.1,93.979/- + compensation of Rs.50,000/-) is imposed on the respondent in default of which, the respondent shall undergo imprisonment for six months. The fine amount of Rs.2,97,150/- is to be deposited before the trial court within twelve weeks from today, failing which the respondent shall be taken into custody to serve the default sentence. On deposit of fine amount, the amount of Rs.2,97,150/- shall be paid to the appellant-complainant. M/S Shree Daneshwari Traders =VS= Sanjay Jain, [7 LM (SC) 268] Sections 138, 148- Cheque Dishonour- The criminal complaints against the appellants under Section 138 of the N.I. Act were lodged/filed before the amendment Act No. 20/2018 by which Section 148 of the N.I. Act came to be amended and therefore amended Section 148 of the N.I. Act shall not be made applicable The appellants submitted application/s under Section 389 of the Cr.P.C. to suspend the sentence pending appeals challenging the conviction and sentence, amended Section 148 of the N.I. Act came into force and was brought on statute w.e.f. 1.9.2018. Therefore, considering the object and purpose of amendment in Section 148 of the N.I. Act and while suspending the sentence in exercise of powers under Section 389 of the Cr.P.C., when the first appellate court directed the appellants to deposit 25% of the amount of fine/compensation as imposed by the learned trial Court, the same can be said to be absolutely in consonance with the Statement of Objects and Reasons of amendment in Section 148 of the N.I. Act. Facts and circumstances of the case and considering the fact that the appellants were bonafidely litigating before this Court challenging the order passed by the first appellate court, in exercise of powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India and in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case and the amount to be deposited is a huge amount, we grant further four weeks' time from today to the appellants to deposit the amount as directed by the first appellate court, confirmed by the High Court and further confirmed by this Court. We see no reason to interfere with the impugned common judgment and order passed by the High Court dismissing the revision application/s, confirming the order passed by the first appellate court directing the appellants to deposit 25% of the amount of fine/compensation pending appeals. The instant appeals are accordingly dismissed with the aforesaid observations and appellants are now directed to deposit the amount directed by the first appellate court within extended period of four weeks from today. ...Surinder Singh Deswal @ Col. S.S.Deswal =VS= Virender Gandhi, [7 LM (SC) 284] Section 138, 139- Dishonour of 7 cheques The matters relating to 7 cheques issued by the appellant in favour of respondent No. 2 for a sum of Rs. 3 lakhs each are being considered together: and the appellant is being penalised with double the amount of cheques in each case i.e., in all a sum of Rs. 42,00,000/-, in our view, the appellant deserves to be extended another chance to mend himself by making payment of fine, in case of default in payment of the amount of fine, he would undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one year. The sentence is modified in the manner that in each of these 7 cases, the accused- appellant shall pay fine to the extent of double the amount of each cheque (i.e., a sum of Rs. 6 lakhs in each case) within 2 months from today with the stipulation that in case of default in payment of fine, the accused-appellant shall undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one year. On recovery of the amount of fine, the complainant-respondent No. 2 shall be compensated to the tune of Rs. 5.5 lakhs in each case. In the event of imprisonment for default in payment of fine, the sentences in all the 7 cases shall run concurrently. ...Rohitbhai Jivanlal Patel =VS= State of Gujarat, [8 LM (SC) 15] Section 138- Modified order- Cheque dishonour-Appellant No.2 would be liable to undergo the sentence of simple imprisonment as awarded by the High Court. However, given the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, namely, that the appellants volunteered and thereafter have deposited the cheque amount with the Registry of this Court in the year 2018, we are inclined to take a lenient view. The impugned judgment of the High Court dated 09112017 is thus modified, and it is directed that Appellant No.2 shall not be required to undergo the awarded sentence. M/s. Kalamani Tex =VS= Balasubramanian, [10 LM (SC) 6] P Section 138 r/w Section 141- Quashed and set aside The appellant herein is neither a Director nor a partner in any firm who has issued the cheque. Therefore, even the appellant cannot be convicted with the aid of Section 141 of the NI Act. Therefore, the High Court has committed a grave error in not quashing the complaint against the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 138 r/w Section 141 of the NI Act. The criminal complaint filed against the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 138 r/w Section 141 of the NI Act, therefore, can be said to be abuse of process of law and therefore the same is required to be quashed and set aside. The impugned judgment and order dated 21.08.2019 passed by the High Court in Criminal Writ Petition No. 2595 of 2019 refusing to quash the criminal complaint against the appellant for the offence punishable under Section 138 read with Section 141 of the NI Act is hereby quashed and set aside. The complaint case pending in the Court of the learned Metropolitan Magistrate filed by respondent No. 1 - original complainant being C.C. No. 2802/SS/2016 is hereby quashed and set aside. The appeal is allowed accordingly.....Alka Khandu Avhad -VS- Amar Syamprasad Mishra, [10 LM (SC) 11] Section 138-Unless law is strike down or amended we have no authority or scope to interfere with the proceeding or to quash the same on the ground that the existing law is bad one or inconsistence with its object, in exercising the power under section 561A of the Code. Mahmudur Rahman Nazlu vs State, 64 DLR 179 Section 138-The requirement is a notice in writing to the drawer of the cheque within fifteen (15) days of the receipt of the information by him from the Bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid. The legal implication is that notice must not exceed fifteen (15) days and notice can very well be given seven (7) days time. Sayed Hasan Imam Litu vs Al-Arafah Islami Bank, 64 DLR 255 Section 138-When a cheque is issued for payment of any amount of money, drawer of the cheque is under obligation to honour the same or arrange payment. If it does not arrange payment of the cheque money and the cheque is dishonoured, such an act may constitute an offence of cheating punishable under section 420 of the Code. Abul Khair Chandu vs State, 65 DLR 230 Section 138-Stop Payment-Since the cheques were returned by bank with the endorsement "payment stopped by the drawer" it is to be presumed that those were returned unpaid because the amount of money standing to the credit of that account was insufficient to honour of the cheque as envisaged in section 138 of the Act. Of course this is a rebuttable presumption. The defence can be considered at the time of holding trial and not in an application under section 561A of the Code. SM Redwan vs Md Rezaul Islam, 66 DLR (AD) 169 Section 138-The cheque was dishonoured with the endorsement "payment stopped by the drawer", a clear prima-facie case of the commission of the offence punishable under section 138 of the Act, has been made out against the accused. Ahmed Lal Mia vs State, 66 DLR (AD) 204 Section 138-It is true that in the judgment sought to be reviewed, there has been no detailed discussions as to the point raised before the High Court Division that the respective petition of complaint having been filed before expiry of the statutory period as stipulated in clause (c) of the proviso to section 138(1) of the Act, was barred by law, this Division having affirmed the judgment and order passed by the High Court Division which took the view that though the respective petition of complaint was filed before expiry of thirty days from the date of receipt of the notice issued under clause (b) of the proviso to section 138, was maintainable in law, in fact, gave the answer. Sarwar Hossain Moni (Md) vs State, 66 DLR (AD) 283 Section 138-The proposition of law which is consistent and no longer a resintegra is that a criminal case and civil case though arising out of the same transaction can proceed simultaneously. Aminul Karim (Md) vs Government of Bangladesh, 67 DLR 354 Section 138-A close reading of sub- i section (1) of section 138 of the Act, shows that it has noting to do with the recovery of loan amount. The whole scheme of the law is to haul up the drawer of the unpaid/ dishonoured cheque(s) for not arranging the funds against the issuance of such cheque(s) and then its/his failure to make the payment of the amount of the money of the unpaid/dishonoured cheque(s) on demand by the payee or, as the case be, by the holder in due course of the cheque(s) in writing within thirty days of the receipt of such notice as provided in clauses (b) and (c) respectively of sub-section (1) of section 138 of the Act. Aminul Karim (Md) vs Government of Bangladesh, 67 DLR 354 Section 138-There is nothing in law precluding a criminal case on account of a civil suit pending against the petitioners on the same facts. The criminal case stands for the offence, while the civil suit is for realization of money. Both can stand together. Aminul Karim (Md) VS Government of Bangladesh, 67 DLR 354 Section 138-Once a cheque is drawn and handed over to the drawee and the latter has presented it in his account for encashment and thereafter, if the cheque is returned to him with an endorsement that the amount of money standing to the credit of the account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid for that account or that t was dishonoured because of 'stop payment instructed by the Bank, an offence punishable under the section would constitute provided that if the drawee fulfills the conditions provided in the proviso to sub-section (1). If the drawer of the cheque is a Company, firm or an association of individuals the said money, firm or association of individuals would also be prosecuted for commission of offence under section 138 subject to the fulfilment of the conditions. (PER SK SINHA, CJ MAJORITY) Eusof Babu (Md) vs State, 68 DLR (AD) 298 Section 138-Onus The onus on the part of the drawee is primary being based on the maxim e.i.: 'incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat' this is because the liability envisaged in sub-section (1) is on the person in-charge of, and was responsible to the business of the company is fixed by the legislature because he is directly responsible for the offence. (Per SK Sinha, CJ majority) Eusof Babu (Md) vs State, 68 DLR (AD) 298 Section 138-The dishonour of a cheque does not itself constitute an offence under section 138. If the drawer of such cheque fails to make payment of the amount of money to the payee within thirty days of receipt of the notice, the cause of action for constituting the offence will arise, and if a complaint is filed within one month of the date on which the cause of action arises, the court shall take cognizance of the offence. So, the cause of action will arise if the drawer fails to make payment to the payee. Now, if the same drawer fails to make payment of the amount of money covered by the cheque (s) within the stipulated time, does it constitute the cause of action? It does. If it does constitute the cause of action, there will be no legal bar to file a case for prosecuting the drawer for the cause of action. Here the cause of action is not distinct but the same. (PER SK SINHA, CJ MAJORITY) Eusof Babu (Md) vs State, 68 DLR (AD) 298 Section 138-The complainant(s)/ drawee(s) of the cheques may, if so advised, arraign by adding the Companies in the category of accused if they feel that for getting effective relief in the cases the presence of the companies is necessary in the cases. (PER SK SINHA, CJ MAJORITY) Eusof Babu (Md) vs State, 68 DLR (AD) 298 Section 138-Once a cheque is drawn it has to be presented within 6 (six) months from the date it is drawn or within the period of it's validity; if dishonoured on placing it for encashment the payee has to make a demand for payment by giving a notice in writing within 30 (thirty) days on receipt of information from the bank regarding the return of the cheque and that the cause of action shall arise if the drawer failed to pay within 30 (thirty) days of receipt of such notice. Nurul Islam vs State, 69 DLR 312 Section 138-At the time of charge hearing, the Court of Joint Metropolitan Session in true sense had no legal scope to consider or decide those facts and it was therefore well justified to refuse the prayer filed under section 265C of the Code. Majharul Hoque Monsur (Md) vs Mir Kashim Chowdhury, 69 DLR 241 Section 138-There are no legal restrictions upon parties to commence legal proceedings both under section 138 of the Act simultaneously with a civil suit, i.e. the Artha Rin suit. The offence committed under section 138 of the Act and its consequences are different to the consequences contemplated under the Artha Rin Suit. Artha Rin Suit relates to the realization of money whereas dishonouring of cheque relates to a statutory offence under the Act of 1881. Mofizur Rahman (Md) vs Bangladesh Represented by Secretary Ministry of Law, 69 DLR 402 Section 138-The offence committed under sections 420 and 406 are totally different from one committed under section 138(1) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, while the ingredients as, well as, the reliefs and punishments provided for, under two laws are different. Section 138(2) provides for imposing fine and to pay fine, to the extent of face value of the dishonoured cheque, to the 'payee'/ complainant. Section 138B provides for depositing not less than 50% of the dishonoured cheque in the trial court, for preferring appeal against conviction under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. There is no such provision under section 420 or 406 of the Penal Code. Besides, joinder of offence committed under section 138(1) of the Negotiable Instruments Act is not permitted with one committed under the Penal Code. Nurul Islam vs State, 69 DLR 308 Section 138-Issuing and signing of the cheques would be proved at the trial. Whether he managed the affairs of the company or not is a disputed question of facts. The High Court Division was not justified in passing the impugned judgment considering the documents submitted before it. The High Court Division was based upon disputed question of facts and defence materials, those materials were not submitted at the trial Court, rather, directly submitted before the High Court Division for consideration in the proceedings under section 561A of the Code. The complainant has no occasion to know about the transfer of shares because it is the internal affairs of the accused and his company which ought not have scrutinized by the High Court Division while exercising its inherent jurisdiction. On the basis of such defence material quashing of the proceedings of the 3(three) cases out of 5(five) is serious error of law. Ashfaq Hossain vs State (Criminal) 74 DLR (AD) 40 Section 138 The Criminal case against the petitioner was brought under a special law, name- ly the Negotiable Instruments Act, which is not compoundable and, as such, the compromise reached by the parties outside the court is of no conse- quence. However, it is noted that the claimant has received the money owing to her and also that the petitioner has served in jail for more than 3 months. Md. Mostafizur Rahman vs. The State (Muhammad Imman Ali J) (Criminal) 11 ADC 800 Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, section 138, 123A, (2) (a) We are to remember that the principal object of interpretation of the statutory law is not only to find out particular meaning of a word or words but to find out the intention of the legislature which has been expressed through the medium of words. Dr. Abdullahel Bari vs. Md. Rahat Chowdhury (Mohammad Anwarul Haque J) (Criminal) 11 ADC 826 Section 138 Whether a pending civil suit in respect of the dishonoured cheque can be used as a shield by the accused for his pro- tection from being prosecuted in respect of an offence committed under section 138 of the Act, 1881. Fazal Ahmed vs. The State (Md. Abdul Wahhab Miah J) (Criminal) 11 ADC 833 Section 138 Section 439 read with section 435 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (the Code) being Criminal Revision No.348 of 2012 for setting aside two orders No.7 dated 26.02.2012 and No.4 dated 29.11.2011 (as arranged in the cause title of the revision application) passed by the learned Metropolitan Sessions Judge.-Ahmed Lal Mia vs. The State (Md. Abdul Wahhab Miah J) (Criminal) 11 ADC 960 Section 138(b) Application before the High Court Division under Section 561A of the Code of Criminal Procedure the accused respondent did not make any statement to the effect that the person who received the notice was not author- ized to receive the same, therefore, the High Court Division committed an error of law in quashing the petition of complaint on the ground of alleged non- service of notice upon the accused- respondent. Alhaj Golam Rasul Belal vs. Habibullah Shakir (Md. Muzammel Hossain CJ) (Criminal) 12 ADC 363 Section 138 There being no specific provision for appeal under the Negotiable Instruments Act, apart from the deposit of 50% of the value of the cheque in the court passing the award, the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure shall apply with regard to appeal, revision etc. Chowdhury Abzal Hossain vs. The State (Muhammad Imman Ali J) (Criminal) 12 ADC 556 Section 138 Upon conclusion of the trial, the accused-petitioner was found guilty and convicted under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and sentenced to suffer simple imprison- ment for three months and to pay a fine of Tk. 15,00,000.00 that would be payable to the complainant. M.A. Azam Chowdhury vs. A.B.M. Asaduzzamn (Muhammad Imman Ali J) (Criminal) 13 ADC 79 Section 138 The convict petitioner surrendered before the trial court and was enlarged on bail and, thereafter, the case was transferred to the Metropolitan sessions Judge, Dhaka and it was registered as Metropolitan sessions Case No.8304 of 2012., Eventually the case was heard and disposed by the learned Additional Metropolitan Sessions judge, Second court, Dhaka, who framed charge under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (the Act) against the petitioner herein. M.A. Azam Chowdhury vs. A.B.M. Asaduzzamn (Muhammad Imman Ali J) (Criminal) 13 ADC 83 Section 138 Whether if a company incorporated under the Companies Act. Commits an offence punishable under section 138 of the Negotiable instruments Act, 1881 is excluded from prosecution, can a direc- tor, manager, secretary or other officer of the company be prosecuted for that offence, and secondly, whether if more than one cheques issued by the same drawer can be prosecuted in a single case.) Mohammad Eusof Babu vs. Johan Provanjon Chowdhury (Surendra Kumar Sinha J) (Criminal) 14 ADC 792 Section 138 Evidently the High Court Division in admitting the appeal has overlooked the fact that the matter had already been disposed of on appeal heard by the Additional Metropolitan Sessions Judge and that any second appeal, in the circumstances was misconceived where the lower appellate Court has reversed the findings of the trial Court by acquit- ting the accused the only redress for the complainant is to file a revisional application before the High Court Division. A. F. M Ahmed Hossain vs. Md. Azizul Haque (Mohammad Imman Ali J) (Criminal) 14 ADC 854 Section 138-Where there is no non-obstante clause the jurisdiction of the court, constituted under the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be taken away or barred the court below committed no illegality in taking cognizance or framing of charge under the general provision of law. Moniruzzaman vs ANM Didar-e-Alam 54 DLR 445. Section 138-The convict respondent admitted about the loan, issuance of cheques by him and dishonour of cheques and that a notice under section 138(1)(b) has been given by the complainant. Thus, all the legal requirements are present to bring the offence under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Amir Hossain vs MA Malek and others 56 DLR (AD) 146. Section 138-The complainant served a legal notice within 15 days of the receipt of the information of return of the cheques. So there is no valid ground for quashing the proceeding under section 138 of the Act. Habibur Rahman Howlader vs State 53 DLR (AD) 111. Section 138-Under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act an offence is commit- ted if a cheque is dishonoured and if payment is not made within 15 days after receipt of a legal notice. It is a settled law that criminal proceeding can be proceeded independently of the civil suit. Monzur Alam vs State 55 DLR (AD) 62. Section 138-Admittedly, in the present case the cheque was presented to the bank after expiry of 6 months from the date of drawing of the cheque. So, obviously this case under section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act is not maintainable in view of the restriction imposed by proviso (a) to the said section. So, the proceeding is liable to be quashed. MA Mazid vs Md Abdul Motaleb 56 DLR 636. Section 138 In the instant case the plain subject matter of this case is the dishonour of the cheque issued by the accused now late Khalilur Rahman in favour of the complainant which clearly comes within the mischief of section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act since the impugned cheque has been returned unpiad for insufficiency of fund. Khalilur Rahman being dead his heirs Mrs Nazma Begum vs Md Habib- ullah 57 DLR 603. Section 138-When the reason for return of the cheque has been mentioned as "refer to drawer" or insufficiency of fund, it is the primary duty of the drawer of the cheque to make payment of the money to the payee within 15 days from the receipt of the notice. Khalilur Rahman being dead his heirs Mrs Nazma Begum vs Md Habibullah 57 DLR 603. Section 138 From the heading of the section it becomes clear that the legislature never intended dishonour of the cheques to be made punishable only in case of insufficiency of fund or exceeds the amount arranged to be paid since the word "etc" has also been used there by the caption of the section. So, it can be presumed that legislature contemplated various other reasons where the cheque is dishonoured. Khalilur Rahman vs Md Habibullah 57 DLR 603. Section 138-The offence under section 138 of the Act can be completed with the concentration of a number of facts i.e. (i) drawing of the cheque, (ii) presentation of the cheque, (iii) returning of the cheque unpaid by the drawee bank, (iv) giving notice in writing to the drawer of the cheque demanding payment of the cheque amount and (v) failure of the drawer to make payment within 15 days of receipt of the notice. As per provisions of sections 177, 178, 179 and 180 of the Code of Criminal Procedure if the aforesaid five different acts were done in five different localities any of the Courts exercising jurisdiction in one of the five local areas can become the place of trial for the offence under section 138 of the Act and complainant can choose any one of the Courts in whose jurisdiction any of the 5 components of the said offence was done. The legal notice was issued from a lawyer at Chittagong District Bar and the complainant, for encashing the cheques, presented the same at a bank at Chittagong. As such, on the ground of initiating the proceeding at Chittagong this proceeding cannot be quashed. Abdul Alim vs Biswajit Dey 59 DLR 236. Section 138 Since the accused-petitioner at no point of time denied his signature on the cheque he must have to discharge the onus as to why he signed the cheque when the cheque was delivered/ given to the complainant. A legitimate claim of the complainant cannot be frustrated on mere technicality. Abdul Alim vs Biswajit Dey 59 DLR 236. Section 138-Since the date of receipt is a question of fact to be ascertained at the time of trial non-disclosure of such fact in the complaint petition cannot render the proceeding liable to be quashed to the great prejudice of the complainant who is entitled to prove his case on evidence. Nizamuddin Mahmood vs Abdul Hamid Bhuiyan 60 DLR (AD) 195. Section 138-The object of crossing is to secure payment not to any particular bank, but to a banker, in order that it may be easily traced for whose use the money was received. The crossing operates as a caution to the banker. Khokan Bhuiyan vs Md Ahsanullah, State 60 DLR 377. Section 138-Whether the accused received the legal notice or not, it is merely a disputed question of fact and the same should be decided in trial. The plea of the accused is nothing but the defence plea. Be that as it may, the proposition of law is now well settled that on the basis of defence plea or materials the criminal proceedings should not be stifled before trial, when there is a prima facie case for going for trial. Shamsul Alam vs State 60 DLR 677. Section 138 Section 138 of the Act gives special law of limitation and it starts from the date of presenting the cheque and 'on' receipt of the information from the Bank, on receipt of the information means and includes as and when the drawee received the notice of dishonouring of the cheque. Abul Kalam Azad vs State 61 DLR 91. Section 138 Stay of proceeding in criminal matter when not entertainable The proceeding under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act appears to be quite independent in nature with a very limited scope for adjudication which is not at all related to the issues involved in the Civil Suit. Moreover, at the fag end of trial of the crimi- nal case, such an application praying for stay order was not at all justified and entertainable. Zafar Ahmed vs Mir Iftekharuddin 61 DLR 732. Section 138-Whether the notice as required to be served under section 138 of Nego- tiable Instruments Act is essentially a question of fact to be proved by adducing evidence at the time of trial, inasmuch as there is specific assertion in the complaint petition that such a notice was, served. Sheikh Mashuk Rahman vs State62 DLR 28. Section 138-Intention of the legislators have been made further clear by incorporating section 138A in the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, prescribing provision for depositing not less than 50% of the amount of the dishonoured cheque is a pre-condition for filing appeal against any order or sentence under sub-section (1) of section 138. Sheikh Mashuk Rahman vs State 62 DLR 28. Section 138 Joint Signature "Stop pay- ment instruction" cannot exonerate the drawer of a cheque from the criminal liability under section 138 of the Act. Similarly, if the drawer of the cheque intentionally issues a cheque on the joint account by putting his single signature with a malafide intention of getting it dishonoured, he cannot also avoid liability of being prosecuted under section 138 of the Act. Shah Alam (Md) vs State 63 DLR 137. Section 138-Non disclosure of the date of receipt of notice under section 138(1)(b) of the Negotiable Instruments Act is a question of fact which will be decided at the time of trial. Noor Jamal vs State 63 DLR 531. Section 138 Filing the petition of complaint before arising cause of action, after expiry of 30 days from the date of receipt of the legal notice, the cause of action arose and, as such, the trial Court did not commit any illegality by framing charge against the petitioner under section 138 of the Act. Shahidul Islam vs State 63 DLR 536. Sections 138, 138A & 140-A prosecu- tion launched under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is different from one launched under sections 420/406 of the Penal Code. Not only the ingredients are different between the offences punishable under these two statutes, rather the liability under section 138 of the Nego- tiable Instruments Act, as imposed for dishonour of cheque, is a strict liability. Sheikh Mashuk Rahman vs State 62 DLR 28. › Sections 138 and 140-For not making any allegation in the complaint petition of committing any offence under section 138 by the drawer-company, provisions of section 140 of the Act would not be applicable and there is no scope in law to hold the accused guilty in the case or to initiate and continue the proceeding. Ferdous Khan vs Islami Bank Bangladesh Ltd 63, DLR 540. Sections 138 and 141-There is no legal bar to try the offence under same transaction under one case. Zahed Hossain vs State 61 DLR 386. Sections 138 and 141-Admittedly there was a transaction between the parties and the petitioner issued the cheque in question but the law of limitation stands as an impediment to proceed further with the case in view of clause (b) of section 138 and clause (b) to section 141 of the Act. Time is a great factor of human life specially when it comes into play for legal purpose. The proceeding of the CR case is quashed. Abdus Salam vs Md Munshi Rashed Kamal 54 DLR 234. Sections 138 and 141-Even though the case is pre-mature and it was filed before the expiry of 15 days from the date of receipt of the notice, the proceeding is not liable to be quashed. Satya Narayan Poddar vs State 403. Sections 138 and 141-Taking of cogni- sance upon the petition of complaint filed by the Attorney upon due examination under section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is "perfectly valid and appropriate". Hashibul Bashar vs Gulzar Rahman 56 DLR (AD) 17. Sections 138 and 141-In view of discus- sions made the facts and circumstance of the case, there was no other alternative but to quash the proceeding as the opposite party No. 1 com- plainant had earlier taken recourse to clause (b) of section 138 of the Act in an unsuccessful manner which does not in any way give rise to further cause of action as cause of action as provided under sections 138 and 141 of the Act arises only for once. Dr Md Mofizur Rahman vs Md Bashir- ullah 55 DLR 630. Sections 138 & 141-An offence under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is for dishonour of a cheque simpliciter for insufficiency of fund, etc. whereas an offence under section 420 of the Penal Code for cheating is a distinct offence. The rule of law about the peremptory application of the special law in place of the general law for trial of an offence hardly applies when the offences are distinct under the two laws. Nurul Islam vs State 49 DLR 464. Sections 138 and 141-Since the cheques issued by the petitioner were dishonoured for insufficient fund and he failed to pay the amount of the dishonoured cheques in time, offence under section 138 of the Act has been disclosed agianst him. The facts narrated in the complaint do constitute prima facie offence under section 138 of the Act and, as such, question of quashing the proceeding does not arise. Solaiman vs State 62 DLR 385. Sections 138 and 141-Since there is no legal bar against the initiation, framing of charge, and continuation of the proceedings and, as such, the proceedings do not amount to an abuse of the process of the Court. Abeda Chowdhury vs State 63 DLR 118. Section 138A-This Court is of the view that said amendment dated 9-2-2006 will have prospective effect on all cases to be filed after the amendment came into force as in the amending enactment as above no intention was expressly stated about retrospective effect of the same. Accordingly, there was no need for deposit of 50% of the amount of dishonoured cheque before filing of the concerned appeal. Impugned order of rejection of the memo of appeal being against the spirit of section 6 of General Clauses Act the same cannot be sustainable. Akhter Hossain Md vs Hasmat Ali and State 60 DLR 368. Section 138(a) Cheques were presented to the bank twice within six months from the date it was drawn-Computation of 15 days for serving notice should be done from the date on which the cheques lastly returned by the bank-This having were been done the application under section 561A of Code of Criminal Procedure is mis- conceived. Habibur Rahman Hawlader vs State 55 DLR 199. Section 138(b) The petitioner would get opportunity to raise the point whether the cheque was presented within time at the time of framing charge and the question when the cheque was presented to the bank for the 1st time cannot be decided in this application under section 561A of the Code of Criminal Procedure which is a disputed question of fact. Hasibul Bashar vs Dilshed Huda 55 DLR 200. Section 138(1)-Under the scheme of the Act the offence punishable under section 138 would be complete only upon the failure by the drawer to pay within fortnight of the receipt of notice from the payee of the dishonour of the cheque. When drawer fails to make payment within the period specified in clause (c) of the proviso the offence is complete. Khalilur Rahman vs Md Habibullah 57 DLR 603. Section 138(1)-The account is not main- tained in the name of the accused-petitioner; rather it is maintained in the name of her hus- band. The cheque was not bounced because of insufficiency of funds or excess of the amount arranged to be paid as agreed upon between the drawer and the Bank. In such a posture of things, section 138(1) cannot be applied against the accused-petitioner. Shahnaj Begum Munni vs State 63 DLR 279. Section 138(1)-The cheque was issued to discharge, either in whole or in part, a legally enforceable debt or liability. The accused- petitioner had never any debt or liability to discharge. It is the husband of the accused petitioner who had the debt or liability to discharge. The liability or debt of the husband of the accused-petitioner cannot be thrust on to the shoulder of the accused-petitioner. Given this scenario, if the accused-petitioner is made liable for the debt or liability of her husband, that will go against the spirit of the mandate of section 138(1) of the Act. Shahnaj Begum Munni vs State 63 DLR 279. Section 138(3)-The complainant may initiate a criminal proceeding against them under section 420 of the Penal Code, if he is so advised. Besides, the door of the Civil Court is always open to the complainant to recover the loan amount by filing a money suit against the party concerned. Shahnaj Begum Munni vs State 63 DLR 279. Section 138(1)(b)-As required notices were issued by registered post, one at the home address and another at the business address of the accused-petitioner but the same were returned by the postal peon. The very correctness of serving legal notice under section 138(1)(b) of the Act and receipt of the same by the drawer of the cheque can only be adjudicated at the trial. Such pro- ceedings cannot be quashed for factual aspect of a case. (Per Md Ataur Rahman Khan J). Zahed Hossain vs State 61 DLR 386. Section 138(1)(b) Notice under section 138 (1)(b) of the Act is a question of fact which will be decided at the time of trial after taking evidence. So, the 8 dishonoured cheques issued through single notice and initiating single proceeding, the petitioner would not have any prejudice by filing of one complaint for 8 (eight) cheques between the same parties and dishonoured on the same date cannot render the proceedings under section 561A of the Code of Criminal Procedure liable to be quashed. (Per Md Ataur Rahman Khan J). Zahed Hossain vs State 61 DLR 386. Section 138(1)(b) Since the complainant filed the complaint after expiry of the statutory period of 30 days from the date of issuance of notice under proviso of section 138(1)(b) of the Act and as such taking cognizance of complaint by the Magistrate was not legal and since taking of cognizance is illegal, the continuation of the proceeding will create abuse of the process of the Court. Rafiqul Islam vs State 62 DLR 377. Section 138(1)(c) Section 141(1)(b)- Cause of action clause (b) of section 141, read with sub-section (1) of section 138 of the Act, clearly signifies that dishonour of a cheque per se would not bring the drawer of the dishonoured cheque within the mischief of sub-section (1) of section 138. There must have arisen a cause of action for taking cognizance under clause (1) of section 141 of the Act. Such cause of action arises upon failure of the drawer of cheque to make payment of "the amount of money", within 30 days of receiving the notice demanding payment of the amount under the dishonoured cheque and not within 30 days of dishonour of a cheque. Nurun Nabi vs Md Abu Taher Khan 62 DLR 317. Section 138(1)(c)-Section 141(1)(b)- Cause of action-Complaint petition-Since, in the demand notice the total amount of the 3(three) cheques amounting to Taka 12,84,600 has been demanded and the drawer of the cheque having failed to make payment of the "said amount of money" within 30 days, only one cause of action has arisen and, legally, for one cause of action there should be one complaint petition, which has exactly been done in the impugned proceeding Nurun Nabi vs Md Abu Taher Khan 62 DLR 317. Section 138(3)-Sub-section (3) of section 138 gives additional authority to the civil Court to satisfy the complainant if any other grievances is found to be left out. Khalilur Rahman being dead his heirs Mrs Nazma Begum vs Md Habibullah 57 DLR 603. Section 138-On a reading of the petition of complaint it is difficult to hold that there is any legal bar or the continuation of the proceeding will amount to an abuse of the process of the Court. The proposition of law is by now well settled that on the basis of the defence plea or materials, the criminal proceedings should not be stifled before trial, when there is a prima-facie case for going to the trial. Nurul Huda (Md) vs State, 69 DLR 486. Section 138-Notice under section 138 is required to be served upon "the drawer" of the cheque so as to give the drawer an opportunity to make the payment and escape the penal consequences. Shahidul Alam @ S Alam vs Dr Jahid Hossain Prodhan, 69 DLR 547. Section 138-The person who writes a cheque or draft instructs the drawer to pay someone else. The company is the "drawer" of the cheque. The wordings as used in section 138 is very clear to make only the "drawer" liable and thus, leaves no room for any doubt or ambiguity. Shahidul Alam @S Alam vs Dr Jahid Hossain Prodhan, 69 DLR 547. Section 138-Since company is a juristic person, it would be managed by living persons who guided the act of such a juristic person to commit such a glaring default and hence, should be held respon- sible. Shahidul Alam @S Alam vs Dr Jahid Hossain Prodhan, 69 DLR 547. Section 138-The Managing Director being the chief executive of the company his knowledge may be deemed to be the knowledge of the company and the directors as well. Shahidul Alam @ S Alam vs Dr Jahid Hossain Prodhan, 69 DLR 547. Section 138-A single notice of demand issued to the Managing Director of the company will henceforth, be considered to have been issued to the directors as well and the liability of directors can arise on the basis of such notice. Shahidul Alam @ S Alam vs Dr Jahid Hossain Prodhan, 69 DLR 547. Section 138-Since the cheque in question had been issued by the Company as drawer, it constitutes single cause of action and there cannot be any question of splitting up of the cause of action where the accused No. 2 remains absconding and the law does not contemplate separate notice to be given to every director. Shahidul Alam @S Alam vs Dr Jahid Hossain Prodhan, 69 DLR 547. Section 138-The cheque was drawn some time in 2004 and it was presented in the Bank in the month of September, 2007 i.e. beyond the period of six months from the date on which it was drawn. A cheque receiving in the year 2004, filling up the various columns later on, at the sweet will of the complainant, if presented in the Bank after a long gap of 3/4 years, undoubtedly the same is a fraud upon the drawer of the cheque and if Court allow to continue such practice, that would be sheer indulgence to the creditors to be more oppressive to the debtors. Mohammad Ali Fatik vs State, 66 DLR 228. Section 138-Whenever a cheque is drawn by a person in order to make payment of any amount, the amount must be given in it by the drawer of the cheque. Since the amount was not given by the drawer of the cheque having no intention for making any payment, such a cheque cannot be considered as a cheque to serve the purpose of section 138 of the Act. Dr Shyamal Baidya vs Islami Bank Bangla- desh Ltd, 66 DLR 547. Section 138-Legislature do not intent to serve notice one after another, in fact any one form therein is enough to serve the notice if it is found to be served properly as per law, in the premises if the notice returned unserved when it is served through registered post it is enough, and to be held as good service and thus it is not the legislative mandate to publish the notice in the daily news paper again for drawing attention to the drawer of the cheque. Ferdous Khan (Md) vs State, 68 DLR 334. Section 138-The accused is at liberty to take his defense plea in the trial and to produce supporting evidence in accordance with law. Shariful Haque (Md) vs State represented by the Deputy Commissioner, 70 DLR 209. Section 138-Since the criminal proceeding can be proceeded indepen- dently of the civil suit, there is no bar to proceed with the criminal proceedings. Abu Sayeed Chowdhury vs State, 68 DLR 169. Section 138-When the cheque was dishonoured by the bank on the ground of 'insufficiency of fund' in the respondent's account, a proceeding under section 138 of the Act cannot be frustrated merely on a technical ground. Hasan vs State, 68 DLR 225. Section 138-Cheque, which is otherwise complete except the date, will be treated as an inchoate document handed over to the payee with implied authority (unless an express authority is annexed) to write the date on the cheque. It is the choice and decision of the drawer of a cheque to hand over a date, post-dated or undated cheque to the payee. He (drawer) cannot subsequently come with the plea that an undated or post dated cheque handed over to the payee. In such case he is stopped by his conduct, called estoppels by conduct, and cannot be allowed to deny his obligation only on the excuse that an undated cheque was given to the payee. Ahmad Ullah vs Md Younus, 68 DLR 228. Section 138-The offence is not deemed to have been committed against the State. The proceeding is initiated by the 'payee', of a 'holder in due course', who has proprietary right and interest in the property of the dishonoured cheque. The State is not a necessary party, though it may be a proper party in such a case. NI Act case is unlike a case filed under Penal Code etc. In a case under NI Act, cost may be awarded to the aggrieved party for causing financial hardship. Leading a person or a family to the verge of ruination, for harass- ment and inflicting mental agony on frivolous grounds or by resorting to dilatory tactics or on issues of law already settled by the Appellate Division, i.e. when the accused-petitioner does not come in clean hands for seeking justice, but with collateral purpose. Harun-or-Rashid vs State, 68 DLR 535. Sections 138 and 140-Sections 138 and 140 of the Act do not make the directors principal offenders but accessories before the fact or liable vicariously. It is the company which is the principal offender, which has indeed committed the offence by issuing the cheques that were bounced, and hence question of choice is out of context. (PER AHM SHAMSUDDIN CHOUDHURY, J DISSCUSTING) Eusof Babu (Md) vs State, 68 DLR (AD) 298. Sections 138 and 140-Prosecution minus the company was not maintainable, I find no necessity to consider other grounds the appellants/ leave petitioners have aired. So, the issue before me is very narrow indeed, but the flare and the dimension of it is too extensive and pervasive. Eusof Babu (Md) vs State, 68 DLR (AD) 298. Sections 138 and 140-The difference between sections 138 and 140 is that in respect of section 138 the offence is committed by human being that is to say, natural person and in section 140 though the expression "the person" is used which is qualified by a company which means "any body corporate and includes a firm of other association of individuals" which is a juristic person or not. It can be prosecuted for the offence under section 138. (PER SK SINHA, CJ MAJORITY) Eusof Babu (Md) vs State, 68 DLR (AD) 298. Sections 138 and 140-The purport and scope of section 140 does not lay down any requirement that in the eventuality of an offence under section 138, the directors must individually be issued separate notices under section 138. Shahidul Alam @S Alam vs Dr Jahid Hossain Prodhan. 69 DLR 547. Sections 138 & 140 Petitioner was Managing Director of the Company at the time of offence committed and all acts are committed or done within his knowledge. He is responsible for the conduct of the business of the company and in such situation when the Managing Director of the Company is made party, there is no necessity for making the Company a party. Younus-uz-zaman (Badal) vs State, 66 DLR 249. Section 138(1)-Service of notice-If a notice is issued upon the Managing Director of the company who is in-charge of the affairs of the Company and signed the cheque on behalf of the company, the service of notice upon the Managing Director is sufficient to infer that the company has received the notice. This will fasten the company as well as the commis- sion of the offence. This is because the Managing Director being the chief executive of the company his knowledge may be deemed to be the knowledge of the company. (PER SK SINHA, CJ MAJORITY) Eusof Babu (Md) vs State, 68 DLR (AD) 298. Section 138(1)-The "account payee cheque" mentioned in the complaint- petition has not lost it's character as negotiable instrument, the same can be easily brought within the mischief of "any cheque" mentioned in section 138(1) of the Act because cheque includes "account payee cheque". Mohammad Ali vs State, 64 DLR 426. Section 138(1)-Section 138(1) empowers the trial Court to punish with imprisonment for a maximum period of one year, or with fine which may extend to thrice the amount of the cheque or both. The powers given to the Court is discretionary. The language used in the section is not such that the Court must impose fine thrice the amount of the cheque. The legislature has left the matter to the discretion of the trial Court while awarding the sentence of imprisonment and fine. Shahidur Rahman Khadem vs State, 64 DLR (AD) 103. Section 138(1)-While the main part of section 138(1) of the Act provides the definition of an offence, identity of the offender and the quantum of punishment, its proviso sets out three conditions for application of the main provision. Aleya vs State, 70 DLR 303. Section 138(1)-If a drawer of the cheque is allowed to escape his liability under section 138(1) of the Act, on any frivolous ground or on mere technicality then a lot of payee or beneficiary of the cheques and the financial institutions and the Bank will be at the verge of ruination and the resultant havoc in the transactions, done in ordinary course since long, based on cheques are bound to erode the prevailing practices. If the fraud and deception are allowed to function freely in the economic system and various economic transaction and the fraud and cheaters are allowed to let go with impunity the financial institutions as well as the individual payees will be ruined. Ahmad Ullah vs Md Younus, 68 DLR 228. Section 138(1) read with Section 141(b)-While failure to comply with any one of the three conditions set out in clauses (a) to (c) of the proviso to section 138(1) of the Act shall result in non- commission of the offence inscribed in the main part of section 138(1) of the Act, non- compliance of the condition stipulated in section 141(b) of the Act shall make the Magistrate incompetent to take cognizance of the offence. Aleya vs State, 70 DLR 303. Section 138(1)(b) and (c)-While, in practice, mostly the date of dishonouring of the cheque and the date of receiving information from the bank about the dishonouring of cheque are the same date, however, there may be cases where the payee might be notified by the bank about dishonouring the cheque on a later date. Similarly, counting of thirty days stipulated in clause (c) of the proviso to section 138(1) of the Act should be commenced from the date of receiving the notice issued by the payee and, thus, calculation of thirty days should not be counted from the date of sending the demand notice. Aleya vs State, 70 DLR 303. Section 138(b) The complainant published the legal notice through "Dainik Suprovat Bangladesh" on asking to pay the cheque's amount within 30 days but the accused petitioner failed to pay the cheque's amount and thereafter, the complainant filed the case on within the period of one month in compliance with clause (b) of section 141 of the Act. The proposition of law is by now well settled that on the basis of the defence plea or materials, the criminal proceedings should not be stifled before trial, when there is a prima-facie case for going to the trial. Hasan Jahangir Alam vs State, 69 DLR 363. Section 138(b)(c)-Legislature has not created any absolute bar in filing a petition of complaint before expiry of thirty days of the receipt of the notice issued under clause (b) of the proviso to section 138 as created in case of filing a petition of complaint after expiry of one month of the date on which the cause of action arises under clause (c) of the proviso to section 138. Prematurity shall be cured the moment the period of thirty days expires and the payment of the dishonoured cheque is not made within the said period. Zahidul Islam (Md) vs Md Kamal Hossain, 66 DLR (AD) 180. Section 138(1)(2)(3) Upon a careful reading of section 138(1)(2)(3) it appears that these provisions have been designed to compensate the disappointed holder of the cheque, where any interest of the State or its entitlement to fine has been overlooked. If it remains concluded that an offence under section 138 of the Act is compound- able, then recognition of entitlement to fine by the State sounds conflicting. Even in compoundable offences defined in the Penal Code, if those end in compromise, and the law does not raise the State between the parties compromising, as a claimant of jail for the accused or as a claimant of fine. Imposition of fine making it payable to the State cannot be encouraged. Bulbul Sharif (Md) vs State, 68 DLR 314. Section 138(2) Since sub-section (2) of section 138 make clear provision for getting the face value of the cheque by the holder of the cheque, so there should have been black and white order in the judgment otherwise it may create confusion as to the entitlement by the holder of the cheque. Muraduzzaman Polash (Md) vs State, 67 DLR 501. Section 138(1A)-Before insertion of this sub-section (1A) there was some ambiguities as regard the service of notice. To dispel such ambiguity sub-section (1A) of section 138 of the Act was inserted in order to further clarify the method of 'service' of "notice" and to fortify the earlier section 138 in respect of service of notice. This provision brings about an additional measure which the legislature in its wisdom thought it proper to be inserted by 1A and this provision, has been added to the original laws governing the field only to strengthen the procedure of service of 'notice' that existed before. Though the provisions under section 27 of the Act were there, even then the legislature further clarified this substantive issue and set it at rest once for all. Mofizur Rahman (Md) vs Bangladesh Represented by Secretary Ministry of Law, 69 DLR 402. Section 138(1A)-The provisions under challenge (1A) suggested 3 (three) methods consecutively, but all the methods are alternative method since the word 'or' appears employing a construction of making the same disjunctive and, as such, it can easily be inferred that legislature consciously did this only to further simplify the procedure in respect of service of notice. Mofizur Rahman (Md) vs Bangladesh Represented by Secretary Ministry of Law, 69 DLR 402. Section 138(1A) Service of notice under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 138 of the Act means any of the 3(three) modes as provided under clause (a), (b) and (c) of sub-section (1A) of section 138 of the Act. The legislature while prescribing the 3 (three) modes of service of notice has used the words "or" and thus, makes each clause disjunctive. The duty of the payee is discharged once he served notice either under clause (a) or (b) or (c) of sub section (1A) of section 138 of the Act. No where within the four corners of sub section (1A) the legislature has put burden upon the payee to further exhaust the mode of service of notice as prescribed under clause (c) of sub-section (IA) by paper publication when the drawer is found absent in his last known address. Nurul Islam vs State, 69 DLR 312. Section 138A-Right of appeal is a substantive right and it becomes a vested right when the original proceeding is initiated and this right is not defeated by the repeal of the statute conferring the right of appeal. But there are two exceptions to this rule, namely, when by a competent enact- ment, such right of appeal is taken away expressly or impliedly with retrospective effect, and when the Court or tribunal to which appeal lay at the commencement of the original proceeding stands abolished without providing another forum. A litigant has, however, no vested right to any particular forum and where a new forum is provided by the repealing Act, the right of appeal is to be exercised in the new forum. A change of law imposing any restriction on the right of appeal, in the absence of any contrary intention, will not affect the right of appeal as it stood at the commencement of the original proceeding. Parvin Akhter vs Bangladesh, 70 DLR 413. Section 140-The directors only signed the company's cheques and thereby acted as the fuel injectors in the Company's commission of the offence. Section 140 of the Act made them vicariously liable as per me decision of the larger Bench of the Indian Supreme Court. Question is not founded on the applicability of the civil law principle of non-joinder but that of the criminal jurisprudence which ordains that a criminal proceeding is non-est for aiders or abettors if the principal offender is not booked. (PER AHM SHAMSUDDIN CHOUDHURY, J DISSCUSTING) Eusof Babu (Md) vs State, 68 DLR (AD) 298. Section 140-Section 140 does not contain that the prosecution of company is indisputable for the prosecution of the other categories of persons. If the company is not prosecuted, the other two categories of persons cannot, on that ground alone, escape from criminal liability. (Per SK Sinha, CJ majority) Eusof Babu (Md) vs State, 68 DLR (AD) 298. Section 140-Company is a distinct personality, independent of its Directors and share-holders and it is the company who is liable for offence committed by it and that the directors who steer the affairs of the company are not liable as the principal offenders but either vicariously or as aiding or abetting agents. For this view I take in aid observations expressed in re- Sir Dinshai Petit, supra, to the effect that when a company is duly incorporated the Court should start with the presumption that it is a separate entity from the individuals. (PER AHM SHAMSUDDIN CHOUDHURY, J DISSCUSTING) Eusof Babu (Md) vs State, 68 DLR (AD) 298. Section 140-In the first part of section 140 of the Act contain the offence committed by the person, who are responsible as well as in charge of the company at the time of commission of offence, shall be deemed to be guilty. But the 2nd part of section 140 of the Act provides that any director, manager, secretary or other officer of the company would be held guilty of that offence if at that time they had active part of company as well as consent or connivance of, or is attributable to, any neglect on the part of any director. manager. secretary or other officer of the company. Mozahar Sowdagor (Md) vs State, 69 DLR 204. Section 140-The trial Court should amend the charge by incorporating a reference to 140 of the Act, with a further statement that the accused issued the cheque as an office bearer of the Company and that he is liable to be prosecuted. The accused should be allowed to produce his defense evidence in accordance with law. Shariful Haque (Md) vs State represented by the Deputy Commissioner, 70 DLR 209. Section 140 The prosecution should be given opportunities to prove its own case by providing sufficient evidence as to the matters of fact in dispute including receipt of notice, as such, this court cannot interfere any disputed question of fact which should be adjudicated by the trial court after obtaining evidence from the parties. The High Court Division held that company includes any persons of the company. In the instant case, the petitioner admittedly is a director of the company names M/S Benz Industries (BD) Ltd. The case of the petitioner is not that accused petitioner was not involved in the day to day performance of the company rather he filed this miscellaneous cases under Section 561A of the Code of Criminal Procedure challenging the proceeding by the bank impleding him in the complaint cases. The High Court Division is of the view that being a director the petitioner cannot be exclude him from the liabilities of the companies, as he was responsible for company's conduct of businesses. Accordingly, the High Court Division is certain that the proceeding against the present accused-petitioner is not illegal because under Section 140 the offences of companies has been considered the persons who are in charge and responsible on behalf of the company for the conduct of business of the company accordingly, the present petitioner cannot separate himself from the offences of the company. Syed Md. Rizwanul Bari -Vs. Sonali Bank and another (Criminal) 21 ALR (HCD) 280-283. Sections 140 and 141 If for any reason the company is not prosecuted, the other persons who are in charge of the affairs of the company or in the management of the company or have knowledge about the affairs of the company can not escape from criminal liability if they are served with the notice. The Appellate Division after approving the views and observation of the Supreme Court of India held that the infirmity of not making the company as accused which could be removed by affording the complainant to add the company M/S Modi Industries Ltd. in the case were termed as obiter dictum by the Supreme Court in India in Anil Hada V. Indian Acrylic Ltd, (2000) 1 SCC 1 and approved the views taken by Chinnappa Reddy, J. in Sheoratan Agarwal (Supra). This case is in respect of an offence under the Negotiable Instruments Act. The Indian provision is identical to our provision with the variation that section 140 of our Act corresponds to section 141 of the Indian Act. It was held in that case that if the offence was committed by a company it can be punished only if the company is prosecuted. But instead of prosecuting the company if a payee opts to prosecute only the persons who are responsible in the conduct of the business of the company, the payee can succeed in the case only if he succeeds in showing that the offence was actually committed by the company. The court summed up by observing that 'if a company is not prosecuted due to any legal snag or otherwise, the other prosecuted persons can not, on that score alone, escape from criminal liability created through legal fiction envisaged in section 141 of the Act." Mohammad Eusof Babu and others -Vs.- Johan Provanjon Chowdhury (Criminal) 23 ALR (AD) 58. Section 141(b) If a notice is issued upon the Managing Director of the Company who is in charge of the affairs of the Company and signed the cheque on behalf of the company, the service of notice upon the Managing Director is sufficient to infer that the company has received the notice. This will fasten the company as well for the commission of the offence. This is because the Managing Director being the chief executive of the company his knowledge may be deemed to be the knowledge of the company. Mohammad Eusof Babu and others -Vs.- Johan Provanjon Chowdhury (Criminal) 23 ALR (AD) 58. Section 141 Neither the prosecution nor the defence produced any documentary evidence to prove or disprove consideration and business transaction between the parties. PW1 (authorised agent of the complainant company) had seen the accused for the first time in the Court. He knows nothing about the business transactions between the par- ties which is the foundation of the prosecution case. PW1, in fact, does not possess any knowledge, let alone due knowledge, regarding the alleged business transactions. The prosecution, from filing of the case till end of the trial, conducted case in a shoddy and clumsy manner. The judgment of conviction cannot be sustained for the reasons discussed above. The High Court Division observed that reverting back to the cases in hand, neither the prosecution nor the defence produced any documentary evidence to prove or disprove consideration and business transaction between the parties. PW1 (authorised agent of the complainant company) had seen the accused for the first time in the Court. He knows nothing about the business transactions between the parties which is the foundation of the prosecution case. PW1, in fact, does not possess any knowledge, let alone due knowledge, regarding the alleged business transactions. The defence case, on the other hand, as narrated by DW1 and DW2 that the accused refused to do business with the complainant without agreement, that he signed advanced cheques and went abroad, that the General Manager (GM) of his business enterprise used the said cheques and did business with the complainant of which the accused was not aware of, that the accused filed criminal case against the said GM. in connection of which he is in jail custody-could not be disproved by the prosecution. Applying the test of 'preponderance of probability'/ 'probable defence', this Court is of the view that the defence has successfully rebutted the statutory presumption of consideration. Thus, the onus to prove, standard being "beyond reasonable doubt', that the cheques were drawn for consideration, shifted to the prosecution, but it failed to discharge the onus and the foundation of the prosecution case (business transactions and passing of consideration) has fallen apart. Hence, the inevitable conclusion is that in spite of facts that the cheques in question were signed by the accused and the complainant company was the payee, those were drawn without consideration. In the result, both the appeals are allowed. Md. Ershad Ali @ Md. Ershad Ullah -Vs.- The State and another (Criminal) 21 ALR (HCD) 49-54. Section 6, 138, 141 We are of the view that the operation of section 138 of the Act, 1881 cannot be obstructed or, in any way, circumvented by the mere fact of filing of a suit by the drawer of the dishonoured cheque in civil Court whatever allegations may be in the plaint about the same and the relief prayed for therein, because such a device shall totally make the section itself nugatory. However, if a holder or the payee gets hold of a dishonoured cheque by fraudulent means or forgery, the drawer of the cheque shall have the liberty to take such defence during the trial. Consequently we find no reason to interfere with the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court Division. This petition is dismissed. …Arif-Uz-Zaman(Md.) =VS= The State, (Criminal), 2020 (1) [8 LM (AD) 614] Sections 79 & 80 Section 79 provides for interest when it is expressly made payable on a promissory note or a bill of exchange, and section 80 provides that the rate of interest would be 6% per annum, when no rate of interest is specified in the instrument. [Para-12J Sonali Bank Vs. M/S. Karnaphuli Works Ltd. 2 BLT (AD)-78 Section 118 Claim for recovery of money by Bank—Claim for recovery of money by a Banking Company whether can be decreed in the absence of any evidence as to actual payment of the amount—In view of the fact that title deeds were deposited with the bank along with all other usual documents, executed by the predecessor of the defendant Company .ind regular entries in the ledger and clean :ash book of the Bank in respect of the loan, the claim is established—There is also admission of the Managing Director of the defendant Company as to the liability to the Bank—Moreover there is presumption under he Negotiable instruments Act, Bankers Books of Evidence Act and Banking Companies Ordinance. Planters (Bangladesh) Ltd. Vs. Mahaluxmi Bank Limited and others 5BLD(AD)150. Section 118,138 Dishonour of cheque, Once there is admission of the execution of the cheque or the same is proved to have been executed, the presumption under section 118(a) of the Act is raised that it is supported by consideration. The category of “stop payment cheque” would be subject to rebuttal and hence it would be an offence only if the drawer of the cheque fails to discharge the burden of rebuttal. The accused person can prove the non-existence of a consideration by raising a probable defence. If the accused discharges the initial onus of prove showing that the existence of consideration was improbable or doubtful or the same was illegal, the onus would shift to the complainant. He will be obliged to prove it as a matter of fact and upon its failure to prove would disentitle him to grant of relief on the basis of negotiable instrument . …Md. Abul Kaher Shahin Vs. Emran Rashid & anr., (Criminal), 14 SCOB [2020] AD 96 Sections 123A & 138 Crossed cheque– The legislative mandate as used in clause (a) of sub-section (2) of section 123A of the Act, 1881 that when a cheque is crossed "account payee" shall cease to be negotiable means it cannot be negotiated or encashed with any other person except the person in whose favour the same was issued. To make it clearer, a crossed cheque "account payee" must be enchased through the account of the holder in whose favour it was issued. So, by no means, a crossed cheque "account payee" loses its character as a negotiable one within the meaning of section 138 of the Act, 1881. Moreover, section 138 of Act, 1881 which has defined "Negotiable instrument" has not made any distinction between crossed cheque "account payee" or cheque of other kind such as bearer cheque we ordinarily mean. Thus, we find that section 123A of the Act, in no way, creates any bar in proceeding with a case under section 138 of the Act, 1881. In other words, we do not see any nexus of section 123A with the proceedings to be initiated under section 138 of the Act. .....Sahab Uddin(Md.) =VS= The State, (Criminal), 2017 (2)– [3 LM (AD) 592] Sections 123A and 138 - Crossed cheque. The legislative mandate as used in clause (a) of sub-section (2) of section 123A of the Act, 1881 that when a cheque is crossed "account payee" shall cease to be negotiable means it cannot be negotiated or encashed with any other person except the person in whose favour the same was issued. To make it clearer, a crossed cheque "account payee" must be enchased through the account of the holder in whose favour it was issued. So, by no means, a crossed cheque "account payee" loses its character as a negotiable one within the meaning of section 138 of the Act, 1881. Moreover, section 13 of Act, 1881 which has defined "Negotiable instrument" has not made any distinction between crossed cheque "account payee" or cheque of other kind such as bearer cheque we ordinarily mean. Thus, we find that section 123A of the Act, in no way, creates any bar in proceeding with a case under section 138 of the Act, 1881. In other words, we do not see any nexus of section 123A with the proceedings to be initiated under section 138 of the Act. Md. Sahab Uddin -Vs. The State 3 ALR(2014)(1)(AD) 111 Section 138-Stop Payment-Since the cheques were returned by bank with the endorsement "payment stopped by the drawer" it is to be presumed that those were returned unpaid because the amount of money standing to the credit of that account was insufficient to honour of the cheque as envisaged in section 138 of the Act. Of course this is a rebuttable presumption. The defence can be considered at the time of holding trial and not in an application under section 561A of the Code. SM Redwan vs Md Rezaul Islam, 66 DLR (AD) 169 Section 138 There is no provision in the Negotiable Instruments Act or in any other law which stipulates that a drawer of a negotiable instrument cannot re-validate it. It is always open to a drawer to voluntarily revalidate a negotiable instrument, including a cheque. AIR 2002 SC page 38- Veera Expert Vs T. Kalavathy Section 138-Whether the Court shall examine the authenticity of the cheque only or it shall examine and consider the bonafide of the claim of the complainant and the defence case appeared in mate- rials available on record. Chapter XXIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure consisting of sections 265A to 265L deal with the procedure to be followed when the case is tried. Those provisions cast a duty upon the Sessions Judge to apply his judicial mind in considering the materials and evidence adduced by the prosecution in order to come to a decision whether charge framed against accused person is proved or not. If after recording evidence and on perusal of the same and hearing the parties the Sessions Court considers that the evidence adduced by the prosecution are not sufficient and reliable to convict the accused, the Court shall record order of acquittal under section 265H of the Criminal Procedure Code. Since the case under section 138 of the Act is Sessions triable case, the trial Judge shall follow the aforesaid provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure for holding trial. Md. Abul Kaher Vs. Emran Rashid and another (Criminal) 19 ALR (AD) 56-64 Section 138(IA) (c) -The notice has been served in the 'Daily Sangram' newspaper which is not a National Newspaper having wide circulation and whether is a violation of the provision as laid down under section 138(1A)(c). The High Court Division held that whether a notice has been published in a daily Bangla National Newspaper having wide circulation or not is obviously a mat- ter of fact and can be decided on merit after taking evidence by the trial court. If a daily national newspaper is very much available in around the area where the accused usually resides or having business can be said to have wide circulation. However since this is absolutely a discretion of the trial court to determine the question about the wide circulation of the daily newspaper, High Court Division is of the view that this question of fact is out of the ambit of juris- diction under section 561A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, and can not be quashed. Mohammad Hasan Vs. The State and other (Criminal) 7 ALR (AD) 129- 132 Section 138 read with Code of Criminal Procedure [V of 1898] Sections 439A, 439 (1), 423, 426,427 and 428 Keeping in mind the sentencing principles let the Appellate Division consider whether the High Court Division is justified in enhancing the sentences of fine suo moto in the absence of filing revision petitions by the complainant. The petitioner was convicted in the cases pursuant to complaints made by the complainant. Section 417A empowers the complainant to prefer appeal to the appellate court against the sentence on the ground of its in adequacy. Sub- section (3) of Section 417A provides that when an appeal has been filed against sentence on the ground of its inadequacy, the appellate court shall not enhance the sentence except after giving to the accused reasonable opportunity of showing cause against such enhancement. The similar principle will be applicable in cases of inadequacy or reduction of sentence passed by the appellate Court in view of section 439(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (the Code) under which provision, the revisional court has been given all the powers conferred on a court of appeal by sections 423, 426, 427 and 428 of the Code. [আপীল আদালতদন্ডপ্রাপ্ত ব্যক্তিকে কারনদশানোরসুযোগব্যতিতসাজারমেয়াদবর্ধিতকরিবেনা।] Shahidur Rahman Khadem-Vs-The State and others 6 ALR (AD) 2015 (2)218 Section 138- An offence under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is not compoundable, it being a special law. The ends of Justice will be sufficiently met if the sentence of the petitioner is reduced to imprisonment for the period already undergone by him in prison, and the sentence of fine is set aside. Md. Idris Chowkder Vs. The State 5 ALR (AD)2015(1) 83 Section 138- Section 138(1) empowers the trial Court to punish with imprisonment for a maximum period of one year, or with fine which may extend to thrice the amount of the cheque or both. The powers given to the Court is discretionary. The language used in the section is not such that the Court must impose fine thrice the amount of the cheque. The legislature has left the matter to the discretion of the trial Court. Shahidur Rahman Khadem -Vs.- The State 5 ALR (AD)2015(1) 144 Section 138 The allegations of bouncing of cheque simpliciter does not ipso facto constitute any offence as defined under section 115 of the Penal Code punishable under section 420 of the Penal Code and as such, framing of charge against the appellant under section 420 of the Penal Code suffered from serious illegality. M. A. Sukkur -Vs. Md. Zahirul Haque and another 5 ALR (AD)2015(1) 27 Sections 138 and 141(b)- Criminal proceeding should not be stifled before trial, when there is a prima facie case for going to the trial. There was no violation of section 141(b) of the Negotiable Instrument Act. The High Court Division further found that the law is now settled on the point that a criminal proceeding should not be stifled before trial, when there is a prima facie case for going to the trial. M.K. Bazlur Rahman -Vs.- Md. Johurul Haque 3 ALR(2014)(1)(AD) 107 Section-138 Punishment for dishonour of cheque due to insufficiency of fund etc. Dishonour of cheque by the bank due to fraudulent action of the drawer clearly brings him within the mischief of the offence u/s 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. 'Stopping of payment' by the drawer with oblique motive also brings him within the mischief of section 138 of the Act, although the drawer has the right to stop payment on genuine grounds. S.M. Redwan Vs. Md. Rezaul Islam and others 3ALR(2014)(1)(AD)62 Section 138 read with Penal Code [XLV of 1860] Section 420-The ingredients of sec- tion 138(1) of the Negotiable Instruments Act were not present in the case. The High Court Division observed that the account on which the cheque was drawn was not maintained in the name of the accused-petitioner, rather it was main- tained in the name of her husband and that the cheque was not bounced because of insufficiency of fund. The Appellate Division held that the High Court Division observed also that the facts and circumstances of the case prima facie showed that there were ingredients of cheating against both the accused-petitioner and her husband and that in view of the matter the complainant may initiate a criminal proceeding against them under section 420 of the Penal Code and may also go to the civil court to recover his loan amount of Tk. 30 lac by filing a money suit against the accused and her husband. Ap- pellate Division finds no reason to interfere with the above findings and decision of the High Court Division. Al-haj Abdun Nabi Ledu @ Abdun Nabi -Vs.- Shahnaj Begum Sumi Begum and another (Criminal) 10 ALR (AD) 267-268 Section 138-The convict respondent admitted about the loan, issuance of cheques by him and dishonour of cheques and that a notice under section 138(1)(b) has been given by the complainant. Thus, all the legal requirements are present to bring the offence under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Amir Hossain vs MA Malek and others 56 DLR (AD) 146. Section 138-Under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act an offence is commit- ted if a cheque is dishonoured and if payment is not made within 15 days after receipt of a legal notice. It is a settled law that criminal proceeding can be proceeded independently of the civil suit. Monzur Alam vs State 55 DLR (AD) 62. Section 138-Since the date of receipt is a question of fact to be ascertained at the time of trial non-disclosure of such fact in the complaint petition cannot render the proceeding liable to be quashed to the great prejudice of the complainant who is entitled to prove his case on evidence. Nizamuddin Mahmood vs Abdul Hamid Bhuiyan 60 DLR (AD) 195. Sections 138 and 141-Taking of cogni- sance upon the petition of complaint filed by the Attorney upon due examination under section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is "perfectly valid and appropriate". Hashibul Bashar vs Gulzar Rahman 56 DLR (AD) 17. Section 138-Dishonour of a cheque may also be an offence not only under sec- tion 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act but also under section 420 of the Penal Code. To constitute an offence punishable under section 138 an initial intention of cheating need not be established. It is sine qua non for an offence punishable under section 420 of Penal Code. The Appellate Division held that disho- nour of a cheque may also be an offence not only under section 138 of the Negotia- ble Instruments Act but also under section 420 of the Penal Code. To constitute an of- fence punishable under section 138 an ini- tial intention of cheating need not be estab- lished. It is sine qua non for an offence pu- nishable under section 420 of Penal Code. The following are the essential ingredients of an offence under section 420 of the Penal Code: (a) there should be fraudulent or dishon- est inducement of a person by de- ceiving him; (b) the person so induced should be intentionally induced to deliver any property to any person or to consent that any person shall retain any property, or (c) the person so induced to do anything which he would not do or omit if he were not so deceived, and (d) in cases covered by second part of clause (a), the act or omission should be one which caused or was likely to cause damage or harm to the person induced in body, mind or property. For an offence of cheating there must be dishonest or fraudulent misrepresentation, that is to say, deception and inducement of the person deceived to part with the property must be established. Md. Motaleb Hossain: Vs. Abdul Ha- que Limon and another: (Criminal) 11 ALR (AD) 105-110 Section 138-Whether the High Court Division in exercising its inherent power under section 561A of the Code can award cost to any of the party of the proceedings, particularly, the accused while discharging the Rule issued for quashing a criminal proceeding or not. The Appellate Division held that there is nothing to authorize the High Court Divi- sion or any criminal Court to award costs in a criminal case against the accused or the informant/complainant as the case may be. Khondker Latifur Rahman Vs. The State, represented by the Deputy Com- missioner, Chittagong and another (Criminal) 12 ALR (AD) 6-11 Section 138- Since the entire amount as mentioned in the cheque has been deposited, the Appellate Division inclined to reduce the sentence of the pe- titioner. Accordingly, this review peti- tion is disposed of and the judgment and order dated 18.01.2018 passed in Criminal Petition for leave to Appeal No. 554 of 2017 is set aside. The Appellate Division held that admit- tedly, the petitioner has deposited 50% of the amount mentioned in the cheque at the time of preferring the appeal in the trial Court and that he deposited the balance amount of the cheque amounting to Tk. 700,000/- by challan No. 146 of 20.02.2018. The fine of depositing Tk. 50,000/- to the treasury of the Government is exempted. Since the entire amount as mentioned in the cheque has been depo- sited, the Appellate Division inclined to reduce the sentence of the petitioner. Ac- cordingly, this review petition is disposed of and the judgment and order dated 18.01.2018 passed in Criminal Petition for leave to Appeal No. 554 of 2017 is set aside. The judgment and order dated 08.11.2015 passed by the High Court Divi- sion is modified and sentence of imprison- ment imposed upon the petitioner is re- duced to the period he has already under- gone in jail custody. Abdul Jalil. -Vs. The State and others. (Criminal) 13 ALR (AD) 175-176 Section 138 and 140 View of Indian Supreme Court about impleading the Director/s of the Company in a case under Section 138 read with 140 NI Act. From a plain reading of all the cases referred to from the Indian jurisdiction, it is our understanding that in the cited cases there was no dispute about commission of an offence under Section 138 of the NI Act by the company and its director/s. So, in the cited cases, offence was there, the offenders were there and the offenders were named as the company and its BoD. But the Indian Supreme Court took the view that unless the complainant makes any averment about the responsibility of the director in the transaction in question, no cognizance is to be taken and no summon/warrant to be issued against the said director. In other words, the Indian Supreme Court laid down a principle that for taking cognizance of an offence under Sections 138 & 140 of the NI Act against a director of a company, there must be a specific allegation in the complaint-petition against a director specifying the accused-director’s nature of responsibility and duties in the said company. Engineer Sirajul Islam and another -Vs.- The State and another (Criminal) 2019 ALR (HCD) Online 230. ধারা ১৩৮ এবং ১৪০ এন আই আইনের অধীনে মামলায় কোম্পানির পরিচালক/পরিচালকদের অন্তর্ভুক্ত করার বিষয়ে ভারতীয় সুপ্রিম কোর্টের মতামত। ভারতীয় অধিক্ষেত্র থেকে উল্লেখিত মামলাগুলোর সরল পাঠ থেকে আমাদের বোঝা যায় যে, উল্লেখিত মামলাগুলোতে কোম্পানি এবং এর পরিচালক/পরিচালকদের দ্বারা এনআই আইনের ধারা ১৩৮ এর অধীনে অপরাধ সংঘটনের বিষয়ে কোনো বিতর্ক ছিল না। অর্থাৎ, উল্লেখিত মামলাগুলোতে অপরাধ ছিল, অপরাধীরা ছিল এবং অপরাধীদের নাম কোম্পানি এবং এর পরিচালনা পর্ষদ হিসেবে উল্লেখ করা হয়েছিল। তবে, ভারতীয় সুপ্রিম কোর্ট এই মত গ্রহণ করেছেন যে, অভিযোগকারী যদি সংশ্লিষ্ট লেনদেনের ক্ষেত্রে পরিচালকের দায়িত্ব সম্পর্কে কোনো বক্তব্য প্রদান না করেন, তবে কোনো বিচার গ্রহণ করা হবে না এবং সংশ্লিষ্ট পরিচালকের বিরুদ্ধে কোনো সমন/ওয়ারেন্ট জারি করা হবে না। অন্য কথায়, ভারতীয় সুপ্রিম কোর্ট একটি নীতিমালা প্রতিষ্ঠা করেছেন যে, একটি কোম্পানির পরিচালকের বিরুদ্ধে ধারা ১৩৮ এবং ১৪০ এনআই আইনের অধীনে অপরাধের বিচার গ্রহণ করতে হলে, অভিযোগপত্রে নির্দিষ্ট অভিযোগ থাকতে হবে যেখানে অভিযুক্ত পরিচালকের দায়িত্ব এবং কর্তব্যের প্রকৃতি স্পষ্টভাবে উল্লেখ থাকবে। ইঞ্জিনিয়ার সিরাজুল ইসলাম এবং অন্যজন বনাম রাষ্ট্র এবং অন্যজন (ক্রিমিনাল) ২০১৯ ALR (HCD) Online 230. Section 138-Under section 138 of Negotiable instruments Act, 1881. After examination of P.W.1. the accused prayed for recalling the P.W.1 for cross examination. These facts prove that the respondent has been adopting dilatory tactics. The Appellate Division observed that the trial court has completed the cross examination of the P.W.1 on 13-03-2014 and the- reafter, the case was fixed for examination of the accused under section 342 of Criminal Procedure Code. These facts prove that the respondent has been adopting dilatory tactics. The High Court Division did not apply its judicial mind in staying the pro- ceeding. The rule itself is not maintainable. Accordingly, the rule is discharged. The trial court is directed to complete the trial within 1 (one) month from the date of re- ceipt of the order. Borak Real Estate (Pvt. Ltd. -Vs.- Mr. Arifur Rahman and another (Criminal) 8 ALR (AD) 153-154 Sections 138(a) and 141 (b) read with General Clauses Act [X of 1897] Section 9- Whether it is within six months from the date on which the che- que is drawn as provided in clause (a) of the proviso to section 138(1) or within thirty days of receipt of the information by the drawee from his bank regarding the return of the cheque unpaid? The Appellate Division held that the dis- cretion is given to the drawee to present the cheque for encashment either on the day it was issued or within six months from the date on which it was issued. One of the conditions precedent to a prosecution under section 138 is that the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque must give a demand notice in writing to the drawer of the cheque. Clause (b) of section 138(1) fixes time-limit for giving such a notice providing that the said notice is to be given within thirty days of the receipt of infor- mation by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque unpaid. Md. Motaleb Hossain: Vs.- Abdul Ha- que Limon and another: (Criminal) 11 ALR (AD) 105-110 Sections 138(a) and 141 (b) -A cheque can be presented any number of times to the bank within the period of its validity. The Appellate Division held that Clause (a) to the proviso to section 138(1) does not put any embargo upon the payee to succes- sively present a dishonoured cheque during the period of its validity. It is the option of the payee to proceed with the next step or to negotiate with the drawer for payment. If the drawer assures him to present it in the next month, he may wait till he makes ar- rangement to honour the cheque. He may present the cheque on repeated occasions on the request of the drawer until the period of six months from the date of its issuance or within the period of its validity expires. On each occasion of dishonour of the cheque as per assurance of the drawer a distinct cause of action in respect of an of- fence punishable under the Penal Code will arise for intentional inducement and de- ception other than the one punishable under section 138(1). The cause of action for an offence punishable under sub-section (1) of section 138 will arise if the drawer fails to make payment within thirty days of the re- ceipt of notice under clause (b) of the pro- viso to section 138(1). And the drawee must file the criminal case within one month of the date on which the cause of action arises. Md. Motaleb Hossain: Vs. Abdul Ha- que Limon and another: (Criminal) 11 ALR (AD) 105-110 Sections 138 and 141 read with Cr. PC Section 417-This is to be noted that in clauses (b) and (c) of the proviso to sub- section (1) of section 138, a period of 'thirty days' have been mentioned in both counts but in clause (b) of section 138(1) the period of one month has been men- tioned which is also significant. In the ear- lier case the period should be counted on days and in the latter case the period one month shall be counted according to calen- dar. Sections 138 and 141 are special laws similar to section 417 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which is also a special law and other provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure are general law. Md. Motaleb Hossain: Vs. Abdul Ha- que Limon and another: (Criminal) 11 ALR (AD) 105-110 Sections 138, 140 and section 141 Section 141 (b) cannot take away the substantive right accruing to the beneficiary of a cheque to prosecute any number of subsequent presentation of the cheque on its dishonour. Similarly, each dishonour will give rise to a concomitant right to serve notice under proviso (b) to section 138 (1) of the Act and demand payment, failing which the bearer of the cheque will have the right to make a complaint in writing in accordance with section 141 (a) of the Act– Section 138(1) and section 141(b). Sections 138 and 140 of the Act are substantive provisions of law giving details of the offence, when the offence is committed and who is liable; section 141 of the Act describes the procedure to be followed. That the second and subsequent presentation of the cheque must be within six months from the date on which the cheque was drawn in order to be able to prosecute the drawer of the cheque criminally under section 138 of the Act. Upon subsequent presentation of the cheque for payment, if it is again dishonoured another opportunity will accrue to the beneficiary to take action as provided under section 138(1) of the Act, and again, in accordance with the provisions of section 141, the beneficiary of the cheque will be obliged to make complaint against such subsequent dishonour within a period of one month from the cause of action arising under proviso (c) to section 138 (1) of the Act. The offence is committed each time the cheque is dishonoured on presentation for payment. The procedural limitation provided in section 141 (b) cannot take away the substantive right accruing to the beneficiary of a cheque to prosecute any number of subsequent presentation of the cheque on its dishonour. Similarly, each dishonour will give rise to a concomitant right to serve notice under proviso (b) to section 138 (1) of the Act and demand payment, failing which the bearer of the cheque will have the right to make a complaint in writing in accordance with section 141 (a) of the Act. It will be entirely up to the bearer of the cheque to proceed in respect of any particular dishonour of the cheque. …Nizam Uddin Mahmud Hossain =VS= The State, (Criminal), 2019 (2) [7 LM (AD) 259] Section 138 Where the amount promised shall depend on some other complementary facts or fulfillment of another promise and if any cheque is issued on that basis, but that promise is not fulfilled it will not create any obligation on the part of the drawer of the cheque. As such dishonesty or fraud cannot be attributed to the respondent in giving stop payment instructions– The High Court Division being last court of facts upon elaborate consideration of the evidence both the oral and documentary has come to the conclusion that the complainant failed to take any step to sell the property of the respondent, rather the respondent and his brother and sister sold the said property to the U.S.A. Embassy and the complainant did not help the respondent in any way in that regard. In his cross examination the complainant has said, "শর্তে উল্লেখআছেবাজারমূল্যেক্রেতাআনিতেপারিলেআমি (বাদী)কমিশনপাব।" There is no such averment, in the petition of complaint or in the evidence that the complainant has stated that he had brought any purchaser who offered market price of the property. From the evidence quoted above it appears that the condition under which the cheques were issued was not fulfilled by the complainant appellant. Thus, the respondent instructed the bank not to encash the impugned cheques. Accordingly, the bank returned the cheques with endorsement, “payment stopped by the drawer”. Where the amount promised shall depend on some other complementary facts or fulfillment of another promise and if any cheque is issued on that basis, but that promise is not fulfilled it will not create any obligation on the part of the drawer of the cheque or any right which can be claimed by the holder of the cheque. As such dishonesty or fraud cannot be attributed to the respondent in giving stop payment instructions. Consequently, the question of committing an offence by the accused respondent punishable under section 138 of the Act does not arise. All the appeals are dismissed. ...Abul Kaher Shahin(Md.) =VS= Emran Rashid, (Criminal), 2020 [9 LM (AD) 338] Section 138 The Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881 Section 138 Artha Rin Adalat Ain, 2003 Section 6 Civil and criminal cases shall proceed in accordance with law– The final conclusion of the High Court Division is contradictory to several decisions of this Division wherein it has been clearly held that the pendency of a civil suit will not hinder proceeding of a criminal case and vice versa. In this regard, reference may be made to the cases of Monzur Alam (Md) vs State, 55 DLR (AD) 62, SAB Solaiman Ali vs Rangs Industries Limited, 2004 1 Law Guardian (AD) 20. We are constrained to hold that the impugned judgements and orders of the High Court Division are palpably erroneous set aside. Accordingly, the criminal petitions for leave to appeal are disposed of with direction that both civil and criminal cases shall proceed in accordance with law. ...Eastern Bank Limited =VS= Sirajuddula(Md), (Criminal), 2020 [9 LM (AD) 566] Sections 138, 141(b) The Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (Amendment Act 1994) Sections 138, 141(b) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 Sections 561A It is the argument of the appellant that on the complainant’s own case the appellant must be fixed with notice for payment at least from 4-1-96 and after the expiry of 15 days from that date, i.e., from 19-1-96, the cause of action should be taken to have arisen due to non-payment within the said period and the complaint was required to be filed within one month from the said date (19-1-96) in compliance with clause(b) of section 141. Admittedly the petition of complaint was filed long after that date i.e., on 18-4-96 and thus cognizance could not be taken upon such complaint. Unfortunately, the High Court Division failed to appreciate this simple point raised before it and wrongly rejected the application for quashing summarily under a misconception. For the reasons this appeal is allowed and the impugned proceeding is quashed. .....SM Anwar Hossain =VS= Md. Shafiul Alam (Chand) , (Criminal), 2022(1) [12 LM (AD) 617] Section 138 On the contrary Appellate Division reiterates that if any cheque is presented to the Bank twice or on many more times, within six months from the date it was drawn, computation of the period for prosecution under section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act should be done from which the cheque is lastly returned. .....Nizam Uddin Mahmood =VS= Abdul Hamid Bhuiyan, (Criminal), 2022(1) [12 LM (AD) 655] Section 138 Non disclosure of the date as to receipt of notice by the accused and failure to mention any legal cause of action in the petition of complaint, so the proceeding cannot be allowed to continue and as such it is liable to be quashed– After considering the facts and circumstances and the law on the point Appellate Division finds substance in the submissions made on behalf of the respondent. In view of the non disclosure of the date as to receipt of notice by the accused and failure to mention any legal cause of action in the petition of complaint, this Division is of the view that the proceeding cannot be allowed to continue and as such it is liable to be quashed. In view of our discussion made above the ultimate order of the High Court Division in quashing the proceeding is found to be sustainable. .....Nizam Uddin Mahmood =VS= Abdul Hamid Bhuiyan, (Criminal), 2022(1) [12 LM (AD) 655] Section 138 The Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 Section 138 Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 Section 561A When the complainant stated that he had served a legal notice within 15 days from the date of the receipt of information of the return of the cheque, non-discloser of the date of service of notice in the complaint petition can not be a ground for quashing the proceeding– Appellate Division is of the view that the High Court Division in exercising its jurisdiction at the very first instance is not empowered to interfere with the trial proceedings by invoking jurisdiction under section 561A of Code of Criminal Procedure,1898. It has been consistently held by this Division that when the complainant stated that he had served a legal notice within 15 days from the date of the receipt of information of the return of the cheque, non-discloser of the date of service of notice in the complaint petition can not be a ground for quashing the proceeding. In this context reference may also be made to the decision of the case of Habibur Rahman Howlader -Vs- State and another reported in 53 DLR (AD) 111. This Division is of the view that the impugned judgment and order of the High Court Division is not sustainable in law. Accordingly, this Division finds merit in the appeal. Consequently the proceeding of C. R. Case No.3783 of 2004 under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, now pending in the Court of Metropolitan Magistrate, Dhaka shall proceed in accordance with law. .....Alhaj Golam Rasul Belal =VS= Habibullah Shakir, (Criminal), 2022(1) [12 LM (AD) 672] Sections 138, 141(C) The legal notice was issued within time and the complaint case has also been initiated within time we do not find any illegality in the judgment and order passed by the High Court Division in discharging the Rule– There is no denial as to the dishonouring of the cheque issued by the accused petitioner and the fact of issuance of legal notice after the last occasion of dishonoring the cheque by the bank concern with the endorsement “not arranged for and refer to the drawar” and on the face of dishonour of the disputed cheque and non-response to the demand for payment against dishonoured cheque Appellate Division finds criminality as alleged and as the High Court Division has observed that the accused persons have been avoiding payment and that the legal notice was issued within time and the complaint case has also been initiated within time this Division does not find any illegality in the judgment and order passed by the High Court Division in discharging the Rule. The High Court Division on detailed discussions on the issues involved has arrived at its decision with cogent reasonings, which are in accordance with law and hence no interference is called for. .....Joynul Karim =VS= The State, (Criminal), 2022(1) [12 LM (AD) 686] Section 138 Complainant failed to prove the case as made out in the complaint-petition against accused-respondent No. 1 beyond all reasonable doubt that the complaint was filed in order to harass respondent No. 1– The learned Sessions Judge, Bagerhat convicted appellant-respondent No. 1 under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and sentenced her there under to suffer simple imprisonment for 6 (six) months with a fine of Tk. 10,00000/- (Ten lakh),in default, to suffer simple imprisonment for further 1(one) month more. Feeling aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the aforesaid impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court Division, the complainant as the leave-petitioner filed this criminal petition for leave to appeal before this Division. Admittedly, accused-respondent No. 1 was given in marriage to the son of the complainant-leave-petitioner and as soon as respondent No. 1 divorced her husband, the complaint-petition was filed against respondent No. 1. Having gone through the record, Appellate Division is fully satisfied that the complaint-petition was filed in order to harass respondent No. 1 for divorcing the son of the complainant-leave-petitioner. This Division does not find any substance in this criminal petition. Accordingly, this criminal petition is dismissed. ...Sheikh Wahiduzzaman Dipu =VS= Tanima Afrin Kumkum, (Criminal), 2021(2) [11 LM (AD) 312] Sec-138 Dishonoured due to insufficient fund– We also find it difficult to accept that if the petitioner had in fact paid the money owed to the complainant in the year 2011, as alleged by him, that he did not take any steps to stop payment of the cheque issued by him earlier, especially when he himself states that the complainant told him that the cheque was lost, keeping in mind that anyone could attempt to encash that cheque. From 24.7.2011, when the petitioner apparently paid Tk.10 lac by Pay Order, till 18.09.2012 when the complaint was lodged, the petitioner did nothing to retrieve the cheque or to stop payment of the cheque. He admitted in his cross examination that he did not file any G.D. in respect of the non-return of the cheque. Moreover, we find from the deposition of the petitioner (D.W.1) that he admitted in cross examination of other transactions between himself and the complainant with regard to sale of land by the complainant and his wife and the payment of money in 2011. .....M.A. Azam Chowdhury =VS= A.B.M. Asaduzzamn & another, (Criminal), 2016-[1 LM (AD) 591] Section 138 The trial court has completed the cross examination of the P.W.1 on 13-03-2014 and thereafter, the case was fixed for examination of the accused under section 342 of Criminal Procedure Code. These facts prove that the respondent has been adopting dilatory tactics. The High Court Division did not apply its judicial mind in staying the proceeding. The rule itself is not maintainable. Accordingly, the rule is discharged. The trial court is directed to complete the trial within 1 (one) month from the date of receipt of the order. .....Borak Real Estate (Pvt.) Ltd. =VS= Arifur Rahman(Mr.), (Criminal), 2017 (2)– [3 LM (AD) 543] Section 138 The accused petitioner issued 60 post dated cheques in favour of complainant financial institution. As per provisions of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act, prima-facie case against the petitioner, had been made out. The High Court Division held that since there is no bar to get the loan amount realized by producing issued cheques for encashment, the instant proceedings were not liable to be quashed. .....Ehetasamul Haque =VS= The State, (Criminal), 2017 (2)– [3 LM (AD) 552] Section 138 An offence under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is not compoundable, it being a special law. However, in view of the submissions made by the learned Advocates on Record, we are of the opinion that the ends of Justice will be sufficiently met if the sentence of the petitioner is reduced to imprisonment for the period already undergone by him in prison, and the sentence of fine is set aside. We note that the complainant appeared before us to say that he has received his money in full satisfaction. The criminal petition for leave to appeal is dismissed. The conviction of the petitioner under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments act is affirmed with modification of the sentence as mentioned above. .....Idris Chowkder (Md.) =VS= The State, (Criminal), 2017 (2)– [3 LM (AD) 560] Sections 138 and 141(b) Criminal proceeding should not be stifled before trial, when there is a prima facie case for going to the trial– There was no violation of section 141(b) of the Negotiable Instrument Act. The High Court Division further found that the law is now settled on the point that a criminal proceeding should not be stifled before trial, when there is a prima facie case for going to the trial. .....M.K. Bazlur Rahman =VS= Md. Johurul Haque, (Criminal), 2017 (2)– [3 LM (AD) 586] Section 138 The powers given to the Court is discretionary– Section 138(1) empowers the trial Court to punish with imprisonment for a maximum period of one year, or with fine which may extend to thrice the amount of the cheque or both. The powers given to the Court is discretionary. The language used in the section is not such that the Court must impose fine thrice the amount of the cheque. The legislature has left the matter to the discretion of the trial Court. .....Shahidur Rahman Khadem =VS= The State, (Criminal), 2017 (2)– [3 LM (AD) 600] Section 138 The Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881 Section-138 r/w Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 Section 561 The cheques were issued by the respondent which were returned with endorsement, "payment stopped by the drawer". Since the cheques were returned by bank with the endorsement "payment stopped by the drawer" it is to be presumed that those were returned unpaid because the amount of money standing to the credit of that account was insufficient to honour of the cheque as envisaged in Section 138 of the Act. Of course this is a rebuttable presumption. The defence can be considered at the time of holding trial and not in an application under Section 561A of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The judgment and orders of the High Court Division are hereby set aside. The concerned Courts are directed to proceed with the cases in accordance with law. .....S.M. Redwan =VS= Md. Rezaul Islam, (Criminal), 2017 (2)– [3 LM (AD) 605] Section 138 & 140 If a case is instituted against a company alone, excluding the persons who were responsible to the affairs of the company’s, it can be prosecuted and punished– The difference between sections 138 and 140 is that in respect of section 138 the offence is committed by human beings, that is to say, natural person and in section 140 though the expression “the person” is used which is qualified by a company which means “any body corporate and includes a firm or other association of individuals” which is a juristic person or not. It can be prosecuted for the offence under section 138. Section 140 of the Act, we are of the view that for proper and effective adjudication of the cases, the complainant (s) / drawee (s) may add the company as one of the accused in the case but for not impleading the company, the case will not fail. .....Mohammad Eusof Babu =VS= Jhon Provanjon Chowdhury, (Criminal), 2017 (2)– [3 LM (AD) 562] Section 138 The order of conviction passed by the trial Court was in accordance with the law as by adducing evidence the complainant succeeded in proving that a cheque for Tk.7,00,000.00 given to him was, when duly presented, dishonoured and that before filing the complaint petition, he complied with the procedural requirements laid down in section 138 of the Act. So, this leave petition is dismissed as it is bound to be. The petitioner has in fact paid all the money due to the complainant. The complainant admitted that he had received the full amount of the cheque from the accused petitioner and that he had no further claim against him. In view of the fact that the leave petitioner has paid the full amount of the cheque, he is exonerated from paying any more and as he has already spent 3 months in prison, he need not go back to prison and the sentence of imprisonment is thus modified to the period already undergone by him in prison. .....Biplob (Md.) =VS= The State, (Criminal), 2018 (1) [4 LM (AD) 364] Section 138 Realization of fine to be paid to the payee– Complaint petition filed by an aggrieved person, i.e. the payee, not at the instance of the ‘State’; the State is not a ‘necessary’ party though it may be ‘proper’ party in case under the Act, 1881; the cheque bears the proprietary and pecuniary interest of the payee and the law provides for realization of fine to be paid to the payee, vide sub-section (2) of section 138; by way of amendment, done by Act No. III of 2006 (09.02.2006), section 138A has been inserted making provisions to deposit not less than 50% of the amount of the dishonoured cheque, in the trial Court, as a precondition to prefer appeal; there is no similar provision for preferring appeal by a person convicted under any other law; apparently, the Act, 1881 is a piece of beneficial legislation and distinct from other penal law; hence, in appropriate case, costs may be awarded in case under the Act, 1881. .....Khondker Latifur Rahman =VS= The State, (Criminal), 2018 (1) [4 LM (AD) 383] Section 138 Two questions are involved in these appeals and petitions. The first question is whether if a company incorporated under the Companies Act commits an offence punishable under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 is excluded from prosecution, can a director, manager, secretary or other officer of the company be prosecuted for that offence, and secondly, whether if more than one cheques issued by the same drawer can be prosecuted in a single case. .....Mohammad Eusof Babu =VS= Johan Provanjon Chowdhury, (Criminal), 2018 (2) [5 LM (AD) 251] Section 138 Cheque dishonour– There is no legal bar of filing a single case against the drawer of the cheques if the notice is served within the period of limitation intimating the fact of dishonour of the cheques with a request to pay the amount involved in those cheques within a period of thirty days. .....Mohammad Eusof Babu =VS= Johan Provanjon Chowdhury, (Criminal), 2018 (2) [5 LM (AD) 251] Section 138 Scope to cross-examine and also be at liberty to examine defence witness– The High Court Division took the right view that the accused should be given scope to cross-examine PW1 allowing 2/3 dates as the Metropolitan Additional Sessions Judge, in the meantime, fixed the respective cases for examination of the accused under section 342 of the Code and accordingly, we endorse the same. We add by saying that the respective petitioners shall also be at liberty to examine defence witnesses, if they so desire, after their examination under section 342 of the Code. The trial Court is directed to conclude the trial as expeditiously as possible, but not later than 2(two) months from the date of receipt of this judgment. .....Majad Hossain =VS= The State, (Criminal), 2018 (2) [5 LM (AD) 318] Sections 138, 140 The Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881 Sections 138, 140 The Code of Criminal Procedure Section 561A The disputed questions of facts which should be decided after appreciating the evidence at the trial–The High Court Division in disposing the application under the provision of section 561A of the Code does not require to formulate any disputed question of facts, rather, only to see whether the story of the F.I.R. or petition of complaint discloses the criminal offences or not. Therefore, the High Court Division exceeded the extraordinary jurisdiction by quashing the proceeding. Accordingly, the judgment of the High Court Division is set aside. ...Ashfaq Hossain =VS= The State, (Criminal), 2021(1) [10 LM (AD) 515] Sections 138, 140 The Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 Section 138, 140 The Evidence Act, 1872 Section 102 According to section 102 of the Evidence Act, 1872 the burden of proof is upon the respondent to prove that though she was the director of the company, the offence has been committed without her knowledge or that she was a non-executive director of the company and she was not involved in day-to-day affairs of the company etc. The innocence of the respondent No.1, the director, has to be proved before the Court by adducing evidence and thus, the director, respondent No.1 has to face the trial. Only after taking evidence during trial if the director, respondent No.1 herein, is found that she was not to be a person-in-charge of the affairs of the company at the relevant time of the issuance of the cheque only then she may be exonerated from the charge. ...Phoenix Finance and Investment Ltd. =VS= Yeasmin Ahmed, (Criminal), 2021(1) [10 LM (AD) 522] Section 138 In order to make a person liable under section 138 the payee of a cheque has to give a notice in writing to the drawer of the cheque within 15 days of the receipt of information by hun from the Bank regarding the return of the chequer as unpaid in terms of clause (b) to the proviso. The drawer of the cheque is obliged to make the payment within 15 days of the receipt of the said notice failing which the cause of action for prosecution will arise under clause (c). [Para-7] S. M. Anwar Hossain Vs. Md. Shafiul Alam & Am: 7BLT (AD)-218 Section 138 In order to make a person liable under section 138 the payee of a cheque has to give a notice in writing to the drawer of the cheque within 15 days of the receipt of information by him from the Bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid in terms of clause (b) to the proviso. The drawer of the cheque is obliged to make the payment within 15 days of the receipt of the said notice failing which the cause of action for prosecution will arise under clause (c). S.M. Anwar Hossain Vs Md. Shafiqul Alam (Chand) and another, 19BLD(AD)166 Sections 138 and 141 read with Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (V of 1898) Section—561A The cheque in question was issued by the appellant on 21.12.1995 which was presented for encashment on 23.12.1995 but it was dishonoured on the same day whereupon the complainant issued notice to the appellant on 24.12.1995 for payment of money for which the cheque was issued following the clause (b) to the proviso to section 138 of the Act. On receipt of the said notice the appellant in order to avoid payment fraudulently informed the complainant through a lawyer on 4.1.1996 that he had lost the cheque written in the complainants name and made a GD Entry in that behalf. The cause of action for prosecution will arise under clause (c) of the proviso to section 138 on the failure of the appellant to pay the amount within 15 days of the receipt of the notice of the complainant. Relying on the complainant’s own case it is contended on behalf of the appellant the accused-appellant must be fixed with notice for payment at least from 4.1.1996 and after the expiry of 15 days from that date i.e; from 19.1.1996 the cause of action should be taken to have arisen due to non-payment within the said period and complaint was required to be filed within one month from 19.1.1996 in compliance with clause (b) of section 141 of the Act. Admittedly the petition of complaint was filed long after that date i.e., on 18.4.1996 and thus cognizance could not be taken upon such complaint. The subsequent allegations will not save the limitation because the requirement under the law is that the complaint has to be filed within one month of the date on which the cause of action arises under clause (c) of the proviso to section 138 of the Act and hence the impugned proceeding is quashed. S.M. Anwar Hossain Vs Md. Shafiqul Alum (Chand) and another, 19BLD(AD)166 Sections 138 and 141 The cause of action for prosecution will arise under clause (c) of the proviso to section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act on the failure of the appellant to pay the amount within 15 days of the receipt of the notice of the complainant. In the present case, the cause of action arose on 19-1-96 and the petition of complaint was required to be filed within one month from 19-1-96 in compliance with clause (b) of section 141 of the Act which having not been done by the complainant the cognizance of the offence cannot be taken upon such complaint and hence the impugned proceeding is quashed. SM Anwar Hossain vs Shafiul Alam (Chand) & another 4BLC(AD) 106. Section 138(1) (b) Whether the notice was a demand notice or not as contemplated under section 138 (1) (b) of the Act is a disputed question of fact which could not be decided by the High Court Division while exercising jurisdiction under section 561A of the Code. Rashedul Alam Chowdhury vs ASM Shahajahan 17 BLC (AD) 39 Section 138 The complainant served a legal notice within 15 days of the receipt of the information of return of the cheques. So there is no valid ground for quashing the proceeding under section 138 of the Act. Habibur Rahman Howlader vs State 53 DLR (AD) 111. Section 138 Under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act an offence is committed if a cheque is dishonoured and if payment is not made within 15 days after receipt of a legal notice. It is a settled law that criminal proceeding can be proceeded independently of the civil suit. Manzur Alam (Md) vs State and another 55 DLR (AD) 62. Section 138 The convict respondent admitted about the loan, issuance of cheques by him and dishonour of cheques and that a notice under section 138(1)(b) has been given by the complainant. Thus, all the legal requirements are present to bring the offence under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Amir Hossain vs MA Malek and others 56 DLR (AD) 146. Sections 138 & 141 Subsequent allegations will not save limitation for prosecution– The requirement under the law is that the complaint against non–payment of money has to be filed within one month of the date on which the cause of action arises–The High Court Division wrongly rejected the application for quashing. SM Anwar Hossain vs Md Shajiul Alam (Chand) and another 51 DLR (AD) 218. Section 138 Filing the complaint by the attorney no illegality has been committed–– The complainant while in jail hajat, filed the complaint before the concerned Court of Magistrate through his attorney to avoid the limitation and satisfactory explanation has been furnished to that effect and as such Appellate Division cannot ignore this compelling circumstance in filing the complaint by the attorney. In the instant case, ‘the holder in due course of the cheque’ himself is the complainant and same was presented before the Court through the attorney. ––This Division have no hesitation to hold that in filing the complaint by the attorney no illegality has been committed and the learned Magistrate rightly took cognizance into the case against the accused petitioner having complied with the relevant provision of law. .....Kabir Reza =VS= Shah Mohammad Ashraf Islam, (Criminal), 2023(2) [15 LM (AD) 265] Sections 138 & 141 Taking of cognisance upon the petition of complaint filed by the Attorney upon due examination under section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is "perfectly valid and appropriate". Hashibul Bashar vs Guizar Rahman and another 56 DLR (AD) 17. Section 138(1) (b) (c), 141. It does not constitute any offence or no offence shall be deemed to have been committed as alleged and as such it would be manifestly unjust to allow process of the Court to continue and would infact be an abuse of process and, therefore the proceeding is liable to be quashed. Nizam Uddin Mahmood vs Abdul Hamid Bhuiyan (Amirul Kabir Chowdhury J)(Criminal) 2ADC 793 Section 138 A criminal proceeding can be quashed under section 561A of the Code of crim­inal procedure if the same does not dis­close any case or it manifestly appears that there is a legal bar against the insti­tution or continuation of the said pro­ceeding or whether the facts disclose an offence or not can only be determined on evidence being adduced. Abdul Aziz vs Khaja Abdul Gani (K. M. Hasan C. J) (Criminal) J ADC 23 Section 138,141 We are, therefore, of the view that though the appellant presented the cheque on four dates but after the cheque was dishonoured for the last time on 26.10.2000, he served the required notice on 06.11.2000, well within statutory period and as such fil­ing of the instant complaint on 11.12.2000 cannot be regarded as ille­gal. Munshi Md. Rashed Kamal vs Abdus Salam (Amirul Kabir Chowdhury J) (Criminal) 2ADC 798 Section 138,141 In order to make a person liable under section 138 the payee of a cheque has to give a notice in writing to the drawer of the cheque within 15 days of the receipt of information by him from the Bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid in terms of clause (b) to the Proviso. S.M. Anwar Hossain vs Md. Shafiul Alam (Chand) (A.T.M. Afzal C J)(Criminal) 2ADC 879 Section 138,141(b) Section 241A of the Code of Criminal Procedure praying to discharge him but the learned Magistrate rejected the appli- cation and then the accused filed Criminal Miscellaneous Case No.5518 of 2001 under Section 561A of the Code of Criminal Procedure praying to quash the proceeding and the High Court Division by the judgment and order dated 25.06.2002 made the rule absolute quash­ing the proceeding. Nizamuddin Mahmood vs. Abdul Hamid Bhuiyan (Md. Abdul Matin J) (Criminal) 5ADC 891 Section 138 That though the appellant presented the cheque on four dates but after the cheque was dishonoured for the last time on 26.10.2000, he served the required notice on 06.11.2000, well within statu­tory period and as such filing of the instant complaint on 11.12.2000 cannot be regarded as illegal. It is clear that the High Court Division took a contrary view on an erroneous interpretation of the law and quashed the proceeding. The impugned judg­ment is bad in law and as such is not sustainable. Munshi Md. Rashed Kamal vs. Abdus Salam and another (Amirul Kabir Chowdhury J) (Criminal) 4ADC 357 Section 138 For non-compliance with the require­ment of Section 138(1) (b) and (c) of the Act no offence has been constituted or deemed to have been committed and as such as the proceeding has correctly been quashed. Nizam Uddin Mahmood vs. Abdul Hamid Bhuiyan and another (Amirul Kabir Chowdhury J) (Criminal) 4ADC 446 Sections 138 and 140 The Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 Sections 138 and 140 The Code of Criminal Procedure Sections 435, 426(2A) and 561A There is a specific provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure for preferring revisional application against the order of rejection of the bail petition filed under Section 426(2A) of the Code of Criminal Procedure–– Appellate Division’s view is that there are specific provision in Sections 426 and 435 of the Code of Criminal Procedure for bail of a convicted person and if bail petition filed by a convicted person under Section 426(2A) of the Code of Criminal Procedure is rejected, then the remedy lies under Section 435 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in “Revisional Jurisdiction”. It appears that the High Court Division without appreciating the scope of Section 561A of the Code of Criminal Procedure and without applying its judicial mind exceeded its jurisdiction in passing the order in exercise of inherent power vide impugned judgment and orders dated 25.10.2022 which calls interference by this Division. The convict Md. Lutful Hasan is in jail custody, it is felt that justice would be best served if he is given an opportunity to file a revisional application in the competent court of jurisdiction under Section 435 of the Code of Criminal Procedure against the impugned orders dated 26.09.2022 passed by the learned Joint Metropolitan Sessions Judge, 5th Court, Chattogram. Accordingly, the convict person i.e. Md. Lutful Hasan may file a revisional application under Section 435 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, if so advised, against the impugned orders dated 26.09.2022 within 30 (thirty) days from the date of receipt a copy of this judgment and order. .....Sajjad Hossain = Md. Lutful Hasan, (Criminal), 2023(1) [14 LM (AD) 599] Section 138 (1) Section 138 (1) is not a compoundable one. Since both the parties have settled matter amicably and the complainant received the half of the amount of the dishonoured cheque in cash and the rest of the amount was deposited with the Sessions Court filing the appeal before the High Court Division. So the sentence awarded against the petitioner is reduced to the period undergone. .....Subhash Chandra Sarker =VS= The State, (Criminal), 2023(1) [14 LM (AD) 450] Section 138 The offence under section 138 of the Act is not a natural crime like hurt or murder. It is an offence created by a legal fiction in the statute– The offence under section 138 of the Act is not a natural crime like hurt or murder. It is an offence created by a legal fiction in the statute. It is a civil liability, transformed into a criminal liability under restricted conditions by way of an amendment of the Act. Before amendment, offending acts referred to section 138 of the Act constituted only a pure and civil liability. ...Mohammad Alauddin =VS= The State, (Criminal), 2019 (1) [6 LM (AD) 124] Section 138 The cheque is filled up and presented to the bank, the person who had drawn the cheque cannot avoid criminal liability– Once issuance of cheque and signature thereon are found to be genuine, the court shall proceed with the proceeding. Question of fraud or fraudulent insertion can only be determined by recording and considering evidence by the trial Court after holding trial. If blank cheque is issued towards liability or as security, when the liability is proved, if the cheque is filled up and presented to the bank, the person who had drawn the cheque cannot avoid criminal liability. The disputed question of fact as to the issuance of the cheque as 'security' or 'advance' or 'post dated' can only be decided upon recording evidence. All the appeals and petitions are dismissed. ...Mohammad Alauddin =VS= The State, (Criminal), 2019 (1) [6 LM (AD) 124] Section 138-Trial Court by its judgment and order convicted the peti- tioner u/s 138 of N. I. Act and sentenced him to suffer simple imprisonment and to pay a fine, on appeal High Court Di- vision upholding the conviction, in the meantion the petitioner paid entire fine, Appellate Division reduced to the period of sentence already undergone by him. The Appellate Division observed that the High Court Division did not commit any error in upholding the conviction of the pe- titioner under section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881. It is pertinent to quote here Order 14 dated 29.04.2012 of the Court of Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Chittagong as under: আদেশ নং-১৪, তাং-২৯-০৪- ১২ইং। পূর্ববর্তী আদেশ মোতাবেক জরিমানার অবশিষ্ট টাকা বিধি মোতাবেক জমা প্রদান করে আসামী পক্ষ চালানের কপি দাখিল করেছে। দেখলাম। চালানের ফটোকপি নথির সামিল রাখা হোক। স্বাঃ/এস,এম, মজিবুর রহমান, মহানগর দায়রা জজ, চট্টগ্রাম। Having gone through the order, it appears that the leave-peti- tioner has already paid the entire amount on account of fine imposed on him. Having considered all aspects of the case, Appel- late Division is of the view that on facts and circumstances of the case, the sentence of the leave-petitioner should be reduced to the period of imprisonment already under- gone by him. Accordingly, this criminal petition for leave to appeal is disposed of and the sentence imposed on the leave-pe- titioner is reduced to the period of sentence already undergone by him. Alim Uddin Babu. Vs. The State and another. (Criminal) 12 ALR (AD) 171- 173 Sections 138 and 141-Whether for the deception of the drawer a cheque is dishonoured will such deception give the extension of the period of limitation or due such act of deception the payee will be debarred from filing a case under sec- tion 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The Appellate Division held that section 141 starts with the word 'notwithstanding'. It is no doubt a non-obstante clause and thus, the provisions of the Code of Crimi- nal Procedure for the purpose of taking cognizance will not apply. It is equivalent to saying that inspite of the provision, the enactment following it will have its full op- eration. A non-obstante clause is used as a legislative device to modify the ambit of the provision of law mentioned in the non- obstante clause or to override it in specified circumstance. However, it does not debar the payee to seek redress to an ordinary criminal court to take cognizance in respect of a distinct offence committed for willful deception by the drawer. Even if a crimi- nal offence punishable under section 138 is barred, the drawee or payee's remedy for realization of the amount represents in the cheaque will not be barred. He can realize the said amount through the process of the civil court in view of sub-section (3) of section 138. Apart from the civil cases, the drawee/payee can also file criminal case punishable under the Penal Code other than the one mentioned above. Md. Motaleb Hossain: -Vs.- Abdul Ha- que Limon and another: (Criminal) 11 ALR (AD) 105-110 Sections 138 and 140-Whether the proceedings are maintainable without impleading the Companies as the prin- cipal offenders. The Appellate Division is of the view that for proper and effective adjudication of the cases, the complainant(s) /drawee (s) may add the Company as one of the ac- cused in the case but for not impleading the Company, the case will not fail. Moham- mad Eusof Babu and others. Mustaque Alam Chowdhury and others. -Vs.- Jhon Provanjon Chowdhury. (Criminal) 11 ALR (AD) 111-113 Sections 138 As per provisions of section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, prima-facie case against the petitioner had been made out. Since there is no bar to get the loan amount realized by producing issued cheques for encashment, the instant proceeding were not liable to be quashed. The Appellate Division observed that it is not disputed that the petitioner issued cheques. The objects of issuance of those cheques were to pay the loan amount. Definitely, the petitioner issued those cheques in favour of the complainant to recover the outstanding by producing those cheques in the Bank for encashment. Accordingly in order to realize the loan, the complainant produced the cheques in the Bank for encashment which were bounced by the Bank. In such situation, the complainant issued legal notice giving the petitioner an opportunity to pay the de- faulted amount but the petitioner failed to pay the same within the stipulated period. Thus, as per provisions of section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, prima- facie case against the petitioner had been made out. The High Court Division held that since there is no bar to get the loan amount realized by producing issued cheques for encashment, the instant proceeding were not liable to be quashed. The Appellate Division does not find any illegality in the judgment and order of the High Court Division which calls any interference by the Appellate Division. Accordingly, all the petitions are dismissed. Ehetasamul Haque -Vs. State and another (Criminal) 20 ALR (AD) 156-157 Section 138-The cheque was dishonoured with the endorsement "payment stopped by the drawer", a clear prima-facie case of the commission of the offence punishable under section 138 of the Act, has been made out against the accused. Ahmed Lal Mia vs State, 66 DLR (AD) 204 Section 138-It is true that in the judgment sought to be reviewed, there has been no detailed discussions as to the point raised before the High Court Division that the respective petition of complaint having been filed before expiry of the statutory period as stipulated in clause (c) of the proviso to section 138(1) of the Act, was barred by law, this Division having affirmed the judgment and order passed by the High Court Division which took the view that though the respective petition of complaint was filed before expiry of thirty days from the date of receipt of the notice issued under clause (b) of the proviso to section 138, was maintainable in law, in fact, gave the answer. Sarwar Hossain Moni (Md) vs State, 66 DLR (AD) 283 Section 138-Once a cheque is drawn and handed over to the drawee and the latter has presented it in his account for encashment and thereafter, if the cheque is returned to him with an endorsement that the amount of money standing to the credit of the account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid for that account or that t was dishonoured because of 'stop payment instructed by the Bank, an offence punishable under the section would constitute provided that if the drawee fulfills the conditions provided in the proviso to sub-section (1). If the drawer of the cheque is a Company, firm or an association of individuals the said money, firm or association of individuals would also be prosecuted for commission of offence under section 138 subject to the fulfilment of the conditions. (PER SK SINHA, CJ MAJORITY) Eusof Babu (Md) vs State, 68 DLR (AD) 298 Section 138-Onus The onus on the part of the drawee is primary being based on the maxim e.i.: 'incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat' this is because the liability envisaged in sub-section (1) is on the person in-charge of, and was responsible to the business of the company is fixed by the legislature because he is directly responsible for the offence. (Per SK Sinha, CJ majority) Eusof Babu (Md) vs State, 68 DLR (AD) 298 Section 138-The dishonour of a cheque does not itself constitute an offence under section 138. If the drawer of such cheque fails to make payment of the amount of money to the payee within thirty days of receipt of the notice, the cause of action for constituting the offence will arise, and if a complaint is filed within one month of the date on which the cause of action arises, the court shall take cognizance of the offence. So, the cause of action will arise if the drawer fails to make payment to the payee. Now, if the same drawer fails to make payment of the amount of money covered by the cheque (s) within the stipulated time, does it constitute the cause of action? It does. If it does constitute the cause of action, there will be no legal bar to file a case for prosecuting the drawer for the cause of action. Here the cause of action is not distinct but the same. (PER SK SINHA, CJ MAJORITY) Eusof Babu (Md) vs State, 68 DLR (AD) 298 Section 138-The complainant(s)/ drawee(s) of the cheques may, if so advised, arraign by adding the Companies in the category of accused if they feel that for getting effective relief in the cases the presence of the companies is necessary in the cases. (PER SK SINHA, CJ MAJORITY) Eusof Babu (Md) vs State, 68 DLR (AD) 298 Sections 138 and 140-Sections 138 and 140 of the Act do not make the directors principal offenders but accessories before the fact or liable vicariously. It is the company which is the principal offender, which has indeed committed the offence by issuing the cheques that were bounced, and hence question of choice is out of context. (PER AHM SHAMSUDDIN CHOUDHURY, J DISSCUSTING) Eusof Babu (Md) vs State, 68 DLR (AD) 298 Sections 138 and 140-Prosecution minus the company was not maintainable, I find no necessity to consider other grounds the appellants/ leave petitioners have aired. So, the issue before me is very narrow indeed, but the flare and the dimension of it is too extensive and pervasive. Eusof Babu (Md) vs State, 68 DLR (AD) 298 Sections 138 and 140-The difference between sections 138 and 140 is that in respect of section 138 the offence is committed by human being that is to say, natural person and in section 140 though the expression "the person" is used which is qualified by a company which means "any body corporate and includes a firm of other association of individuals" which is a juristic person or not. It can be prosecuted for the offence under section 138. (PER SK SINHA, CJ MAJORITY) Eusof Babu (Md) vs State, 68 DLR (AD) 298 Section 138(1)-Service of notice-If a notice is issued upon the Managing Director of the company who is in-charge of the affairs of the Company and signed the cheque on behalf of the company, the service of notice upon the Managing Director is sufficient to infer that the company has received the notice. This will fasten the company as well as the commis- sion of the offence. This is because the Managing Director being the chief executive of the company his knowledge may be deemed to be the knowledge of the company. (PER SK SINHA, CJ MAJORITY) Eusof Babu (Md) vs State, 68 DLR (AD) 298 Section 138(1)-Section 138(1) empowers the trial Court to punish with imprisonment for a maximum period of one year, or with fine which may extend to thrice the amount of the cheque or both. The powers given to the Court is discretionary. The language used in the section is not such that the Court must impose fine thrice the amount of the cheque. The legislature has left the matter to the discretion of the trial Court while awarding the sentence of imprisonment and fine. Shahidur Rahman Khadem vs State, 64 DLR (AD) 103 Section 138(b)(c)-Legislature has not created any absolute bar in filing a petition of complaint before expiry of thirty days of the receipt of the notice issued under clause (b) of the proviso to section 138 as created in case of filing a petition of complaint after expiry of one month of the date on which the cause of action arises under clause (c) of the proviso to section 138. Prematurity shall be cured the moment the period of thirty days expires and the payment of the dishonoured cheque is not made within the said period. Zahidul Islam (Md) vs Md Kamal Hossain, 66 DLR (AD) 180 Section 138 The complainant-leave-petitioner failed to prove the case as made out in the complaint-petition against accused- respondent No. 1 beyond all reasonable doubt and as such, the impugned judgment and order of conviction and sentence called for interference. The Appellate Division held that admittedly, accused-respondent No. 1 was given in marriage to the son of the complainant-leave-petitioner and as soon as respondent No. 1 divorced her husband, the complaint-petition was filed against respondent No. 1. Having gone through the record, the Appellate Division is fully satisfied that the complaint-petition was filed in order to harass respondent No. 1 for divorcing the son of the complainant-leave- petitioner. In the light of the findings made before, the Appellate Division does not find any substance in this criminal petition. Accordingly, this criminal petition is dis- missed. Sheikh Wahiduzzaman Dipu. -Vs.- Tanima Afrin Kumkum and another. (Criminal) 21 ALR (AD) 44-46 Section 138 There is no legal bar of filing a single case against the drawer of the cheques if the notice is served within the period of limitation intimating the fact of dishonour of the cheques with a request to pay the amount involved in those cheques within a period of thirty days. The Appellate Division has already settled that there is no legal bar of filing a single case against the drawer of the cheques if the notice is served within the period of limitation intimating the fact of dishonour of the cheques with a request to pay the amount involved in those cheques within a period of thirty days. As observed above, the dishonour of a cheque does not itself constitute an offence under section 138. If the drawer of such cheque fails to make payment of the amount of money to the payee within thirty days of receipt of the notice, the cause of action for constituting the offence will arise, and if a complaint is filed within one month of the date on which the cause of action arises, the court shall take cognizance of the offence. So, the cause of action will arise if the drawer fails to make payment as above to the payee. Now, if the same drawer fails to make payment of the amount of money covered by the cheque(s) within the stipulated time, does it constitute no cause of action? It does. If it does constitute a cause of action, there will be no legal bar to file a case for prosecuting the drawer for the said cause of action. Here the cause of action is not distinct but the same. Similar fact was involved in Bilakchand Gyanchand Co. V. A. Chinnaswami, (1999) 5 SCC 693. In that case, the accused did not even challenge the propriety of filing of one case against the dishonour of six cheques. Six cheques were issued by the Shakti Spinners Ltd. and were signed by its Managing Director. The cheques were dishonoured with an endorsement that 'sufficient funds were not available and exceed arrangement'. After service of notice the drawee filed a complaint and consequently, process was issued against the Managing Director. On an application moved for quashing the proceedings, the High Court quashed the proceedings on the ground that no notice was served upon the company. The Supreme Court set aside the judgment on the ground that the High Court fell in error in quashing the proceedings, inasmuch as, there is no 'infirmity in the notice issued under section 138 addressed to A. Chinnaswami, who was a signatory of the cheques'. Therefore, the Appellate Division finds no merit in these appeals. The Appellate Division would, however, like to observe that the complainant(s)/drawee(s) of the cheques may, if so advised, arraign by adding the Companies in the category of accused if they feel that for getting effective relief in the cases the presence of the companies is necessary in the cases. The appeals and the petitions are dismissed without, however, any order as to costs. Mohammad Eusof Babu and others Vs. Johan Provanjon Chowdhury (Criminal) 23 ALR (AD) 58 Section 138 Whether if a company incorporated under the Companies Act commits an offence punishable under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 is excluded from prosecution, can a director, manager, secretary or other officer of the company be prosecuted for that offence, and secondly, whether if more than one cheques issued by the same drawer can be prosecuted in a single case. Mohammad Eusof Babu and others -Vs.- Johan Provanjon Chowdhury (Criminal) 23 ALR (AD) 58 Section 138-It is well settled that the enumeration of specific matter "without prejudice to the generality" of a particular provision does not restrict the general application of that provision to the matters enumerated because the words "without prejudice" have the effect of preserving the full effect of the general provisions and also because the Rule of ejusdeme generis has no universe application. Those words clearly indicate that the provision of section 138 did not make any embargo in the application of other provisions of the Act. Where the amount promised shall depend on some other complementary facts or fulfillment of another promise and if any cheque is issued on that basis, but that promise is not fulfilled it will not create any obligation on the part of the drawer of the cheque or any right which can be claimed by the holder of the cheque. The Appellate Division observed that the High Court Division being last court of facts upon elaborate consideration of the evidence both the oral and documentary has come to the conclusion that the complainant failed to take any step to sell the property of the respondent, rather the respondent and his brother and sister sold the said property to the U.S.A. Embassy and the complainant did not help the respondent in any way in that regard. It is relevant here to quote the evidence of the complainant which he adduced before the trial court as P.W.1 which are as follows: "আমি অত্র মামলার বাদী।আসামী ইমরান রশীদের সাথে১৩/৩/১২ খ্রিঃ তারিখে রেজিঃকৃত Memo বা Agreement যার নম্বর ১৮৯৮/১২। আসামী ডকে উপস্থিত নাই। উক্ত Agreement এর শর্তানুযারী আগামী ১/৭/১৩ খ্রিঃ তারিখে ১টা cheque দেয় ১কোটি টাকা। যার নম্বর ০৫৫৯৫৭০ ইহা আমার নামীয় ব্যাংক Account এ বিগত ১৮/৭/১৩ খ্রিঃ তারিখে জমা দেই। কিন্তু stop payment এর কারনে Dishonour হয়। ২৫/৭/১৩ খ্রিঃ তারিখে ইহা পুনরায় জমা দিলে অনুরুপভাবে Dishonour হয়। উক্ত বিষয়ে আমি ১৩/৮/১৩ খ্রিঃ তারিখে আসামীর প্রতি Legal Notice প্রদান করি।কিন্তু আসামী পাওনা পরিশোধ না করার কারণে অত্র মামলা দায়ের করি। অতঃপর ১০/৯/১৩ খ্রিঃ অত্র মামলা দায়ের করি। এই নালিশ (Ext-1) আমার স্বাক্ষর (Ext-1-1) এই সেই cheque (Ext-2), এই সেই দুইটা Dishonour slips (Ext-3 series), এই সেই Legal Notice with postal receipts (Ext 4 series), এবং এই আমার Memo of Agreement (Ext-5) মুল কপিদায়রা৩০৭৯/১৩ মামলায় দাখিল আছে।" Nowhere in his examination-in-chief the complainant claimed that in terms of agreement (Ext-5) he had brought the purchaser to sell the respondent's property and, accordingly, the same was sold. In his cross examination, the complainant has admitted the fact saying, "আমার memo. of understanding এর ১নং শর্তে উল্লেখ আছে ৯০ কার্যদিবসের মধ্যে "positive out coming" নিয়ে আসতে হবে। ২ (ধ) শর্তে উল্লেখ আছে বাজার মূল্যে ক্রেতা আনিতে পারিলে আমি (বাদী) কমিশন পাব। (emphasis supplied) He further said that, "কথিত শর্তের কারণে আসামীগণ $5.25 M dollar-এ ঐ plot বিক্রির প্রস্তাব দেয় মার্কিন দূতাবাসের নিকট।" He further said that, "০৩/০৭/১৩ খ্রিঃ তারিখে sale deed (deed of transfer) সম্পাদন ও রেজিস্ট্রি হয়। তেজগাঁও Registry office Registration nq| H deed এ আমি উপস্থিত ছিলাম না।" That is accused respondent offered the proposal to sell their property to the American Embassy and even, at the time of execution and regis- tration of sale deed, the appellant was not present in the Sub-Registrar's office. Ext.5 would create a liability of the respondent to pay commission under the agreement only when the appellant secured net market price of the res respondent's property by sale what did not happen in this case. In his cross examination the complainant has said, "২(ধ) শর্তে উল্লেখ আছে বাজার মূল্যে ক্রেতা আনিতে পারিলে আমি (বাদী) কমিশন পাব।" There is no such averment, in the petition of complaint or in the evidence that the complainant has stated that he had brought any purchaser who offered market price of the property. From the evidence quoted above it appears that the condition under which the cheques were issued was not ful- filled by the complainant appellant. Thus, the respondent instructed the bank not to encash the impugned cheques. Accordingly, the bank returned the cheques with endorsement, "payment stopped by the drawer". Where the amount promised shall depend on some other complementary facts or fulfillment of another promise and if any cheque is issued on that basis, but that promise is not fulfilled it will not create any obligation on the part of the drawer of the cheque or any right which can be claimed by the holder of the cheque. As such dishonesty or fraud cannot be attributed to the respondent in giving stop payment instructions. Consequently, the question of committing an offence by the accused respondent punishable under section 138 of the Act does not arise. Thus, the Appellate Division is of the view that these appeals do not deserve any consideration. Accordingly, all the appeals are dismissed. Md. Abul Kaher -Vs.- Emran Rashid and another (Criminal) 19 ALR (AD) 56-64 Sections 138 and 141(1)(b)-Whether the proceeding initiated under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act 1881 against the accused petitioner is barred by section 141(1)(b) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 as the complainant earlier issued legal notice in the 'Daily Azadi' on 14.07.2011 for dishonour of the cheques on 28.06.2011 but the complainant without taking recourse to the appropriate remedy within the time fixed under section 141(b) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 again issued legal notice published in the daily 'Jugantor' on 17.11.2011 for dishonour of self same cheques on 02.11.2011 and filed the instant case on 21.11.2011 under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 on the basis of second notice published in the daily 'Jugantor' long after the expiry of the period of limitation. The procedural limitation provided in section 141 (b) cannot take away the substantive right accruing to the beneficiary of a cheque to prosecute any number of subsequent presentation of the cheque on its dishonour. Similarly, each dishonour will give rise to a concomitant right to serve notice under proviso (b) to section 138 (1) of the Act and demand pay- ment, failing which the bearer of the cheque will have the right to make a complaint in writing in accordance with section 141 (a) of the Act. It will be entirely up to the bearer of the cheque to proceed in respect of any particular dishonour of the cheque, keeping in mind that each step of the process has to be taken within the period stipulated by the law. It is the considered view of the Appellate Division that there is no conflict between proviso (c) to section 138(1) and section 141(b). Sections 138 and 140 of the Act are substantive provisions of law giving details of the offence, when the offence is committed and who is liable; section 141 of the Act describes the proce- dure to be followed. The intention of the legislature in enacting section 141(b) is to provide a time limit within which the complaint against the defaulting drawer of the cheque is to be made. This section does not preclude the holder of the cheque from presenting the cheque to the bank again for payment, subject only to the condition that the second and subsequent presentation of the cheque must be within six months from the date on which the cheque was drawn in order to be able to prosecute the drawer of the cheque criminally under section 138 of the Act. Upon subsequent presentation of the cheque for payment, if it is again disho- noured another opportunity will accrue to the beneficiary to take action as provided under section 138(1) of the Act, and again. in accordance with the provisions of section 141, the beneficiary of the cheque will be obliged to make complaint against such subsequent dishonour within a period of one month from the cause of action arising under proviso (c) to section 138 (1) of the Act. The offence is committed each time the cheque is dishonoured on presentation for payment. There is nothing in section 141(b) to suggest that the cause of action cannot arise more than once under clause (c) of the proviso to section 138(1). The procedural limitation provided in section 141 (b) cannot take away the substantive right accruing to the beneficiary of a cheque to prosecute any number of subsequent presentation of the cheque on its dishonour. Similarly, each dishonour will give rise to a concomitant right to serve notice under proviso (b) to section 138 (1) of the Act and demand payment, failing which the bearer of the cheque will have the right to make a complaint in writing in accordance with section 141 (a) of the Act. It will be entirely up to the bearer of the cheque to proceed in respect of any particular dishonour of the cheque, keeping in mind that each step of the process has to be taken within the period stipulated by the law. Hence, the Appellate Division holds that decision in the case of Dr. Md Mofizur Rahman and ors vs Md Bashirullah and another, 55 DLR 630 was incorrect and is accordingly overruled. In view of the above discussion, the opinion of the Appellate Division is that the appeals have no merit and are accordingly dismissed. For the same reasons the criminal petition for leave to appeal is also dismissed. Nizam Uddin Mahmud Hossain Vs. The State and another (Criminal) 16 ALR (AD) 3-11 Section 138 and 140 Monaben Ketanbhai Shah & Another v. State of Gujarat & Others (2004) 7 SCC 15. In the said case, this court observed as under:- ".....The primary responsibility is on the complainant to make necessary averments in the complaint so as to make the accused vicariously liable. For fastening the criminal liability, there is no presumption that every partner knows about the transaction. The obligation of the appellants to prove that at the time the offence was committed they were not in charge of and were not responsible to the firm for the conduct of the business of the firm, would arise only when first the complainant makes necessary averments in the complaint and establishes that fact. The present case is of total absence of requisite averments in the complaint." In State of Haryana v. Brij Lal Mittal & Others (1998) 5 SCC 343, it was held that the vicarious liability of a person 8 for being prosecuted for an offence committed under the Act by a company arises if at the material time he was incharge of and was also responsible to the company for the conduct of its business. Simply because a person is a director of the company it does not necessarily mean that he fulfils both the above requirements so as to make him liable. Conversely, without being a director a person can be incharge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of its business. From the complaint in question we, however, find that except a bald statement that the respondents were directors of the manufacturers, there is no other allegation to indicate, even prima facie, that they were incharge of the company and also responsible to the company for the conduct of its business K.P.G. Nair v. Jindal Menthol India Ltd. (2001) 10 SCC 218 was a case of this court under the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and it was found that the allegations in the complaint did not either in express words or with reference to the allegations contained therein make out a case that at the time of commission of the offence the appellant was in charge of and was responsible to the company for the conduct 9 of its business. It was held that the requirements of Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 were not met and the complaint against the accused was quashed. The same view has been taken in Katta Sujatha (Smt.) v. Fertilizers & Chemicals Travancore Ltd. & Another (2002) 7 SCC 655. The respondent placed reliance on the case of S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. (supra), wherein this Court has held as under: "19. In view of the above discussion, our answers to the questions posed in the reference are as under: (a) It is necessary to specifically aver in a complaint under Section 141 that at the time the offence was committed, the person accused was in charge of, and responsible for the conduct of business of the company. This averment is an essential requirement of Section 141 and has to be made in a complaint. Without this averment being made in a complaint, the requirements of Section 141 cannot be said to be satisfied. (b) The answer to the question posed in sub- para (b) has to be in the negative. Merely being a director of a company is not sufficient to make the person liable under Section 141 of the Act. A director in a company cannot be deemed to be in charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of its business. The requirement of Section 141 is that the person sought to be made liable should be in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company at the relevant time. This has to be averred as a fact as 10 there is no deemed liability of a director in such cases. (c) The answer to Question (c) has to be in the affirmative. The question notes that the managing director or joint managing director would be admittedly in charge of the company and responsible to the company for the conduct of its business. When that is so, holders of such positions in a company become liable under Section 141 of the Act. By virtue of the office they hold as managing director or joint managing director, these persons are in charge of and responsible for the conduct of business of the company. Therefore, they get covered under Section 141. So far as the signatory of a cheque which is dishonoured is concerned, he is clearly responsible for the incriminating act and will be covered under sub- section (2) of Section 141." In Sabitha Ramamurthy and Another v. R.B.S. Channabasavaradhya (2006) 10 SCC 581 this court held there was absence of requisite averments in the complaint not containing any statement that the appellants were in charge of the business of the company at the material time. The statement of witness also did not specifically allege that the appellants were in charge of the business of the company. This Court held that requirement of section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was not complied with and the complaint was liable to be quashed. In K.K. Ahuja v. V.K. Vora and Another (2009) 10 SCC 48, this court observed that the averment in a complaint that an accused is a director and that he is in charge of and is responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company, duly affirmed in the sworn statement, may be sufficient for the purpose of issuing summons to him. But if the accused is not one of the persons who falls under the category of 'persons who are responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company', then merely by stating that 'he was in charge of the business of the company' or by stating that 'he was in charge of the day to day management of the company' or by stating that he was in charge of, and was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company', he cannot be made vicariously liable under Section 141(1) of the Act. Section 138 -Whether a commercial bank can file a case under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (in short, the Act) in respect of dishonour of a post dated cheque taken from a borrower despite taking collateral security from the borrower. The High Court Division on an application under section 561A of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not authorized to quash a proceeding adjudicating a disputed question of fact. Once issuance of cheque and signature thereon are found to be genuine, the court shall proceed with the proceeding. The Appellate Division held that the question of fraud or fraudulent insertion can only be determined by recording and considering evidence by the trial Court after holding trial. However, if blank cheque is issued towards liability or as security, when the liability is proved, if the cheque is filled up and presented to the bank, the person who had drawn the cheque cannot avoid criminal liability. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances the Appellate Division considered opinion is that the disputed question of fact as to the issuance of the cheque as 'security' or 'advance' or 'post dated' can only be decided upon recording evidence. Accordingly, the Appellate Division does not find any substances in the appeals and petitions. Thus, all the appeals and petitions are dismissed. Mohammad Alauddin Vs. The State, represented bythe Deputy Commissioner, Chittagong and others: (Criminal) 16 ALR (AD) 113-117 Section 140-The directors only signed the company's cheques and thereby acted as the fuel injectors in the Company's commission of the offence. Section 140 of the Act made them vicariously liable as per me decision of the larger Bench of the Indian Supreme Court. Question is not founded on the applicability of the civil law principle of non-joinder but that of the criminal jurisprudence which ordains that a criminal proceeding is non-est for aiders or abettors if the principal offender is not booked. (PER AHM SHAMSUDDIN CHOUDHURY, J DISSCUSTING) Eusof Babu (Md) vs State, 68 DLR (AD) 298 Section 140-Section 140 does not contain that the prosecution of company is indisputable for the prosecution of the other categories of persons. If the company is not prosecuted, the other two categories of persons cannot, on that ground alone, escape from criminal liability. (Per SK Sinha, CJ majority) Eusof Babu (Md) vs State, 68 DLR (AD) 298 Section 140-Company is a distinct personality, independent of its Directors and share-holders and it is the company who is liable for offence committed by it and that the directors who steer the affairs of the company are not liable as the principal offenders but either vicariously or as aiding or abetting agents. For this view I take in aid observations expressed in re- Sir Dinshai Petit, supra, to the effect that when a company is duly incorporated the Court should start with the presumption that it is a separate entity from the individuals. (PER AHM SHAMSUDDIN CHOUDHURY, J ) Eusof Babu (Md) vs State, 68 DLR (AD) 298 Sections 140 and 141 If for any reason the company is not prosecuted, the other persons who are in charge of the affairs of the company or in the management of the company or have knowledge about the affairs of the company can not escape from criminal liability if they are served with the notice. The Appellate Division after approving the views and observation of the Supreme Court of India held that the infirmity of not making the company as accused which could be removed by affording the complainant to add the company M/S Modi Industries Ltd. in the case were termed as obiter dictum by the Supreme Court in India in Anil Hada V. Indian Acrylic Ltd, (2000) 1 SCC 1 and approved the views taken by Chinnappa Reddy, J. in Sheoratan Agarwal (Supra). This case is in respect of an offence under the Negotiable Instruments Act. The Indian provision is identical to our provision with the variation that section 140 of our Act corresponds to section 141 of the Indian Act. It was held in that case that if the offence was committed by a company it can be punished only if the company is prosecuted. But instead of prosecuting the company if a payee opts to prosecute only the persons who are responsible in the conduct of the business of the company, the payee can succeed in the case only if he succeeds in showing that the offence was actually committed by the company. The court summed up by observing that 'if a company is not prosecuted due to any legal snag or otherwise, the other prosecuted persons can not, on that score alone, escape from criminal liability created through legal fiction envisaged in section 141 of the Act." Mohammad Eusof Babu and others -Vs.- Johan Provanjon Chowdhury (Criminal) 23 ALR (AD) 58 Section 141(b) If a notice is issued upon the Managing Director of the Company who is in charge of the affairs of the Company and signed the cheque on behalf of the company, the service of notice upon the Managing Director is sufficient to infer that the company has received the notice. This will fasten the company as well for the commission of the offence. This is because the Managing Director being the chief executive of the company his knowledge may be deemed to be the knowledge of the company. Mohammad Eusof Babu and others -Vs.- Johan Provanjon Chowdhury (Criminal) 23 ALR (AD) 58 Section 141 If a company is not prosecuted due to any legal snag or otherwise, the other prosecuted persons can not, on that score alone, escape from criminal liability created through legal fiction envisaged in section 141 of the Act.’ .....Mohammad Eusof Babu =VS= Johan Provanjon Chowdhury, (Criminal), 2018 (2) [5 LM (AD) 251] Section 141(b) The subsequent allegations will not save the limitation—the requirement unçler the law is that the complaint has to be filed within one month of the date on which the cause of action arises under clause(c) of the proviso to section 138. [Para- 10] S. M. Anwar Hossain Vs. Md. Shafiul Alam & Am: 7BLT (AD)-218 Where the amount promised... Where the amount promised shall depend on some other complementary facts or fulfillment of another promise and if any cheque is issued on that basis, but that promise is not fulfilled it will not create any obligation on the part of the drawer of the cheque or any right which can be claimed by the holder of the cheque. …Md. Abul Kaher Shahin Vs. Emran Rashid & anr., (Criminal), 14 SCOB [2020] AD 96 A person issuing the cheque cannot escape... A person issuing the cheque cannot escape liability even if there is a stoppage of payment of cheque, unless he disproves the same for the other reasons. In case a cheque issued by a person in favour of another is dishonoured by the bank for want of funds, the holder of the cheque is entitled to the amount as reflected in the cheque since cheque is a negotiable instrument governed under the Act. …Md. Abul Kaher Shahin Vs. Emran Rashid & anr., (Criminal), 14 SCOB [2020] AD 96 Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (হস্তান্তরযোগ্য দলিল আইন, ১৮৮১) ধারা ৬, ১৩৮, ১৪১-আমরা মনে করি, আইন, ১৮৮১-এর ধারা ১৩৮-এর কার্যকারিতা কেবলমাত্র ডিজঅনার হওয়া চেকের ড্রয়ার দ্বারা কেবলমাত্র দেওয়ানী আদালতে মামলা দায়েরের মাধ্যমে বাধাগ্রস্ত বা কোনোভাবে এড়িয়ে যাওয়া যাবে না, চেক নিয়ে আরজিতে অভিযোগ যা-ই হোক এবং সেখানে যে প্রতিকারই চাওয়া হোক না কেন, কারণ এমন একটি কৌশল সম্পূর্ণরূপে ধারাকেই অকার্যকর করে দেবে। তবে, যদি কোনো হোল্ডার বা প্রাপক প্রতারণামূলক উপায়ে বা জালিয়াতির মাধ্যমে ডিজঅনার হওয়া চেক অর্জন করে, তাহলে চেকের ড্রয়ার বিচার চলাকালীন সেই প্রতিরক্ষা গ্রহণের স্বাধীনতা পাবে। ফলে, আমরা হাইকোর্ট বিভাগের প্রদত্ত তর্কিত রায় এবং আদেশে হস্তক্ষেপ করার কোনো কারণ খুঁজে পাই না। এই পিটিশন খারিজ করা হল। ...আরিফ-উজ-জামান (মো.) বনাম রাষ্ট্র, (ফৌজদারি), ধারা৭৯ও৮০-ধারা৭৯অনুযায়ী প্রমিসরি নোটবাবিলঅবএক্সচেঞ্জে সুদপরিশোধের জন্যস্পষ্টভাবে উল্লেখকরাহলেতাপ্রযোজ্য হয়,এবংধারা৮০অনুসারে, যদিদলিলেসুদেরহারনির্দিষ্ট নাকরাথাকে,তবেসুদেরহারবার্ষিক ৬%হবে। [প্যারাগ্রাফ-১২]সোনালীব্যাংকবনামএম/এস. কর্ণফুলী ওয়ার্কস লিমিটেড, ২বিএলটি (এডি)-৭৮ ধারা ১১৮- ব্যাংক কর্তৃক অর্থ আদায়ের দাবি—ব্যাংকিং কোম্পানি কর্তৃক অর্থ আদায়ের দাবি কি অর্থের প্রকৃত পরিশোধের বিষয়ে কোনো প্রমাণ ছাড়াই ডিক্রি প্রদান করা যেতে পারে—যেহেতু বিবাদী কোম্পানির পূর্বসূরি দ্বারা সম্পাদিত অন্যান্য সাধারণ নথির সাথে স্বত্বের দলিলগুলি ব্যাংকের কাছে জমা দেওয়া হয়েছিল এবং ঋণের বিষয়ে ব্যাংকের খাতা এবং ক্যাশবইয়ে নিয়মিত এন্ট্রি ছিল, তাই দাবি প্রতিষ্ঠিত হয়েছে—এছাড়াও, বিবাদী কোম্পানির ব্যবস্থাপনা পরিচালক ব্যাংকের প্রতি দায় স্বীকার করেছেন—তদুপরি, হস্তান্তরযোগ্য দলিল আইন, ব্যাংকার্স বুকস অফ এভিডেন্স আইন এবং ব্যাংকিং কোম্পানি অধ্যাদেশের অধীনে একটি অনুমান বিদ্যমান। প্লান্টার্স (বাংলাদেশ) লিমিটেড বনাম মহালক্ষ্মী ব্যাংক লিমিটেড এবং অন্যান্য ৫ DLR (AD) ১৫০। ধারা ১১৮, ১৩৮- চেক ডিজঅনার- একবার চেকের সম্পাদন স্বীকার করা হলে বা এটি সম্পাদিত হয়েছে বলে প্রমাণিত হলে, আইনের ধারা ১১৮(ক) অনুযায়ী এই ধারণা ওঠে যে, এটি প্রতিদান দ্বারা সমর্থিত। "স্টপ পেমেন্ট চেক" এর বিষয়টি খণ্ডনযোগ্য হবে এবং সেক্ষেত্রে এটি তখনই অপরাধ হবে যদি চেকের ড্রয়ার খণ্ডনের দায়ভার প্রমাণ করতে ব্যর্থ হয়। অভিযুক্ত ব্যক্তি সম্ভাব্য প্রতিরক্ষা উত্থাপন করে প্রতিদানের অনুপস্থিতি প্রমাণ করতে পারেন। যদি অভিযুক্ত প্রাথমিক প্রমাণের ভারটি পালন করতে পারে এবং দেখাতে পারে যে প্রতিদানের অস্তিত্ব থাকা অসম্ভব বা সন্দেহজনক ছিল বা এটি অবৈধ ছিল, তাহলে ভারটি অভিযোগকারী পক্ষের উপর স্থানান্তরিত হবে। তখন অভিযোগকারী পক্ষকে এটি প্রমাণ করতে হবে এবং প্রমাণ করতে ব্যর্থ হলে, হস্তান্তরযোগ্য দলিলের ভিত্তিতে কোনো প্রতিকার পাওয়ার অধিকার হারাবে। ...মো. আবুল কাহের শাহিন বনাম এমরান রশীদ ও অন্যান্য, (ফৌজদারি), ১৪ SCOB [২০২০] AD ৯৬ ধারা ১২৩এ এবং ১৩৮- ক্রসড চেক- আইন, ১৮৮১-এর ধারা ১২৩এ-এর উপ-ধারা (২) এর দফা (ক)-তে ব্যবহৃত আইনসভা কর্তৃক প্রদত্ত ম্যান্ডেট অনুযায়ী, যখন একটি চেক "অ্যাকাউন্ট পেয়ি" হিসাবে ক্রসড করা হয়, তখন সেটি আর হস্তান্তরযোগ্য থাকে না অর্থাৎ এটি যার পক্ষে ইস্যু করা হয়েছে, তার ব্যতীত অন্য কোনো ব্যক্তির কাছে হস্তান্তর বা নগদায়ন করা যাবে না। আরও স্পষ্ট করে বললে, একটি "অ্যাকাউন্ট পেয়ি" ক্রসড চেক অবশ্যই যার পক্ষে এটি ইস্যু করা হয়েছে তার অ্যাকাউন্টের মাধ্যমে নগদায়ন করতে হবে। সুতরাং, কোনোভাবেই একটি "অ্যাকাউন্ট পেয়ি" ক্রসড চেক তার হস্তান্তরযোগ্য চরিত্র হারায় না, যা ১৮৮১ সালের আইন, ধারা ১৩৮ এর অর্থে একটি হস্তান্তরযোগ্য দলিল হিসাবে বিবেচিত হয়। তদুপরি, ১৮৮১ সালের আইন, ধারা ১৩৮-এ হস্তান্তরযোগ্য দলিলের সংজ্ঞা প্রদান করা হয়েছে, এবং সেখানে ক্রসড চেক "অ্যাকাউন্ট পেয়ি" এবং অন্যান্য ধরণের চেক যেমন আমরা সাধারণত বুঝে থাকি, সেই বেয়ারার চেক-এর মধ্যে কোনো পার্থক্য করা হয়নি। তাই, আমরা দেখতে পাই যে আইন, ১৮৮১-এর ধারা ১২৩এ, আইন, ১৮৮১-এর ধারা ১৩৮-এর অধীনে কোনো মামলার কার্যক্রম চালানোর ক্ষেত্রে কোনো বাধা সৃষ্টি করে না। অন্য কথায়, আমরা ধারা ১২৩এ এবং আইন, ১৮৮১-এর ধারা ১৩৮-এর অধীনে শুরু হওয়া কার্যক্রমের মধ্যে কোনো সংযোগ দেখি না। .....মোঃ সাহাবউদ্দিন বনাম রাষ্ট্র, (ফৌজদারি), ২০১৭ (২) [৩ LM (AD) ৫৯২] ধারা ১২৩এ এবং ১৩৮- ক্রসড চেক- আইন, ১৮৮১-এর ধারা ১২৩এ-এর উপ-ধারা (২) এর দফা (ক)-তে ব্যবহৃত আইনসভা কর্তৃক প্রদত্ত ম্যান্ডেট অনুযায়ী, যখন একটি চেক "অ্যাকাউন্ট পেয়ি" হিসাবে ক্রসড করা হয়, তখন সেটি আর হস্তান্তরযোগ্য থাকে না অর্থাৎ এটি যার পক্ষে ইস্যু করা হয়েছে, তার ব্যতীত অন্য কোনো ব্যক্তির কাছে হস্তান্তর বা নগদায়ন করা যাবে না। আরও স্পষ্ট করে বললে, একটি "অ্যাকাউন্ট পেয়ি" ক্রসড চেক অবশ্যই যার পক্ষে এটি ইস্যু করা হয়েছে তার অ্যাকাউন্টের মাধ্যমে নগদায়ন করতে হবে। সুতরাং, কোনোভাবেই একটি "অ্যাকাউন্ট পেয়ি" ক্রসড চেক তার হস্তান্তরযোগ্য চরিত্র হারায় না, যা ১৮৮১ সালের আইন, ধারা ১৩৮ এর অর্থে একটি হস্তান্তরযোগ্য দলিল হিসাবে বিবেচিত হয়। তদুপরি, ১৮৮১ সালের আইন, ধারা ১৩৮-এ হস্তান্তরযোগ্য দলিলের সংজ্ঞা প্রদান করা হয়েছে, এবং সেখানে ক্রসড চেক "অ্যাকাউন্ট পেয়ি" এবং অন্যান্য ধরণের চেক যেমন আমরা সাধারণত বুঝে থাকি, সেই বেয়ারার চেক-এর মধ্যে কোনো পার্থক্য করা হয়নি। তাই, আমরা দেখতে পাই যে আইন, ১৮৮১-এর ধারা ১২৩এ, আইন, ১৮৮১-এর ধারা ১৩৮-এর অধীনে কোনো মামলার কার্যক্রম চালানোর ক্ষেত্রে কোনো বাধা সৃষ্টি করে না। অন্য কথায়, আমরা ধারা ১২৩এ এবং আইন, ১৮৮১-এর ধারা ১৩৮-এর অধীনে শুরু হওয়া কার্যক্রমের মধ্যে কোনো সংযোগ দেখি না। .....মোঃ সহাবউদ্দিন বনাম রাষ্ট্র ৩ ALR (২০১৪) (১) (AD) ১১১ ধারা ১৩৮ পেমেন্ট বন্ধ যেহেতু চেকগুলি ব্যাংক দ্বারা "ড্রয়ার কর্তৃক পেমেন্ট বন্ধ করা হয়েছে" এই এনডোর্সমেন্ট সহ ফেরত দেওয়া হয়েছিল, এটি অনুমান করা যায় যে চেকগুলি অপরিশোধিত অবস্থায় ফেরত দেওয়া হয়েছিল কারণ সেই অ্যাকাউন্টে জমাকৃত অর্থের পরিমাণ চেকের সম্মানার্থে পর্যাপ্ত ছিল না, যা আইন, ১৮৮১-এর ধারা ১৩৮-এ উল্লেখিত হয়েছে। অবশ্যই এটি একটি খণ্ডনযোগ্য অনুমান। প্রতিরক্ষা আদালতের বিচার চলাকালীন বিবেচনা করা যেতে পারে এবং দণ্ডবিধির ধারা ৫৬১এ এর অধীনে কোনো আবেদনপত্রে নয়। এস.এম. রেদওয়ান বনাম মোঃ রেজাউল ইসলাম, ৬৬ DLR (AD) ১৬৯ ধারা ১৩৮- আদালত কি শুধুমাত্র চেকের সত্যতা পরীক্ষা করবেন, নাকি অভিযোগকারীর দাবি এবং রেকর্ডে থাকা প্রতিরক্ষা মামলার প্রমাণও বিবেচনা করবেন? ফৌজদারি কার্যবিধির অধ্যায় ২৩, যা ধারা ২৬৫এ থেকে ২৬৫এল পর্যন্ত বিস্তৃত, বিচার চলাকালীন অনুসরণযোগ্য পদ্ধতির সাথে সম্পর্কিত। এই বিধানগুলো সেশন জজের উপর দায়িত্ব অর্পণ করে যে তিনি প্রসিকিউশন দ্বারা প্রদত্ত উপকরণ ও সাক্ষ্য প্রমাণ বিবেচনা করবেন এবং বিচারিক মনন প্রয়োগ করে সিদ্ধান্তে পৌঁছাবেন যে অভিযুক্তের বিরুদ্ধে আনা অভিযোগ প্রমাণিত হয়েছে কিনা। যদি সাক্ষ্য গ্রহণের পর এবং উক্ত সাক্ষ্য ও পক্ষগুলির বক্তব্য পর্যালোচনার পর সেশন আদালত মনে করেন যে প্রসিকিউশন দ্বারা প্রদত্ত সাক্ষ্য প্রমাণ অভিযুক্তকে দোষী সাব্যস্ত করার জন্য যথেষ্ট ও বিশ্বাসযোগ্য নয়, তবে আদালত ফৌজদারি কার্যবিধির ধারা ২৬৫এইচ অনুযায়ী খালাসের আদেশ রেকর্ড করবে। যেহেতু আইন, ১৮৮১-এর ধারা ১৩৮-এর অধীনে মামলা সেশন আদালতে বিচারযোগ্য, তাই বিচারক উক্ত ফৌজদারি কার্যবিধির বিধান অনুসরণ করে বিচার প্রক্রিয়া পরিচালনা করবেন। মোঃ আবুল কাহের বনাম এমরান রশিদ ও অন্যজন (ফৌজদারি) ১৯ ALR (AD) ৫৬-৬৪ ধারা ১৩৮ (১এ) (গ) - নোটিশটি 'ডেইলি সংগ্রাম' পত্রিকায় প্রকাশিত হয়েছে, যা বহুল প্রচারিত একটি জাতীয় পত্রিকা নয় এবং এটি ধারা ১৩৮ (১এ) (গ) এর অধীনে নির্ধারিত বিধানের লঙ্ঘন কিনা। হাইকোর্ট বিভাগ রায় দিয়েছেন যে, বহুল প্রচারিত একটি দৈনিক বাংলা জাতীয় পত্রিকায় নোটিশ প্রকাশিত হয়েছে কিনা, তা অবশ্যই একটি ঘটনাগত বিষয় এবং বিচারিক আদালত প্রমাণ গ্রহণের পর যোগ্যতার ভিত্তিতে সিদ্ধান্ত নিতে পারেন। যদি কোনো দৈনিক জাতীয় পত্রিকা সেই এলাকায় ব্যাপক ভাবে পাওয়া যায় যেখানে আসামি সাধারণত বসবাস করেন বা ব্যবসা পরিচালনা করেন, তবে তাকে বহুল প্রচারিত বলা যেতে পারে। তবে, দৈনিক পত্রিকার বহুল প্রচার সম্পর্কে প্রশ্ন নির্ধারণ করা বিচারিক আদালতের একান্তই বিবেচনার বিষয়, হাইকোর্ট বিভাগের মতে এই ঘটনাগত প্রশ্নটি ফৌজদারি কার্যবিধির ধারা ৫৬১এ এর অধীনে এখতিয়ার বিহীন এবং এটিকে বাতিল করা যায় না। মোহাম্মদ হাসান বনাম রাষ্ট্র ও অন্যান্য (ফৌজদারি) ৭ ALR (AD) ১২৯-১৩২ ধারা ১৩৮ তৎসহ ফৌজদারি কার্যবিধি- ধারা ৪৩৯এ, ৪৩৯(১), ৪২৩, ৪২৬, ৪২৭ এবং ৪২৮- সাজাপ্রদানের নীতিগুলি মাথায় রেখে আপীল বিভাগ বিবেচনা করতে পারেন যে, অভিযোগকারী দ্বারা রিভিশন পিটিশন দায়ের না করা সত্ত্বেও, হাইকোর্ট বিভাগ স্বতঃপ্রণোদিত ভাবে জরিমানা বৃদ্ধি করার ক্ষেত্রে ন্যায়সঙ্গত কিনা। আবেদনকারীকে অভিযোগকারী দ্বারা করা অভিযোগের ভিত্তিতে মামলাগুলিতে দোষী সাব্যস্ত করা হয়েছিল। ধারা ৪১৭ক অভিযোগকারীকে আপীল আদালতে সাজার অপর্যাপ্ততার ভিত্তিতে আপীল করার ক্ষমতা প্রদান করে। ধারা ৪১৭ক-এর উপ-ধারা (৩)-এ বলা হয়েছে যে, যখন কোনো আপীল সাজার অপর্যাপ্ততার ভিত্তিতে দায়ের করা হয়, তখন আপীল আদালত অভিযুক্তকে এমন বৃদ্ধির বিরুদ্ধে কারণ দর্শানোর জন্য যুক্তিসঙ্গত সুযোগ না দিয়ে সাজার মেয়াদ বৃদ্ধি করবেন না। একই নীতি প্রযোজ্য হবে সাজার অপর্যাপ্ততা বা আপীল আদালত কর্তৃক প্রদত্ত সাজার হ্রাসের ক্ষেত্রে, যা ধারা ৪৩৯(১) এর দৃষ্টিকোণে প্রযোজ্য, যার অধীনে রিভিশনাল আদালতকে ফৌজদারি কার্যবিধির ধারা ৪২৩, ৪২৬, ৪২৭ এবং ৪২৮ এর দ্বারা প্রদত্ত আপীল আদালতের সকল ক্ষমতা প্রদান করা হয়েছে। শাহিদুর রহমান খাদেম বনাম রাষ্ট্র ও অন্যান্য ৬ ALR (AD) ২০১৫ (২) ২১৮ ধারা ১৩৮- একটি বিশেষ আইন হওয়ায় হস্তান্তরযোগ্য দলিল আইন-এর ধারা ১৩৮ এর অধীনে অপরাধ আপসযোগ্য নয়। ন্যায়বিচারের স্বার্থ যথাযথভাবে পূরণ হবে যদি আবেদনকারীর সাজা কারাগারে ইতোমধ্যে ভোগকৃত সময়ের কারাদণ্ডে কমিয়ে আনা হয় এবং অর্থদণ্ডের সাজা বাতিল করা হয়। মোঃ ইদ্রিস চৌকদার বনাম রাষ্ট্র ৫ ALR (AD) ২০১৫ (১) ৮৩ ধারা ১৩৮- ধারা ১৩৮(১) বিচারিক আদালতকে সর্বোচ্চ এক বছরের কারাদণ্ড, বা চেকের পরিমাণের তিনগুণ পর্যন্ত জরিমানা বা উভয়ই প্রদান করার ক্ষমতা প্রদান করে। আদালতকে দেওয়া ক্ষমতা বিবেচনা মূলক। এই ধারায় ব্যবহৃত ভাষা এমন নয় যে আদালতকে চেকের পরিমাণের তিনগুণ জরিমানা আরোপ করতে হবে। আইনসভা এই বিষয়ে বিচারিক আদালতের বিবেচনার উপর নির্ভর করেছে। শাহিদুর রহমান খাদেম বনাম রাষ্ট্র ৫ ALR (AD) ২০১৫ (১) ১৪৪ ধারা ১৩৮- শুধুমাত্র চেক বাউন্স হওয়ার অভিযোগ নিজেই পেনাল কোড-এর ধারা ৪১৫-এর অধীনে সংজ্ঞায়িত এবং ধারা ৪২০-এর অধীনে শাস্তিযোগ্য কোনো অপরাধ গঠন করে না, এবং সুতরাং, পেনাল কোড-এর ধারা ৪২০-এর অধীনে আপিলকারীর বিরুদ্ধে অভিযোগ গঠন করা গুরুতর বেআইনি হয়েছে। এম.এ. শুক্কুর বনাম মোঃ জহিরুল হক এবং অন্য একজন ৫ ALR (AD) ২০১৫ (১) ২৭ ধারা ১৩৮ এবং ১৪১(খ) - ফৌজদারি কার্যক্রম বিচার শুরু হওয়ার আগে বন্ধ করা উচিত নয়, যদি বিচার চলার জন্য একটি প্রাইমা ফেসি কেস থাকে। হস্তান্তরযোগ্য দলিল আইন-এর ধারা ১৪১(খ) এর কোনো লঙ্ঘন হয়নি। হাইকোর্ট বিভাগ আরও উল্লেখ করেছেন যে, আইন এখন এ বিষয়ে স্থির যে, যখন বিচার চলার জন্য একটি প্রাইমা ফেসি কেস থাকে, তখন বিচার শুরু হওয়ার আগে ফৌজদারি কার্যক্রম বন্ধ করা উচিত নয়। এম.কে. বজলুর রহমান বনাম মোঃ জহুরুল হক ৩ ALR (২০১৪) (১) (AD) ১০৭ ধারা-১৩৮ তহবিলের অপর্যাপ্ততার কারণে চেক ডিজঅনারের শাস্তি ইত্যাদি। ড্রয়ারের প্রতারণামূলক কর্মকাণ্ডের কারণে ব্যাংক কর্তৃক চেক ডিজঅনার করা স্পষ্ট ভাবে তাকে ১৮৮১ সালের হস্তান্তরযোগ্য দলিল আইন, ধারা ১৩৮-এর অধীনে অপরাধের আওতায় নিয়ে আসে। ড্রয়ারের পক্ষ থেকে অসৎ উদ্দেশ্যে 'পেমেন্ট বন্ধ করা' ও তাকে আইনটির ধারা ১৩৮-এর আওতায় অপরাধের আওতায় নিয়ে আসে, যদিও ড্রয়ারের সত্যিকার কারণের ভিত্তিতে পেমেন্ট বন্ধ করার অধিকার রয়েছে। এস.এম. রেদোয়ান বনাম মোঃ রেজাউল ইসলাম এবং অন্যান্য ৩ ALR (২০১৪) (১) (AD) ৬২ ধারা ১৩৮ তৎসহ পেনাল কোড, ১৮৬০ এর ধারা ৪২০- হস্তান্তরযোগ্য দলিল আইন, ১৮৮১ এর ধারা ১৩৮(১) এর উপাদানসমূহ মামলার মধ্যে উপস্থিত ছিল না। হাইকোর্ট বিভাগ পর্যবেক্ষণ করেছে যে, যে অ্যাকাউন্টের ওপর চেকটি ইস্যু করা হয়েছিল, সেটি আসামি-পিটিশনারের নামে ছিল না, বরং এটি তার স্বামীর নামে রক্ষিত ছিল এবং চেকটি পর্যাপ্ত তহবিলের অভাবে বাউন্স হয়নি। আপিল বিভাগ বলেন যে, হাইকোর্ট বিভাগ আরও পর্যবেক্ষণ করেছেন যে, মামলার ঘটনা ও পরিস্থিতি প্রাথমিকভাবে দেখায় যে আসামি-পিটিশনার এবং তার স্বামীর বিরুদ্ধে প্রতারণার উপাদান বিদ্যমান এবং এর আলোকে অভিযোগকারী তাদের বিরুদ্ধে পেনাল কোড-এর ধারা ৪২০ এর অধীনে একটি ফৌজদারি কার্যধারা শুরু করতে পারেন এবং আসামি ও তার স্বামীর বিরুদ্ধে মানি সুট দায়ের করে তার ৩০ লক্ষ টাকা ঋণ পুনরুদ্ধার করতে দেওয়ানী আদালতে যেতে পারেন। আপিল বিভাগ হাইকোর্ট বিভাগ এর উপরের পর্যবেক্ষণ এবং সিদ্ধান্তে হস্তক্ষেপ করার কোনো কারণ খুঁজে পান না। আল-হাজ আবদুন নবী লেদু @ আবদুন নবী বনাম শাহনাজ বেগম সুমি বেগম এবং অন্যান্য (ফৌজদারি) ১০ ALR (AD) ২৬৭-২৬৮ ধারা ১৩৮- দণ্ডিত প্রতিপক্ষ ঋণের বিষয়ে, চেক ইস্যু করা এবং চেক ডিজঅনার হওয়ার ব্যাপারে স্বীকার করেছেন এবং অভিযোগকারী কর্তৃক ধারা ১৩৮(১)(খ) এর অধীনে নোটিশ দেওয়া হয়েছে। সুতরাং, ধারা ১৩৮ এর অধীনে অপরাধ আনার জন্য সমস্ত আইনি প্রয়োজনীয়তা উপস্থিত রয়েছে। আমির হোসেন বনাম এমএ মালেক ও অন্যান্য ৫৬ DLR (AD) ১৪৬। ধারা ১৩৮- হস্তান্তরযোগ্য দলিল আইন-এর ধারা ১৩৮ এর অধীনে একটি অপরাধ সংঘটিত হয় যদি একটি চেক ডিজঅনার হয় এবং আইনি নোটিশ পাওয়ার ১৫ দিনের মধ্যে যদি অর্থ প্রদান না করা হয়। এটা সুপ্রতিষ্ঠিত আইন যে ফৌজদারি কার্যক্রম দেওয়ানি মামলা হতে স্বতন্ত্র ভাবে পরিচালিত হতে পারে। মনজুর আলম বনাম রাষ্ট্র ৫৫ DLR (AD) ৬২। ধারা ১৩৮- যেহেতু প্রাপ্তির তারিখ একটি ঘটনাগত বিষয় যা বিচার চলাকালীন সময়ে নির্ধারিত হবে, তাই এই ধরনের ঘটনা নালিশী পিটিশনে প্রকাশ না করায় অভিযোগকারীকে গুরুতর ক্ষতির সম্মুখীন করে বিচার কার্যক্রম বাতিল করা যাবে না, কারণ অভিযোগকারী সাক্ষ্যের মাধ্যমে তার মামলা প্রমাণ করার অধিকারী। নিজামউদ্দিন মাহমুদ বনাম আবদুল হামিদ ভূঁইয়া ৬০ DLR (AD) ১৯৫। ধারা ১৩৮ এবং ১৪১ ফৌজদারি কার্যবিধির ধারা ২০০ অনুযায়ী যথাযথ পরীক্ষার পর অ্যাটর্নি কর্তৃক দায়ের করা নালিশী পিটিশন-এর ভিত্তিতে অপরাধ আমলে গ্রহণ করা "সম্পূর্ণ বৈধ এবং যথাযথ"। হাশিবুল বাশার বনাম গুলজার রহমান ৫৬ DLR (AD) ১৭। ধারা ১৩৮ একটি চেক ডিজঅনার হওয়া কেবল হস্তান্তরযোগ্য দলিল আইন-এর ধারা ১৩৮ এর অধীনেই নয়, বরং পেনাল কোড-এর ধারা ৪২০ এর অধীনেও একটি অপরাধ হতে পারে। ধারা ১৩৮ এর অধীনে শাস্তিযোগ্য অপরাধ গঠনের জন্য প্রতারণার প্রাথমিক অভিপ্রায় প্রমাণিত হওয়া প্রয়োজন নেই। তবে পেনাল কোড-এর ধারা ৪২০ এর অধীন শাস্তিযোগ্য অপরাধের জন্য এটি অত্যাবশ্যক। আপিল বিভাগ রায় দিয়েছেন যে চেক ডিজঅনার হওয়া কেবল হস্তান্তরযোগ্য দলিল আইন-এর ধারা ১৩৮ এর অধীনে নয়, বরং পেনাল কোড-এর ধারা ৪২০ এর অধীনেও একটি অপরাধ হতে পারে। ধারা ১৩৮ এর অধীনে শাস্তিযোগ্য অপরাধ গঠনের জন্য প্রতারণার প্রাথমিক অভিপ্রায় প্রমাণিত হওয়া প্রয়োজন নেই। তবে পেনাল কোড-এর ধারা ৪২০ এর অধীন শাস্তিযোগ্য অপরাধের জন্য এটি অত্যাবশ্যক। পেনাল কোড-এর ধারা ৪২০ এর অধীনে অপরাধের জন্য নিম্নলিখিত মৌলিক উপাদানগুলি থাকতে হবে: (ক) প্রতারণার মাধ্যমে কোনো ব্যক্তিকে প্রতারণামূলক বা অসাধু প্ররোচনা দিতে হবে; (খ) প্ররোচিত ব্যক্তিকে কোনো সম্পত্তি অন্য কোনো ব্যক্তিকে প্রদান করার জন্য বা কোনো ব্যক্তি যেন কোনো সম্পত্তি ধরে রাখে, তার সম্মতি প্রদানের জন্যইচ্ছাকৃতভাবে প্ররোচিত করতে হবে; অথবা (গ) প্ররোচিত ব্যক্তিকে এমন কিছু করতে হবে যা তিনি প্রতারিত না হলে করতেন না বা বাদ দিতেন না; এবং (ঘ) দফা (ক) এর দ্বিতীয় অংশ দ্বারা উল্লেখ করা ক্ষেত্রে, সেই কাজ বা বাদ দেওয়াটি এমন কিছু হওয়া উচিত যা প্ররোচিত ব্যক্তির শরীর, মন বা সম্পত্তির ক্ষতি বা ক্ষতির কারণ হয়ে দাঁড়ায় বা হওয়ার সম্ভাবনা থাকে। প্রতারণার অপরাধের জন্য অবশ্যই অসাধু বা প্রতারণামূলক মিথ্যা উপস্থাপনা থাকতে হবে, অর্থাৎ প্রতারণা এবং প্রতারিত ব্যক্তিকে সম্পত্তি থেকে বিচ্ছিন্ন করার জন্য প্ররোচিত করা প্রমাণিত হতে হবে। মোঃ মতলেব হোসেন বনাম আব্দুল হক লিমন এবং অন্যজন: (ফৌজদারি) ১১ ALR (AD) ১০৫-১১০ ধারা ১৩৮- হাইকোর্ট বিভাগ ফৌজদারি কার্যবিধির ধারা ৫৬১এ এর অধীনে তার অন্তর্নিহিত ক্ষমতা প্রয়োগ করে কোনো পক্ষকে, বিশেষ করে অভিযুক্তকে, ফৌজদারি কার্যক্রম বাতিলের জন্য জারি করা রুল খারিজ করার সময় খরচ প্রদান করতে পারেন কিনা। আপিল বিভাগ সিদ্ধান্তে উল্লেখ করেছেন যে, ফৌজদারি মামলায় অভিযুক্ত বা তথ্য প্রদানকারী/অভিযোগকারী যেই হোক না কেন, হাইকোর্ট বিভাগ বা কোনো ফৌজদারি আদালতকে খরচ প্রদানের ক্ষমতা প্রদান করার মতো কোনো বিধান নেই। খন্দকার লতিফুর রহমান বনাম রাষ্ট্র, জেলা প্রশাসক, চট্টগ্রাম এবং অন্য এক ব্যক্তি কর্তৃক প্রতিনিধিত্ব করা (ফৌজদারি) ১২ ALR (AD) ৬-১১ ধারা ১৩৮- যেহেতু চেকে উল্লেখিত সম্পূর্ণ অর্থ জমা দেওয়া হয়েছে, আপিল বিভাগ আবেদনকারীর সাজা কমানোর বিষয়ে মনোস্থির করেছেন। সেই অনুযায়ী, এই রিভিউ পিটিশন নিষ্পত্তি করা হলো এবং ফৌজদারি পিটিশন ফর লিভ টু আপিল নং ৫৫৪/২০১৭ তে ১৮.০১.২০১৮ তারিখে প্রদত্ত রায় এবং আদেশ বাতিল করা হলো। আপিল বিভাগ রায় দিয়েছেন যে, আবেদনকারী আপিল করার সময় ট্রায়াল কোর্টে চেকে উল্লেখিত ৫০% অর্থ জমা দিয়েছিলেন এবং তিনি ২০.০২.২০১৮ তারিখে চালান নং ১৪৬ এর মাধ্যমে চেকের বাকি ৭,০০,০০০/- টাকা জমা দিয়েছেন। সরকারী ট্রেজারিতে ৫০,০০০/- টাকা জমা দেওয়ার জরিমানা মওকুফ করা হলো। যেহেতু চেকে উল্লেখিত সম্পূর্ণ অর্থ জমা দেওয়া হয়েছে, আপিল বিভাগ আবেদনকারীর সাজা কমানোর বিষয়ে মনোস্থির করেছেন। সেই অনুযায়ী, এই রিভিউ পিটিশন নিষ্পত্তি করা হলো এবং ফৌজদারি পিটিশন ফর লিভ টু আপিল নং ৫৫৪/২০১৭ তে ১৮.০১.২০১৮ তারিখে প্রদত্ত রায় এবং আদেশ বাতিল করা হলো। হাইকোর্ট বিভাগ-এর ০৮.১১.২০১৫ তারিখের রায় এবং আদেশ সংশোধন করা হলো এবং আবেদনকারীর উপর আরোপিত কারাদণ্ডের মেয়াদ কমিয়ে ইতোমধ্যে জেল হেফাজতে কাটানো সময়ের সাথে মিলিয়ে দেওয়া হলো। আব্দুল জলিল বনাম রাষ্ট্র এবং অন্যান্য। (ফৌজদারি) ১৩ ALR (AD) ১৭৫-১৭৬ ধারা ১৩৮- ১৮৮১ সালের হস্তান্তরযোগ্য দলিল আইন অনুযায়ী ধারা ১৩৮ এর অধীনে পি.ডব্লিউ.১ এর সাক্ষ্য গ্রহণের পর, আসামি পি.ডব্লিউ.১-কে পুনরায় জেরার জন্য রিকলের প্রার্থনা করেন। এই তথ্যগুলি প্রমাণ করে যে প্রতিপক্ষ বিলম্বকারী কৌশল গ্রহণ করেছে। আপিল বিভাগ পর্যবেক্ষণ করেছেন যে বিচারিক আদালত ১৩-০৩-২০১৪ তারিখে পি.ডব্লিউ.১ এর জেরা সম্পন্ন করেছেন এবং এরপরে মামলাটি ফৌজদারি কার্যবিধির ধারা ৩৪২ এর অধীনে আসামির পরীক্ষার জন্য নির্ধারিত হয়েছিল। এই তথ্যগুলি প্রমাণ করে যে প্রতিপক্ষ বিলম্বকারী কৌশল গ্রহণ করেছে। হাইকোর্ট বিভাগ বিচারিক মনোভাব প্রয়োগ করেননি মামলার স্থগিতাদেশ দেওয়ার ক্ষেত্রে। রুল ইরক্ষণীয় নয়। সুতরাং, রুলটি বাতিল করা হলো। বিচারিক আদালতকে আদেশ প্রাপ্তির তারিখ থেকে ১ (এক) মাসের মধ্যে বিচার সম্পন্ন করার নির্দেশ দেওয়া হলো। বরাক রিয়েল এস্টেট (প্রাঃ) লিঃ বনাম মিঃ আরিফুর রহমান এবং অন্যজন (ফৌজদারি) ৮ ALR (AD) ১৫৩-১৫৪< ধারা ১৩৮(ক) এবং ১৪১(খ) তৎসহ জেনারেল ক্লজেজ অ্যাক্ট, ধারা ৯-এ, এটি কি চেক ইস্যুর তারিখ থেকে ছয় মাসের মধ্যে যেমন ধারা ১৩৮(১) এর প্রোভাইসোর দফা (ক) তে নির্ধারিত, নাকি চেক অপরিশোধিত অবস্থায় ব্যাংক থেকে তথ্য প্রাপ্তির ত্রিশ দিনের মধ্যে? আপিল বিভাগ রায় দিয়েছেন যে, চেক নগদায়নের ইস্যুর দিনে বা ইস্যুর তারিখ থেকে ছয় মাসের মধ্যে দাখিল করার বিষয়ে প্রাপককে স্বাধীনতা দেওয়া হয়েছে। ধারা ১৩৮-এর অধীনে একটি মামলার পূর্বশর্তগুলির মধ্যে একটি হল, চেকের প্রাপক বা চেকের যথাযথ হোল্ডারকে চেকের ড্রয়ারকে লিখিতভাবে একটি ডিমান্ড নোটিশ দিতে হবে। ধারা ১৩৮(১) এর দফা (খ) এই ধরনের নোটিশ দেওয়ার জন্য সময়সীমা নির্ধারণ করেছে, যেখানে বলা হয়েছে যে এই নোটিশটি ব্যাংক থেকে চেক অপরিশোধিত অবস্থায় ফেরত আসার বিষয়ে তথ্য পাওয়ার ত্রিশ দিনের মধ্যে দিতে হবে। মোঃ মতলেব হোসেন বনাম আব্দুল হক লিমন ও অন্য আরেকজন: (ফৌজদারি) ১১ এএলআর (এডি) ১০৫-১১০ ধারা ১৩৮(ক) এবং ১৪১(খ) - একটি চেক তার বৈধতার সময়কালের মধ্যে যেকোনো সংখ্যকবার ব্যাংকে উপস্থাপন করা যেতে পারে। আপিল বিভাগ রায় দিয়েছেন যে, ধারা ১৩৮(১) এর প্রোভাইসো-এর দফা (ক) চেকের প্রাপককে চেক ডিজঅনার হওয়ার পরে তার বৈধতার সময়ের মধ্যে একাধিকবার উপস্থাপনের উপর কোনো বাধা প্রদান করে না। প্রাপকের ইচ্ছানুযায়ী তিনি পরবর্তী পদক্ষেপ গ্রহণ করতে পারেন অথবা ড্রয়ার এর সাথে চেকের অর্থ প্রদানের জন্য আলোচনা করতে পারেন। যদি ড্রয়ার তাকে আশ্বাস দেয় যে পরবর্তী মাসে চেকটি উপস্থাপন করতে, তাহলে তিনি অপেক্ষা করতে পারেন যতক্ষণ না ড্রয়ার অর্থ প্রদানের ব্যবস্থা করেন। তিনি চেকটি বারবার ড্রয়ার এর অনুরোধে উপস্থাপন করতে পারেন যতক্ষণ না চেক ইস্যু তারিখ থেকে ছয় মাস অতিবাহিত হয় বা এর বৈধতার সময়সীমা শেষ হয়। ড্রয়ার এর আশ্বাসে চেকটি বারবার ডিজঅনার হলে দণ্ডবিধির অধীনে ইচ্ছাকৃত প্ররোচনা ও প্রতারণার শাস্তিযোগ্য অপরাধের জন্য একটি পৃথক নালিশের কারণ তৈরি হবে, যা ধারা ১৩৮(১) এর অধীনে শাস্তিযোগ্য অপরাধের জন্য নয়। ধারা ১৩৮(১) এর অধীনে শাস্তিযোগ্য অপরাধের জন্য নালিশের কারণ শুরু হবে যদি ড্রয়ার ধারা ১৩৮(১) এর প্রোভাইসো-এর দফা (খ) অনুযায়ী নোটিশ প্রাপ্তির ত্রিশ দিনের মধ্যে অর্থ প্রদান করতে ব্যর্থ হয়। এবং প্রাপককে এই নালিশের কারণ শুরু হওয়ার এক মাসের মধ্যে ফৌজদারি মামলা দায়ের করতে হবে। মোঃ মতালেব হোসেন বনাম আব্দুল হক লিমন ও আরেকজন: (ফৌজদারি) ১১ এএলআর (এডি) ১০৫-১১০ ধারা ১৩৮ এবং ১৪১ তৎসহ ফৌজদারি কার্যবিধির ধারা ৪১৭-এটি উল্লেখযোগ্য যে ধারা ১৩৮ এর উপ-ধারা (১) এর প্রোভাইসোর দফা (খ) এবং (গ) তে, উভয় ক্ষেত্রে 'ত্রিশ দিন' সময়সীমা উল্লেখ করা হয়েছে, তবে ধারা ১৩৮(১) এর দফা (খ) তে এক মাসের সময়সীমা উল্লেখ করা হয়েছে যা উল্লেখযোগ্য। প্রথম ক্ষেত্রে সময়সীমা দিন হিসাবে গণনা করা উচিত এবং দ্বিতীয় ক্ষেত্রে এক মাসের সময়সীমা ক্যালেন্ডার অনুযায়ী গণনা করা হবে। ধারা ১৩৮ এবং ১৪১ ফৌজদারি কার্যবিধির ধারা ৪১৭ এর মতো একটি বিশেষ আইন এবং ফৌজদারি কার্যবিধির অন্যান্য বিধানগুলি সাধারণ আইন। মোঃ মতালেব হোসেন বনাম আব্দুল হক লিমন এবং অন্যজন: (ফৌজদারি) ১১ এএলআর (এডি) ১০৫-১১০ ধারা ১৩৮, ১৪০ এবং ধারা ১৪১-ধারা ১৪১ (খ) চেকের সুবিধাভোগীর যেকোনো সংখ্যক পরবর্তী উপস্থাপনার ক্ষেত্রে চেক ডিজঅনারের ফলে মামলার মূল অধিকার কেড়ে নিতে পারে না। অনুরূপভাবে, প্রতিটি ডিজঅনারের ফলে আইন এর ধারা ১৩৮ (১) এর প্রোভাইসো (খ) অনুসারে নোটিশ প্রদান এবং পেমেন্টের দাবি করার সমান অধিকার সৃষ্টি হবে, যা ব্যর্থ হলে চেকের ধারক আইন অনুসারে ধারা ১৪১ (ক) এর অধীনে লিখিত অভিযোগ দায়ের করার অধিকার লাভ করবে- ধারা ১৩৮(১) এবং ধারা ১৪১(খ)- আইন, ১৮৮১-এর ধারা ১৩৮ এবং ১৪০ হল আইনগত মৌলিক বিধান, যা অপরাধের বিশদ বিবরণ প্রদান করে, কখন অপরাধ সংঘটিত হয় এবং কে দায়ী হয়; আইন, ১৮৮১-এর ধারা ১৪১ অনুসরণীয় পদ্ধতির বর্ণনা করে। দ্বিতীয় এবং পরবর্তী উপস্থাপনা অবশ্যই চেক ইস্যুর তারিখ থেকে ছয় মাসের মধ্যে হতে হবে, যাতে চেকের ড্রয়ারকে ফৌজদারি মামলায় অভিযুক্ত করা যায় ধারা ১৩৮ এর অধীনে। চেকটি পুনরায় উপস্থাপনের পর, যদি এটি পুনরায় ডিজঅনার হয়, তবে চেকের সুবিধাভোগীর কাছে ধারা ১৩৮(১) এর অধীনে ব্যবস্থা নেওয়ার আরেকটি সুযোগ থাকবে, এবং পুনরায়, ধারা ১৪১ এর বিধান অনুসারে, সুবিধাভোগী চেকের ডিজঅনারের বিরুদ্ধে অভিযোগ দায়ের করতে বাধ্য থাকবে, যা ধারা ১৩৮ (১) এর প্রোভাইসো (গ) অনুসারে সৃষ্ট কজ অব অ্যাকশন থেকে এক মাসের মধ্যে করতে হবে। চেক প্রদানের জন্য উপস্থাপন করার সময় প্রতিবার ডিজঅনার হলে অপরাধ সংঘটিত হয়। ধারা ১৪১ (খ) এর প্রদত্ত প্রক্রিয়াগত সীমাবদ্ধতা চেকের সুবিধাভোগীর যেকোনো সংখ্যক পরবর্তী উপস্থাপনার ডিজঅনারের ফলে মামলার অধিকার কেড়ে নিতে পারে না। অনুরূপভাবে, প্রতিটি ডিজঅনারের ফলে ধারা ১৩৮ (১) এর প্রোভাইসো (খ) অনুসারে নোটিশ প্রদান এবং পেমেন্টের দাবি করার সমান অধিকার সৃষ্টি হবে, যা ব্যর্থ হলে চেকের ধারক আইন অনুসারে ধারা ১৪১ (ক) এর অধীনে লিখিত অভিযোগ দায়ের করার অধিকার লাভ করবে। এটি সম্পূর্ণরূপে চেকের ধারকের উপর নির্ভর করবে যে, তিনি চেকের যেকোনো নির্দিষ্ট ডিজঅনারের ক্ষেত্রে প্রক্রিয়া শুরু করবেন কিনা। ...নিজামউদ্দিন মাহমুদ হোসেন বনাম রাষ্ট্র, (ফৌজদারি), ২০১৯ (২) [৭ এলএম (এডি) ২৫৯] ধারা ১৩৮-যখন প্রতিশ্রুত অর্থ অন্যান্য সম্পূরক ঘটনা বা অন্য কোনো প্রতিশ্রুতি পূরণের উপর নির্ভর করবে এবং যদি সেই ভিত্তিতে কোনো চেক ইস্যু করা হয়, কিন্তু সেই প্রতিশ্রুতি পূরণ না হয়, তাহলে চেকদাতার কোনো বাধ্যবাধকতা সৃষ্টি হবে না। এরূপ ক্ষেত্রে প্রতিকার প্রদান বা প্রতারণার অভিযোগ চেকদাতার বিরুদ্ধে আরোপ করা যাবে না - হাইকোর্ট ডিভিশন, মৌখিক ও লিখিত সাক্ষ্যগুলির বিস্তারিত বিবেচনার পরে, এই সিদ্ধান্তে উপনীত হয়েছেন যে, বাদী প্রতিপক্ষের সম্পত্তি বিক্রয়ের জন্য কোনো পদক্ষেপ গ্রহণে ব্যর্থ হয়েছে, বরং প্রতিপক্ষ এবং তার ভাই ও বোন উক্ত সম্পত্তি মার্কিন যুক্তরাষ্ট্রের দূতাবাসে বিক্রি করেছে এবং বাদী সেই বিষয়ে প্রতিপক্ষকে কোনোভাবে সহায়তা করেনি। বাদী তার জেরার প্রশ্নে বলেছে, "শর্তে উল্লেখ আছে বাজার মূল্যে ক্রেতা আনিতে পারিলে আমি (বাদী) কমিশন পাব।" কিন্তু নালিশী পিটিশনে বা সাক্ষ্যে এমন কোনো দাবি করা হয়নি যে, বাদী বাজার মূল্যের কোনো ক্রেতা এনেছিলেন। উপরিউক্ত সাক্ষ্য থেকে স্পষ্ট হয় যে, যেসব শর্তে চেকগুলি ইস্যু করা হয়েছিল, বাদী আপিলকারী পূরণ করেননি। ফলে, প্রতিপক্ষ ব্যাংককে বিতর্কিত চেকগুলো নগদায়ন না করার নির্দেশ দেন। ফলস্বরূপ, ব্যাংক চেকগুলি এই নোটের সাথে ফেরত দেয়, “চেকদাতা কর্তৃক পেমেন্ট বন্ধ করা হয়েছে।” যেখানে প্রতিশ্রুত অর্থ অন্যান্য সম্পূরক ঘটনা বা অন্য কোনো প্রতিশ্রুতি পূরণের উপর নির্ভর করবে এবং যদি সেই ভিত্তিতে কোনো চেক ইস্যু করা হয়, কিন্তু সেই প্রতিশ্রুতি পূরণ না হয়, তাহলে চেকদাতার কোনো বাধ্যবাধকতা সৃষ্টি হবে না বা চেকধারক যে অধিকার দাবি করতে পারেন এমন কোনো অধিকারও সৃষ্টি হবে না। এরূপ ক্ষেত্রে প্রতিকার প্রদান বা প্রতারণার অভিযোগ প্রতিপক্ষের বিরুদ্ধে আরোপ করা যাবে না। ফলে, অভিযুক্ত প্রতিপক্ষের বিরুদ্ধে আইনটির ধারা ১৩৮ এর অধীনে শাস্তিযোগ্য অপরাধ সংঘটিত করার প্রশ্নই ওঠে না। সকল আপিল বাতিল করা হলো। ...আবুল কাহের শাহিন (মো.) বনাম ইমরান রশিদ, (ফৌজদারি), ২০২০ [৯ এলএম (এডি) ৩৩৮] ধারা ১৩৮ তৎসহ অর্থঋণ আদালত আইন, ২০০৩ ধারা ৬ - দেওয়ানী এবং ফৌজদারি মামলা আইনের সাথে সঙ্গতি রেখে চলবে—হাইকোর্ট বিভাগের চূড়ান্ত সিদ্ধান্ত এই বিভাগের একাধিক সিদ্ধান্তের সাথে সাংঘর্ষিক, যেখানে স্পষ্টভাবে বলা হয়েছে যে, দেওয়ানী মামলা বিচারাধীন থাকা ফৌজদারি মামলার কার্যক্রমে বাধা হবে না এবং এর বিপরীতও প্রযোজ্য। এ প্রসঙ্গে মনজুর আলম (মোঃ) বনাম রাষ্ট্র, ৫৫ ডিএলআর (এডি) ৬২, এবং এসএবি সোলায়মান আলী বনাম র্যাংস ইন্ডাস্ট্রিজ লিমিটেড, ২০০৪ ১ল’গার্ডিয়ান (এডি) ২০ মামলা উল্লেখ করা যেতে পারে। আমরা রায় দিতে বাধ্য হচ্ছি যে হাইকোর্ট ডিভিশনের তর্কিত রায় এবং আদেশগুলি স্পষ্টতই ত্রুটিপূর্ণ এবং বাতিল করা হলো। সেই অনুযায়ী, ফৌজদারি আপিলের জন্য লিভ পিটিশনগুলি আইন অনুযায়ী দেওয়ানী এবং ফৌজদারি মামলাগুলি পরিচালনার নির্দেশসহ নিষ্পত্তি করা হলো। ...ইস্টার্ন ব্যাংক লিমিটেড বনাম সিরাজউদ্দৌলা (মো.), (ফৌজদারি), ২০২০ [৯ এলএম (এডি) ৫৬৬] ধারা ১৩৮, ১৪১(খ) এবং ফৌজদারি কার্যবিধি, ১৮৯৮-ধারা ৫৬১এ-আপিলকারীর যুক্তি হলো যে, অভিযোগকারীর নিজের মামলার ভিত্তিতে আপিলকারীকে ৪-১-৯৬ থেকে অর্থ প্রদানের জন্য নোটিশ প্রদান করা উচিত এবং সেই তারিখ থেকে ১৫ দিন অতিবাহিত হওয়ার পর অর্থাৎ উক্ত সময়ের মধ্যে অর্থ প্রদান না করার কারণে ১৯-১-৯৬ থেকে কারণ উদ্ভূত হওয়া উচিত এবং ধারা ১৪১(খ) অনুযায়ী উক্ত তারিখ (১৯-১-৯৬) থেকে এক মাসের মধ্যে অভিযোগ দাখিল করা আবশ্যক ছিল। স্বীকৃত মতে নালিশী দরখাস্ত সেই তারিখের অনেক পরে দাখিল করা হয়েছিল, অর্থাৎ ১৮-৪-৯৬ তারিখে এবং এর ফলে এমন অভিযোগের উপর আমল গ্রহণ করা যায়নি। দুর্ভাগ্যবশত, হাইকোর্ট বিভাগ এর নিকট উপস্থাপিত এ সহজ বিষয়ের গুরুত্ব অনুধাবন করতে ব্যর্থ হয়েছেন এবং ভুলভাবে সারসংক্ষেপে বাতিলের আবেদনটি খারিজ করেছেন। এই কারণগুলির জন্য এই আপিলটি গ্রহণ করা হলো এবং তর্কিত কার্যক্রমটি বাতিল করা হলো। .....এসএম আনোয়ার হোসেন বনাম মো. শফিউল আলম (চাঁদ), (ফৌজদারি), ২০২২(১) [১২ এলএম (এডি) ৬১৭] ধারা ১৩৮-এর বিপরীতে আপিল বিভাগ পুনর্ব্যক্ত করেছেন যে, কোনো চেক যদি ব্যাংকে দুইবার বা আরও অনেকবার উপস্থাপন করা হয়, চেকটি ইস্যু হওয়ার তারিখ থেকে ছয় মাসের মধ্যে, তবে হস্তান্তরযোগ্য দলিল আইনের ধারা ১৩৮ অনুযায়ী বিচারিক কার্যক্রমের জন্য সময় গণনা করা উচিত সেই সময় থেকে যখন চেকটি সর্বশেষ ফিরিয়ে দেওয়া হয়। .....নিজামউদ্দিন মাহমুদ বনাম আব্দুল হামিদ ভূঁইয়া, (ফৌজদারি), ২০২২(১) [১২ এলএম (এডি) ৬৫৫] ধারা ১৩৮-অভিযুক্ত ব্যক্তির নিকট নোটিশ প্রাপ্তির তারিখ প্রকাশ না করা এবং নালিশী দরখাস্তে কোনো আইনগত কজ অব অ্যাকশন উল্লেখ করতে ব্যর্থ হওয়ার কারণে কার্যক্রম চালিয়ে যাওয়া সম্ভব নয় এবং এর ফলে এটি বাতিলের যোগ্য। বিষয়টির ঘটনা ও পরিস্থিতি এবং আইনের পরিপ্রেক্ষিতে আপিল বিভাগ রেসপন্ডেন্টের পক্ষে করা উপস্থাপনায় যথেষ্ট যৌক্তিকতা খুঁজে পেয়েছেন। অভিযুক্তের নিকট নোটিশ প্রাপ্তির তারিখ প্রকাশ না করা এবং নালিশী দরখাস্তে কোনো আইনগত কজ অব অ্যাকশন উল্লেখ করতে ব্যর্থ হওয়ার কারণে, এই বিভাগ মনে করেন যে কার্যক্রম চালিয়ে যাওয়া সম্ভব নয় এবং এর ফলে এটি বাতিলের যোগ্য। উপরোক্ত আলোচনার পরিপ্রেক্ষিতে, কার্যক্রম বাতিলের বিষয়ে হাইকোর্ট বিভাগের চূড়ান্ত আদেশটিকে টেকসই বলে মনে করা হয়েছে। .....নিজামউদ্দিন মাহমুদ বনাম আব্দুল হামিদ ভূঁইয়া, (ফৌজদারি), ২০২২(১) [১২ এলএম (এডি) ৬৫৫] ধারা ১৩৮ এবং ফৌজদারি কার্যবিধি, ১৮৯৮-ধারা ৫৬১এ-যখন অভিযোগকারী উল্লেখ করেন যে তিনি চেক ফেরতের তথ্য প্রাপ্তির ১৫ দিনের মধ্যে একটি আইনি নোটিশ প্রদান করেছেন, তখন নালিশী দরখাস্তে নোটিশ প্রেরণের তারিখ উল্লেখ না করা বিচারকার্যক্রম বাতিল করার জন্য একটি কারণ হতে পারে না। আপিল বিভাগ মনে করেন যে হাইকোর্ট বিভাগ প্রথমেই তার এখতিয়ার প্রয়োগ করার সময় ফৌজদারি কার্যবিধি, ১৮৯৮ এর ধারা ৫৬১এ এর অধীনে বিচারকার্যক্রমে হস্তক্ষেপ করার ক্ষমতা রাখেন না। এই বিভাগ ধারাবাহিকভাবে রায় দেওয়া হয়েছে যে যখন অভিযোগকারী উল্লেখ করেন যে তিনি চেক ফেরতের তথ্য প্রাপ্তির ১৫ দিনের মধ্যে একটি আইনি নোটিশ প্রদান করেছেন, তখন নালিশী দরখাস্তে নোটিশ প্রেরণের তারিখ উল্লেখ না করা বিচারকার্যক্রম বাতিল করার জন্য একটি কারণ হতে পারে না। এই প্রেক্ষিতে, ৫৩ ডিএলআর (এডি) ১১১ এ রিপোর্ট করা হাবিবুর রহমান হাওলাদার বনাম রাষ্ট্র এবং অন্য একটি মামলার সিদ্ধান্তের উল্লেখও করা যেতে পারে। এই বিভাগ মনে করেন যে হাইকোর্ট বিভাগের তর্কিত রায় এবং আদেশ আইন অনুযায়ী টিকে থাকতে পারে না। সুতরাং, এই বিভাগ আপিলের ক্ষেত্রে যুক্তি খুঁজে পেয়েছেন। এর ফলে, এখন ঢাকা মহানগর ম্যাজিস্ট্রেট আদালতে বিচারাধীন সিআর মামলা নং ৩৭৮৩/২০০৪, যা হস্তান্তরযোগ্য দলিল আইন, ১৮৮১ এর ধারা ১৩৮ এর অধীনে চলমান রয়েছে, তা আইন অনুযায়ী চলবে। .....আলহাজ গোলাম রসুল বেলাল বনাম হাবিবুল্লাহ শাকির, (ফৌজদারি), ২০২২(১) [১২ এলএম (এডি) ৬৭২] ধারা ১৩৮, ১৪১(গ)- আইনি নোটিশ সময়মতো জারি করা হয়েছে এবং নালিশী মামলাও সময়মতো শুরু করা হয়েছে, তাই হাইকোর্ট বিভাগ কর্তৃক রুল খারিজের বিষয়ে প্রদত্ত রায় এবং আদেশে আমরা কোনো অবৈধতা খুঁজে পাই না—অভিযুক্ত পিটিশনার কর্তৃক ইস্যুকৃত চেকের ডিজঅনার হওয়া এবং ব্যাংক কর্তৃক "Not arranged for and refer to the drawer" এন্ডোর্সমেন্ট সহ চেক ডিজঅনারের পর আইনি নোটিশ জারির সত্যতা এবং বিতর্কিত চেক ডিজঅনার হওয়া ও চেক ডিজঅনারের বিরুদ্ধে অর্থপ্রদানের দাবির জবাব না দেওয়ার ফলে আপিল বিভাগ অভিযোগকৃত অপরাধের প্রমাণ পেয়েছেন এবং যেহেতু হাইকোর্ট বিভাগ পর্যবেক্ষণ করেছেন যে অভিযুক্ত ব্যক্তিরা অর্থ প্রদান এড়িয়ে যাচ্ছিলেন এবং আইনি নোটিশ সময়মতো জারি করা হয়েছে এবং নালিশী মামলাও সময়মতো শুরু করা হয়েছে, তাই এই বিভাগ হাইকোর্ট বিভাগের রায় এবং আদেশে কোনো অবৈধতা খুঁজে পান না। হাইকোর্ট বিভাগ সংশ্লিষ্ট বিষয়ে বিস্তারিত আলোচনা করে আইন অনুযায়ী তার সিদ্ধান্তে পৌঁছেছেন এবং এক্ষেত্রে কোনো হস্তক্ষেপ প্রয়োজন নেই। .....জয়নুল করিম বনাম রাষ্ট্র, (ফৌজদারি), ২০২২(১) [১২ এলএম (এডি) ৬৮৬] ধারা ১৩৮-অভিযোগকারী অভিযুক্ত-প্রতিবাদী নং ১ এর বিরুদ্ধে নালিশী পিটিশনে উত্থাপিত মামলা সন্দেহাতীতভাবে প্রমাণ করতে ব্যর্থ হয়েছেন যে অভিযোগটি দায়ের করা হয়েছিল শুধুমাত্র প্রতিবাদী নং ১-কে হয়রানি করার উদ্দেশ্যে। বিজ্ঞ জেলা জজ, বাগেরহাট হস্তান্তরযোগ্য দলিল আইন, ১৮৮১ এর ধারা ১৩৮ অনুযায়ী আপিলকারী-প্রতিবাদী নং ১-কে দোষী সাব্যস্ত করে তাকে ৬ (ছয়) মাসের বিনাশ্রম কারাদণ্ড এবং ১০,০০,০০০/- (দশ লক্ষ) টাকা জরিমানা, অনাদায়ে আরও ১ (এক) মাসের বিনাশ্রম কারাদণ্ড প্রদান করেন। উপরে বর্ণিত হাইকোর্ট বিভাগের তর্কিত রায় এবং আদেশের বিরুদ্ধে অসন্তুষ্ট এবং ক্ষুব্ধ হয়ে, অভিযোগকারী লিভ পিটিশনার হিসেবে এই বিভাগের সামনে আপিল করার জন্য একটি ফৌজদারি পিটিশন দায়ের করেন। স্বীকৃত মতে, আসামি-প্রতিবাদী নং ১ কে অভিযোগকারী-লিভ পিটিশনারের পুত্রের সাথে বিবাহ দেওয়া হয়েছিল এবং যখনই প্রতিবাদী নং ১ তার স্বামীকে তালাক দেন, তখনই তার বিরুদ্ধে নালিশী দরখাস্ত দায়ের করা হয়। রেকর্ড পরীক্ষা করে আপিল বিভাগ পুরোপুরি সন্তুষ্ট যে, অভিযোগকারী-লিভ পিটিশনারের পুত্রকে তালাক দেওয়ার জন্যই প্রতিবাদী নং ১ কে হয়রানি করার উদ্দেশ্যে নালিশী দরখাস্ত দায়ের করা হয়েছিল। এই ফৌজদারি পিটিশনে কোনো ভিত্তি পাওয়া যায়নি। সুতরাং, এই ফৌজদারি পিটিশনটি বাতিল করা হলো। ...শেখ ওয়াহিদুজ্জামান দীপু বনাম তানিমা আফরিন কুমকুম, (ফৌজদারি), ২০২১(২) [১১ এলএম (এডি) ৩১২] ধারা-১৩৮- অপর্যাপ্ত তহবিলের কারণে ডিজঅনার- আমরাও এটা মেনে নিতে কঠিন মনে করি যে, যদি আবেদনকারী অভিযোগকারীর পাওনা অর্থ ২০১১ সালে পরিশোধ করে থাকেন, যেমনটি তিনি দাবি করেন, তবে তিনি পূর্বেই ইস্যুকৃত চেকের স্টপ পেমেন্ট করতে কোনো পদক্ষেপ গ্রহণ করেননি, বিশেষত যখন তিনি নিজেই উল্লেখ করেছেন যে অভিযোগকারী তাকে বলেছিলেন যে চেকটি হারিয়ে গেছে। এটি বিবেচনায় রেখে যে যে কেউ সেই চেকটি নগদ করতে চেষ্টা করতে পারে। ২৪.৭.২০১১ তারিখে, যখন আবেদনকারী পে অর্ডারের মাধ্যমে ১০ লক্ষ টাকা পরিশোধ করেছিলেন, তখন থেকে ১৮.০৯.২০১২ তারিখে অভিযোগ দায়ের হওয়ার পর পর্যন্ত, আবেদনকারী চেকটি ফেরত নিতে বা চেকের অর্থ প্রদান বন্ধ করতে কিছুই করেননি। তিনি তার জেরায় স্বীকার করেছেন যে তিনি চেক ফেরত না দেওয়ার বিষয়ে কোনো সাধারণ ডায়েরি (জিডি) দাখিল করেননি। তাছাড়া, আমরা আবেদনকারীর (ডি.ডব্লিউ.১) জবানবন্দি থেকে পাই যে তিনি জেরায় স্বীকার করেছেন যে অভিযোগকারী এবং তার স্ত্রী কর্তৃক জমি বিক্রির বিষয়ে এবং ২০১১ সালে অর্থ প্রদান সম্পর্কিত অন্যান্য লেনদেনের বিষয়ে অভিযোগকারীর সাথে তার মধ্যে লেনদেন হয়েছে। .....এম.এ. আজম চৌধুরী বনাম এ.বি.এম. আসাদুজ্জামান ও অন্য, (ফৌজদারি), ২০১৬-[১ এলএম (এডি) ৫৯১] ধারা ১৩৮-অভিযুক্ত পিটিশনার অভিযোগকারী আর্থিক প্রতিষ্ঠানের অনুকূলে ৬০টি পোস্টডেটেড চেক ইস্যু করেছিলেন। হস্তান্তরযোগ্য দলিল আইনের ধারা ১৩৮ অনুযায়ী, পিটিশনারের বিরুদ্ধে একটি প্রাথমিক মামলা গঠিত হয়েছে। হাইকোর্ট বিভাগ রায় দিয়েছেন যে, ঋণের অর্থ আদায়ের জন্য ইস্যুকৃত চেক নগদায়নের জন্য উপস্থাপনে কোনো বাধা না থাকায়, এই কার্যক্রম বাতিলযোগ্য নয়। ...এহেতাসামুল হক বনাম রাষ্ট্র, (ফৌজদারি), ২০১৭ (২) [৩ এলএম (এডি) ৫৫২] ধারা ১৩৮-একটি বিশেষ আইন হওয়ায় হস্তান্তরযোগ্য দলিল আইনের ধারা ১৩৮ এর অধীনে অপরাধ আপসযোগ্য নয়। তবে, বিজ্ঞ অ্যাডভোকেট অন রেকর্ড এর দ্বারা প্রদত্ত উপস্থাপনাগুলির পরিপ্রেক্ষিতে আমরা মনে করি যে, ন্যায়বিচারের প্রয়োজন যথাযথভাবে পূরণ হবে যদি আবেদনকারীর সাজা কারাগারে ইতিমধ্যে ভোগ করা সময় পর্যন্ত কমানো হয় এবং জরিমানার সাজা বাতিল করা হয়। আমরা লক্ষ্য করি যে, অভিযোগকারী আমাদের সামনে উপস্থিত হয়ে বলেছেন যে তিনি তার অর্থ সম্পূর্ণরূপে পেয়েছেন। ফৌজদারি লিভ টু আপিল আবেদনটি খারিজ করা হলো। হস্তান্তরযোগ্য দলিল আইনের ধারা ১৩৮ এর অধীনে আবেদনকারীর দণ্ড উল্লেখিত সংশোধনের সাথে নিশ্চিত করা হলো। ...ইদ্রিস চৌকদার (মোঃ) বনাম রাষ্ট্র, (ফৌজদারি), ২০১৭ (২) [৩ এলএম (এডি) ৫৬০] ধারা ১৩৮-আদালতকে প্রদত্ত ক্ষমতা ঐচ্ছিক—ধারা ১৩৮(১) বিচারিক আদালতকে সর্বোচ্চ এক বছর পর্যন্ত কারাদণ্ড, অথবা চেকের পরিমাণের তিনগুণ পর্যন্ত জরিমানা বা উভয় দণ্ডে দণ্ডিত করার ক্ষমতা প্রদান করে। আদালতকে প্রদত্ত ক্ষমতা ঐচ্ছিক। ধারায় ব্যবহৃত ভাষা এমন নয় যে আদালতকে অবশ্যই চেকের পরিমাণের তিনগুণ জরিমানা আরোপ করতে হবে। আইনপ্রণেতারা বিষয়টি বিচারিক আদালতের বিবেচনার উপর ছেড়ে দিয়েছেন। ...শাহিদুর রহমান খাদেম বনাম রাষ্ট্র, (ফৌজদারি), ২০১৭ (২) [৩ এলএম (এডি) ৬০০] ধারা ১৩৮ এবং ১৪০-যদি কোনো মামলা শুধুমাত্র একটি কোম্পানির বিরুদ্ধে দায়ের করা হয়, যেখানে কোম্পানির কার্যক্রম পরিচালনার জন্য দায়ী ব্যক্তিদের বাদ দেওয়া হয়, তবে এটি বিচার ও শাস্তির জন্য গ্রহণযোগ্য হতে পারে। ধারা ১৩৮ এবং ১৪০ এর মধ্যে পার্থক্য হলো ধারা ১৩৮ এর ক্ষেত্রে অপরাধটি মানুষের দ্বারা সংঘটিত হয়, অর্থাৎ, প্রকৃত ব্যক্তির দ্বারা এবং ধারা ১৪০ এর ক্ষেত্রে যদিও “ব্যক্তি” শব্দটি ব্যবহৃত হয়েছে, এটি একটি কোম্পানির মাধ্যমে সন্নিবেশিত হয়েছে, যা “যেকোনো কর্পোরেট সংস্থা এবং এর মধ্যে একটি ফার্ম বা অন্যান্য ব্যক্তি সংঘ অন্তর্ভুক্ত” যা একটি আইনগত ব্যক্তি হতে পারে বা নাও হতে পারে। এটি ধারা ১৩৮ এর অধীনে অপরাধের জন্য বিচারযোগ্য। আমরা মনে করি, ধারা ১৪০ অনুযায়ী, মামলাগুলির যথাযথ ও কার্যকর বিচারিক প্রক্রিয়ার জন্য, অভিযোগকারী (রা) / ড্রাইয়ার (রা) মামলায় কোম্পানিকে একজন অভিযুক্ত হিসাবে যুক্ত করতে পারেন, তবে কোম্পানিকে অন্তর্ভুক্ত না করার জন্য মামলাটি ব্যর্থ হবে না। ...মোহাম্মদ ইউসুফ বাবু বনাম জন প্রভাঞ্জন চৌধুরী, (ফৌজদারি), ২০১৭ (২) [৩ এলএম (এডি) ৫৬২] ধারা ১৩৮-বিচারিক আদালত কর্তৃক প্রদত্ত দণ্ডাদেশ আইন অনুযায়ী সঠিক ছিল, কারণ অভিযোগকারী সাক্ষ্য প্রদান করে প্রমাণ করতে সক্ষম হয়েছেন যে তাকে দেওয়া ৭,০০,০০০.০০ টাকার একটি চেক যথাযথভাবে উপস্থাপিত হওয়ার পর ডিজঅনার হয়েছিল এবং নালিশী দরখাস্ত দায়েরের আগে তিনি হস্তান্তরযোগ্য দলিল আইনের ১৩৮ ধারায় উল্লেখিত পদ্ধতিগত প্রয়োজনীয়তা মেনে চলেছেন। সুতরাং, এই লিভ পিটিশনটি খারিজ করা হয়েছে যেহেতু এটি খারিজ হতে বাধ্য। পিটিশনার আসলে অভিযোগকারীকে সমস্ত অর্থ প্রদান করেছেন। অভিযোগকারী স্বীকার করেছেন যে তিনি অভিযুক্ত পিটিশনার থেকে চেকের পুরো অর্থ পেয়েছেন এবং তার বিরুদ্ধে আর কোনো দাবি নেই। যেহেতু লিভ পিটিশনার চেকের পুরো অর্থ পরিশোধ করেছেন, তাই তাকে আরও কোনো অর্থ প্রদানে অব্যাহতি দেওয়া হয়েছে এবং তিনি ইতিমধ্যে ৩ মাস কারাভোগ করেছেন, তাই তাকে আর কারাগারে ফিরে যেতে হবে না এবং কারাদণ্ডের শাস্তি সংশোধন করে ইতিমধ্যে কারাভোগকৃত সময় হিসাবে বিবেচনা করা হলো। ...বিপ্লব (মো.) বনাম রাষ্ট্র, (ফৌজদারি), ২০১৮ (১) [৪ এলএম (এডি) ৩৬৪] ধারা ১৩৮-জরিমানার অর্থ পাওনাদারের কাছে পরিশোধ করতে হবে- নালিশী পিটিশন দায়ের করা হয়েছে একজন ক্ষতিগ্রস্ত ব্যক্তির দ্বারা, অর্থাৎ পাওনাদার, ‘রাষ্ট্রের’ দ্বারা নয়; যদিও আইন, ১৮৮১ এর অধীনে মামলার ক্ষেত্রে রাষ্ট্র ‘প্রয়োজনীয়’ পক্ষ নয়, তবে ‘উপযুক্ত’ পক্ষ হতে পারে; চেকটি পাওনাদারের স্বত্ব এবং আর্থিক স্বার্থকে বহন করে এবং আইন অনুযায়ী পাওনাদারের কাছে জরিমানা আদায়ের বিধান রয়েছে, ধারা ১৩৮ এর উপ-ধারা (২) অনুসারে; ২০০৬ সালের (০৯.০২.২০০৬) আইনের সংশোধনীর মাধ্যমে, ধারা ১৩৮এ অন্তর্ভুক্ত করা হয়েছে, যা চেক ডিজঅনার হওয়া অর্থের কমপক্ষে ৫০% পরিমাণ ট্রায়াল কোর্টে জমা দেওয়ার বিধান করেছে, আপিল করার পূর্বশর্ত হিসাবে; অন্য কোনো আইনের অধীনে দোষী সাব্যস্ত ব্যক্তির জন্য আপিল করার জন্য কোনো অনুরূপ বিধান নেই; স্পষ্টতই, আইন, ১৮৮১ একটি কল্যাণমূলক আইন এবং অন্যান্য দণ্ড আইন থেকে ভিন্ন; সুতরাং, যথাযথ ক্ষেত্রে, আইন, ১৮৮১ এর অধীনে মামলায় ব্যয় প্রদান করা যেতে পারে। ...খোন্দকার লতিফুর রহমান বনাম রাষ্ট্র, (ফৌজদারি), ২০১৮ (১) [৪ এলএম (এডি) ৩৮৩] ধারা ১৩৮-এই আপিল এবং পিটিশনে দুটি প্রশ্ন জড়িত। প্রথম প্রশ্ন হলো, যদি কোম্পানি আইন অনুসারে নিবন্ধিত কোনো কোম্পানি, হস্তান্তরযোগ্য দলিল আইন, ১৮৮১-এর ধারা ১৩৮-এর অধীনে শাস্তিযোগ্য অপরাধ করে, তবে সেই অপরাধের জন্য কোম্পানির কোনো পরিচালক, ব্যবস্থাপক, সচিব বা অন্য কোনো কর্মকর্তা অভিযুক্ত হতে পারে কিনা এবং দ্বিতীয়ত, যদি একই ড্রয়ার একাধিক চেক ইস্যু করেন তাহলে একাধিক চেকের জন্য একটি মামলায় বিচার করা যেতে পারে কিনা। ...মোহাম্মদ ইউসুফ বাবু বনাম জোহান প্রভাঞ্জন চৌধুরী, (ফৌজদারি), ২০১৮ (২) [৫ এলএম (এডি) ২৫১] ধারা ১৩৮-চেক ডিজঅনার- যদি তামাদির সময়সীমার মধ্যে নোটিশ প্রদান করে চেক ডিজঅনারের ঘটনা সম্পর্কে অবহিত করা হয় এবং চেকগুলির সংশ্লিষ্ট অর্থ ৩০ দিনের মধ্যে পরিশোধের অনুরোধ করা হয়, তাহলে চেকের ড্রয়ারের বিরুদ্ধে একটি একক মামলা দায়ের করার জন্য কোনো আইনগত বাধা নেই। ...মোহাম্মদ ইউসুফ বাবু বনাম জোহান প্রভোঞ্জন চৌধুরী, (ফৌজদারি), ২০১৮ (২) [৫ এলএম (এডি) ২৫১] ধারা ১৩৮-জেরা করার সুযোগ এবং প্রতিরক্ষা সাক্ষী পরীক্ষা করার স্বাধীনতা— হাইকোর্ট বিভাগ যথার্থভাবে মতামত দিয়েছে যে, অভিযুক্তকে পিডব্লিউ ১-কে জেরা করার সুযোগ দেওয়া উচিত এবং ২/৩ তারিখ নির্ধারণ করা উচিত যেহেতু মেট্রোপলিটন অতিরিক্ত সেশন জজ ইতিমধ্যে ফৌজদারি কার্যবিধির ধারা ৩৪২ অনুযায়ী অভিযুক্তের পরীক্ষা করার জন্য সংশ্লিষ্ট মামলাগুলি নির্ধারণ করেছেন, এবং সে অনুযায়ী আমরা এটিকে সমর্থন করি। আমরা আরও যোগ করছি যে, সংশ্লিষ্ট আবেদনকারীদেরও ফৌজদারি কার্যবিধির ধারা ৩৪২ অনুযায়ী পরীক্ষা করার পরে, যদি তারা ইচ্ছা করে, প্রতিরক্ষা সাক্ষীদের পরীক্ষা করার স্বাধীনতা থাকবে। বিচারিক আদালতকে যত দ্রুত সম্ভব, কিন্তু এই রায়ের কপি প্রাপ্তির তারিখ থেকে ২ (দুই) মাসের মধ্যে বিচারিক কার্যক্রম শেষ করার নির্দেশ দেওয়া হলো। ...মাজাদ হোসেন বনাম রাষ্ট্র, (ফৌজদারি), ২০১৮ (২) [৫ এলএম (এডি) ৩১৮] ধারা ১৩৮, ১৪০ এবং ফৌজদারি কার্যবিধি - ধারা ৫৬১এ-বিচারের সময় সাক্ষ্য প্রমাণ মূল্যায়নের পর যে বিতর্কিত ঘটনাগত বিষয়গুলো নির্ধারণ করা উচিত—ফৌজদারি কার্যবিধির ধারা ৫৬১এ-এর অধীনে আবেদন নিষ্পত্তির ক্ষেত্রে হাইকোর্ট বিভাগকে কোনো বিতর্কিত ঘটনাগত প্রশ্ন নির্ধারণ করার প্রয়োজন নেই, বরং কেবল দেখতে হবে এফ.আই.আর বা নালিশী দরখাস্তের গল্পে ফৌজদারি অপরাধ প্রকাশিত হয় কিনা। অতএব, হাইকোর্ট বিভাগ কার্যক্রম খারিজ করে দিয়ে তার বিশেষ এখতিয়ার অতিক্রম করেছেন। সে অনুসারে, হাইকোর্ট বিভাগের রায় বাতিল করা হলো। ...আশফাক হোসেন বনাম রাষ্ট্র, (ফৌজদারি), ২০২১(১) [১০ এলএম (এডি) ৫১৫] ধারা ১৩৮, ১৪০ এবং সাক্ষ্য আইন, ১৮৭২-ধারা ১০২-সাক্ষ্য আইন, ১৮৭২-এর ধারা ১০২ অনুযায়ী, প্রতিপক্ষের উপর প্রমাণের দায়িত্ব রয়েছে যে, যদিও তিনি কোম্পানির পরিচালক ছিলেন, তবুও অপরাধটি তার অজান্তে সংঘটিত হয়েছে বা তিনি কোম্পানির একজন অ-নির্বাহী পরিচালক ছিলেন এবং তিনি কোম্পানির দৈনন্দিন কার্যক্রমে জড়িত ছিলেন না ইত্যাদি। প্রতিপক্ষ নং ১, পরিচালক, এর নির্দোষিতা আদালতে সাক্ষ্যপ্রমাণ প্রদানের মাধ্যমে প্রমাণ করতে হবে এবং এইভাবে পরিচালক, প্রতিপক্ষ নং ১-কে বিচারের মুখোমুখি হতে হবে। কেবল বিচারকালে সাক্ষ্যগ্রহণের পর যদি দেখা যায় যে পরিচালক, প্রতিপক্ষ নং ১, চেক ইস্যুর প্রাসঙ্গিক সময়ে কোম্পানির কার্যক্রমের জন্য দায়িত্বপ্রাপ্ত ব্যক্তি ছিলেন না, কেবল তখনই তিনি অভিযোগ থেকে মুক্তি পেতে পারেন। ...ফিনিক্স ফাইন্যান্স অ্যান্ড ইনভেস্টমেন্ট লিমিটেড বনাম ইয়াসমিন আহমেদ, (ফৌজদারি), ২০২১(১) [১০ এলএম (এডি) ৫২২] ধারা ১৩৮-ধারা ১৩৮ এর অধীনে কোনো ব্যক্তিকে দায়বদ্ধ করতে, ব্যাংক থেকে অপরিশোধিত চেক ফেরতের বিষয়ে অবগতির ১৫ দিনের মধ্যে ধারা ১৩৮-এর প্রোভাইসোর দফা (খ) অনুসারে চেকের প্রাপককে চেকদাতাকে লিখিত নোটিশ প্রদান করতে হবে। চেকদাতা উক্ত নোটিশ পাওয়ার ১৫ দিনের মধ্যে অর্থ প্রদান করতে বাধ্য, অন্যথায় ধারা ১৩৮(গ) এর অধীনে মামলা দায়েরের কারণ উদ্ভূত হবে। [অনুচ্ছেদ-৭]এস.এম. আনোয়ার হোসেন বনাম মো. শফিউল আলম ও অন্যান্য: ৭ বিএলটি (এডি)-২১৮ ধারা ১৩৮ এবং ১৪১ তৎসহ ফৌজদারি কার্যবিধি, ১৮৯৮-ধারা—৫৬১এ - উল্লেখিত চেকটি আপিলকারী কর্তৃক ২১.১২.১৯৯৫ তারিখে ইস্যু করা হয়েছিল, যা ২৩.১২.১৯৯৫ তারিখে নগদায়নের জন্য উপস্থাপন করা হয়েছিল, কিন্তু একই দিনে এটি ডিজঅনার করা হয়, যেখানে অভিযোগকারী ২৪.১২.১৯৯৫ তারিখে আপিলকারীকে অর্থপ্রদানের জন্য নোটিশ জারি করেন, যা ধারা ১৩৮-এর প্রোভাইসোর দফা (খ) অনুযায়ী চেকটি ইস্যু করা হয়েছিল। উক্ত নোটিশ প্রাপ্তির পর, আপিলকারী প্রতারণামূলকভাবে অর্থ প্রদান এড়াতে ৪.১.১৯৯৬ তারিখে একজন আইনজীবীর মাধ্যমে অভিযোগকারীকে জানায় যে তিনি অভিযোগকারীর নামে লেখা চেকটি হারিয়ে ফেলেছেন এবং এই বিষয়ে একটি জিডি এন্ট্রি করেছেন। ধারা ১৩৮-এর প্রাভাইসোর দফা (গ)-এর অধীনে অভিযোগের জন্য কারণ উদ্ভূত হবে তখনই যখন আপিলকারী অভিযোগকারীর নোটিশ প্রাপ্তির ১৫ দিনের মধ্যে অর্থ প্রদান করতে ব্যর্থ হন। অভিযোগকারীর নিজের মামলার উপর নির্ভর করে আপিলকারীর পক্ষে যুক্তি দেওয়া হয় যে, অভিযুক্ত-আপিলকারীকে ন্যূনতম ৪.১.১৯৯৬ তারিখ থেকে অর্থপ্রদানের জন্য নোটিশ প্রদান করা উচিত এবং সেই তারিখ থেকে ১৫ দিন অতিবাহিত হওয়ার পর, অর্থাৎ ১৯.১.১৯৯৬ তারিখ থেকে, উল্লেখিত সময়সীমার মধ্যে অর্থ প্রদান না করার কারণে অভিযোগের কারণ উদ্ভূত হওয়া উচিত এবং ধারা ১৪১-এর দফা (খ) অনুযায়ী ১৯.১.১৯৯৬ তারিখ থেকে এক মাসের মধ্যে অভিযোগ দাখিল করা আবশ্যক ছিল। স্বীকৃত মতে, নালিশী দরখাস্ত উক্ত তারিখের অনেক পরে, অর্থাৎ ১৮.৪.১৯৯৬ তারিখে দাখিল করা হয়েছিল, এবং এর ফলে এমন অভিযোগের উপর আমল গ্রহণ করা যায়নি। পরবর্তী অভিযোগগুলো তামাদি রক্ষা করবে না কারণ আইনের অধীনে প্রয়োজনীয়তা হলো যে, অভিযোগটি ধারা ১৩৮-এর প্রোভাইসোর দফা (গ) অনুযায়ী কারণ উদ্ভূত হওয়ার তারিখ থেকে এক মাসের মধ্যে দাখিল করতে হবে এবং এর ফলে তর্কিত কার্যক্রম বাতিল করা হলো। এস.এম. আনোয়ার হোসেন বনাম মো. শফিকুল আলম (চাঁদ) ও অন্য একজন, ১৯ বিএলডি (এডি) ১৬৬ ধারা ১৩৮ এবং ১৪১-হস্তান্তরযোগ্য দলিল আইনের ধারা ১৩৮-এর প্রোভাইসোর দফা (গ) অনুযায়ী, অভিযোগকারীর নোটিশ প্রাপ্তির ১৫ দিনের মধ্যে আপিলকারী দ্বারা অর্থ পরিশোধে ব্যর্থ হওয়ার কারণে মামলা করার জন্য কারণ উদ্ভূত হবে। বর্তমান মামলায়, কজ অব অ্যাকশন ১৯-১-৯৬ তারিখে উদ্ভূত হয়েছিল এবং ১৯-১-৯৬ তারিখ থেকে এক মাসের মধ্যে নালিশী দরখাস্ত দাখিল করা আবশ্যক ছিল, যা ধারা ১৪১-এর দফা (খ) অনুসারে করা হয়নি। এই কারণে এমন অভিযোগের উপর অপরাধের আমল গ্রহণ করা সম্ভব নয় এবং তর্কিত কার্যক্রমটি বাতিল করা হলো। এসএম আনোয়ার হোসেন বনাম শফিউল আলম (চাঁদ) ও অন্য আরেকজন ৪ বিএলসি (এডি) ১০৬। ধারা ১৩৮(১) (খ)- উক্ত আইনের ধারা ১৩৮(১) (খ) অনুযায়ী নোটিশটি দাবির নোটিশ ছিল কিনা তা একটি বিতর্কিত ঘটনাগত প্রশ্ন, যা হাইকোর্ট বিভাগ ফৌজদারি কার্যবিধির ধারা ৫৬১এ-এর অধীনে এখতিয়ার প্রয়োগের সময় সিদ্ধান্ত নিতে পারেন না। রাশেদুল আলম চৌধুরী বনাম এএসএম শাহাজাহান ১৭ বিএলসি (এডি) ৩৯। ধারা ১৩৮-অভিযোগকারী চেক ফেরতের তথ্য পাওয়ার ১৫ দিনের মধ্যে একটি আইনগত নোটিশ প্রদান করেছেন। সুতরাং, আইনের ধারা ১৩৮-এর অধীনে কার্যক্রম বাতিল করার জন্য কোনো বৈধ কারণ নেই। হাবিবুর রহমান হাওলাদার বনাম রাষ্ট্র ৫৩ ডিএলআর (এডি) ১১১। ধারা ১৩৮ এবং ১৪১-পরবর্তী অভিযোগ মামলার তামাদি বাঁচাবে না। আইনের অধীনে প্রয়োজন হলো, অর্থ প্রদান না করার বিরুদ্ধে অভিযোগ দায়ের করতে হবে যেদিন কজ অব অ্যাকশন উদ্ভূত হয় সেই তারিখ থেকে এক মাসের মধ্যে। হাইকোর্ট বিভাগ ভুলভাবে বাতিলের জন্য আবেদনটি খারিজ করেছেন। এসএম আনোয়ার হোসেন বনাম মো. শফিউল আলম (চাঁদ) এবং অন্য একজন ৫১ ডিএলআর (এডি) ২১৬। ধারা ১৩৮-অ্যাটর্নির মাধ্যমে অভিযোগ দাখিলে কোন অবৈধতা সংঘটিত হয়নি। অভিযোগকারী যখন জেলহাজতে ছিলেন, তখন তামাদি এড়াতে তার অ্যাটর্নির মাধ্যমে সংশ্লিষ্ট ম্যাজিস্ট্রেট আদালতে অভিযোগ দাখিল করেন এবং এর পক্ষে সন্তোষজনক ব্যাখ্যা প্রদান করা হয়েছে। অতএব, আপিল বিভাগ এই প্রভাবশালী পরিস্থিতিকে উপেক্ষা করতে পারেন না যেখানে অভিযোগটি অ্যাটর্নির মাধ্যমে দাখিল করা হয়েছে। বর্তমান মামলায়, ‘চেকের যথাযথ ধারক’ নিজেই অভিযোগকারী এবং মামলাটি অ্যাটর্নির মাধ্যমে আদালতে উপস্থাপিত হয়। এই বিভাগে কোনো দ্বিধা নেই যে অ্যাটর্নির মাধ্যমে অভিযোগ দাখিল করার ক্ষেত্রে কোনো অবৈধতা সংঘটিত হয়নি এবং বিজ্ঞ ম্যাজিস্ট্রেট আইন প্রয়োগের সাথে সাথে যথাযথভাবে অভিযুক্ত পিটিশনারের বিরুদ্ধে মামলাটি আমলে গ্রহণ করেছেন। ...কবির রেজা বনাম শাহ মোহাম্মদ আশরাফ ইসলাম, (ফৌজদারি), ২০২৩(২) [১৫ এলএম (এডি) ২৬৫] ধারা ১৩৮ এবং ১৪১ ফৌজদারি কার্যবিধির ধারা ২০০ অনুসারে যথাযথ পরীক্ষার পর অ্যাটর্নি কর্তৃক দাখিলকৃত নালিশী দরখাস্তের উপর আমল গ্রহণ করা "সম্পূর্ণ বৈধ এবং যথাযথ"। হাশিবুল বাশার বনাম গুইজার রহমান এবং অন্য একজন ৫৬ ডিএলআর (এডি) ১৭। ধারা ১৩৮(১) (খ) (গ), ১৪১-এটি কোনো অপরাধ গঠন করে না বা কথিত অপরাধ সংঘটিত হয়েছে বলে মনে করা হবে না এবং এই কারণে আদালতের কার্যক্রম চালিয়ে যাওয়া প্রকাশ্যে অন্যায় হবে এবং প্রকৃতপক্ষে এটি কার্যধারার অপব্যবহার হবে, সুতরাং কার্যক্রমটি বাতিলযোগ্য। নিজামউদ্দিন মাহমুদ বনাম আব্দুল হামিদ ভূঁইয়া (আমিরুল কবির চৌধুরী জে) (ফৌজদারি) ২ এডিসি ৭৯৩। ধারা ১৩৮-ফৌজদারি কার্যবিধির ধারা ৫৬১এ অনুযায়ী একটি ফৌজদারি কার্যক্রম বাতিল করা যেতে পারে যদি তা কোনো মামলা প্রকাশ না করে বা এটি স্পষ্ট ভাবে প্রতীয়মান হয় যে উক্ত কার্যক্রম প্রতিষ্ঠা বা অব্যাহত রাখার ক্ষেত্রে কোনো আইনি বাধা রয়েছে বা উপস্থাপিত সাক্ষ্যের ভিত্তিতে ঘটনা অপরাধ প্রকাশ করে কিনা তা নির্ধারণ করা যেতে পারে। আব্দুল আজিজ বনাম খাজা আব্দুল গনি (কে.এম. হাসান সি.জে) (ফৌজদারি) জে এডিসি ২৩। ধারা ১৩৮, ১৪১ -আমরা এই অভিমত পোষণ করছি যে, যদিও আপিলকারী চারটি তারিখে চেক উপস্থাপন করেছিলেন, কিন্তু চেকটি সর্বশেষ ২৬.১০.২০০০ তারিখে ডিজঅনার হওয়ার পর, তিনি ০৬.১১.২০০০ তারিখে প্রয়োজনীয় নোটিশ প্রদান করেন, যা আইনগত সময়সীমার মধ্যে এবং এই কারণে ১১.১২.২০০০০ তারিখে দায়েরকৃত বর্তমান অভিযোগকে অবৈধ হিসেবে গণ্য করা যায় না। মুনশি মো. রাশেদ কামাল বনাম আবদুস সালাম (আমিরুল কবির চৌধুরী জে) (ফৌজদারি) ২ এডিসি ৭৯৮। ধারা ১৩৮, ১৪১(খ) -ফৌজদারি কার্যবিধির ধারা ২৪১এ-এর অধীনে তাকে অব্যাহতি দেওয়ার জন্য আবেদন করেছিলেন, কিন্তু বিজ্ঞ ম্যাজিস্ট্রেট আবেদনটি নামঞ্জুর করেন। এরপর অভিযুক্ত ধারা ৫৬১এ-এর অধীনে ফৌজদারি মিসকেস নং ৫৫১৮/২০০১ দাখিল করেন এবং কার্যক্রম বাতিল করার জন্য প্রার্থনা করেন। হাইকোর্ট বিভাগ ২৫.০৬.২০০২ তারিখের রায় এবং আদেশ দ্বারা রুলটি চূড়ান্তভাবে কার্যক্রম বাতিল করেন। নিজামউদ্দিন মাহমুদ বনাম আব্দুল হামিদ ভূঁইয়া (মো. আব্দুল মতিন জে) (ফৌজদারি) ৫ এডিসি ৮৯১। ধারা ১৩৮ যদিও আপিলকারী চারটি তারিখে চেকটি উপস্থাপন করেছিলেন, তবে চেকটি সর্বশেষ ২৬.১০.২০০০ তারিখে ডিজঅনার হওয়ার পর, তিনি ০৬.১১.২০০০০ তারিখে প্রয়োজনীয় নোটিশ প্রদান করেছিলেন, যা আইনি সীমার মধ্যে ছিল এবং ১১.১২.২০০০০ তারিখে বর্তমান অভিযোগ দাখিলকে বেআইনি হিসেবে গণ্য করা যায় না। এটি স্পষ্ট যে, হাইকোর্ট বিভাগ আইনের একটি ত্রুটিপূর্ণ ব্যাখ্যার ভিত্তিতে ভিন্নমত গ্রহণ করেছিলেন এবং কার্যক্রম বাতিল করেছিলেন। তর্কিত রায়টি আইনগতভাবে ত্রুটিপূর্ণ এবং তাই টেকসই নয়। মুনশী মো. রাশেদ কামাল বনাম আব্দুস সালাম ও অন্য একজন (আমিরুল কবির চৌধুরী জে) (ফৌজদারি) ৪ এডিসি ৩৫৭। ধারা ১৩৮-আইনের ধারা ১৩৮(১) (খ) এবং (গ)-এর প্রয়োজনীয়তা পালনে ব্যর্থতার কারণে কোনো অপরাধ গঠিত হয়নি বা অপরাধ সংঘটিত হয়েছে বলে গণ্য করা হয়নি, এবং এই কারণে কার্যক্রমটি যথাযথভাবে বাতিল করা হয়েছে। নিজামউদ্দিন মাহমুদ বনাম আব্দুল হামিদ ভূঁইয়া ও অন্য একজন (আমিরুল কবীর চৌধুরী জে) (ফৌজদারি) ৪ এডিসি ৪৪৬। ধারা ১৩৮ এবং ১৪০ তৎসহ ফৌজদারি কার্যবিধি- ধারা ৪৩৫, ৪২৬(২এ) এবং ৫৬১এ-ফৌজদারি কার্যবিধির অধীনে ধারা ৪২৬(২এ) অনুযায়ী দাখিলকৃত জামিন আবেদন খারিজের আদেশের বিরুদ্ধে রিভিশনাল আবেদন পছন্দ করার জন্য নির্দিষ্ট বিধান রয়েছে। আপিল বিভাগের মতামত হলো, ফৌজদারি কার্যবিধির ধারা ৪২৬ এবং ৪৩৫-এ দণ্ডিত ব্যক্তির জামিনের জন্য নির্দিষ্ট বিধান রয়েছে এবং যদি দণ্ডিত ব্যক্তির দ্বারা ফৌজদারি কার্যবিধির ধারা ৪২৬(২এ) অনুযায়ী দাখিলকৃত জামিন আবেদন খারিজ করা হয়, তাহলে ধারা ৪৩৫-এর অধীনে "রিভিশনাল জুরিসডিকশন"-এ প্রতিকার পাওয়া যায়। এটি দেখা যায় যে হাইকোর্ট বিভাগ ফৌজদারি কার্যবিধির ধারা ৫৬১এ-এর পরিসরের মূল্যায়ন না করেই এবং বিচারিক মন প্রয়োগ না করেই তর্কিত রায় ও আদেশ দ্বারা অর্ন্তনিহিত ক্ষমতা প্রয়োগের আদেশ প্রদান করার ক্ষেত্রে তার এখতিয়ার অতিক্রম করেছেন, যাতে এই বিভাগের হস্তক্ষেপ প্রয়োজন। দণ্ডিত মো. লুৎফুল হাসান জেল হেফাজতে রয়েছেন, তাই ন্যায়বিচার পূর্ণরূপে বজায় রাখতে তাকে ফৌজদারি কার্যবিধির ধারা ৪৩৫-এর অধীনে যথাযথ আদালতে তর্কিত আদেশের বিরুদ্ধে রিভিশনাল আবেদন দাখিলের সুযোগ প্রদান করা সর্বোত্তম হবে। সেই অনুযায়ী, দণ্ডিত ব্যক্তি মো. লুৎফুল হাসান তর্কিত আদেশের বিরুদ্ধে ফৌজদারি কার্যবিধির ধারা ৪৩৫-এর অধীনে রিভিশনাল আবেদন দাখিল করতে পারেন, যদি তিনি উপদেশপ্রাপ্ত হন, এবং এই রায় ও আদেশের একটি কপি প্রাপ্তির তারিখ থেকে ৩০ (ত্রিশ) দিনের মধ্যে আবেদনটি দাখিল করতে হবে।.....সাজ্জাদ হোসেন বনাম মো. লুৎফুল হাসান, (ফৌজদারি), ২০২৩(১) [১৪ এলএম (এডি) ৫৯৯] ধারা ১৩৮(১)- ধারা ১৩৮(১) একটি সমঝোতাযোগ্য ধারা নয়। যেহেতু উভয় পক্ষ বিষয়টি সৌহার্দ্যপূর্ণভাবে নিষ্পত্তি করেছে এবং অভিযোগকারী ডিজঅনার করা চেকের অর্ধেক অর্থ নগদে পেয়েছেন এবং বাকি অর্থ হাইকোর্ট বিভাগে আপিল দায়ের করে সেশন কোর্টে জমা দেওয়া হয়েছে, তাই আবেদনকারীর বিরুদ্ধে প্রদত্ত শাস্তি ভোগ করা সময়ের সমান কমিয়ে দেওয়া হলো।.....সুভাষ চন্দ্র সরকার বনাম রাষ্ট্র, (ফৌজদারি), ২০২৩(১) [১৪ এলএম (এডি) ৪৫০] ধারা ১৩৮-আইনের ধারা ১৩৮ এর অধীনে অপরাধটি আঘাত বা হত্যার মতো প্রাকৃতিক অপরাধ নয়। এটি একটি আইনগত কল্পকাহিনির মাধ্যমে আইনে সৃষ্ট একটি অপরাধ—আইনের ধারা ১৩৮ এর অধীনে অপরাধটি আঘাত বা হত্যার মতো প্রাকৃতিক অপরাধ নয়। এটি একটি আইনগত কল্পকাহিনির মাধ্যমে আইনে সৃষ্ট একটি অপরাধ। এটি একটি দেওয়ানী দায়বদ্ধতা, যা আইনের সংশোধনের মাধ্যমে সীমাবদ্ধ শর্তে একটি ফৌজদারি দায়বদ্ধতায় রূপান্তরিত হয়েছে। সংশোধনের আগে, আইনের ধারা ১৩৮-এ উল্লিখিত অপরাধমূলক কাজগুলি কেবল একটি শুদ্ধ দেওয়ানী দায়বদ্ধতা হিসেবে বিবেচিত হতো।...মোহাম্মদ আলাউদ্দিন বনাম রাষ্ট্র, (ফৌজদারি), ২০১৯ (১) [৬ এলএম (এডি) ১২৪] ধারা ১৩৮ যখন চেক পূরণ করে ব্যাংকে উপস্থাপন করা হয়, তখন চেকটি যিনি ইস্যু করেছেন তিনি ফৌজদারি দায়িত্ব এড়াতে পারবেন না। যদি চেকের ইস্যু এবং তাতে স্বাক্ষর সঠিক পাওয়া যায়, তবে আদালত কার্যক্রম চালিয়ে যাবে। প্রতারণা বা প্রতারণামূলক সংযোজনের প্রশ্নটি শুধুমাত্র বিচারিক আদালতে সাক্ষ্য গ্রহণ ও বিচার শেষে বিবেচনা করে নির্ধারণ করা যেতে পারে। যদি কোনো ফাঁকা চেক দায়বদ্ধতার জন্য বা সিকিউরিটি হিসেবে ইস্যু করা হয় এবং যদি দায়বদ্ধতা প্রমাণিত হয়, তবে চেকটি পূরণ করে ব্যাংকে উপস্থাপন করা হলে, চেকটি যিনি ইস্যু করেছেন তিনি ফৌজদারি দায়িত্ব এড়াতে পারবেন না। চেকটি 'সিকিউরিটি', 'অ্যাডভান্স' বা ‘পোস্টডেটেড' হিসেবে ইস্যু করা হয়েছে কিনা, সেই বিতর্কিত প্রকৃতির প্রশ্নটি শুধুমাত্র সাক্ষ্য গ্রহণের মাধ্যমে নির্ধারিত হতে পারে। সব আপিল এবং পিটিশন বাতিল করা হলো।...মোহাম্মদ আলাউদ্দিন বনাম রাষ্ট্র, (ফৌজদারি), ২০১৯ (১) [৬ এলএম (এডি) ১২৪] ধারা ১৩৮-বিচারিক আদালত তার রায় এবং আদেশের মাধ্যমে পিটিশনারকে এন.আই. আইনের ধারা ১৩৮ এর অধীনে দোষী সাব্যস্ত করেন এবং তাকে বিনাশ্রম কারাদণ্ড ভোগ করতে এবং জরিমানা দিতে আদেশ দেন। আপিলের পর, হাইকোর্ট বিভাগ দণ্ডাদেশ বহাল রাখেন, এদিকে পিটিশনার পুরো জরিমানার অর্থ পরিশোধ করে। আপিল বিভাগ তার দণ্ডাদেশ ইতিমধ্যে ভোগ করা সময়কালের মধ্যে সীমিত করেন। আপিল বিভাগ উল্লেখ করেছেন যে হাইকোর্ট বিভাগ পিটিশনারের এন.আই. আইন, ১৮৮১ এর ধারা ১৩৮ এর অধীনে দোষী সাব্যস্ত করার ক্ষেত্রে কোনো ভুল করেননি। এখানে চট্টগ্রাম মহানগর দায়রা জজ আদালতের আদেশ নং ১৪, তারিখ ২৯-০৪-২০১২ উদ্ধৃত করা প্রাসঙ্গিক: আদেশ নং-১৪, তাং-২৯-০৪- ১২ইং। পূর্ববর্তী আদেশ মোতাবেক জরিমানার অবশিষ্ট টাকা বিধি মোতাবেক জমা প্রদান করে আসামী পক্ষ চালানের কপি দাখিল করেছে। দেখলাম। চালানের ফটোকপি নথির সাথে সামিল রাখা হোক। স্বাঃ/এস,এম, মজিবুর রহমান মহানগর দায়রা জজ চট্টগ্রাম। আদেশটি পর্যালোচনা করে দেখা যায় যে, লিভ পিটিশনার তার উপর আরোপিত জরিমানার সম্পূর্ণ অর্থ ইতিমধ্যেই পরিশোধ করেছেন। মামলার সমস্ত দিক বিবেচনা করে, আপিল বিভাগ মনে করেন যে মামলার প্রেক্ষাপট এবং পরিস্থিতির উপর ভিত্তি করে লিভ পিটিশনারের দণ্ডাদেশ ইতিমধ্যে ভোগ করা কারাদণ্ডের সময়ের মধ্যে সীমিত করা উচিত। অতএব, এই ফৌজদারি লিভ টু আপিল আবেদন নিষ্পত্তি করা হলো এবং লিভ পিটিশনারের উপর আরোপিত দণ্ডাদেশ ইতিমধ্যে ভোগ করা সময়ের মধ্যে সীমিত করা হলো। আলিম উদ্দিন বাবু বনাম রাষ্ট্র এবং অন্য। (ফৌজদারি) ১২ এএলআর (এডি) ১৭১-১৭৩। ধারা ১৩৮ এবং ১৪১ যদি ড্রয়ারের প্রতারণার কারণে একটি চেক প্রত্যাখ্যাত হয়, তবে কি এই প্রতারণা তামাদির সময়সীমা বাড়ানোর সুযোগ দেবে বা এই প্রতারণার কারণে প্রাপক ধারা ১৩৮ এর অধীনে মামলা দায়ের করতে বাধা পাবেন? আপিল বিভাগ রায় দিয়েছেন যে ধারা ১৪১ শব্দ 'সত্ত্বেও' দিয়ে শুরু হয়েছে। এটি নিঃসন্দেহে একটি নন-অবস্টান্ট দফা এবং এইভাবে, আমলে গ্রহণের উদ্দেশ্যে ফৌজদারি কার্যবিধির বিধান প্রযোজ্য হবে না। এটি বলার সমান যে বিধানের সত্ত্বেও, পরবর্তী আইনটি তার পূর্ণ কার্যকারিতা পাবে। একটি নন-অবস্টান্ট দফা ব্যবহার করা হয় নন-অবস্টান্ট দফায় বর্ণিত আইনি বিধানের পরিধি পরিবর্তন করার জন্য বা নির্দিষ্ট পরিস্থিতিতে এটিকে অতিক্রম করার জন্য। তবে, প্রতারণার উদ্দেশ্যে ড্রয়ার দ্বারা সংঘটিত পৃথক অপরাধের জন্য এটি প্রাপককে সাধারণ ফৌজদারি আদালতে প্রতিকার চাইতে বাধা দেয় না। যদিও ধারা ১৩৮ এর অধীনে শাস্তিযোগ্য একটি ফৌজদারি অপরাধের ক্ষেত্রে বারিত হয়, তবুও ড্রয়ি বা প্রাপকের জন্য চেকে প্রদর্শিত অর্থের প্রাপ্তির প্রতিকার বারিত হবে না। ধারা ১৩৮ এর উপধারা (৩) অনুযায়ী, তিনি দেওয়ানি আদালতের মাধ্যমে উক্ত অর্থ আদায় করতে পারেন। দেওয়ানি মামলা ছাড়াও, ড্রয়ি/প্রাপক দণ্ডবিধি অনুযায়ী উল্লেখিত অপরাধ ছাড়াও অন্য অপরাধের জন্য ফৌজদারি মামলা দায়ের করতে পারেন। মো. মোতালেব হোসেন বনাম আব্দুল হক লিমন ও অন্য একজন: (ফৌজদারি) ১১ এএলআর (এডি) ১০৫-১১০ ধারা ১৩৮ -হস্তান্তরযোগ্য দলিল আইনের ধারা ১৩৮-এর বিধান অনুযায়ী, আবেদনকারীর বিরুদ্ধে প্রাথমিকভাবে একটি মামলা গঠন করা হয়েছে। যেহেতু ঋণের পরিমাণ আদায়ের জন্য ইস্যুকৃত চেকগুলি নগদায়নের জন্য ব্যাংকে উপস্থাপনের ক্ষেত্রে কোনো বাধা নেই, তাই বর্তমান কার্যক্রম বাতিলযোগ্য নয়। আপিল বিভাগ পর্যবেক্ষণ করেছেন যে, আবেদনকারী চেক ইস্যু করেছেন তা নিয়ে কোনো বিতর্ক নেই। সেই চেকগুলি ইস্যুর উদ্দেশ্য ছিল ঋণের পরিমাণ পরিশোধ করা। নিঃসন্দেহে, আবেদনকারী অভিযোগকারীর পক্ষে চেকগুলি ইস্যু করেছেন যাতে ব্যাংকে সেগুলি নগদায়নের মাধ্যমে বকেয়া আদায় করা যায়। সেই অনুযায়ী ঋণের অর্থ আদায়ের জন্য, অভিযোগকারী চেকগুলি ব্যাংকে উপস্থাপন করেছিলেন যা ব্যাংক দ্বারা প্রত্যাখ্যাত হয়েছিল। এই পরিস্থিতিতে, অভিযোগকারী আবেদনকারীকে বকেয়া অর্থ পরিশোধের সুযোগ দিতে আইনগত নোটিশ জারি করেছিলেন, কিন্তু আবেদনকারী নির্দিষ্ট সময়ের মধ্যে অর্থ পরিশোধ করতে ব্যর্থ হন। ফলে, হস্তান্তরযোগ্য দলিল আইনের ধারা ১৩৮-এর বিধান অনুযায়ী, আবেদনকারীর বিরুদ্ধে প্রাথমিকভাবে একটি মামলা গঠন করা হয়েছে। হাইকোর্ট বিভাগ রায় দিয়েছেন যে, যেহেতু ঋণের পরিমাণ আদায়ের জন্য ইস্যুকৃত চেকগুলি নগদায়নের জন্য উপস্থাপনে কোনো বাধা নেই, তাই বর্তমান কার্যক্রম বাতিলযোগ্য নয়। আপিল বিভাগ হাইকোর্ট বিভাগের রায় ও আদেশে কোনো অবৈধতা খুঁজে পাননি, যা আপিল বিভাগের হস্তক্ষেপ দাবি করে। সুতরাং, সকল আবেদন খারিজ করা হলো। এহেতাসামুল হক বনাম রাষ্ট্র ও অন্যজন (ফৌজদারি) ২০ এএলআর (এডি) ১৫৬-১৫৭ ধারা ১৩৮-চেকটি "ড্রয়ার দ্বারা পেমেন্ট বন্ধ করা হয়েছে" এই উল্লেখসহ ডিজঅনার হয়েছিল, যা স্পষ্টভাবে ধারা ১৩৮-এর অধীন শাস্তিযোগ্য অপরাধের একটি সুস্পষ্ট প্রাথমিক মামলা গঠন করে, যা অভিযুক্তের বিরুদ্ধে প্রমাণিত হয়েছে। আহমেদ লাল মিয়া বনাম রাষ্ট্র, ৬৬ ডিএলআর (এডি) ২০৪। ধারা ১৩৮-এটি সত্য যে পর্যালোচনার জন্য প্রার্থিত রায়ে, হাইকোর্ট বিভাগের সামনে উত্থাপিত বিষয়ে বিস্তারিত আলোচনা করা হয়নি যে নালিশী দরখাস্তটি আইন অনুযায়ী ধারা ১৩৮(১)-এর প্রোভাইসোর দফা (গ) এর অধীনে নির্ধারিত আইনানুগ সময়সীমা শেষ হওয়ার আগেই দায়ের করা হয়েছিল, যা আইন অনুযায়ী বাধাগ্রস্ত ছিল। এই বিভাগ হাইকোর্ট বিভাগের দেওয়া রায় ও আদেশকে অনুমোদন করেছেন, যেখানে বলা হয়েছিল যে নালিশী দরখাস্তটি ধারা ১৩৮-এর প্রোভাইসোর দফা (খ) এর অধীনে নোটিশ প্রাপ্তির তারিখ থেকে ত্রিশ দিন পূর্ণ হওয়ার আগে দায়ের করা হলেও তা আইনসম্মত ছিল, প্রকৃতপক্ষে এই বিষয়ে উত্তর দিয়েছে। সারওয়ার হোসেন মনি (মোঃ) বনাম রাষ্ট্র, ৬৬ ডিএলআর (এডি) ২৮৩। ধারা ১৩৮ যখন একটি চেক ইস্যু করা হয় এবং প্রাপককে হস্তান্তর করা হয় এবং প্রাপক সেটি তার অ্যাকাউন্টে নগদায়নের জন্য উপস্থাপন করে এবং এরপরে, যদি চেকটি তার কাছে ফেরত আসে এই মর্মে যে, অ্যাকাউন্টের ঋণের পরিমাণ চেকের পরিমাণ মেটানোর জন্য অপর্যাপ্ত বা সেটি অ্যাকাউন্টে প্রদেয় পরিমাণের চেয়ে বেশি, অথবা 'ব্যাংকের নির্দেশ অনুযায়ী পেমেন্ট বন্ধ' হওয়ার কারণে ডিজঅনার করা হয়েছে, তবে ধারা অনুযায়ী শাস্তিযোগ্য একটি অপরাধ গঠন করবে, যদি প্রাপক উপধারা (১)-এর প্রোভাইসোতে উল্লিখিত শর্তগুলো পূরণ করে। যদি চেকের ড্রয়ার একটি কোম্পানি, ফার্ম বা ব্যক্তি সমিতি হয়, তবে উক্ত কোম্পানি, ফার্ম বা ব্যক্তি সমিতিকে শর্ত পূরণের ক্ষেত্রে ধারা ১৩৮-এর অধীনে অপরাধের জন্য অভিযুক্ত করা হবে। (এস কে সিনহা, সিজে সংখ্যালঘিষ্ঠের মতামত) ইউসুফ বাবু (মোঃ) বনাম রাষ্ট্র, ৬৮ ডিএলআর (এডি) ২৯৮। ধারা ১৩৮-প্রমাণের ভার: প্রমাণের প্রাথমিক ভার দাতার উপর বর্তায়, যা এই নীতির উপর ভিত্তি করে যে, 'প্রমাণ করার দায়িত্ব তার উপর বর্তায় যে দাবি করে, তার উপর নয় যে অস্বীকার করে।' কারণ উপ-ধারা (১)-এ যে ভারের কথা উল্লেখ করা হয়েছে, তা সেই ব্যক্তির উপর বর্তায় যিনি কোম্পানির ব্যবসার দায়িত্বে ছিলেন এবং ব্যবসার জন্য দায়ী ছিলেন। এই কারণেই আইন প্রণেতারা তাকে অপরাধের জন্য সরাসরি দায়ী করেছেন। (বিচারপতি এস কে সিনহা, সিজে, সংখ্যাগরিষ্ঠ মত) মো. ইউসুফ বাবু বনাম রাষ্ট্র, ৬৮ ডিএলআর (এডি) ২৯৮। ধারা ১৩৮-চেক ডিজঅনার হওয়া নিজেই ধারা ১৩৮ এর অধীনে অপরাধ গঠন করে না। যদি চেকদাতা নোটিশ প্রাপ্তির ৩০ দিনের মধ্যে গ্রহণকারীকে এমন চেকের অর্থ প্রদান না করেন, তাহলে অপরাধ গঠনের কারণ উদ্ভূত হবে এবং যদি ওই তারিখ থেকে এক মাসের মধ্যে অভিযোগ দায়ের করা হয় যেদিন কজ অব অ্যাকশন উদ্ভূত হয়, আদালত অপরাধ আমলে গ্রহণ করবে। সুতরাং, কজ অব অ্যাকশন তখন ই উদ্ভূত হবে যদি চেকদাতা প্রাপকের কাছে অর্থ প্রদান করতে ব্যর্থ হন। এখন, যদি একই চেকদাতা নির্ধারিত সময়ের মধ্যে চেক (গুলো) এ বর্ণিত অর্থ প্রদান করতে ব্যর্থ হন, তাহলে এটি কজ অব অ্যাকশন গঠন করে কি? করে। যদি এটি কজ অব অ্যাকশন গঠন করে, তবে চেকদাতাকে কজ অব অ্যাকশন এর জন্য অভিযুক্ত করার জন্য মামলা দায়ের করতে কোনও আইনি বাধা থাকবে না। এখানে কজ অব অ্যাকশন পৃথক নয়, বরং একই। (প্রধান বিচারপতি এস কে সিনহা, সংখ্যাগরিষ্ঠ) ইউসুফ বাবু (মো) বনাম রাষ্ট্র, ৬৮ ডিএলআর (এডি) ২৯৮ ধারা ১৩৮-অভিযোগকারী/চেকের প্রাপক, যদি উপদেশপ্রাপ্ত হন, তবে তারা অভিযুক্তদের তালিকায় কোম্পানিগুলোকে যুক্ত করতে পারেন যদি তারা মনে করেন যে মামলায় কার্যকর প্রতিকার পাওয়ার জন্য কোম্পানিগুলোর উপস্থিতি প্রয়োজন। (প্রধান বিচারপতি এস কে সিনহা, সংখ্যাগরিষ্ঠ মতামত) ইউসুফ বাবু (মো.) বনাম রাষ্ট্র, ৬৮ ডিএলআর (এডি) ২৯৮। ধারা ১৩৮ এবং ১৪০- আইনের ধারা ১৩৮ এবং ১৪০ পরিচালকদেরকে মূল অপরাধী হিসেবে উল্লেখ করে না, বরং তাদেরকে অপরাধ পূর্ব সহায়ক বা প্রতিনিধিত্বমূলক দায়বদ্ধ হিসেবে বিবেচনা করা হয়। কোম্পানিই মূল অপরাধী, যেটি আসলে বাউন্স হওয়া চেক ইস্যু করার মাধ্যমে অপরাধ করেছে, এবং সেক্ষেত্রে পছন্দের প্রশ্ন প্রসঙ্গের বাইরে। (বিচারপতি এ এইচ এম শামসুদ্দিন চৌধুরী দ্বারা আলোচিত) ইউসুফ বাবু (মো.) বনাম রাষ্ট্র, ৬৮ ডিএলআর (এডি) ২৯৮। ধারা ১৩৮ এবং ১৪০-কোম্পানিকে বাদ দিয়ে মামলা রক্ষণীয় ছিল না, আমি আপিলকারীদের/লিভ পিটিশনারদের উত্থাপিত অন্যান্য বিষয়গুলি বিবেচনা করার প্রয়োজন দেখছিনা। সুতরাং, আমার সামনে যে বিষয়টি রয়েছে তা খুবই সংকীর্ণ, তবে এর ব্যাপকতা এবং পরিধি অত্যন্ত বিস্তৃত এবং ব্যাপক। ইউসুফ বাবু (মো.) বনাম রাষ্ট্র, ৬৮ ডিএলআর (এডি) ২৯৮। ধারা ১৩৮(১)- নোটিশ প্রদান-যদি কোম্পানির ব্যবস্থাপনা পরিচালক, যিনি কোম্পানির কার্যক্রমের দায়িত্বে আছেন এবং কোম্পানির পক্ষে চেকটি স্বাক্ষর করেছেন, তার উপর নোটিশ জারি করা হয়, তবে এই নোটিশ প্রদান যথেষ্ট যাতে ধারণা করা যায় যে কোম্পানি নোটিশটি পেয়েছে। এটি কোম্পানি এবং অপরাধ সংঘটনের উপর দায় চাপাবে। কারণ, ব্যবস্থাপনা পরিচালক কোম্পানির প্রধান নির্বাহী হওয়ায় তার জ্ঞানকে কোম্পানির জ্ঞান হিসেবে গণ্য করা যেতে পারে। (এস কে সিনহা, প্রধান বিচারপতি মেজরিটি) ইউসুফ বাবু (মোঃ) বনাম রাষ্ট্র, ৬৮ ডিএলআর (এডি) ২৯৮ ধারা ১৩৮(খ)(গ)- আইনসভা ধারা ১৩৮-এর প্রোভাইসোর দফা (খ) অনুযায়ী নোটিশ প্রাপ্তির ত্রিশ দিনের মেয়াদ শেষ হওয়ার আগে নালিশী দরখাস্ত দাখিলের ক্ষেত্রে কোনো চূড়ান্ত বাধা তৈরি করেননি, যেভাবে ধারা ১৩৮-এর প্রোভাইসোর দফা (গ) অনুযায়ী কজ অব অ্যাকশন উদ্ভূত হওয়ার এক মাসের মেয়াদ শেষ হওয়ার পরে নালিশী দরখাস্ত দাখিলের ক্ষেত্রে বাধা তৈরি করেছে। ত্রিশ দিনের মেয়াদ শেষ হওয়ার মুহূর্তে এবং উক্ত সময়ের মধ্যে ডিজঅনার হওয়া চেকের অর্থ প্রদান না করা হলে প্রিম্যাচিউরিটি নিরসন হবে। জাহিদুল ইসলাম (মো) বনাম মো. কামাল হোসেন, ৬৬ ডিএলআর (এডি) ১৮০। ধারা ১৩৮- চেক ডিজঅনারের ঘটনা জানিয়ে এবং সেই চেকগুলির অর্থপ্রদানের জন্য ত্রিশ দিনের মধ্যে অর্থ পরিশোধের অনুরোধসহ নোটিশ সীমিত সময়ের মধ্যে প্রদান করা হলে, চেকদাতার বিরুদ্ধে একটি মাত্র মামলা দায়ের করার ক্ষেত্রে কোনো আইনগত বাধা নেই। আপিল বিভাগ ইতিমধ্যে নির্ধারণ করেছেন যে, চেক ডিজঅনারের ঘটনা জানিয়ে এবং সেই চেকগুলির অর্থপ্রদানের জন্য ত্রিশ দিনের মধ্যে অর্থ পরিশোধের অনুরোধসহ নোটিশ সীমিত সময়ের মধ্যে প্রদান করা হলে, চেকদাতার বিরুদ্ধে একটি মাত্র মামলা দায়ের করার ক্ষেত্রে কোনো আইনগত বাধা নেই। উপরের পর্যবেক্ষণে দেখা যায়, ধারা ১৩৮-এর অধীনে একটি চেক ডিজঅনার নিজেই একটি অপরাধ সৃষ্টি করে না। যদি সেই চেকের দাতা নোটিশ প্রাপ্তির ৩০ দিনের মধ্যে গ্রহীতাকে অর্থপ্রদানে ব্যর্থ হয়, তবে অপরাধ গঠনের জন্য কারণ উদ্ভূত হবে এবং যদি সেই তারিখ থেকে এক মাসের মধ্যে অভিযোগ দাখিল করা হয়, তাহলে আদালত অপরাধ আমলে গ্রহণ করবেন। অতএব, যদি দাতা গ্রহীতাকে উপরোক্ত হিসাবে অর্থ প্রদান করতে ব্যর্থ হয়, তবে কারণ উদ্ভূত হবে। এখন, যদি একই দাতা নির্ধারিত সময়ের মধ্যে চেক(গুলি) তে উল্লেখিত অর্থ প্রদান করতে ব্যর্থ হয়, তবে তা কি কোনো কারণ উদ্ভূত করে না? এটি করে। যদি এটি কারণ উদ্ভূত করে, তবে সেই কারণের জন্য দাতার বিরুদ্ধে মামলা দায়ের করার জন্য কোনো আইনগত বাধা থাকবে না। এখানে কারণটি ভিন্ন নয় বরং একই। বিলক চাঁদ গিয়ান চাঁদ কো বনাম এ. চিন্না স্বামী, (১৯৯৯) ৫ এসসিসি ৬৯৩ মামলায় একই ধরনের ঘটনা ছিল। সেই ক্ষেত্রে, অভিযুক্ত ব্যক্তি ছয়টি চেকের ডিজঅনারের বিরুদ্ধে একটি মামলা দায়ের করার সঠিকতা চ্যালেঞ্জ করেননি। শক্তি স্পিনারস লিমিটেড দ্বারা ছয়টি চেক ইস্যু করা হয়েছিল এবং সেগুলি এর ম্যানেজিং ডিরেক্টর দ্বারা স্বাক্ষরিত হয়েছিল। চেকগুলি ডিজঅনার হয়েছিল এই মন্তব্য সহ যে 'যথেষ্ট তহবিল ছিল না এবং বিন্যাস অতিক্রম করেছে'। নোটিশ প্রাপ্তির পরে, প্রাপক একটি অভিযোগ দাখিল করে এবং পরবর্তীতে, ম্যানেজিং ডিরেক্টরের বিরুদ্ধে প্রক্রিয়া জারি করা হয়। কার্যক্রম বাতিল করার জন্য একটি আবেদন করার পরে, হাইকোর্ট কোম্পানির উপর নোটিশ প্রদান করা হয়নি এই ভিত্তিতে কার্যক্রম বাতিল করেন। সুপ্রিম কোর্ট হাইকোর্টের রায়টি বাতিল করেন এই ভিত্তিতে যে হাইকোর্ট কার্যক্রম বাতিল করতে গিয়ে ভুল করেছেন, যেহেতু ধারা ১৩৮-এর অধীনে এ. চিন্না স্বামী, যিনি চেকগুলির স্বাক্ষরকারী ছিলেন, তার উদ্দেশ্যে জারি করা নোটিশে কোনো 'ত্রুটি নেই'। সুতরাং, আপিল বিভাগ এই আপিলগুলিতে কোনো মেরিট খুঁজে পান না। আপিল বিভাগ, তবে, এই মন্তব্য করতে চান যে, অভিযোগকারী/প্রাপক, যদি প্রয়োজন মনে করেন, মামলা পরিচালনার জন্য কোম্পানিগুলিকে অভিযুক্তদের মধ্যে অন্তর্ভুক্ত করতে পারেন যদি তারা মনে করেন যে মামলাগুলিতে কার্যকরী প্রতিকার পেতে কোম্পানিগুলির উপস্থিতি প্রয়োজন। আপিল এবং পিটিশনগুলো খরচ ছাড়াই বাতিল করা হলো। মোহাম্মদ ইউসুফ বাবু এবং অন্যেরা বনাম জোহান প্রভানজন চৌধুরী (ফৌজদারি) ২৩ এএলআর (এডি) ৫৮ ধারা ১৩৮- কোম্পানি আইন অনুযায়ী নিবন্ধিত একটি কোম্পানি যদি হস্তান্তরযোগ্য দলিল আইন, ১৮৮১-এর ধারা ১৩৮-এর অধীনে শাস্তিযোগ্য অপরাধ করে, তবে সেই কোম্পানির পরিচালক, ম্যানেজার, সেক্রেটারি বা অন্য কোনো কর্মকর্তা সেই অপরাধের জন্য অভিযুক্ত হতে পারেন কিনা, এবং দ্বিতীয়ত, একই ব্যক্তির দ্বারা ইস্যুকৃত একাধিক চেক একক মামলায় বিচার করা যেতে পারে কিনা। মোহাম্মদ ইউসুফ বাবু ও অন্যান্য বনাম জোহান প্রভানজন চৌধুরী (ফৌজদারি) ২৩ এএলআর (এডি) ৫৮। ধারা ১৩৮-এটি সুপ্রতিষ্ঠিত যে নির্দিষ্ট বিষয়ের "সাধারণ বিধানের ক্ষেত্রে ক্ষতি না করে" এর বিবরণ কোনোভাবেই সেই নির্দিষ্ট বিষয়ের ক্ষেত্রে সাধারণ বিধানের প্রয়োগকে সীমাবদ্ধ করে না, কারণ "ক্ষতির বাইরে" শব্দগুলি সাধারণ বিধানের সম্পূর্ণ প্রভাব সংরক্ষণ করে এবং "ইজুসডেম জেনেরিস" বিধির কোনো সার্বজনীন প্রয়োগ নেই। এই শব্দগুলি স্পষ্টভাবে নির্দেশ করে যে, ধারা ১৩৮-এর বিধান এই আইনের অন্যান্য বিধান প্রয়োগে কোনো বাধা সৃষ্টি করে না। যখন প্রতিশ্রুত অর্থ কিছু অন্যান্য সম্পূরক ঘটনা বা অন্য কোনো প্রতিশ্রুতি পূরণের উপর নির্ভর করে এবং যদি সেই ভিত্তিতে কোনো চেক ইস্যু করা হয়, কিন্তু সেই প্রতিশ্রুতি পূরণ না হয়, তবে এটি চেক ইস্যুকারীর পক্ষে কোনো বাধ্যবাধকতা সৃষ্টি করবে না বা চেকের ধারীর পক্ষ থেকে কোনো অধিকার সৃষ্টি করবে না যা দাবি করা যেতে পারে। আপিল বিভাগ পর্যবেক্ষণ করেছেন যে, হাইকোর্ট বিভাগ ব্যাপকভাবে মৌখিক ও দলিলগত সাক্ষ্য প্রমাণ বিবেচনা করে শেষ আদালত হিসেবে এই সিদ্ধান্তে উপনীত হয়েছেন যে, অভিযোগকারী রেসপন্ডেন্ট এর সম্পত্তি বিক্রির জন্য কোনো পদক্ষেপ নেননি, বরং রেসপন্ডেন্ট এবং তার ভাই ও বোন উক্ত সম্পত্তি যুক্তরাষ্ট্র দূতাবাসে বিক্রি করেছেন এবং অভিযোগকারী সেই বিষয়ে রেসপনডেন্টকে কোনোভাবে সহায়তা করেননি। এখানে অভিযোগকারীর সাক্ষ্যের কিছু অংশ উল্লেখ করা প্রাসঙ্গিক, যা তিনি বিচারিক আদালতে পি.ডব্লিউ.১ হিসাবে প্রদান করেছিলেন, যা নিম্নরূপ: "আমি অত্র মামলার বাদী। আসামী ইমরান রশীদের সাথে ১৩/৩/১২ খ্রিঃ তারিখে রেজিঃকৃত মেমো অব এগ্রিমেন্ট যার নম্বর ১৮৯৮/১২। আসামী ডকে উপস্থিত নাই। উক্ত এগ্রিমেন্ট এর শর্তানুযায়ী আগামী ১/৭/১৩ খ্রিঃ তারিখে ১টা চেক দেয় ১ কোটি টাকা। যার নম্বর ০৫৫৯৫৭০ ইহা আমার নামীয় ব্যাংক একাউন্টে এ বিগত ১৮/৭/১৩ খ্রিঃ তারিখে জমা দেই। কিন্তু স্টপ পেমেন্ট এর কারনে ডিজঅনার হয়। ২৫/৭/১৩ খ্রিঃ তারিখে ইহা পুনরায় জমা দিলে অনুরুপভাবে ডিজঅনার হয়। উক্ত বিষয়ে আমি ১৩/৮/১৩ খ্রিঃ তারিখে আসামীর প্রতি লিগ্যাল নোটিশ প্রদান করি। কিন্তু আসামী পাওনা পরিশোধ না করার কারণে অত্র মামলা দায়ের করি। অতঃপর ১০/৯/১৩ খ্রিঃ অত্র মামলা দায়ের করি। এই নালিশ (Ext-1) আমার স্বাক্ষর (Ext-1-1) এই সেই চেক (Ext-2), এই সেই দুইটা ডিজঅনার স্লিপস (Ext-3 series), এই সেই লিগ্যাল নোটিশ উইথ পোস্টাল রিসিটস (Ext-4 series), এবং এই আমার মেমো অব এগ্রিমেন্ট (Ext-5) মূল কপি দায়রা ৩০৭৯/১৩ মামলায় দাখিল আছে।" তার মূল জবানবন্দিতে বাদী কোথাও দাবি করেননি যে, চুক্তি (প্রদর্শনী-৫) অনুযায়ী তিনি ক্রেতাকে আনার মাধ্যমে বিবাদীর সম্পত্তি বিক্রির ব্যবস্থা করেছেন এবং সেই অনুযায়ী, সম্পত্তিটি বিক্রি হয়েছে। তার জেরা করার সময়, বাদী স্বীকার করেছেন, "আমার মেমো অব আন্ডারস্ট্যান্ডিং এর ১ নং শর্তে উল্লেখ আছে ৯০ কার্যদিবসের মধ্যে 'ভালো ফলাফল নিয়ে আসতে হবে'। ২(ক) শর্তে উল্লেখ আছে বাজার মূল্যে ক্রেতা আনিতে পারিলে আমি (বাদী) কমিশন পাব।" (গুরুত্ব আরোপিত) তিনি আরও বলেছেন, "কথিত শর্তের কারণে আসামী গং $৫.২৫ মিলিয়ন ডলার এ ঐ প্লট বিক্রির প্রস্তাব দেয় মার্কিন দূতাবাসের নিকট।" তিনি আরও বলেছেন, "০৩/০৭/১৩ খ্রিঃ তারিখে বিক্রয় দলিল (হস্তান্তর দলিল) সম্পাদন ও রেজিস্ট্রি হয়। তেজগাঁও রেজিস্ট্রি অফিসে দলিল নিবন্ধন হয়। আমি সেই নিবন্ধন অফিসে উপস্থিত ছিলাম না।" অর্থাৎ আসামী রেসপনডেন্ট তাদের সম্পত্তি মার্কিন দূতাবাসে বিক্রির প্রস্তাব দিয়েছিল এবং এমন কি বিক্রয় দলিল সম্পাদন ও নিবন্ধনের সময়ও, আপিলকারী সাব-রেজিস্ট্রারের অফিসে উপস্থিত ছিলেন না। প্রদর্শনী-৫ অনুযায়ী, রেসপনডেন্টকে কমিশন প্রদান করতে বাধ্য হতে হবে শুধুমাত্র তখনই যখন আপিলকারী রেসপনডেন্ট এর সম্পত্তির বাজার মূল্য নিশ্চিত করবে, যা এই ক্ষেত্রে ঘটেনি। তার জেরা করার সময় বাদী বলেছেন, "২(ক) শর্তে উল্লেখ আছে বাজার মূল্যে ক্রেতা আনিতে পারিলে আমি (বাদী) কমিশন পাব।" নালিশী দরখাস্ত বা সাক্ষ্যে এমন কোনো দাবির উল্লেখ নেই যে বাদী কোনো ক্রেতাকে এনেছেন যিনি সম্পত্তির বাজার মূল্য প্রস্তাব করেছেন। উপরের উল্লেখিত সাক্ষ্য থেকে বোঝা যায় যে, চেকগুলি যে শর্তে ইস্যু করা হয়েছিল, বাদী আপিলকারী পূরণ করতে পারেননি। তাই, রেসপনডেন্ট ব্যাংককে চেক নগদায়ন না করার নির্দেশ দেন। সুতরাং, ব্যাংক চেকগুলি ফেরত দিয়েছিল এই মন্তব্য সহ, "ড্রয়ার দ্বারা পেমেন্ট বন্ধ করা হয়েছে"। যেখানে প্রতিশ্রুত অর্থ অন্যকিছু সহায়ক তথ্য বা অন্য কোনো প্রতিশ্রুতি পূরণের উপর নির্ভর করবে এবং যদি সেই ভিত্তিতে কোনো চেক ইস্যু করা হয়, কিন্তু সেই প্রতিশ্রুতি পূরণ না হয়, তবে এটি চেকের দাতার পক্ষ থেকে কোনো বাধ্যবাধকতা সৃষ্টি করবে না বা চেকের ধারক দ্বারা দাবি করা যেতে পারে এমন কোনো অধিকার সৃষ্টি করবে না। সুতরাং, প্রতারণা বা দুর্নীতি নির্দেশনার মাধ্যমে পেমেন্ট বন্ধ করার ক্ষেত্রে রেসপনডেন্ট এর বিরুদ্ধে আরোপিত হতে পারে না। ফলস্বরূপ, আইন অনুযায়ী চেক ডিজঅনারের শাস্তিযোগ্য অপরাধের ক্ষেত্রে আসামী রেসপনডেন্ট এর বিরুদ্ধে কোনো অভিযোগের প্রশ্নই ওঠে না। এই কারণে, আপিল বিভাগ মনে করেন যে, এই আপিলগুলি বিবেচনার যোগ্য নয়। সে অনুযায়ী, সব আপিল খারিজ করা হলো। মো. আবুল কাহের বনাম এমরান রশিদ ও আরেকজন (ফৌজদারি) ১৯ এএলআর (এডি) ৫৬-৬৪ Here is the text with the joined words corrected. The original formatting, including div and style tags, and the English case citation, has been retained as requested. ধারা ১৩৮ এবং ১৪১(১)(খ) - হস্তান্তরযোগ্য দলিল আইন, ১৮৮১-এর অধীনে ধারা ১৩৮ অনুযায়ী আসামি পিটিশনারের বিরুদ্ধে শুরু হওয়া কার্যক্রমটি হস্তান্তরযোগ্য দলিল আইন, ১৮৮১-এর ধারা ১৪১(১)(খ) দ্বারা বাধাগ্রস্ত হয়েছে কিনা, যেহেতু অভিযোগকারী পূর্বে ২৮.০৬.২০১১ তারিখে চেক ডিজঅনার হওয়ায় 'দৈনিক আজাদী' পত্রিকায় ১৪.০৭.২০১১ তারিখে আইনি নোটিশ জারি করেছিলেন কিন্তু অভিযোগকারী হস্তান্তরযোগ্য দলিল আইন, ১৮৮১-এর ধারা ১৪১(খ) অনুযায়ী নির্ধারিত সময়ের মধ্যে সঠিক প্রতিকার গ্রহণ না করে আবার ০২.১১.২০১১ তারিখে একই চেক ডিজঅনার হওয়ায় ১৭.১১.২০১১ তারিখে 'যুগান্তর' পত্রিকায় আইনি নোটিশ জারি করেন এবং ২১.১১.২০১১ তারিখে হস্তান্তরযোগ্য দলিল আইন, ১৮৮১-এর ধারা ১৩৮ অনুযায়ী দ্বিতীয় নোটিশের ভিত্তিতে মামলা দায়ের করেন, যা সময়সীমা অতিক্রম করার দীর্ঘ সময় পর। ধারা ১৪১ (খ) এ প্রদত্ত পদ্ধতিগত বিধান চেকের সুবিধাভোগীর যেকোনো পরবর্তী চেকের উপস্থাপনের সময় ডিজঅনার হলে মামলা করার মৌলিক অধিকারকে কেড়ে নিতে পারে না। তদ্রূপ, প্রতিটি ডিজঅনার আইনের ধারা ১৩৮(১) এর প্রোভাইসো (খ) অনুযায়ী নোটিশ প্রদানের অধিকার সৃষ্টি করবে এবং অর্থ দাবি করার অধিকার দেবে, যা ব্যর্থ হলে চেকের বহনকারী আইনের ধারা ১৪১ (ক) অনুযায়ী লিখিত অভিযোগ করার অধিকার পাবে। চেক বহনকারী যেকোনো নির্দিষ্ট চেক ডিজঅনারের বিষয়ে পদক্ষেপ গ্রহণ করতে পারেন, তবে মনে রাখতে হবে যে প্রতিটি ধাপ আইন দ্বারা নির্ধারিত সময়ের মধ্যে নিতে হবে। আপিল বিভাগের বিবেচিত মতামত অনুযায়ী, ধারা ১৩৮(১) এর প্রোভাইসো (গ) এবং ধারা ১৪১(খ) এর মধ্যে কোনো সংঘাত নেই। আইনের ধারা ১৩৮ এবং ১৪০ অপরাধ সংঘটনের সময় এবং কে দায়ী হবে তার বিস্তারিত তথ্য প্রদানকারী আইনসঙ্গত বিধান। ধারা ১৪১ আইন অনুযায়ী অনুসরণীয় পদ্ধতি বর্ণনা করে। আইন প্রণেতাদের ধারা ১৪১(খ) প্রণয়নের উদ্দেশ্য ছিল সময়সীমা নির্ধারণ করা যার মধ্যে চেকের ডিফল্টিং ড্রয়ার এর বিরুদ্ধে অভিযোগ করতে হবে। এই ধারা চেকের ধারককে ব্যাংকে পুনরায় চেক উপস্থাপন করার অধিকার থেকে বঞ্চিত করে না, কেবলমাত্র শর্ত যে চেকের দ্বিতীয় এবং পরবর্তী উপস্থাপনাগুলি অবশ্যই চেক ইস্যুর তারিখ থেকে ছয় মাসের মধ্যে হতে হবে যাতে আইনটির ধারা ১৩৮ এর অধীনে চেকের ড্রয়ারকে অপরাধমূলকভাবে অভিযুক্ত করা যায়। চেক পুনরায় উপস্থাপন করা হলে এবং যদি তা আবার ডিজঅনার হয়, তাহলে সুবিধাভোগী আবার ধারা ১৩৮(১) এর প্রোভাইসো (গ) অনুযায়ী আইনানুগ ব্যবস্থা গ্রহণ করতে পারেন এবং ধারা ১৪১ এর বিধান অনুসারে ডিজঅনারের পরবর্তী অভিযোগটি এক মাসের মধ্যে দায়ের করতে বাধ্য থাকবেন। প্রতিবার চেক ডিজঅনার হওয়ার সময় অপরাধ সংঘটিত হয়। ধারা ১৪১(খ) এ কিছু নেই যা থেকে বোঝা যায় যে ধারা ১৩৮(১) এর প্রোভাইসো (গ) এর অধীনে একাধিকবার কারণ উদ্ভূত হতে পারে না। ধারা ১৪১(খ) এ প্রক্রিয়াগত তামাদি চেকের ধারকের আইনসঙ্গত অধিকারকে হ্রাস করতে পারে না যে তিনি যেকোনো সংখ্যক পরবর্তী উপস্থাপনার জন্য ডিজঅনারের কারণে মামলা দায়ের করবেন। একই ভাবে, প্রতিটি ডিজঅনার একটি সংযুক্ত অধিকার প্রদান করবে ধারা ১৩৮(১) এর প্রোভাইসো (খ) এর অধীনে নোটিশ প্রদান করার এবং অর্থ দাবি করার, যা ব্যর্থ হলে চেকের ধারক আইনের ধারা ১৪১(ক) অনুযায়ী লিখিত অভিযোগ করতে পারবেন। পুরো প্রক্রিয়াটি আইনসঙ্গত সময়সীমার মধ্যে সম্পন্ন করতে হবে। তাই, আপিল বিভাগ মনে করেন যে ডাঃ মোঃ মফিজুর রহমান বনাম মোঃ বশির উল্লাহ এবং আরেকজন, ৫৫ DLR ৬৩০ মামলার সিদ্ধান্তটি ভুল ছিল এবং এটি বাতিল করা হয়েছে। উপরোক্ত আলোচনার প্রেক্ষিতে, আপিল বিভাগের মতামত হল যে আপিলগুলির কোনো মেরিট নেই এবং তা বাতিল করা হলো। একই কারণে ক্রিমিনাল পিটিশনটি ফর লিভ টু আপিলও বাতিল করা হলো। Nizamuddin Mahmud Hossain vs Rashtra and Annyajan (ফaujdarī) 16 ALR (AD) 3-11. ধারা ১৩৮- হস্তান্তরযোগ্য দলিল আইন (সংক্ষেপে আইন) এর ধারা ১৩৮ এর অধীনে একটি বাণিজ্যিক ব্যাংক কি একজন ঋণগ্রহীতার কাছ থেকে গৃহীত পোস্ট ডেটেড চেক ডিজঅনার হওয়ার কারণে মামলা করতে পারে, যদিও ঋণগ্রহীতা থেকে জামানত নেওয়া হয়েছে। ফৌজদারি কার্যবিধির ধারা ৫৬১এ-এর অধীনে হাইকোর্ট বিভাগের কোন বিবাদমান প্রশ্নের সমাধান করতে গিয়ে একটি কার্যধারা বাতিল করার ক্ষমতা নেই। একবার চেকের ইস্যু এবং তাতে স্বাক্ষর সত্য বলে প্রমাণিত হলে, আদালত কার্যধারার সাথে অগ্রসর হবেন। আপিল বিভাগ মতামত দিয়েছে যে প্রতারণা বা প্রতারণামূলক অন্তর্ভুক্তির প্রশ্নটি শুধুমাত্র ট্রায়াল কোর্টে প্রমাণ গ্রহণ ও বিবেচনার মাধ্যমে নির্ধারণ করা যেতে পারে। তবে, যদি কোনো দায়বদ্ধতা বা জামানত হিসাবে একটি সাদা চেক ইস্যু করা হয়, এবং যখন দায় প্রমাণিত হয়, চেকটি পূরণ করে ব্যাংকে উপস্থাপন করা হয়, তখন চেকের দাতা অপরাধমূলক দায় থেকে রক্ষা পেতে পারে না। উপরোক্ত তথ্য এবং পরিস্থিতির আলোকে, আপিল বিভাগ মনে করে যে 'জামানত', 'অগ্রিম' বা 'পোস্ট ডেটেড' হিসাবে চেক ইস্যুর বিবাদমান প্রশ্নটি শুধুমাত্র প্রমাণ গ্রহণের মাধ্যমে সিদ্ধান্ত নেওয়া যেতে পারে। সুতরাং, আপিল বিভাগ আপিল এবং পিটিশনগুলিতে কোনও সার্থকতা খুঁজে পাননি। এই কারণে, সমস্ত আপিল এবং পিটিশন বাতিল করা হলো। Mohammad Alauddin vs Rashtra, Upokamishnar, Chattagram and Annanya Pratinidhitve: (Faujdarī) 16 ALR (AD) 113-117 ধারা ১৪০- পরিচালকরা কেবল কোম্পানির চেকগুলোতে স্বাক্ষর করেছেন এবং এর মাধ্যমে কোম্পানির অপরাধ সংঘটনে জ্বালানী ইঞ্জেক্টরের ভূমিকা পালন করেছেন। ধারা ১৪০ অনুযায়ী, তাদেরকে ভারতীয় সুপ্রিম কোর্টের বৃহত্তর বেঞ্চের সিদ্ধান্ত অনুযায়ী পরোক্ষভাবে দায়ী করা হয়েছে। প্রশ্নটি দেওয়ানী আইনের "non-joinder" এর প্রয়োগযোগ্যতার উপর প্রতিষ্ঠিত নয়, বরং ফৌজদারি আইনশাস্ত্রের উপর ভিত্তি করে, যা নির্দেশ করে যে প্রধান অপরাধী গ্রেফতার না হলে সহায়তাকারী বা প্ররোচনাকারীর বিরুদ্ধে ফৌজদারি কার্যক্রম অকার্যকর। (বিচারপতি এ এইচ এম শামসুদ্দিন চৌধুরী, জে এ আর এর মতামত) Yusuf Babu (Md.) vs Rashtra, 68 DLR (AD) 298. ধারা ১৪০- ধারা ১৪০-এ বলা নেই যে অন্য শ্রেণির ব্যক্তিদের বিরুদ্ধে মামলা চালানোর জন্য কোম্পানির বিরুদ্ধে মামলা চালানো অনস্বীকার্য। যদি কোম্পানির বিরুদ্ধে মামলা না হয়, তাহলে শুধুমাত্র সেই কারণে অপর দুই শ্রেণির ব্যক্তিরা ফৌজদারি দায় থেকে মুক্তি পেতে পারেন না। (বহুমতের ভিত্তিতে প্রধান বিচারপতি এস কে সিনহা) Yusuf Babu (Md.) vs Rashtra, 68 DLR (AD) 298. ধারা ১৪০- কোম্পানি একটি পৃথক সত্তা, যা এর পরিচালক ও শেয়ারহোল্ডারদের থেকে স্বতন্ত্র এবং কোম্পানির দ্বারা সংঘটিত অপরাধের জন্য কোম্পানিই দায়ী এবং কোম্পানির কার্যক্রম পরিচালনাকারী পরিচালকরা প্রধান অপরাধী হিসাবে দায়ী নন, বরং হয় পরোক্ষভাবে দায়ী বা সহায়ক বা প্ররোচনা দানকারী এজেন্ট হিসেবে দায়ী হতে পারেন। এই মতামতের জন্য আমি স্যার দিনশাই পেটিটের ক্ষেত্রে প্রকাশিত পর্যবেক্ষণগুলির সাহায্য নিই, যেখানে বলা হয়েছে যে একটি কোম্পানি যথাযথভাবে নিবন্ধিত হলে আদালতকে এই ধারণা দিয়ে শুরু করতে হবে যে এটি ব্যক্তিদের থেকে আলাদা একটি সত্তা। (বিচারপতি এ এইচ এম শামসুদ্দিন চৌধুরী) Yusuf Babu (Md.) vs Rashtra, 68 DLR (AD) 298. ধারা ১৪০ এবং ১৪১-যদি কোনো কারণে কোম্পানির বিরুদ্ধে মামলা করা না হয়, তাহলে যারা কোম্পানির কার্যক্রমের দায়িত্বে আছেন, কোম্পানির ব্যবস্থাপনার সঙ্গে যুক্ত আছেন বা কোম্পানির কার্যক্রম সম্পর্কে জানেন, তারা নোটিশ প্রাপ্তির পরেও ফৌজদারি দায় থেকে রেহাই পেতে পারেন না। আপিল বিভাগ, ভারতের সুপ্রিম কোর্টের মতামত এবং পর্যবেক্ষণ অনুমোদন করে, রায় দিয়েছেন যে কোম্পানিকে অভিযুক্ত হিসেবে অন্তর্ভুক্ত না করার ত্রুটি, যা অভিযোগকারীকে মেসার্স মোদি ইন্ডাস্ট্রিজ লিমিটেডকে মামলায় যুক্ত করার সুযোগ দিয়ে দূর করা যেতে পারে, এটিকে ভারতের সুপ্রিম কোর্ট Anil Hada vs Indian Acrylic Limited (2000) 1 SCC 1 মামলায় অবাইটার ডিকটাম বলে অভিহিত করেছেন এবং Shiratan Agarwal মামলায় Chinnappa Reddy, J. কর্তৃক নেওয়া মতামতকে অনুমোদন করেছেন। এই মামলা হস্তান্তরযোগ্য দলিল আইনের অধীনে একটি অপরাধ সম্পর্কিত। ভারতের বিধান আমাদের বিধানের সঙ্গে অভিন্ন, এই পার্থক্য ছাড়া যে আমাদের আইনের ধারা ১৪০ ভারতের আইনের ধারা ১৪১-এর সঙ্গে সমতুল্য। সেই মামলায় বলা হয়েছিল যে, যদি কোনো কোম্পানি অপরাধ করে, তাহলে শুধুমাত্র তখনই শাস্তি দেওয়া যাবে যখন কোম্পানির বিরুদ্ধে মামলা করা হয়। কিন্তু যদি কোম্পানির পরিবর্তে কোনো পাওনাদার শুধুমাত্র তাদের বিরুদ্ধে মামলা করতে চায় যারা কোম্পানির ব্যবসার পরিচালনার জন্য দায়ী, তবে সেই পাওনাদার শুধুমাত্র তখনই মামলায় সফল হতে পারে যখন সে প্রমাণ করতে সক্ষম হয় যে অপরাধটি আসলে কোম্পানির দ্বারা করা হয়েছিল। আদালত পর্যবেক্ষণ করে সংক্ষেপে বলেছেন যে, 'যদি কোনো আইনি জটিলতা বা অন্য কারণে কোম্পানির বিরুদ্ধে মামলা না করা হয়, তাহলে আইনের ধারা ১৪১-এর মাধ্যমে সৃষ্ট আইনি কল্পনার ফলে দায়বদ্ধতা থেকে অন্য অভিযুক্ত ব্যক্তিরা কেবল সেই কারণেই রেহাই পেতে পারে না।' Mohammad Yusuf Babu and Annyara vs Johan Pravanjan Chowdhury (Faujdarī) 23 ALR (AD) 58 ধারা ১৪১(খ) - যদি কোম্পানির ব্যবস্থাপনা পরিচালক, যিনি কোম্পানির কার্যক্রম পরিচালনার দায়িত্বে আছেন এবং কোম্পানির পক্ষে চেক স্বাক্ষর করেছেন, তার বিরুদ্ধে নোটিশ জারি করা হয়, তাহলে ব্যবস্থাপনা পরিচালকের কাছে নোটিশ প্রাপ্তি থেকে ধরে নেওয়া যেতে পারে যে কোম্পানি নোটিশটি পেয়েছে। এটি কোম্পানিকে অপরাধের জন্য দায়ী করবে। কারণ, ব্যবস্থাপনা পরিচালক কোম্পানির প্রধান নির্বাহী কর্মকর্তা হওয়ার কারণে তার জ্ঞানকে কোম্পানির জ্ঞান হিসেবে গণ্য করা যেতে পারে। Mohammad Yusuf Babu and Annyanya vs Johan Provanjan Chowdhury (Faujdarī) 23 ALR (AD) 58. ধারা ১৪১(খ)- পরবর্তী অভিযোগগুলি তামাদি রক্ষা করতে পারবে না—আইনের বিধান অনুযায়ী, অভিযোগটি অবশ্যই ধারা ১৩৮-এর প্রোভিসোর দফা (গ) এর অধীনে কারণ উদ্ভূত হওয়ার তারিখ থেকে এক মাসের মধ্যে দাখিল করতে হবে। [অনুচ্ছেদ- ১০] S. M. Anwar Hossain vs Mo. Shafiul Alam and Annyara: 7 BLT (AD) 218. হুন্ডি কী হুন্ডি হলো একটি প্রাচীন বাণিজ্যিক দলিল, যা মূলত অর্থ স্থানান্তরের জন্য ব্যবহৃত হতো। এটি অনেকটা বিল অফ এক্সচেঞ্জ বা প্রমিসরি নোটের মতো কাজ করে। হুন্ডি কি প্রমিসরি নোট হিসেবে গণ্য হয় কি না 'হুন্ডি' একটি প্রমিসরি নোট হতেও পারে, আবার নাও হতে পারে। তাই, শুধু স্ট্যাম্পের উপরের অংশে "হুন্ডি" এবং "স্বীকৃত" (accepted) লেখা থাকলেই কোনো দলিল বিল অফ এক্সচেঞ্জ হয়ে যায় না, যখন দলিলটি প্রকৃতপক্ষে একটি প্রমিসরি নোট। কোনো দলিলের আসল বৈশিষ্ট্য দলিলের বিধানাবলী দেখেই নির্ধারণ করতে হবে, এর জন্য ব্যবহৃত নামের উপর ভিত্তি করে নয়। "এআইআর ১৯৪১ কলকাতা ৪৯৮-আইএলআর (১৯৪১) ২ কল. ১০৭" (AIR 1941 Cal 498-ILR (1941) 2 Cal. 107) মামলায় এমন সিদ্ধান্ত দেওয়া হয়েছে। বিষয়টি আরও স্পষ্ট করে কয়েকটি পয়েন্টে আলোচনা করা হলো: দলিলের আসল বৈশিষ্ট্য: কোনো দলিল হুন্ডি নাকি অন্য কোনো প্রকারের দলিল, তা শুধু এর নামের উপর নির্ভর করে না। দলিলের ভেতরের শর্তাবলী এবং বিধানাবলী পরীক্ষা করে এর আসল বৈশিষ্ট্য নির্ধারণ করতে হয়। "হুন্ডি" এবং "স্বীকৃত" লেখার প্রভাব: শুধু "হুন্ডি" এবং "স্বীকৃত" লেখা থাকলেই কোনো প্রমিসরি নোট বিল অফ এক্সচেঞ্জ হয়ে যায় না। যদি দলিলের শর্তাবলী প্রমিসরি নোটের মতো হয়, তাহলে এটি প্রমিসরি নোট হিসেবেই গণ্য হবে। প্রমিসরি নোটের বৈশিষ্ট্য: প্রমিসরি নোট হলো একটি লিখিত প্রতিশ্রুতি, যেখানে একজন ব্যক্তি অন্য ব্যক্তিকে একটি নির্দিষ্ট পরিমাণ অর্থ একটি নির্দিষ্ট সময়ে পরিশোধ করতে প্রতিশ্রুতি দেন। বিল অফ এক্সচেঞ্জের বৈশিষ্ট্য: বিল অফ এক্সচেঞ্জ হলো একটি লিখিত আদেশ, যেখানে একজন ব্যক্তি অন্য ব্যক্তিকে তৃতীয় কোনো ব্যক্তিকে একটি নির্দিষ্ট পরিমাণ অর্থ পরিশোধ করার নির্দেশ দেন। একটি উদাহরণের মাধ্যমে বিষয়টি আরও পরিষ্কার করা যাক: ধরা যাক, একটি দলিলে লেখা আছে "আমি, 'ক', 'খ'-কে এত টাকা এত তারিখে পরিশোধ করতে প্রতিজ্ঞাবদ্ধ"। স্ট্যাম্পের উপরে "হুন্ডি" এবং "স্বীকৃত" লেখা থাকলেও, এই দলিলটি একটি প্রমিসরি নোট হিসেবে গণ্য হবে, কারণ এখানে 'ক' সরাসরি 'খ'-কে অর্থ পরিশোধের প্রতিশ্রুতি দিয়েছেন। এটি বিল অফ এক্সচেঞ্জ হবে না, কারণ এখানে 'ক' অন্য কাউকে 'খ'-কে অর্থ পরিশোধ করার নির্দেশ দিচ্ছেন না। সংক্ষেপে, কোনো দলিলের নাম "হুন্ডি" হলেই এটি বিল অফ এক্সচেঞ্জ হয়ে যায় না। দলিলের ভেতরের শর্তাবলী এবং বিধানাবলী পরীক্ষা করে এর আসল বৈশিষ্ট্য নির্ধারণ করতে হবে। মামলার সূত্র: AIR 1941 Cal 498-ILR (1941) 2 Cal. 107 প্রমিসরি নোটে প্রস্তুতকারক স্বাক্ষর না করলে এর বৈধতা কি? হস্তান্তরযোগ্য দলিল আইনের ৪ ধারা অনুযায়ী, একটি প্রমিসরি নোট অবশ্যই প্রস্তুতকারক (maker) বা তার পক্ষে অন্য কারো দ্বারা স্বাক্ষরিত হতে হবে। যদি কোনো দলিলে লেখা থাকে যে 'B' উক্ত দলিলে উল্লিখিত অর্থ চাহিবামাত্র পরিশোধ করতে বাধ্য, এবং এটি 'N' কর্তৃক স্বাক্ষরিত হয় এবং 'N' যদি 'B'-এর পক্ষে স্বাক্ষর করছেন বলে উল্লেখ না করেন, তাহলে বলা যাবে না যে দলিলটি প্রস্তুতকারক কর্তৃক স্বাক্ষরিত হয়েছে। "আইএলআর (১৯৫৯) ৯ রাজ. ১৮৭" (ILR (1959) 9 Raj. 187) মামলায় এমন সিদ্ধান্ত দেওয়া হয়েছে। বিষয়টি আরও স্পষ্ট করে কয়েকটি পয়েন্টে আলোচনা করা হলো: প্রস্তুতকারকের স্বাক্ষর: প্রমিসরি নোটের অন্যতম গুরুত্বপূর্ণ উপাদান হলো প্রস্তুতকারকের স্বাক্ষর। এই স্বাক্ষর প্রমাণ করে যে প্রস্তুতকারক নির্দিষ্ট শর্তে অর্থ পরিশোধ করতে বাধ্য। প্রতিনিধির স্বাক্ষর: প্রস্তুতকারক যদি নিজে স্বাক্ষর করতে না পারেন, তাহলে তার পক্ষে অন্য কেউ স্বাক্ষর করতে পারেন। তবে, এক্ষেত্রে স্পষ্টভাবে উল্লেখ করতে হবে যে তিনি প্রস্তুতকারকের পক্ষে স্বাক্ষর করছেন। যেমন, "B-এর পক্ষে N কর্তৃক" অথবা "For B, N" ইত্যাদি। স্বাক্ষরের অনুপস্থিতি: যদি কোনো ব্যক্তি অন্য কারো পক্ষে স্বাক্ষর করছেন বলে উল্লেখ না করেন, তাহলে সেই স্বাক্ষর প্রমিসরি নোটের জন্য যথেষ্ট নয়। উদাহরণস্বরূপ, যদি কোনো দলিলে 'B' অর্থ পরিশোধ করতে বাধ্য থাকে এবং 'N' শুধু নিজের নাম স্বাক্ষর করেন, তাহলে সেই দলিলটি বৈধ প্রমিসরি নোট হিসেবে গণ্য হবে না। একটি উদাহরণের মাধ্যমে বিষয়টি আরও পরিষ্কার করা যাক: ধরা যাক, 'B' 'A'-এর কাছ থেকে কিছু টাকা ধার নিয়েছেন এবং একটি প্রমিসরি নোট দিয়েছেন। যদি নোটটিতে লেখা থাকে "আমি, B, A-কে এই টাকা পরিশোধ করতে বাধ্য", এবং নিচে শুধু 'N' এর স্বাক্ষর থাকে এবং 'N', B-এর পক্ষে স্বাক্ষর করছেন বলে উল্লেখ না থাকে, তাহলে এই নোটটি বৈধ প্রমিসরি নোট হিসেবে গণ্য হবে না। কারণ, এখানে স্পষ্টভাবে বোঝা যাচ্ছে না যে 'N', 'B'-এর প্রতিনিধি হিসেবে স্বাক্ষর করেছেন। সংক্ষেপে, হস্তান্তরযোগ্য দলিল আইনের ৪ ধারা অনুযায়ী, প্রমিসরি নোট অবশ্যই প্রস্তুতকারক বা তার উপযুক্ত প্রতিনিধির দ্বারা স্বাক্ষরিত হতে হবে। প্রতিনিধির ক্ষেত্রে, তিনি যার পক্ষে স্বাক্ষর করছেন, তা স্পষ্টভাবে উল্লেখ করতে হবে। মামলার সূত্র: ILR (1959) 9 Raj. 187 প্রমিসরি নোট কি? (১৯০৩) ৪৩০ সি ৬২৭ মামলায় বলা হয়েছে যে, একটি প্রমিসরি নোট পক্ষগুলির মধ্যে অন্যান্য লেনদেন থেকে স্বাধীন। প্রথমত, একটি প্রমিসরি নোটের উদ্দেশ্য হলো দেখানো যে নোট দ্বারা উপস্থাপিত বিশেষ লেনদেনটি একটি পৃথক লেনদেন, এবং এটি উদ্দেশ্য যে সেই লেনদেনের ক্ষেত্রে প্রতিকারগুলি আলাদাভাবে অনুসরণ করা উচিত, যদিও পক্ষগুলির মধ্যে বেশ কয়েকটি লেনদেন ছিল এবং তাদের মধ্যে একটি চলমান হিসাব রয়েছে। বিষয়টি আরও স্পষ্ট করে বলা যাক: একটি প্রমিসরি নোট হলো একটি লিখিত প্রতিশ্রুতি, যেখানে একজন ব্যক্তি অন্য ব্যক্তিকে একটি নির্দিষ্ট পরিমাণ অর্থ একটি নির্দিষ্ট সময়ে পরিশোধ করার প্রতিশ্রুতি দেন। এটি একটি স্বতন্ত্র আইনি দলিল, যা পক্ষগুলির মধ্যে অন্যান্য চুক্তি বা লেনদেন থেকে আলাদা। (১৯০৩) ৪৩০ সি ৬২৭ মামলার সিদ্ধান্ত অনুযায়ী: একটি প্রমিসরি নোট একটি পৃথক লেনদেন হিসেবে গণ্য হবে, এমনকি যদি পক্ষগুলির মধ্যে পূর্বে অন্যান্য লেনদেন বা একটি চলমান হিসাব থাকে। প্রমিসরি নোটের অধীনে প্রতিকারগুলি (যেমন - অর্থ আদায়ের জন্য মামলা) অন্যান্য লেনদেন থেকে আলাদাভাবে অনুসরণ করা যেতে পারে। বিষয়টি একটি কাল্পনিক পরিস্থিতির মাধ্যমে ব্যাখ্যা করা যাক: মনে করুন, জনাব 'ক' জনাব 'খ' এর সাথে দীর্ঘদিন ধরে ব্যবসা করছেন এবং তাদের মধ্যে একটি চলমান হিসাব রয়েছে। এই হিসাবের বাইরে, 'ক' 'খ' এর কাছ থেকে জরুরি প্রয়োজনে ১ লক্ষ টাকা ধার নেন এবং এর জন্য একটি প্রমিসরি নোট লিখে দেন, যেখানে ৩ মাস পর এই টাকা পরিশোধের প্রতিশ্রুতি দেওয়া হয়। এই পরিস্থিতিতে, (১৯০৩) ৪৩০ সি ৬২৭ মামলার সিদ্ধান্ত অনুযায়ী: ১ লক্ষ টাকার প্রমিসরি নোটটি একটি পৃথক লেনদেন হিসেবে গণ্য হবে, যা তাদের চলমান হিসাব থেকে আলাদা। যদি 'খ' ৩ মাস পর টাকা পরিশোধ না করেন, তাহলে 'ক' শুধুমাত্র প্রমিসরি নোটের ভিত্তিতে তার বিরুদ্ধে মামলা করতে পারবেন, তাদের পূর্বের লেনদেন বা চলমান হিসাবের উপর নির্ভর করতে হবে না। সংক্ষেপে, একটি প্রমিসরি নোট হলো একটি স্বতন্ত্র আইনি দলিল এবং এটি পক্ষগুলির মধ্যে অন্যান্য লেনদেন থেকে স্বাধীন। এর অধীনে প্রতিকারগুলিও আলাদাভাবে অনুসরণ করা যায়। যদি বিল গ্রহীতা কর্তৃক গৃহীত হওয়ার পর প্রেরক গ্রহীতাকে প্রতারিত করে, তাহলে যথাসময়ে ধারকের অধিকারের উপর এর কী প্রভাব পড়ে? হস্তান্তরযোগ্য দলিল আইনের ৫ এবং ৯ ধারা অনুযায়ী, যথাসময়ে বিল অফ এক্সচেঞ্জের একজন যথোপযুক্ত ধারক (holder in due course) বিলটি ভাঙিয়ে টাকা পাওয়ার অধিকারী, এবং বিলটি গ্রহীতা কর্তৃক গ্রহণের পরেও যদি বিলের প্রেরক গ্রহীতাকে প্রতারিত করে, তবুও তাকে অর্থ পরিশোধে বাধা দেওয়া যাবে না। "এক্সপোর্টার্স ইন্ডিয়া বনাম রূপসী গার্মেন্টস এবং অন্যান্য" (Exporters India vs Rupashi Garments and others.) ১১ বিএলডি (এইচসিডি) ৬৫ মামলায় এমন সিদ্ধান্ত দেওয়া হয়েছে। বিষয়টি আরও স্পষ্ট করে কয়েকটি পয়েন্টে আলোচনা করা হলো: বিল অফ এক্সচেঞ্জ: বিল অফ এক্সচেঞ্জ হলো একটি লিখিত আদেশ, যেখানে একজন ব্যক্তি (প্রেরক) অন্য একজন ব্যক্তিকে (গ্রহীতা) তৃতীয় কোনো ব্যক্তিকে (প্রাপক) একটি নির্দিষ্ট পরিমাণ অর্থ পরিশোধ করার নির্দেশ দেন। যথোপযুক্ত ধারক: যথোপযুক্ত ধারক হলেন সেই ব্যক্তি যিনি বিলটি সরল বিশ্বাসে, মূল্যের বিনিময়ে এবং বিলটির মেয়াদ শেষ হওয়ার আগে গ্রহণ করেন। তিনি বিলের কোনো ত্রুটি সম্পর্কে অবগত থাকেন না। গ্রহীতার স্বীকৃতি: বিল অফ এক্সচেঞ্জ তখনই বৈধ হয় যখন গ্রহীতা এটি গ্রহণ করেন। গ্রহীতা সাধারণত বিলের উপর "accepted" লিখে স্বাক্ষর করে এটি গ্রহণ করেন। প্রতারণার প্রভাব: যদি বিলটি গ্রহণ করার পর প্রেরক গ্রহীতাকে প্রতারিত করে, তবুও যথোপযুক্ত ধারকের অধিকার ক্ষুন্ন হয় না। গ্রহীতা বিলের ধারককে অর্থ পরিশোধ করতে বাধ্য। ধারকের সুরক্ষা: এই বিধানের মূল উদ্দেশ্য হলো বিল অফ এক্সচেঞ্জের মাধ্যমে বাণিজ্যিক লেনদেনের সুরক্ষা নিশ্চিত করা। যথোপযুক্ত ধারক যেন কোনো প্রকার হয়রানির শিকার না হন, তা নিশ্চিত করা আইনের লক্ষ্য। একটি উদাহরণের মাধ্যমে বিষয়টি আরও পরিষ্কার করা যাক: ধরা যাক, 'ক' (প্রেরক) 'খ'-কে (গ্রহীতা) একটি বিল অফ এক্সচেঞ্জ লিখে 'গ'-কে (প্রাপক) ১ লক্ষ টাকা পরিশোধ করার নির্দেশ দেন। 'খ' বিলটি গ্রহণ করেন। এরপর 'ক' কোনোভাবে 'খ'-কে প্রতারিত করেন। 'গ' যদি বিলটির যথোপযুক্ত ধারক হন, তাহলে 'খ' 'গ'-কে ১ লক্ষ টাকা পরিশোধ করতে বাধ্য থাকবেন, 'ক'-এর প্রতারণা সত্ত্বেও। সংক্ষেপে, হস্তান্তরযোগ্য দলিল আইনের ৫ ও ৯ ধারা অনুযায়ী, বিল অফ এক্সচেঞ্জের একজন যথোপযুক্ত ধারক বিলটি ভাঙিয়ে টাকা পাওয়ার অধিকারী এবং প্রেরকের প্রতারণাতেও তার এই অধিকারে কোনো বাধা দেওয়া যায় না। মামলার সূত্র: Exporters India vs Rupashi Garments and others. ১১ বিএলডি (এইচসিডি) ৬৫। যদি প্রেরক (drawer) এবং গ্রহীতা (drawee) একই ব্যক্তি হন, তাহলে সেই দলিল বিল অফ এক্সচেঞ্জ হিসেবে গণ্য হবে কিনা? হস্তান্তরযোগ্য দলিল আইনের ধারা ৫-এ এমন কিছু নেই যা প্রমাণ করে যে যদি প্রেরক এবং গ্রহীতা একই ব্যক্তি হন, তাহলে সেই দলিলকে বিল অফ এক্সচেঞ্জ বলা যাবে না। নিঃসন্দেহে যেখানে প্রেরক এবং গ্রহীতা একই ব্যক্তি, সেই ব্যক্তি দলিলটিকে বিল অফ এক্সচেঞ্জ হিসেবে গণ্য করতে অধিকারী নন, কিন্তু বিলের ধারক (holder) এটিকে বিল অফ এক্সচেঞ্জ হিসেবে গণ্য করতে পারেন। "এআইআর ১৯৩০ পাটনা ২৩৯ (ডিবি) = এআইআর ১৯২৮ কলকাতা ৫৬৬ (এসবি) = এআইআর ১৯৩২ মাদ্রাজ ৭৬৫" (AIR 1930 Pat 239 (DB) = AIR 1928 Cal. 566 (SB) = AIR 1932 Mad. 765) মামলায় এমন সিদ্ধান্ত দেওয়া হয়েছে। বিষয়টি আরও স্পষ্ট করে কয়েকটি পয়েন্টে আলোচনা করা হলো: বিল অফ এক্সচেঞ্জের সংজ্ঞা: বিল অফ এক্সচেঞ্জ হলো একটি লিখিত আদেশ, যেখানে একজন ব্যক্তি (প্রেরক) অন্য একজন ব্যক্তিকে (গ্রহীতা) তৃতীয় কোনো ব্যক্তিকে (প্রাপক) একটি নির্দিষ্ট পরিমাণ অর্থ পরিশোধ করার নির্দেশ দেন। প্রেরক ও গ্রহীতা একই ব্যক্তি: সাধারণত বিল অফ এক্সচেঞ্জে প্রেরক এবং গ্রহীতা ভিন্ন ব্যক্তি হন। কিন্তু যদি কোনো কারণে প্রেরক এবং গ্রহীতা একই ব্যক্তি হন, তাহলে সেই দলিলটিকে প্রমিসরি নোট হিসেবে গণ্য করা হয়। ধারকের অধিকার: যদিও প্রেরক এবং গ্রহীতা একই ব্যক্তি হওয়ার কারণে তিনি নিজে সেই দলিলকে বিল অফ এক্সচেঞ্জ হিসেবে গণ্য করতে পারেন না, তবে যদি সেই দলিল কোনো ধারকের কাছে থাকে, তাহলে সেই ধারক এটিকে বিল অফ এক্সচেঞ্জ হিসেবে গণ্য করতে পারেন এবং এর ভিত্তিতে আইনি পদক্ষেপ নিতে পারেন। একটি উদাহরণের মাধ্যমে বিষয়টি আরও পরিষ্কার করা যাক: ধরা যাক, একটি কোম্পানির প্রধান নির্বাহী কর্মকর্তা (CEO) কোম্পানির নামে একটি চেক লিখলেন এবং নিজেকেই সেই চেকের গ্রহীতা হিসেবে উল্লেখ করলেন। এই ক্ষেত্রে, CEO নিজে এই চেকটিকে বিল অফ এক্সচেঞ্জ হিসেবে গণ্য করতে পারবেন না, এটি প্রমিসরি নোট হিসেবে গণ্য হবে। কিন্তু যদি কোম্পানি এই চেকটি অন্য কোনো ব্যক্তি বা প্রতিষ্ঠানের কাছে হস্তান্তর করে, তাহলে সেই ব্যক্তি বা প্রতিষ্ঠান এই চেকটিকে বিল অফ এক্সচেঞ্জ হিসেবে গণ্য করতে পারবে এবং এর ভিত্তিতে আইনি পদক্ষেপ নিতে পারবে। সংক্ষেপে, যদি বিল অফ এক্সচেঞ্জের প্রেরক এবং গ্রহীতা একই ব্যক্তি হন, তাহলে সেই দলিলটি প্রাথমিকভাবে প্রমিসরি নোট হিসেবে গণ্য হবে, কিন্তু বিলের ধারক এটিকে বিল অফ এক্সচেঞ্জ হিসেবে গণ্য করতে পারেন। মামলার সূত্র: AIR 1930 Pat 239 (DB) = AIR 1928 Cal. 566 (SB) = AIR 1932 Mad. 765 একটি লিগ্যাল নোটিশে যদি কোনো করণিক ভুল (clerical error) থাকে, তাহলে সেই ভুল সংশোধনের জন্য অথবা সম্পূর্ণ নোটিশটি বাতিল করার জন্য কি দ্বিতীয় নোটিশ জারি করা যায়? এ বিষয়ে "এস. এম. স মিলস বনাম কাবেরী টিম্বার কোং" [S. M. Saw Mills v. Cauvery Timber Co. [2004(3) AI CLR 591 (Mad)]] মামলার আলোকে আলোচনা করা হলো: নোটিশ ইস্যু করার পর যদি দেখা যায় যে তাতে কিছু করণিক ভুল রয়েছে, তাহলে তা সংশোধনের জন্য দ্বিতীয়বার নোটিশ দেওয়া যেতে পারে। তবে, তামাদি গণনার ক্ষেত্রে প্রথম নোটিশ জারী হওয়ার পর থেকেই সময় গণনা শুরু হবে। "এস. এম. স মিলস" মামলায় মাদ্রাজ হাইকোর্ট মন্তব্য করেন: "If the tenor of the second notice goes to show that it is not an independent notice but is intended merely to correct the mistake or mistakes committed in the earlier notice, then cause of action will accrue in terms of the earlier notice. To this extent the legal position is quite clear. But if the second notice appears to be a fresh demand notice and it was served on the drawer within 15 days of the receipt of the earlier notice then it is to be seen whether by the second notice the earlier notice was cancelled or revoked. Cancellation or revocation of the earlier notice at any time before accrual of cause of action for filing a complaint will make the earlier notice non est and computation of the period of limitation for filing the complaint shall also be in terms of the second notice. The second notice then will be binding on both the parties. The complainant also will be debarred from filing a complaint before the expiry of 15 days of the receipt of the second notice. Any action taken by him prior to that shall be treated as premature and no cognizance can be taken on such premature complaint." এই মন্তব্যের অর্থ হলো: যদি দ্বিতীয় নোটিশের বক্তব্য থেকে বোঝা যায় যে এটি কোনো স্বাধীন নোটিশ নয়, বরং আগের নোটিশে হওয়া ভুল বা ভুলগুলি সংশোধন করার জন্য দেওয়া হয়েছে, তাহলে প্রথম নোটিশ জারির তারিখ থেকেই তামাদি গণনা শুরু হবে। এই বিষয়ে আইনি অবস্থান স্পষ্ট। কিন্তু যদি দ্বিতীয় নোটিশটি একটি নতুন ডিমান্ড নোটিশ হিসেবে প্রতীয়মান হয় এবং এটি আগের নোটিশ পাওয়ার ১৫ দিনের মধ্যে ড্রয়ারের উপর জারি করা হয়, তাহলে দেখতে হবে যে দ্বিতীয় নোটিশের মাধ্যমে আগের নোটিশ বাতিল বা প্রত্যাহার করা হয়েছে কিনা। অভিযোগ দায়ের করার জন্য কারণ সৃষ্টি হওয়ার আগে যেকোনো সময় আগের নোটিশ বাতিল বা প্রত্যাহার করলে আগের নোটিশ বাতিল হয়ে যাবে এবং অভিযোগ দায়ের করার জন্য তামাদির সময় গণনাও দ্বিতীয় নোটিশের ভিত্তিতে হবে। সেক্ষেত্রে দ্বিতীয় নোটিশ উভয় পক্ষের জন্য বাধ্যতামূলক হবে। অভিযোগকারীও দ্বিতীয় নোটিশ পাওয়ার ১৫ দিন অতিবাহিত হওয়ার আগে কোনো অভিযোগ দায়ের করতে পারবেন না। এর আগে তার নেওয়া যেকোনো পদক্ষেপ অকালপক্ক হিসেবে বিবেচিত হবে এবং এমন অকালপক্ক অভিযোগের উপর কোনো স্বীকৃতি নেওয়া যাবে না। বিষয়টি আরও স্পষ্ট করে কয়েকটি উদাহরণসহ ব্যাখ্যা করা হলো: ভুল সংশোধনের ক্ষেত্রে: ধরা যাক, প্রথম নোটিশে চেকের পরিমাণ ভুল লেখা হয়েছিল। দ্বিতীয় নোটিশে সেই ভুল সংশোধন করা হলো। এক্ষেত্রে, তামাদি গণনা প্রথম নোটিশের তারিখ থেকেই শুরু হবে। প্রথম নোটিশ বাতিলের ক্ষেত্রে: যদি দ্বিতীয় নোটিশে স্পষ্টভাবে উল্লেখ করা হয় যে প্রথম নোটিশ বাতিল করা হলো এবং নতুন করে ডিমান্ড করা হলো, তাহলে প্রথম নোটিশটি আর কার্যকর থাকবে না। সেক্ষেত্রে, তামাদি গণনা দ্বিতীয় নোটিশের তারিখ থেকে শুরু হবে এবং দ্বিতীয় নোটিশ পাওয়ার ১৫ দিন পর অভিযোগ দায়ের করা যাবে। সময়সীমা: দ্বিতীয় নোটিশ যদি প্রথম নোটিশ পাওয়ার ১৫ দিনের মধ্যে জারি করা হয় এবং প্রথম নোটিশ বাতিল করে, তাহলে দ্বিতীয় নোটিশ পাওয়ার ১৫ দিন পর অভিযোগ দায়ের করতে হবে। এর আগে অভিযোগ দায়ের করলে তা অকালপক্ক হিসেবে গণ্য হবে। সংক্ষেপে, দ্বিতীয় নোটিশ দিয়ে প্রথম নোটিশের করণিক ভুল সংশোধন করা যায় অথবা প্রথম নোটিশ বাতিলও করা যায়। তবে, তামাদি গণনা এবং অভিযোগ দায়েরের সময়সীমা দ্বিতীয় নোটিশের প্রকৃতির উপর নির্ভর করে। মামলার সূত্র: এস. এম. স মিলস বনাম কাবেরী টিম্বার কোং [S. M. Saw Mills v. Cauvery Timber Co. [2004(3) AI CLR 591 (Mad)]] Stop Payment Since the cheques were returned by bank with the endorsement "payment stopped by the drawer" it is to be presumed that those were returned unpaid because the amount of money standing to the credit of that account was insufficient to honour of the cheque as envisaged in section 138 of the Act. Of course this is a rebuttable presumption. The defence can be considered at the time of holding trial and not in an application under section 561 A of the Code. SM Redwan vs Md Rezaul Islam, 66 DLR (AD) 169








Premature Case Under NI Act Legislature has not created any absolute bar in filing a petition of complaint before expiry of thirty days of the receipt of the notice issued under clause (b) of the proviso to section 138 as created in case of filing a petition of complaint after expiry of one month of the date on which the cause of action arises under clause (c) of the proviso to section 138. Prematurity shall be cured the moment the period of thirty days expires and the payment of the dishonoured cheque is not made within the said period. Zahidul Islam (Md) vs Md Kamal Hossain, 66 DLR (AD) 180








Defective Consideration Negotiable Instruments Act [XXVI of 1881] Section 138 read with Code of Criminal Procedure [V of 1898] Sections 375, 423, 428, 435 and 439 Additional evidence The High Court Division observed that since the presumption raised about the defective consideration as written in the cheque in question, that has to be proved or disproved by the respective party and in proving their own case they have to be given a chance again to proof their own claim by producing their supporting respective evidence. And to that extent, the High Court Division is inclined to send the case back to the appellate Court below who is the last Court of fact and has ignored the certain admitted facts of the case as well as the grounds taken and placed in appeal before him for deciding the said appeal and as such, he is bound to discover the actual truth as behind the allegation brought in the case and then upon taking the additional evidence he has to make a decision thereto in accordance with law; however, keeping in mind the observations as made above by our apex Court and inasmuch as of the apex Court of this sub-continent. Hence, by the empowerment of section 439 read with section 375 inasmuch as following the provisions of section 423 & 428 of the Cr.P.C the High Court Division is inclined to send the case back to the appellate Court below to hold retrial of the case for taking decision upon enabling both the affected parties to place their additional evidence about to prove their own case as well as to prove and disprove the presumption raised herein. [2022] 24 ALR (HCD) 113]








2.5 Guidelines for the learned Magistrates who are empowered to take cognizance of the offence under section 138 of the NI Act: 1. The learned Magistrates shall not entertain any petition of complaint under section 138 of the NI Act unless the same contains the following statements: (a) Date of issuance of the cheque in question, (b) Date of dishonour of the said cheque for the last occasion i.e. the latest date of dishonour, (c) Date of receiving information as to the dishonouring of the cheque by the payee from the bank, (d) Date of making written demand (by delivering it in person/by registered post/by publication in the Bangla national newspaper) by the payee to the issuer/drawer of the cheque, (e) Date of receipt of the demand notice by the issuer/drawer of the cheque. 2 . After going through the complaint petition, if the learned Magistrate finds that a single statement of the above statements is missing, s/he shall decline to examine the complainant under section 200 of the CrPC. 3. When the learned Magistrate would be satisfied that the above steps were perfectly taken by the payee as per the provisions of clauses (a) to (c) of the Proviso to section 138 of the NI Act, then, the learned Magistrate shall check as to whether the payee has approached the Court within one month from the date of receipt of the written demand notice. 4. If the learned Magistrate finds that the payee has approached the Court upon complying with the above provisions of law, only then s/he is competent to exercise his/her power of taking cognizance. 5 . The learned Magistrates shall bear in mind that if, at this stage, the complainant simply makes statements in respect of the above steps in addition to producing the original cheque in question, it will be sufficient for the complainant to initiate his/her case, for, it shall rest upon the complainant to prove his/her above statements by adducing oral/documentary evidence at the trial. 2.6. Guidelines for the learned Sessions Judges/Additional Sessions Judges/Joint Sessions Judges who are conducting the trial of the cases under section 138 of the NI Act: (1) When an application for discharge under section 265C of the CrPC is filed by the accused only on the ground of noncompliance of the provisions of the clauses (a) to (c) of the Proviso to section 138 and section 141 (b) of the NI Act, the trial Court must not hesitate to discharge the accused if it appears to the Court that neither the petition of complaint contains nor the statements made by the complainant at the time of examination under section 200 of the CrPC disclose the information enunciated hereinbefore under the caption "Guidelines for the learned Magistrates". (2) If the above information is provided in writing in an application under section 265C of the CrPC by the accused, the trial Court should not regard it as defence version, for, in bringing the noncompliance to the above provisions of section 138 and 141 of the NI Act, the complainant is simply seeking to draw the attention of the Court that the petition of complaint does not or the statements made under section 200 of the CrPC do not disclose any offence. At this stage, the trial Court shall not emphasize on the document/s in corroboration of the statements made by the complainant as to the various dates, because the complainant shall have the opportunity to prove his/her statements either by oral evidence or by documentary evidence at the time of making his/her deposition as a witness. (3) No accused shall be discharged on the basis of the defence version i.e. any information provided or documents produced by the accused at this stage in an application under section 265C of the CrPC. However, if the defence version taken by the accused in the discharge application appears to the Court to be prima facie plausible, the Court should endeavour to complete the trial of the case within the shortest possible time to minimize the harassments. 70 DLR (2018) 303 ২.৫ এন আই আইনের ১৩৮ ধারার অধীনে অপরাধ আমলে নেওয়ার ক্ষমতাপ্রাপ্ত বিজ্ঞ ম্যাজিস্ট্রেটদের জন্য নির্দেশিকা: ১. বিজ্ঞ ম্যাজিস্ট্রেটগণ এন আই আইনের ১৩৮ ধারার অধীনে কোনো অভিযোগের আবেদন গ্রহণ করবেন না যদি না তাতে নিম্নলিখিত বক্তব্যগুলো থাকে: (ক) প্রশ্নযুক্ত চেকের ইস্যু করার তারিখ, (খ) শেষ বারের মতো অর্থাৎ সর্বশেষ তারিখের অসম্মানের জন্য উক্ত চেকের অসম্মানের তারিখ, (গ) ব্যাংক কর্তৃক প্রাপকের কাছে চেক অসম্মানিত হওয়ার তথ্য পাওয়ার তারিখ, (ঘ) প্রাপক কর্তৃক চেকের ইস্যুকারী/আহবায়ককে লিখিত চাহিদা জানানোর তারিখ (স্বশরীরে/রেজিস্টার্ড ডাকযোগে/বাংলা জাতীয় দৈনিকে প্রকাশের মাধ্যমে), (ঙ) চেকের ইস্যুকারী/আহবায়ক কর্তৃক চাহিদার নোটিশ প্রাপ্তির তারিখ। ২. অভিযোগের আবেদনটি খতিয়ে দেখার পর, যদি বিজ্ঞ ম্যাজিস্ট্রেট দেখেন যে উপরের বক্তব্যগুলোর একটিও অনুপস্থিত, তাহলে তিনি ফৌজদারি কার্যবিধির ২০০ ধারার অধীনে অভিযোগকারীকে পরীক্ষা করতে অস্বীকার করবেন। ৩. যখন বিজ্ঞ ম্যাজিস্ট্রেট সন্তুষ্ট হবেন যে এন আই আইনের ১৩৮ ধারার শর্তাংশের (ক) থেকে (গ) উপধারা অনুযায়ী প্রাপক কর্তৃক উপরের পদক্ষেপগুলি সঠিকভাবে নেওয়া হয়েছে, তখন, বিজ্ঞ ম্যাজিস্ট্রেট পরীক্ষা করবেন যে প্রাপক লিখিত চাহিদার নোটিশ প্রাপ্তির তারিখ থেকে এক মাসের মধ্যে আদালতের দ্বারস্থ হয়েছেন কিনা। ৪. যদি বিজ্ঞ ম্যাজিস্ট্রেট দেখেন যে প্রাপক আইনের উপরের বিধানগুলি মেনে চলার পর আদালতের দ্বারস্থ হয়েছেন, তাহলেই তিনি আমলে নেওয়ার ক্ষমতা প্রয়োগ করতে সক্ষম। ৫. বিজ্ঞ ম্যাজিস্ট্রেটগণ মনে রাখবেন যে, এই পর্যায়ে, অভিযোগকারী যদি প্রশ্নযুক্ত মূল চেক উপস্থাপনের পাশাপাশি উপরের পদক্ষেপগুলির বিষয়ে কেবল বক্তব্য রাখেন, তাহলে অভিযোগকারীর মামলা শুরু করার জন্য তা যথেষ্ট হবে, কারণ, বিচারে মৌখিক/দলিল প্রমাণ পেশ করে অভিযোগকারীকে তার উপরের বক্তব্য প্রমাণ করতে হবে। ২.৬ এন আই আইনের ১৩৮ ধারার অধীনে মামলা পরিচালনারত বিজ্ঞ দায়রা জজ/অতিরিক্ত দায়রা জজ/যুগ্ম দায়রা জজদের জন্য নির্দেশিকা: (১) যখন ফৌজদারি কার্যবিধির ২৬৫সি ধারার অধীনে কোনো অব্যাহতি চেয়ে আবেদন অভিযুক্ত কর্তৃক কেবল এন আই আইনের ১৩৮ ধারার শর্তাংশের (ক) থেকে (গ) উপধারা এবং ১৪১ (খ) ধারার বিধানাবলী অনুসরণ না করার ভিত্তিতে দাখিল করা হয়, তখন যদি আদালতের কাছে প্রতীয়মান হয় যে "বিজ্ঞ ম্যাজিস্ট্রেটদের জন্য নির্দেশিকা" শিরোনামের অধীনে পূর্বে বর্ণিত তথ্য অভিযোগের আবেদনেও নেই বা ফৌজদারি কার্যবিধির ২০০ ধারার অধীনে পরীক্ষার সময় অভিযোগকারীর দেওয়া বক্তব্যেও প্রকাশ পায় না, তাহলে বিচারিক আদালত অভিযুক্তকে অব্যাহতি দিতে দ্বিধা করবে না। (২) যদি অভিযুক্ত কর্তৃক ফৌজদারি কার্যবিধির ২৬৫সি ধারার অধীনে কোনো আবেদনে উপরের তথ্য লিখিতভাবে প্রদান করা হয়, তাহলে বিচারিক আদালতের এটিকে প্রতিরক্ষার বক্তব্য হিসেবে বিবেচনা করা উচিত নয়, কারণ, এন আই আইনের ১৩৮ এবং ১৪১ ধারার উপরের বিধানাবলী অনুসরণ না করার বিষয়টি উত্থাপন করে, অভিযোগকারী কেবল আদালতের দৃষ্টি আকর্ষণ করতে চাইছেন যে অভিযোগের আবেদনে কোনো অপরাধ প্রকাশ পায় না অথবা ফৌজদারি কার্যবিধির ২০০ ধারার অধীনে দেওয়া বক্তব্যে কোনো অপরাধ প্রকাশ পায় না। এই পর্যায়ে, বিচারিক আদালতের বিভিন্ন তারিখ সম্পর্কে অভিযোগকারীর দেওয়া বক্তব্যের সমর্থনে দলিলের উপর জোর দেওয়া উচিত নয়, কারণ সাক্ষী হিসেবে তার জবানবন্দি দেওয়ার সময় অভিযোগকারীর মৌখিক প্রমাণ বা দলিল প্রমাণের মাধ্যমে তার বক্তব্য প্রমাণ করার সুযোগ থাকবে। (৩) ফৌজদারি কার্যবিধির ২৬৫সি ধারার অধীনে কোনো আবেদনে এই পর্যায়ে অভিযুক্ত কর্তৃক প্রদত্ত কোনো তথ্য বা দাখিলকৃত দলিলের ভিত্তিতে অর্থাৎ প্রতিরক্ষার বক্তব্যের ভিত্তিতে কোনো অভিযুক্তকে অব্যাহতি দেওয়া হবে না। তবে, অব্যাহতি চেয়ে আবেদনে অভিযুক্ত কর্তৃক গৃহীত প্রতিরক্ষার বক্তব্য যদি আদালতের কাছে প্রথম দর্শনে বিশ্বাসযোগ্য মনে হয়, তাহলে হয়রানি কমাতে আদালতের যত তাড়াতাড়ি সম্ভব মামলার বিচার শেষ করার চেষ্টা করা উচিত। ৭০ ডিএলআর (২০১৮) ৩০৩








Authority to File Complaint by Company Satish And Company vs S.R. Traders And Ors. on 28 November, 1996 Equivalent citations: 1997(1)ALD(CRI)745, 1997(1)ALT(CRI)696, [1999]95COMPCAS836(AP), 1998CRILJ419 Author: B.S. Raikote Bench: B.S. Raikote JUDGMENT 1. This appeal is preferred by the complainant by name M/s. Satish and company being aggrieved by the judgment and order dt. 31-12-1994 passed by the III Metropolitan Magistrate, Hyderabad in C.C. No. 229 of 1993. By the impugned order, the Court below acquitted the accused for the offence under S. 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (for short 'the Act'). The learned counsel appearing for the appellant strenuously contended that the entire approach of the Court below is totally erroneous and on the basis of the material recorded an offence is constituted under S. 138 of the Act and as such, the impugned order is liable to be set aside and the accused are liable to be convicted for the offence they are charged with. The learned counsel appearing for the respondents supported the order. 2. In order to appreciate the rival contentions it is necessary for me to notice the facts of the case. 3. It is alleged by the complainant that A-1 is the firm and A-2 to A-4 are its partners. The accused were purchasing goods from the complainant on credit basis and A-1 was accordingly issuing the cheques for the goods purchased. In relation to such a transaction, the accused issued cheque dated 9-6-1993 for an amount of Rs. 81,450/- drawn on State Bank of India, Begum Bazar Branch, marked in the case as Ex. P. 2. The accused also issued two other cheques dated 11-6-1993 for an amount of Rs. 82,700/- marked as Ex. P. 3 and the third cheque dated 10-6-1993 for an amount of Rs. 82,200/- marked as Ex. P. 4. The latter two cheques were drawn on A.P. Mahesh Co-operative Urban Bank Limited, Begum Bazar. The complainant accordingly presented the cheques to the Banks but the Banks returned Ex. P. 2 on 11-6-1993 vide bank Memo Ex. P. 5, and Ex. P. 3 was returned on 14-6-1993 under bank endorsement Ex. P. 6 and Ex. P. 4 cheque was also returned on the same day i.e. on 14-6-1993 vide bank endorsement Ex. P. 7. All these cheques were returned by the Banks on the ground of 'insufficient funds and effect not cleared'. Thereafter, the complainant issued a notice dated 18-3-1993 vide Ex. P. 8 and the same was received in time by the accused and accordingly the accused also gave reply to the said notice vide Ex. P. 9 dated 3-7-1993. Since the accused did not pay the amount within fifteen days as per S. 138 of the Act, the complainant filed a complaint on 20-7-1993. On the same day, after examining the complaint, the Court has taken the cognizance of the offence and proceeded with the trial of the case. On behalf of the Company, its manager by name Naresh Kumar has been examined as P.W. 1. On the appreciation of the entire material the Court below has acquitted the respondents, for the offence under S. 138 of the Act. It is in these circumstances, the complainant has come up to this Court by way of this appeal. 4. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that the entire approach of the Court below is in error. He elaborated his argument contending that the Court below was wrong in holding that the complainant was incompetent to lodge the complaint. He submitted that the complainant is M/s. Satish and Company and the complaint was filed through its Manager Sri Naresh Kumar. It is stated in the cause title of the complaint that it was filed by M/s. Satish and Company by its Manager. Therefore, the Court below is not right in holding that such a complaint was not made by a competent person. At any rate, he submitted that Ex. P. 1 though filed after one year authorising the Manager to initiate proceedings either civil or criminal, it cannot be said that the Manager was not competent to file the present complaint. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the alleged authorisation Ex. P. 1 was not filed along with the complaint but it was filled after one year of the filing of the complaint and as such the fact remains that as on the date of filing of the complaint, no such authorisation letter was filed. Therefore, the complaint, as filed on 20-7-1993 itself was not maintainable and filing such authorisation if any later, would not cure the legal infirmity. Therefore, he submitted that the Court below is correct in holding that the complaint was not competent and accordingly it has rightly acquitted the accused. 5. Having regard to this kind of controversy, the short point that arises for my consideration is whether the complaint filed by and on behalf of the company under the name and style M/s. Satish and Company was competent as on the date of filing the same i.e. as on 20-7-1993 and what is the effect of the alleged authorisation letter, Ex. P. 1 in favour of P.W. 1 filed after one year. 6. In order to appreciate the rival contentions I have to note a few admitted facts. It is an admitted fact that the complaint in question was filed by M/s. Satish and Company represented by its Manager, Mr. N. K. Gupta. It is also an admitted fact that along with the complaint no letter or any resolution of the company was filed to show that the Manager was authorised to file the complaint. It is also not in dispute that a letter said to have been dated 17-6-1993 is filed in the case vide Ex. P-1 after one year of filing of the complaint. Now the short question, therefore would be whether the complaint was competent as on the date of filing of the complaint, i.e. as on 20-7-1993, and whether Ex. P-1 can be taken as the ratification on behalf of the Company for the action taken by the Manager P.W. 1 in filing the complaint and even if it is so, would it be a valid ratification. 7. In order to consider these points, I have to necessarily refer to some of the provisions of the N.I. Act. Section 142(a) provides that no Court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under S. 138 except upon a complaint, in writing, made by the payee or, as the case may be, the holder in due course of the cheque. 8. From this section, it follows that the offence under S. 138 is made non-cognizable and such an offence can be taken cognizance of only upon a complaint made by the payee or the holder in due course. According to the three cheques marked as Exs. P-2, P-3 and P-4 the payee is M/s. Satish and Company. Therefore, the complaint should have been filed by M/s. Satish and Company. Such a complaint also could be filed by a person who is a holder in due course of the cheque. The Manager cannot be construed to be a person holder in due course of the cheque in terms of the definition of 'holder in due course' found under S. 9 of the Act. Therefore, it is only M/s. Satish and Company alone who is entitled to file a complaint. But the Company being a corporate body and it breathes its life only through authorised officers or agents and if that is so, any officer of the company who is duly authorised by the company to initiate proceedings can file a complaint for and on behalf of the company. 9. The learned counsel for the complainant submitted that the complaint being filed by the Manager being one of the officers of the company was competent as on the date of the filing of the complaint. But the learned counsel for the respondent submitted that a Manager can file the complaint only if he is duly authorised by the Company and for that purpose he has to produce with the complaint any authorisation letter or power of attorney and he submitted that in the instant case, the complainant did not file anything of that sort when the complaint was filed. Therefore, as on the date of the filing of the, complaint it was an incompetent complaint and not validly instituted and on the basis of such a complaint, the Court is not entitled to take cognizance of the offence. 10. I have given a very anxious consideration to the case. The Act does not provide any mode as to how a complaint can be filed by and on behalf of the company. However, under S. 141 of the Act, if the offence is committed by a company under S. 138 of the Act, it is provided that "every person who, at the time the offence was committed, was in charge of, and was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company, as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to he proceeded against and punished accordingly. A proviso added to 141 (1) further states that : "Nothing contained in this sub-section shall render any person liable to punishment if he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge, or that he had exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence." Sub-clause (2) of S. 141 further provides that, in case it is proved that the offence has been committed with the consent or connivance attributable to any neglect on the part of any director, manager, Secretary or other officer of the Company, such Director, Manager, Secretary or other officer of the company shall also be deemed to be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly. Under the explanation "Company" has been defined as body corporate including a firm and other association of individuals" and a 'Director' in relation to a firm is also defined as 'a partner in the firm.' 11. Thus, from the reading of S. 141 of the Act, so far as the firm or any company or a corporate body is concerned, a person who was incharge of or was responsible to the Company shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence for the purpose of S. 138 of the Act. 12. On the basis of S. 141 of the Act, though it contemplates a case in which a company is an accused, on the basis of analogy, even in case of company being the complainant it can be inferred that the person who can file a complaint on behalf of the company would be a person who is incharge of or was responsible to the company. In other words, he must be a person whose actions would be binding on the company. 13. Section 26 and 27 of the N.I. Act also deal with similar situations in relation to promissory notes, bills, cheques, etc. Under S. 26 of the Act. "Every person capable of contracting, according to the law to which he is subject may bind himself and be bound by the making, drawing, acceptance, indorsement, delivery and negotiation of a promissory note, bill of exchange or cheque." The proviso to S. 26 of the Act further adds that : "Nothing herein contained shall be deemed to empower a corporation to make, indorse or accept such instruments except in cases in which, under the law for the time being in force, they are so empowered." 14. From these sections, it is clear that such a person to bind the corporation or a company must be a person empowered by law so as to bind such corporation. For instance, in case of companies registered under the Companies Act, the memorandum of article itself may specify as to who should institute or defend proceedings for and on behalf of the company and such an authorised person can file a complaint. There may be another person who acts as an agent capable of binding himself or of being bound, as mentioned in S. 26 of the Act "duly authorised agent acting in his name". A proviso to S. 27 further provides that : "A general authority to transact business and to receive and discharge debts does not confer upon an agent the power of accepting or indorsing bills of exchange so as to hind his principal and any authority to draw bills of exchange does not of itself import an authority to indorse." 15. From this section a further principle evolves that "a duly authorised agent" can also file a complaint, suit or any legal proceedings in the competent court of law. In other words, he must be such a person that his actions would bind the company which he represents, whether he is called a Manager, Secretary or by any other designation. 16. In fact, corporations being only inanimate legal persons necessarily have to act through such authorised persons and on the basis of an authority under any law or under specific instrument such person can sign the pleadings and file or defend proceedings for and on behalf of such corporation or a company. 17. In this context Order XXIX, Rule 1 of CPC also deserves to be noted and it reads as under : "In suits by or against a corporation, any pleading may be signed and verified on behalf of the corporation by the Secretary or by any director or other principal officer of the Corporation who is able to depose to the facts of the case." 18. Interpreting the import of Order XXIX of CPC in "M/s. Kalpaka Shrimp Exports v. Kerala Financial Corporation" held that any officer generally or specially authorised by the Board in that behalf could be regarded as the "Principal Officer of the Corporation". The High Court of Delhi in "M/s. Nibro Ltd. v. National Insurance Co. Ltd." , held that for the purpose of Order XXIX, CPC unless a power to institute a suit is specifically conferred on a particular director, he has no authority to institute a suit on behalf of the company. As held by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in "Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. v. Sardar Chand" , such authorisation could also be by way of delegation of powers to the other officers, under any statute, or rule authorising them to file a suit, appeal, etc. 19. From the above analysis of the general principles of law regarding corporations and companies it follows that under S. 142 of the Act, a complaint can be filed by the payee or by the holder in due course or by their duly authorised officer. To the same effect is also the law declared by the High Court of Madras in "M/s. Ruby Leather Exports v. K. Venu Rep. Vandana Chemicals etc. (1994) 1 Crimes 820. In this case, the High Court of Madras considered a batch of petitions filed under S. 482 of Cr. P.C. seeking quashing of the proceedings on the ground that the complaints under S. 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act were filed by or on behalf of certain firms and companies without due authorisation. The point that was raised for consideration was as under : "Can a power of Attorney Agent or a person authorised in writing by payee or holder in due course be competent to make a complaint in writing under S. 142(a) of the Negotiable Instruments Act to facilitate valid cognizance being taken by the Magistrate ?" 20. After considering the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and other High Courts the High Court of Madras held as under : "Whenever the statute, required a particular act to be done personally, it stood so mentioned. The law laid down by Paripoornan, J. is one more indication, that when the statute, does not insist, that the complaint should be filed personally by the payee or the holder in due course, such a meaning cannot be read into it. There cannot be any dispute, that when the law specified, that an act should be done in that way, and not in any other way. Once there cannot be any doubt, that the power of Attorney agent is virtually the payee himself or the holder in due course, it cannot be construed, that the Act of filing a complaint by a power of Attorney, is done in a way not contemplated by S. 142(a) of the Act. It will not be possible to hold, on the analogy of S. 141 of the Act, which refers to offences by companies, that such of those persons contemplated therein, will also be competent to file complaints, when the statute is silent on that aspect. If a power of Attorney Agent can act instead of an individual payee or a holder in due course, it will equally be competent for a power of Attorney Agent of a company, explained under S. 141 of the Act, meaning anybody corporate including a firm or other association of individuals, to file a complaint, on behalf of the company. The answer to the question posed, is that a Power of Attorney Agent of the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, will be competent to make a complaint in writing under S. 142(a) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, to facilitate valid cognizance being taken by the Magistrate." 21. After enunciating the principle, as above, the High Court of Madras quashed those proceedings in which no authorisation was filed along with the complaint (and dismissed the criminal petitions in which either authorised or power of attorneys were filed for and on behalf of the payee at the time of filing of the complaint.). 22. At this stage, I may also notice the other contention of the learned counsel for the appellant herein that in the instant case, the Manager being an employee of the company is deemed to be authorised to file the complaint. But, according to me the powers of the Manager are slightly different from that of the Managing Director of a company. A Managing Director may derive his powers from the articles of association directly or for certain other acts he may be authorised to do so, but in case of a Manager such powers may be traced either to his appointment order or to specific authorisation given to him regarding a particular aspect or aspects of the business. It is quite common that there are Purchase managers, entitled to make only purchases and there are Sales managers authorised only to sell the commodities etc. Therefore, on the basis of designation that one is it cannot be inferred that he has all the powers of the firm or a company or any corporate body including the power to file the complaint. The designation 'Manager' does not clothe a person with all the powers to file a suit and defend the suit or file a complaint for or on behalf of the company. In fact, dealing with a similar situation, the High Court of Madras in "Sudesh Kumar Sharma v. Selvamani" (1994) 4 Cur Cri R 2374 held that a person who is competent to file a complaint under S. 138 of the Act must be a payee or a holder in due course. It further held that by no stretch of imagination, a Manager of the company can be said to be a payee or a holder in due course. Therefore, unless there is specific authorisation, a complaint filed by such manager was incompetent. However, the learned counsel for the appellant tried to distinguish that case by contending that in that case the complaint was filed by Selvamani in his individual capacity but not as a Manager though he described himself as a Manager. But, according to me, the facts of the case do not matter much for proper appreciation of the principle of law that such a Manager should be an authorised person. Even if the cause title of the complaint describes the company as the complainant through the Manager, the point for consideration would be whether such a complaint is competent without such authorisation. According to me even if the company is the complainant represented by its Manager, such Manager shall necessarily be an authorised Manager so that the Magistrate can take cognizance of the offence. Thus, in my humble opinion, the other decision of the High Court of Madras in "M/s. Gopalakrishna Trading Co. v. D. Baskaran" 1992 (1) Mad WN (Cri) 236 : 1992 (Supp) MWN (Cr) Mad (sic) that a manager is competent to institute complaint without any authorisation by the company cannot be taken as laying down correct law. 23. The next question that arises in this case is that even in such cases where proper authorisation letter or power of attorney was not filed, along with the complaint, whether the company can ratify such actions later or whether such authorisation letter can be filed later so as to regularise the irregular proceedings. 24. The learned counsel for the appellant-complainant brought to my notice that in this case Ex. P-1, a letter, authorising the Manager to institute the proceedings was filed after one year and on that basis he submitted that the defect, if any, in filing the complaint stands cured and therefore the complaint was properly instituted. I am afraid that this contention also cannot be accepted for more than one reason. If there was no proper authorisation as on the date of filing of the complaint, the Court could not have taken cognizance of the offence since it was not a proper complaint in terms of S. 142(a) of the Act. 25. The object of law in all such cases, that the complaint or suit shall be filed by a person duly authorised, is that, such proceedings will definitely have financial consequences on the company so as to bind the company for the actions of such persons. A company which suffered, a decree or order, at the hands of such a person, who was not duly authorised, may repudiate the order and decree of a competent Court as not binding. Even in criminal cases an aggrieved person may also file a suit for malicious prosecution in case a false complaint was filed. Even in such cases also the company may take up a plea that it was not bound by the actions of a particular officer on the ground that he was not duly authorised in that behalf. Therefore, a principle has emerged that any legal proceedings whether criminal or civil shall be instituted by the company through its authorised officers, so as to bind the company. In this view of the matter, therefore, there shall be a proper initiation of the proceedings by filing a proper complaint so that the Court may take cognizance of the same and if the complaint, as filed, was not maintainable as on the date of its filing, it was liable to be dismissed and subsequent ratification cannot revive it. For this principle, I am supported by a judgment of the High Court of Madras in "K. N. Sankaranarayanan v. Shree Consultations" (1994) 80 Com Cas 558. In that case, one of the Directors filed a petition for prevention of oppression and mismanagement on behalf of the company without the approval of the Board of Directors and on that basis it was contended that such a suit instituted without the authority of the Board was incompetent. Negativing the contention of the other side in that case, that subsequently, a letter of consent to file the petition under Ss. 397 and 398 of the Companies Act was given, the Court held that any cause instituted without the authority makes it invalid from its inception and cannot be validated by a later ratification and accordingly the proceedings initiated by one of the Directors without the resolution of the company was dismissed as not maintainable. In this context, I further make it clear that in terms of S. 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, another duly authorised complaint could be filed in time i.e. within one month from the date of cause of action. In this view of the matter, Ex. P-1, a letter of authorisation filed after one year cannot be taken as a proper ratification of the action initiated by P.W. 1. Because if it is taken that on the date of Ex. P-1, letter (filed after one year), a duly constituted complaint is filed, it would be barred by limitation of one month prescribed by S. 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Moreover nothing prevented the complainant to withdraw the complaint himself voluntarily and file another complaint with proper authorisation within the time permitted by S. 142 of the Act. 26. For the above reasons, I do not find any illegality or infirmity in the order of the Court below and hence I pass the order as under : 27. The Criminal Appeal is dismissed. 28. Appeal dismissed.








In the case of Raghu Lakshminarayanan vs. M/s. Fine Tubes (2007) 5 SCC 103, Hon'ble The Supreme Court of India elucidatedly held that in case of proprietorship concern, it is only the proprietor who can be held liable under Section 138 of NI Act, on account of the fact that proprietorship concern has no separate legal identity. A sole proprietorship firm would therefore not fall within the scope and ambit 3 of 10 of Section 141 of NI Act. The para as relevant to the present case reads thus:- "It is settled position in law that the concept of vicarious liability introduced in Negotiable Instruments Act is attracted only against the Directors, partners or other persons in charge and control of the business of the company, or otherwise responsible for its affairs. Section 141 of NI Act not covers within its ambit, the proprietary concern. The proprietary concern is not a juristic person so as to attract the concept of vicarious liability. The concept of vicarious liability is attracted only in the case of juristic person, such as the company registered under the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956 or the partnership firm registered under the provisions of Partnership Act, 1932 or association of persons which ordinarily would mean a body of persons which is not incorporated under any statute. The proprietary concern stands absolutely on different footing. A person may carry on a business in the name of the business concern being proprietor of such proprietary concern. In such case the proprietor of proprietary concern alone can be held responsible for the conduct of business carried in the name of such proprietary concern. Therefore, Section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act have no applicability in a case involving the offence committed by a proprietary concern." High Court of Delhi in the case of M. M. Lal vs. State NCT of Delhi 2012 (4) JCC 284, held thus:- "It is well settled that a sole proprietorship firm has no separate legal identity and in fact is a business name of the sole proprietor. Thus, any reference to sole proprietorship firm means and includes sole proprietor thereof and vice versa. Sole proprietorship firm would not fall within the ambit and scope of Section 141 of the Act, which envisages that if the person committing an offence under Section 138 is a company, every person who, at the time of offence was committed, was in-charge of, and was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company, as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly. Company includes a partnership firm and any other association of individuals. The sole proprietorship firm would not fall within the meaning of partnership firm or association of individual. Thus, in the case of a proprietorship concern, only the proprietor can be held liable under Section 138 NI Act as the proprietorship concern and the proprietor are one and the same."








Joint Account Holder Under NI Act Aparna A. Shah v. Sheth Developers Private Limited & Anr., reported in (2013) 8 SCC 71 আপিলকারী: শ্রীমতি অপর্ণা এ. শাহ প্রতিপক্ষ: মেসার্স শেঠ ডেভেলপার্স প্রাইভেট লিমিটেড এবং অন্য একজন মামলা: ফৌজদারি আপিল নং ৮১৩ অফ ২০১৩ (বিশেষ অনুমতি পিটিশন (ফৌজদারি) নং ৯৭৯৪ অফ ২০১০ থেকে উদ্ভূত) সুপ্রিম কোর্ট, ভারত বিচারক: পি. সাথাসিভাম এবং জগদীশ সিং খেহার সিদ্ধান্ত: আপিল মঞ্জুর; অপর্ণা শাহের বিরুদ্ধে দায়ের করা মামলা বাতিল। মামলার সংক্ষিপ্ত ঘটনা: শেঠ ডেভেলপার্স, একটি নির্মাণ সংস্থা, পানভেলের আশেপাশে একটি টাউনশিপ প্রকল্প এবং বিশেষ অর্থনৈতিক অঞ্চল (SEZ) গড়ে তুলতে আগ্রহী ছিল। তারা অপর্ণা শাহ এবং তার স্বামীর সাথে পরিচিত হয়, যারা ভূমি একত্রীকরণকারী এবং বিকাশকারী হিসাবে কাজ করতেন। শাহ দম্পতি দাবি করেন যে তাদের পানভেলের আশেপাশে জমি আছে যা প্রকল্পের জন্য উপযুক্ত, কিন্তু তাদের নিজস্বভাবে এটি বিকাশের আর্থিক সামর্থ্য নেই। শেঠ ডেভেলপার্স এই উপস্থাপনার উপর বিশ্বাস করে, জমিটির শিরোনাম নথি পরিদর্শনের জন্য শাহ দম্পতিকে ২৫ কোটি রুপি দেয়, এই শর্তে যে প্রকল্পটি বাস্তবায়িত না হলে অর্থ ফেরত দেওয়া হবে। প্রকল্পটি শেষ পর্যন্ত ভেস্তে যায়, এবং শাহ দম্পতি দাবি করেন যে শেঠ ডেভেলপার্সের অনুরোধে প্রাথমিক যৌথ উদ্যোগের খরচ মেটাতে ২৫ কোটি রুপি খরচ হয়ে গেছে। পরে, শেঠ ডেভেলপার্স আরেকটি নতুন প্রকল্প শুরু করতে তাদের ব্যাংক থেকে আর্থিক সুবিধা নিতে চেয়েছিল। তারা শাহ দম্পতির কাছে আসে এবং জানায় যে ব্যাংকের কাছ থেকে সুবিধা পাওয়ার জন্য তাদের পর্যাপ্ত জামানত নেই এবং লিখিতভাবে প্রাপ্য দেখাতে হবে। সেই অনুযায়ী, শেঠ ডেভেলপার্স এবং শাহ দম্পতির মধ্যে একটি সমঝোতার ভিত্তিতে, শাহের স্বামী তাদের যৌথ অ্যাকাউন্ট থেকে ২৫ কোটি রুপির একটি চেক দেন। শাহ দম্পতির দাবি, এই সমঝোতা ভঙ্গ করে, শেঠ ডেভেলপার্স ৫ ফেব্রুয়ারি, ২০০৯ তারিখে চেকটি আইডিবিআই ব্যাংকে জমা দেয় এবং "অপর্যাপ্ত তহবিল"-এর কারণে চেকটি প্রত্যাখ্যান হয়। ১৮ ফেব্রুয়ারি, ২০০৯ তারিখে, নেগোশিয়েবল ইনস্ট্রুমেন্টস অ্যাক্ট, ১৮৮১ (এনআই অ্যাক্ট)-এর ধারা ১৩৮ এর অধীনে একটি বিধিবদ্ধ নোটিশ অপর্ণা শাহ এবং তার স্বামীকে ২৫ কোটি রুপি পরিশোধ করার জন্য বলা হয়। ৬ মার্চ, ২০০৯ তারিখে, শাহ দম্পতি একটি উত্তর পাঠান, যেখানে চেকটি কোন পরিস্থিতিতে দেওয়া হয়েছিল তা উল্লেখ করা হয় এবং সহায়ক কাগজপত্রও যুক্ত করা হয়। ৪ এপ্রিল, ২০০৯ তারিখে, মেট্রোপলিটন ম্যাজিস্ট্রেট, দাদার, মুম্বাইয়ের আদালতে শাহ দম্পতি এবং তাদের স্বামীর বিরুদ্ধে একটি অভিযোগ দায়ের করা হয়, যা মামলা নং ১১৭১-এসএস অফ ২০০৯ হিসাবে নিবন্ধিত হয়। ২০ এপ্রিল, ২০০৯ তারিখে, তাদের বিরুদ্ধে প্রক্রিয়া জারি করা হয়। শাহ দম্পতি এই প্রক্রিয়ার বিরুদ্ধে হাইকোর্টে একটি রিট পিটিশন দায়ের করেন। হাইকোর্ট তাদের আবেদন আংশিকভাবে মঞ্জুর করেন এবং একটি আদেশ বাতিল করেন, তবে কার্যক্রম বাতিল করতে অস্বীকার করেন। এরপর অপর্ণা শাহ সুপ্রিম কোর্টে আপিল করেন। আদালতের সিদ্ধান্ত ৬) আমরা প্রতিদ্বন্দ্বী দাখিলগুলি সাবধানে বিবেচনা করেছি এবং সমস্ত প্রাসঙ্গিক উপকরণ পড়েছি। আলোচনা: ৭) প্রতিদ্বন্দ্বী বক্তব্যগুলি বোঝার জন্য, এন.আই. আইনের ধারা ১৩৮ উল্লেখ করা उपयोगी। যা নীচে উল্লেখ করা হলো: “১৩৮. তহবিলের অপর্যাপ্ততা ইত্যাদির কারণে চেক প্রত্যাখ্যান।—যেখানে কোনো ব্যক্তি কর্তৃক রক্ষিত ব্যাংক অ্যাকাউন্টে অন্য কোনো ব্যক্তিকে কোনো পরিমাণ অর্থ পরিশোধের জন্য কাটা কোনো চেক, উক্ত অ্যাকাউন্ট থেকে কোনো ঋণ বা অন্য কোনো দায় সম্পূর্ণ বা আংশিকভাবে পরিশোধের জন্য, যদি ব্যাংক কর্তৃক অপরিশোধিত অবস্থায় ফেরত দেওয়া হয়, কারণ সেই অ্যাকাউন্টে জমা অর্থের পরিমাণ চেকটি পরিশোধ করার জন্য অপর্যাপ্ত অথবা এটি সেই পরিমাণ অতিক্রম করে যা উক্ত ব্যাংকের সাথে চুক্তির মাধ্যমে উক্ত অ্যাকাউন্ট থেকে পরিশোধ করার ব্যবস্থা করা হয়েছে, তবে উক্ত ব্যক্তিকে অপরাধী বলে গণ্য করা হবে এবং এই আইনের অন্য কোনো বিধানের প্রতিকূলতা ছাড়াই, দুই বছর পর্যন্ত মেয়াদ পর্যন্ত কারাদণ্ডে দণ্ডিত করা হবে, অথবা চেকের পরিমাণের দ্বিগুণ পর্যন্ত জরিমানা করা হবে, অথবা উভয় দণ্ডে দণ্ডিত করা হবে: তবে এই ধারায় বর্ণিত কিছুই প্রযোজ্য হবে না যদি না— (ক) চেকটি তার তারিখ থেকে ছয় মাসের মধ্যে বা তার বৈধতার মেয়াদ, যা আগে হয়, তার মধ্যে ব্যাংকে উপস্থাপন করা হয়েছে; (খ) প্রাপক বা চেকের যথোপযুক্ত ধারক, যেমনটি হতে পারে, চেকটি অপরিশোধিত অবস্থায় ফেরত দেওয়ার বিষয়ে ব্যাংক থেকে তথ্য পাওয়ার ত্রিশ দিনের মধ্যে, চেকের ড্রয়ারকে লিখিত নোটিশ দেওয়ার মাধ্যমে উক্ত পরিমাণ অর্থ পরিশোধের দাবি জানায়; এবং (গ) উক্ত চেকের ড্রয়ার উক্ত নোটিশ প্রাপ্তির পনের দিনের মধ্যে প্রাপক বা, যেমনটি হতে পারে, চেকের যথোপযুক্ত ধারককে উক্ত পরিমাণ অর্থ পরিশোধ করতে ব্যর্থ হয়। ব্যাখ্যা।—এই ধারার উদ্দেশ্যে, “ঋণ বা অন্য দায়” অর্থ আইনগতভাবে প্রয়োগযোগ্য ঋণ বা অন্য দায়।” ৮) এন.আই. আইনের ধারা ১৩৮ এর অধীনে অপরাধ গঠনের জন্য, এই আদালত, যুগেশ সেহগাল বনাম শামশের সিং গোগী, (২০০৯) ১৪ এসসিসি ৬৮৩-এ, নিম্নলিখিত উপাদানগুলি পূরণ করা প্রয়োজন বলে উল্লেখ করেছেন: “(i) একজন ব্যক্তিকে তার ব্যাংকে রক্ষিত অ্যাকাউন্টে অন্য ব্যক্তিকে উক্ত অ্যাকাউন্ট থেকে একটি নির্দিষ্ট পরিমাণ অর্থ পরিশোধের জন্য একটি চেক কাটতে হবে; (ii) চেকটি কোনো ঋণ বা অন্য দায়ের সম্পূর্ণ বা আংশিকভাবে পরিশোধের জন্য জারি করা উচিত; (iii) চেকটি তার তারিখ থেকে ছয় মাসের মধ্যে বা তার বৈধতার মেয়াদ, যা আগে হয়, তার মধ্যে ব্যাংকে উপস্থাপন করা হয়েছে; (iv) চেকটি ব্যাংক কর্তৃক অপরিশোধিত অবস্থায় ফেরত দেওয়া হয়েছে, কারণ অ্যাকাউন্টে জমা অর্থের পরিমাণ চেকটি পরিশোধ করার জন্য অপর্যাপ্ত অথবা এটি সেই পরিমাণ অতিক্রম করে যা ব্যাংকের সাথে চুক্তির মাধ্যমে উক্ত অ্যাকাউন্ট থেকে পরিশোধ করার ব্যবস্থা করা হয়েছে; (v) প্রাপক বা চেকের যথোপযুক্ত ধারক, যেমনটি হতে পারে, চেকটি অপরিশোধিত অবস্থায় ফেরত দেওয়ার বিষয়ে ব্যাংক থেকে তথ্য পাওয়ার ১৫ দিনের মধ্যে, চেকের ড্রয়ারকে লিখিত নোটিশ দেওয়ার মাধ্যমে উক্ত পরিমাণ অর্থ পরিশোধের দাবি জানায়; (vi) উক্ত চেকের ড্রয়ার উক্ত নোটিশ প্রাপ্তির ১৫ দিনের মধ্যে প্রাপক বা চেকের যথোপযুক্ত ধারককে উক্ত পরিমাণ অর্থ পরিশোধ করতে ব্যর্থ হয়। যেহেতু এটি ক্রমবর্ধমান, তাই যখন উপরের সমস্ত উপাদান পূরণ হয় তখনই চেক কাটা ব্যক্তিকে আইনের ধারা ১৩৮ এর অধীনে অপরাধী বলে গণ্য করা যেতে পারে।” ধারা ১৩৮ এ ব্যবহৃত ভাষা বিবেচনা করে এবং সেই পটভূমির চুক্তির নোট গ্রহণ করে যার অধীনে একাধিক ব্যক্তি কর্তৃক চেক জারি করা হয়, আমাদের মতামত এই যে শুধুমাত্র চেকের "ড্রয়ার" এন.আই. আইনের বিধানের অধীনে শাস্তিমূলক পদক্ষেপের জন্য দায়ী হতে পারে। এটা প্রতিষ্ঠিত আইন যে শাস্তিমূলক বিধির কঠোর ব্যাখ্যা দিতে হবে। ৯) যুগেশ সেহগাল (উপরের) মামলায়, মামলার তথ্যের উপর ধারা ১৩৮ আকর্ষণ করার উপাদানগুলি উল্লেখ করার পরে, এই আদালত এই সিদ্ধান্তে উপনীত হয়েছে যে আইনের ধারা ১৩৮ এর অধীনে মামলা চালানোর কোনও কারণ নেই। সেই মামলায়, ২০.০১.২০০১ তারিখে, অভিযোগকারী ভারতীয় দণ্ডবিধি, ১৮৬০ (এরপর "আইপিসি" হিসাবে উল্লেখ করা হয়েছে) এর ধারা ৪২০, ৪৬৭, ৪৬৮, ৪৭১ এবং ৪০৬ এর অধীনে অপরাধের জন্য সকল অভিযুক্তের বিরুদ্ধে একটি এফআইআর দায়ের করেন এবং এতে খুব কমই বিতর্ক ছিল যে, এন.আই. আইনের ধারা ১৩৮ এর অধীনে অভিযোগের বিষয়বস্তু চেকটি সোনপত শাখার ইন্ডিয়ান ব্যাংকে তার দ্বারা রক্ষিত অ্যাকাউন্টে আপিলকারী কর্তৃক কাটা হয়নি। ধারা ১৩৮ এর বিধানগুলিকে আকর্ষণ করার জন্য প্রয়োজনীয় উপাদানগুলির আলোকে, এই আদালত, এই finding এর পরে যে উপরে বর্ণিত এন.আই. আইনের ধারা ১৩৮ এর একেবারে প্রথম উপাদানটি পূরণ হয়নি তাতে সামান্য সন্দেহ নেই এবং এই সিদ্ধান্তে উপনীত হয়েছে যে আপিলকারীর বিরুদ্ধে ধারা ১৩৮ এর অধীনে অপরাধ করার অভিযোগ প্রমাণ করা যাবে না। ১০) এস.কে. আলাঘ বনাম উত্তর প্রদেশ রাজ্য এবং অন্যান্য, (২০০৮) ৫ এসসিসি ৬৬২-এ, এই আদালত রায় দিয়েছে: ১৯. … … যদি এবং যখন কোনও বিধিতে এই ধরনের আইনগত কল্পনাবিশেষ তৈরি করার কথা বলা হয়, তবে এটি বিশেষভাবে এর জন্য ব্যবস্থা করে। বিধির অধীনে কোনও বিধান না থাকলে, কোম্পানির কোনও পরিচালক বা কর্মচারীকে কোম্পানির দ্বারা সংঘটিত কোনও অপরাধের জন্য পরোক্ষভাবে দায়ী করা যাবে না। (সবিতা রামমূর্তি বনাম আর.বি.এস. চন্নবাসভারধ্য, (২০০৬) ১০ এসসিসি ৫৮১ দেখুন)” ১১) শ্যাম সুন্দর এবং অন্যান্য বনাম হরিয়ানা রাজ্য, (১৯৮৯) ৪ এসসিসি ৬৩০-এ, এই আদালত নীচে উল্লেখ করা হয়েছে: “৯. শাস্তিমূলক বিধানটি প্রথমে কঠোরভাবে ব্যাখ্যা করতে হবে। দ্বিতীয়ত, ফৌজদারি আইনে কোনও পরোক্ষ দায় নেই যদি না বিধিতে এটিও অন্তর্ভুক্ত করা হয়। ধারা ১০ এই ধরনের দায়ের ব্যবস্থা করে না। এটি সমস্ত অংশীদারকে অপরাধের জন্য দায়ী করে না তারা ব্যবসা করুক বা না করুক।” ১২) আপিলকারীর বিজ্ঞ সিনিয়র আইনজীবী যেমনটি সঠিকভাবে উল্লেখ করেছেন, উত্তরদাতাদের দ্বারা প্রস্তাবিত ব্যাখ্যা ১৪১ ধারায় শব্দ যোগ করবে এবং পরোক্ষ দায়ের নীতিকে সেই ব্যক্তিদের কাছে প্রসারিত করবে যাদের নাম এতে নেই। ১৩) বর্তমান মামলায়, আমরা চেকের অমর্যাদার কারণে ফৌজদারি দায় নিয়ে উদ্বিগ্ন। এটি প্রাথমিকভাবে ড্রয়ারের উপর পড়ে, যদি এটি কোনও কোম্পানি হয়, তবে ড্রয়ার কোম্পানি এবং কোম্পানির অফিসারদের কাছে প্রসারিত হয়। ফৌজদারি দায় জড়িত মামলাগুলিতে সাধারণ নিয়ম পরোক্ষ দায়ের বিরুদ্ধে। স্পষ্ট করে বলতে গেলে, অন্যজনের কাজের জন্য কাউকে অপরাধীভাবে দায়ী করা যাবে না। এই সাধারণ নিয়মটি, তবে, বিধিতে নির্দিষ্ট বিধান থাকার কারণে ব্যতিক্রমের সাপেক্ষে যা অন্যদের কাছে দায় প্রসারিত করে। উদাহরণস্বরূপ, এন.আই. আইনের ধারা ১৪১ নির্দিষ্ট বিধানের একটি উদাহরণ যে যদি কোনও কোম্পানি কর্তৃক ধারা ১৩৮ এর অধীনে কোনও অপরাধ সংঘটিত হয়, তবে চেকের অমর্যাদার জন্য ফৌজদারি দায় কোম্পানির অফিসারদের কাছে প্রসারিত হবে। প্রকৃতপক্ষে, ধারা ১৪১ এর মধ্যে শর্ত রয়েছে যা দায় প্রসারিত করার আগে পূরণ করতে হবে। যেহেতু বিধানটি একটি ফৌজদারি দায় তৈরি করে, শর্তগুলি কঠোরভাবে মেনে চলতে হবে। অন্য কথায়, যে ব্যক্তিদের সাথে এই বিষয়ের কোনও সম্পর্ক নেই, তাদের জড়ানোর দরকার নেই। একটি কোম্পানি যেহেতু একটি আইনগত ব্যক্তি, তাই এর সমস্ত কাজ এবং কার্যাবলী অন্যদের কাজের ফল। অতএব, কোম্পানির কর্মকর্তারা, যারা কোম্পানির নামে করা কাজের জন্য দায়ী, তাদের ব্যক্তিগতভাবে সেই কাজের জন্য দায়ী করা হয় যার ফলে কোম্পানির বিরুদ্ধে ফৌজদারি ব্যবস্থা নেওয়া হয়। অন্য কথায়, এটি প্রত্যেক ব্যক্তিকে দায়ী করে যে, অপরাধ সংঘটিত হওয়ার সময়, কোম্পানির দায়িত্বে ছিল এবং কোম্পানির ব্যবসার পরিচালনার জন্য কোম্পানির কাছে দায়ী ছিল, সেইসাথে কোম্পানিও অপরাধের জন্য দায়ী। এটা সত্য যে উপ-ধারার শর্তটি কিছু ব্যক্তিকে প্রমাণ করতে সক্ষম করে যে অপরাধ তাদের অজান্তে সংঘটিত হয়েছিল বা তারা অপরাধ সংঘটন রোধে সমস্ত যথাযথ পরিশ্রম করেছে। এন.আই. আইনের ধারা ১৪১ এর অধীনে দায় কোম্পানির সাথে যুক্ত কোনও ব্যক্তির উপর পরোক্ষভাবে চাপানো হয়, মূল অভিযুক্ত স্বয়ং কোম্পানি। এটি ফৌজদারি আইনে পরোক্ষ দায়ের বিরুদ্ধে নিয়ম থেকে একটি বিচ্যুতি। ১৪) এটা নিয়ে কোনো বিরোধ নেই যে প্রথম উত্তরদাতা দণ্ডবিধির অন্য কোনো বিধানের অধীনে কোনো অভিযোগ দায়ের করেননি এবং সেইজন্য, পক্ষগুলির উদ্দেশ্য সম্পর্কিত যুক্তিটি সম্পূর্ণরূপে ভ্রান্ত। আমাদেরকে ধারা ১৩৮ এর অধীনে জারি করা নোটিশ, এর দেওয়া উত্তর, অভিযোগের অনুলিপি এবং প্রক্রিয়া জারির আদেশ দেখানো হয়েছে। এই বিষয়ে, মিঃ মুকুল রোহাতগি, উত্তরদাতার বিজ্ঞ সিনিয়র আইনজীবী এখানে আপিলকারীর এবং তার স্বামীর জড়িত থাকার বর্ণনা দেওয়ার পরে যুক্তি দিয়েছিলেন যে তাদের তাদের জ্ঞানের মধ্যে থাকা বস্তুগত তথ্য গোপন/চাপ দেওয়ার কারণে কোনও আপত্তি তোলার অনুমতি দেওয়া যাবে না। উক্ত উদ্দেশ্যে, তিনি ওসওয়াল ফ্যাটস অ্যান্ড অয়েলস লিমিটেড বনাম অতিরিক্ত কমিশনার (প্রশাসন), বারেইলি বিভাগ, বারেইলি এবং অন্যান্য, (২০১০) ৪ এসসিসি ৭২৮, বলবন্তরাই চিমনলাল ত্রিবেদী বনাম এম.এন. নাগরাশনা এবং অন্যান্য, এআইআর ১৯৬০ এসসি ১২৯২, জে.পি. বিল্ডার্স এবং অন্য একজন বনাম এ. রামদাস রাও এবং অন্য একজন, (২০১১) ১ এসসিসি ৪২৯ এর উপর নির্ভর করেছিলেন। যেহেতু আপিলকারী প্রাসঙ্গিক উপকরণ, যেমন নোটিশের অনুলিপি, উত্তরের অনুলিপি, অভিযোগের অনুলিপি এবং প্রক্রিয়া জারির আদেশ সংযুক্ত করেছিলেন যা এন.আই. আইনের ধারা ১৩৮ এর অধীনে অভিযোগের ক্ষেত্রে বিবেচনার জন্য একমাত্র প্রাসঙ্গিক, তাই ১ নম্বর উত্তরদাতার বিজ্ঞ সিনিয়র আইনজীবী যে যুক্তি দিয়েছেন যে আপিলকারীর অবস্থানকে বস্তুগত তথ্য বা প্রাসঙ্গিক তথ্য গোপন করার জন্য প্রত্যাখ্যান করতে হবে, তা টিকতে পারে না। এই পরিস্থিতিতে, আমাদের মতামত এই যে প্রতিদ্বন্দ্বী ১ নম্বর উত্তরদাতা কর্তৃক নির্ভর করা মামলা আইন বর্তমান মামলার তথ্যের জন্য প্রযোজ্য নয়। ১৫) মিঃ মুকুল রোহাতগি, ১ নম্বর উত্তরদাতার বিজ্ঞ সিনিয়র আইনজীবী, জেনারেল ক্লজেস অ্যাক্ট, ১৮৯৭ এর ধারা ৩(৪২) এ "ব্যক্তি" এর সংজ্ঞার দিকে আমাদের দৃষ্টি আকর্ষণ করে জমা দিয়েছেন যে উল্লিখিত বিভিন্ন পরিস্থিতির পরিপ্রেক্ষিতে, এখানে আপিলকারী স্ত্রী হিসেবে ফৌজদারি বিচারের জন্য দায়ী। তিনি আরও জমা দিয়েছেন যে এন.আই. আইনের ধারা ১৪১(২) এর ব্যাখ্যা অনুসারে, আপিলকারী স্ত্রীকে স্বতন্ত্র ব্যক্তির সমিতি হিসাবে বিচার করা হচ্ছে। আমাদের মতে, উপরের সমস্ত বক্তব্য গ্রহণযোগ্য নয় কারণ ১ নম্বর উত্তরদাতা ম্যাজিস্ট্রেট আদালতে দায়ের করা অভিযোগে কখনই বলেননি যে আপিলকারী স্ত্রীকে স্বতন্ত্র ব্যক্তিদের সমিতি হিসাবে বিচার করা হচ্ছে এবং সেইজন্য, এই grounds alone এর কারণেই, উপরের বক্তব্যটি প্রত্যাখ্যানযোগ্য। যেহেতু, এই অভিব্যক্তিটি সংজ্ঞায়িত করা হয়নি, তাই এটিকে এন.আই. আইনের ধারা ১৪১-এ অন্তর্ভুক্ত পরোক্ষ দায়ের নীতির উদ্দেশ্য অনুসারে ইজডেম জেনেরিস ব্যাখ্যা করতে হবে। "অভিযোগ", "ব্যক্তি", "ব্যক্তির সমিতি", "কোম্পানি" এবং "পরিচালক" শব্দগুলি এই আদালত রঘু লক্ষ্মীনারায়ণন বনাম ফাইন টিউবস, (২০০৭) ৫ এসসিসি ১০৩-এ ব্যাখ্যা করেছেন। ১৬) ধারা ১৩৮ এর সাথে সম্পর্কিত উপরের আলোচনা এবং বিধিবদ্ধ নোটিশ, উত্তর, অভিযোগের অনুলিপি, আদেশ, প্রক্রিয়া জারি ইত্যাদি থেকে প্রাপ্ত উপকরণগুলি স্পষ্টভাবে দেখায় যে চেকের জন্য শুধুমাত্র চেকের ড্রয়ারই দায়ী। ১৭) আমাদের উপসংহার ছাড়াও, এই বিষয়ে বিভিন্ন হাইকোর্ট কর্তৃক প্রদত্ত কিছু সিদ্ধান্ত উল্লেখ করা। ১৮) মাদ্রাজ হাইকোর্টের বিজ্ঞ একক বিচারক দেবেন্দ্র পুণ্ডির বনাম রাজেন্দ্র প্রসাদ মৌর্য, স্বত্বাধিকারী, সত্যমেব এক্সপোর্টস এস/ও শ্রী রাম শঙ্কর মৌর্য, ২০০৮ ক্রিমিনাল ল জার্নাল ৭৭৭-এ, এই আদালতের সিদ্ধান্ত অনুসরণ করে, এই সিদ্ধান্তে উপনীত হয়েছেন: “৭. এই আদালত মনে করে যে উপরে উল্লিখিত Hon’ble Apex Court কর্তৃক বর্ণিত আইনের প্রস্তাবনা তাত্ক্ষণিক মামলার তথ্যের সাথে সম্পূর্ণরূপে প্রযোজ্য। এমনকি এই মামলাতেও, যেমনটি ইতিমধ্যেই উল্লেখ করা হয়েছে, প্রথম অভিযুক্ত নিঃসন্দেহে "কামাক্ষী এন্টারপ্রাইজ" উদ্বেগের একমাত্র স্বত্বাধিকারী এবং সেইজন্য, দ্বিতীয় অভিযুক্তকে প্রথম অভিযুক্ত কর্তৃক এন.আই. আইনের ধারা ১৩৮ এর অধীনে সংঘটিত অপরাধের জন্য পরোক্ষভাবে দায়ী করার প্রশ্নই ওঠে না।” এমন বলার পর, বিজ্ঞ একক বিচারক, সেখানে আবেদনকারীর বিরুদ্ধে শুরু করা কার্যক্রম বাতিল করেন এবং জুডিশিয়াল ম্যাজিস্ট্রেটকে অন্যদের ক্ষেত্রে বিচার চালিয়ে যাওয়ার এবং ত্বরান্বিত করার অনুমতি দেন। ১৯) গীতা বেরি বনাম জেনেসিস এডুকেশনাল ফাউন্ডেশন, ১৫১ (২০০৮) ডিএলটি ১৫৫-এ, সেখানকার আবেদনকারী ছিলেন স্ত্রী এবং তিনি এন.আই. আইনের ধারা ১৩৮ এর অধীনে দায়ের করা অভিযোগ বাতিলের জন্য কোডের ধারা ৪৮২ এর অধীনে একটি আবেদন দায়ের করেন। সেখানকার আবেদনকারীর মামলা ছিল যে শুধুমাত্র তিনি তার স্বামীর সাথে যৌথ অ্যাকাউন্টধারী ছিলেন এই grounds alone এর উপর তার বিরুদ্ধে আইনের ধারা ১৩৮ এর অধীনে অপরাধ হয়েছে বলা যায় না। এটা উল্লেখ করা হয়েছিল যে তিনি প্রশ্নযুক্ত চেকটি কাটেনি বা জারি করেননি এবং সেইজন্য, তার মতে, তার বিরুদ্ধে অভিযোগটি টিকতে পারে না। দিল্লি হাইকোর্টের বিজ্ঞ একক বিচারক, উল্লেখ করেন যে অভিযোগটি শুধুমাত্র আইনের ধারা ১৩৮ এর অধীনে ছিল, আইপিসি এর ধারা ৪২০ এর অধীনে নয় এবং উল্লেখ করেন যে অভিযোগকারী থেকে এমন কিছুই জানা যায়নি যে আবেদনকারী প্রশ্নযুক্ত চেকের জন্য দায়ী ছিলেন, আবেদনকারীর ক্ষেত্রে কার্যক্রম বাতিল করেন। ২০) শ্রীমতি বানদীপ কৌর বনাম এস. অবनीत সিং, (২০০৮) ২ পিএলআর ৭৯৬-এ, অনুরূপ পরিস্থিতিতে, পাঞ্জাব ও হরিয়ানা হাইকোর্টের বিজ্ঞ একক বিচারক রায় দিয়েছেন যে যদি কোনও চেকের ড্রয়ার নোটিশ পাওয়ার পর অর্থ পরিশোধ করতে ব্যর্থ হয়, তবে আইনের ধারা ১৩৮ এর বিধান শুধুমাত্র তার বিরুদ্ধেই আকৃষ্ট হতে পারে। বিজ্ঞ একক বিচারক আরও রায় দিয়েছেন যে যদিও চেকটি একটি যৌথ ব্যাংক অ্যাকাউন্টে কাটা হয়েছিল যা যে কেউ, অর্থাৎ আবেদনকারী বা তার স্বামী দ্বারা পরিচালিত হতে পারে, তবে বিতর্কিত নথিটি হল চেক, যার অমর্যাদার দায় শুধুমাত্র এর ড্রয়ারের উপর চাপানো যেতে পারে। এমন বলার পর, বিজ্ঞ একক বিচারক আবেদনকারীর আবেদন গ্রহণ করেন এবং তার ক্ষেত্রে কার্যক্রম বাতিল করেন এবং অভিযোগকারীকে অন্যদের ক্ষেত্রে আরও এগিয়ে যাওয়ার অনুমতি দেন। ২১) পূর্বের অনুচ্ছেদে আলোচিত নীতিগুলির আলোকে, আমরা মাদ্রাজ, দিল্লি এবং পাঞ্জাব ও হরিয়ানা হাইকোর্টের বিজ্ঞ বিচারকদের দ্বারা প্রকাশিত মতামতের সাথে সম্পূর্ণরূপে একমত। ২২) উপরের আলোচনার আলোকে, আমরা ধরে নিই যে আইনের ধারা ১৩৮ এর অধীনে, শুধুমাত্র চেকের ড্রয়ারকেই বিচার করা যেতে পারে। বর্তমান মামলায়, এটা সর্বজনবিদিত যে আপিলকারী চেকের ড্রয়ার নন এবং তিনি এতে স্বাক্ষর করেননি। চেকের একটি অনুলিপি আমাদের নজরে আনা হয়েছে, যদিও এতে আপিলকারী এবং তার স্বামীর নাম রয়েছে, তবে বাস্তবতা হল তার স্বামী একাই স্বাক্ষর করেছেন। একই সাথে, অভিযোগের পাশাপাশি অভিযোগকারীর প্রধান পরীক্ষায় হলফনামা এবং চেকের দিকে তাকালে দেখা যাবে যে আপিলকারী চেকের উপর স্বাক্ষর করেননি। ২৩) আমরা আরও ধরে নিই যে এন.আই. আইনের ধারা ১৩৮ এর অধীনে, যৌথ অ্যাকাউন্ট থেকে চেক জারির ক্ষেত্রে, প্রতিটি ব্যক্তি যিনি যৌথ অ্যাকাউন্টধারী, তার দ্বারা চেকটিতে স্বাক্ষর না করা পর্যন্ত কোনও যৌথ অ্যাকাউন্টধারীকে বিচার করা যাবে না। উক্ত নীতি এন.আই. আইনের ধারা ১৪১ এর একটি ব্যতিক্রম যা বর্তমান মামলায় প্রযোজ্য হবে না। ধারা ১৩৮ এর অধীনে দায়ের করা কার্যক্রম আপিলকারীর কাছ থেকে কথিত বকেয়া আদায়ের জন্য একটি হাত-মোচড়ানোর কৌশল হিসাবে ব্যবহার করা যাবে না। এটা বলা যাবে না যে অভিযোগকারীর আপিলকারীর বিরুদ্ধে কোনও প্রতিকার নেই কিন্তু অবশ্যই ধারা ১৩৮ এর অধীনে নয়। চেকের অমর্যাদার সাথে যুক্ত অপরাধবোধ, কোনও ক্ষেত্রেই "এন.আই. আইনের ধারা ১৪১ এর মামলা ব্যতীত" তাদের কাছে প্রসারিত করা যাবে না যাদের পক্ষ থেকে চেক জারি করা হয়েছে। এই আদালত পুনরায় বলে যে শুধুমাত্র চেকের ড্রয়ারকেই আইনের ধারা ১৩৮ এর অধীনে যে কোনও কার্যবিধিতে অভিযুক্ত করা যেতে পারে। এমনকি হাইকোর্টও বিশেষভাবে আপিলকারীর অবস্থান রেকর্ড করেছে যে তিনি চেকের স্বাক্ষরকারী ছিলেন না কিন্তু এই যুক্তি প্রত্যাখ্যান করেছেন যে পরিমাণ বকেয়া ছিল না এবং তার দ্বারা প্রদেয় ছিল না শুধুমাত্র এই grounds alone এর উপর যে বিচার চলছে। এটা মনে রাখতে হবে যে প্রক্রিয়া জারির পরই একজন ব্যক্তি হাইকোর্টের কাছে যেতে পারেন এবং তার কাছে উপলব্ধ বিভিন্ন grounds এর উপর ভিত্তি করে একই বাতিল করার আবেদন করতে পারেন। সেই পরিস্থিতিতে, হাইকোর্ট স্পষ্টভাবে ভুল ছিল যে আপিলকারীর প্রার্থনা এমনকি বিবেচনাও করা যাবে না। অধিকন্তু, হাইকোর্ট নিজেই ম্যাজিস্ট্রেটকে নথিপত্রের স্বীকৃতি/অস্বীকৃতির প্রক্রিয়া চালানোর নির্দেশ দিয়েছে। এমন পরিস্থিতিতে, এটা বলা যাবে না যে বিচার উন্নত পর্যায়ে আছে। ২৪) এই পরিস্থিতিতে, আপিল মঞ্জুর করার যোগ্য এবং বিজ্ঞ মেট্রোপলিটন ম্যাজিস্ট্রেট ১৩ তম আদালত, দাদার, মুম্বাইয়ের আদালতে বিচারাধীন ফৌজদারি মামলা নং ১১৭১/এসএস/২০০৯ এর প্রক্রিয়া বাতিল করার যোগ্য, সেই অনুযায়ী, এখানে আপিলকারীর বিরুদ্ধে বাতিল করা হল। আপিল মঞ্জুর করা হল।








বিল অব এক্সচেঞ্জ কি? এর বৈশিষ্ট্য কি? বিল অফ এক্সচেঞ্জের একটি অপরিহার্য বৈশিষ্ট্য হলো এতে অবশ্যই গ্রহণ বা পরিশোধের একটি আদেশ থাকতে হবে এবং গ্রহণকারীকে এটি গ্রহণ করতে হবে। যদি পরিশোধের এমন কোনো নির্দেশনা না থাকে, তাহলে সেই দলিল বিল অফ এক্সচেঞ্জ বা হুন্ডি হবে না। "এআইআর ১৯৫৫ কলকাতা ৫৬২-আইএলআর (১৯৫৬) ২ কল. ৩১৮" (AIR 1955 Cal. 562-ILR (1956) 2 Cal. 318) মামলায় এমন সিদ্ধান্ত দেওয়া হয়েছে। বিষয়টি আরও স্পষ্ট করে কয়েকটি পয়েন্টে আলোচনা করা হলো: বিল অফ এক্সচেঞ্জের সংজ্ঞা: বিল অফ এক্সচেঞ্জ হলো একটি লিখিত আদেশ, যেখানে একজন ব্যক্তি (প্রেরক/ drawer) অন্য একজন ব্যক্তিকে (গ্রহীতা/ drawee) তৃতীয় কোনো ব্যক্তিকে (প্রাপক/ payee) একটি নির্দিষ্ট পরিমাণ অর্থ পরিশোধ করার নির্দেশ দেন। পরিশোধের আদেশ: বিল অফ এক্সচেঞ্জে অবশ্যই পরিশোধের একটি সুস্পষ্ট আদেশ থাকতে হবে। এটি শুধু একটি অনুরোধ বা প্রতিশ্রুতি নয়, বরং একটি নির্দেশ হতে হবে। গ্রহীতার স্বীকৃতি: বিল অফ এক্সচেঞ্জ তখনই বৈধ হয় যখন গ্রহীতা এটি গ্রহণ করেন। গ্রহীতা সাধারণত বিলের উপর "accepted" লিখে স্বাক্ষর করে এটি গ্রহণ করেন। নির্দেশনার অনুপস্থিতি: যদি কোনো দলিলে পরিশোধের কোনো আদেশ না থাকে, তাহলে সেটি বিল অফ এক্সচেঞ্জ হিসেবে গণ্য হবে না, এমনকি যদি এটিকে হুন্ডি হিসেবেও উল্লেখ করা হয়। একটি উদাহরণের মাধ্যমে বিষয়টি আরও পরিষ্কার করা যাক: ধরা যাক, 'ক' 'খ'-কে একটি চিঠি লিখল, "আমি 'গ'-এর কাছে আমার পাওনা ১০,০০০ টাকা তোমাকে পরিশোধ করতে অনুরোধ করছি"। এই চিঠিটি বিল অফ এক্সচেঞ্জ হবে না, কারণ এখানে 'ক' 'খ'-কে শুধু অনুরোধ করেছেন, কোনো নির্দেশ দেননি। অন্যদিকে, যদি 'ক' 'খ'-কে একটি চিঠি লিখে বলেন, "আমি 'খ'-কে নির্দেশ দিচ্ছি যে তিনি 'গ'-কে আমার পাওনা ১০,০০০ টাকা পরিশোধ করুন", এবং 'খ' সেই চিঠিতে "Accepted" লিখে স্বাক্ষর করেন, তাহলে এটি একটি বৈধ বিল অফ এক্সচেঞ্জ হবে। সংক্ষেপে, বিল অফ এক্সচেঞ্জের অপরিহার্য বৈশিষ্ট্য হলো এতে পরিশোধের একটি সুস্পষ্ট আদেশ থাকতে হবে এবং গ্রহীতাকে তা গ্রহণ করতে হবে। এই বৈশিষ্ট্যগুলির অনুপস্থিতিতে কোনো দলিল বিল অফ এক্সচেঞ্জ হিসেবে গণ্য হবে না। মামলার সূত্র: AIR 1955 Cal. 562-ILR (1956) 2 Cal. 318








আমমোক্তার এর মাধ্যমে চেকের মামলা পরিচালনা করা যাবে কি না এই বিষয়ে সাম্প্রতিক একটি রায়ে৷ আপিল বিভাগ বিস্তারিত আলোচনা করেছেন। 77 DLR (AD) (2025) 17 তে রায়টি রিপোর্টেড হয়েছে। মূল রায়টি ইংরেজিতে। পাঠকের সুবিধার্থে বাংলায় দেয়া হলো। তবে এই রায়ের উপর নির্ভর করার আগে ইংরেজিতে প্রদত্ত রায় দেখে নিন। এই অনুবাদ ত্রুটিমুক্ত নয়। রায় এম. ইনায়েতুর রহিম, জে: এই ফৌজদারি পিটিশন ফর লিভ টু আপিলটি হাইকোর্ট বিভাগের একটি ডিভিশন বেঞ্চ কর্তৃক ০৬-৫-২০১৮ তারিখে ফৌজদারি রিভিশন নং ৬৪৫/২০১৭-এ পাস করা রায় এবং আদেশের বিরুদ্ধে করা হয়েছে, যা রুল খারিজ করে। ২. এই ফৌজদারি পিটিশন দাখিলের জন্য প্রাসঙ্গিক ঘটনাগুলো সংক্ষেপে হলো, বর্তমান বিপরীত পক্ষ নং ১, তার অ্যাটর্নির মাধ্যমে অভিযোগকারী হিসেবে, ১৮৮১ সালের নেগোশিয়েবল ইন্সট্রুমেন্টস আইনের ১৩৮ ধারার অধীনে কথিত অপরাধের জন্য বর্তমান অভিযুক্ত-পিটিশনারের বিরুদ্ধে সিলেট মেট্রোপলিটন ম্যাজিস্ট্রেট আদালত নং ১-এ একটি নালিশী দরখাস্ত দাখিল করেন। ৩. নালিশী দরখাস্তে অভিযোগ করা হয়েছে যে, অভিযুক্ত-পিটিশনার তার অ্যাকাউন্ট নং ৪০০৮-১২১০-০০২০-০৩০-এর মাধ্যমে শাহজালাল ইসলামী ব্যাংক লিমিটেড, উত্তরা, ঢাকা-এর মাধ্যমে ৩,০০,০০,০০০ (তিন কোটি) টাকা মূল্যের ৪৩৮৩৬২৪ নং এবং ৩,০০,০০,০০০ (তিন কোটি) টাকা মূল্যের ৪৩৮৩৬২৫ নং দুটি চেক ইস্যু করেছেন। অভিযোগকারী ৩১-৩-২০১৪, ২০১৪ সালের ২-৪-২০১৪ এবং সবশেষে ৯-৬-২০১৪ তারিখে উক্ত চেকগুলো নগদায়নের জন্য সংশ্লিষ্ট ব্যাংকে উপস্থাপন করেন। তবে, অভিযুক্ত কর্তৃক পেমেন্ট বন্ধ করার কারণে ওই চেকগুলো প্রত্যাখ্যান করা হয়। অভিযোগকারী আইনি নোটিশ জারি করেন। তবে, অভিযুক্ত একই পরিমাণ অর্থ পরিশোধ করেননি। যেহেতু প্রাসঙ্গিক সময়ে অভিযোগকারী একটি ফৌজদারি মামলার সাথে সম্পর্কিত হয়ে জেল হাজতে ছিলেন, তাই তিনি তার অ্যাটর্নির মাধ্যমে নালিশী দরখাস্ত দাখিল করতে বাধ্য হন। ৪. সংশ্লিষ্ট ম্যাজিস্ট্রেট সমস্ত আইনি আনুষ্ঠানিকতা পর্যবেক্ষণ করার পর অভিযুক্ত-পিটিশনারের বিরুদ্ধে ১৮৮১ সালের নেগোশিয়েবল ইন্সট্রুমেন্টস আইনের ১৩৮ ধারার অধীনে অপরাধ আমলে গ্রহণ করেন এবং মামলাটি ২০১৪ সালের সিআর মামলা নং ৭৬৮ হিসাবে নিবন্ধিত হয়। অবশেষে, মামলার রেকর্ডটি বিচারের জন্য সিলেট মেট্রোপলিটন সেশন জজ আদালতে প্রেরণ করা হয়। ১১-১-২০১৭ তারিখে অভিযুক্ত-পিটিশনার তার বিরুদ্ধে আনা অভিযোগ থেকে তাকে অব্যাহতি দেওয়ার জন্য ফৌজদারি কার্যবিধির ২৬৫(সি) ধারার অধীনে একটি আবেদন দাখিল করেন। ৫. তবে, বিচারিক আদালত ৬-২-২০১৭ তারিখের তার আদেশের মাধ্যমে নেগোশিয়েবল ইন্সট্রুমেন্টস আইনের ১৩৮ ধারার অধীনে অভিযুক্ত-পিটিশনারের বিরুদ্ধে অভিযোগ গঠন করে। উক্ত আদেশকে চ্যালেঞ্জ করে অভিযুক্ত-পিটিশনার ফৌজদারি কার্যবিধির ৪৩৫ ধারার সাথে ৪৩৯ ধারার অধীনে একটি আবেদন দাখিল করে হাইকোর্ট বিভাগে যান। হাইকোর্ট বিভাগের একটি ডিভিশন বেঞ্চ ০৬-৫-২০১৮ তারিখের বিতর্কিত রায় এবং আদেশ দ্বারা রুল শুনানি করার পরে তা খারিজ করে দেন। ৬. উক্ত রায় এবং আদেশে সংক্ষুব্ধ হয়ে অভিযুক্ত এই বিভাগের সামনে বর্তমান ফৌজদারি পিটিশন ফর লিভ টু আপিল দাখিল করেছেন। ৭. অভিযুক্ত-পিটিশনারের পক্ষে উপস্থিত বিজ্ঞ আইনজীবী জনাব বালায়েত হোসেন বলেন যে, বর্তমান মামলায় অভিযোগটি অভিযোগকারীর অ্যাটর্নির মাধ্যমে দায়ের করা হয়েছিল এবং উক্ত অ্যাটর্নি চেকের 'পেয়ী' বা 'হোল্ডার ইন ডিউ কোর্স' নন এবং ২০১৭ বিএলডি (এডি) ২০২-এ রিপোর্ট করা মোঃ নূর হোসেন বনাম মোঃ আলমগীর আলমের মামলায় নিষ্পত্তি হওয়া আইনের প্রস্তাবনার পরিপ্রেক্ষিতে, পিটিশনারের বিরুদ্ধে কার্যক্রম ১৮৮১ সালের নেগোশিয়েবল ইন্সট্রুমেন্টস আইনের ১৩৮ এবং ১৪১ ধারার বিধানের অধীনে নিষিদ্ধ। ৮. পিটিশনারের বিজ্ঞ আইনজীবীর বক্তব্য প্রত্যাখ্যান করে, অভিযোগকারী-রেসপন্ডেন্টের পক্ষে উপস্থিত বিজ্ঞ আইনজীবী জনাব আলী মুর্তজা, ৫৬ ডিএলআর (এডি) ১৭-এ রিপোর্ট করা হাসিবুল বাশার বনাম গুলজার রহমান এবং অন্যান্যদের মামলার উল্লেখ করে যুক্তি দেন যে, ফৌজদারি কার্যবিধির ২০০ ধারার অধীনে যথাযথ পরীক্ষার পর অ্যাটর্নি কর্তৃক দাখিল করা অভিযোগের আবেদনের উপর আমলে গ্রহণ করা সম্পূর্ণরূপে বৈধ এবং উপযুক্ত। ৯. আমরা সংশ্লিষ্ট পক্ষগুলোর পক্ষে উপস্থিত বিজ্ঞ আইনজীবীদের বক্তব্য বিবেচনা করেছি, নালিশী দরখাস্ত, বিতর্কিত রায় এবং আমাদের সামনে উপস্থাপিত অন্যান্য উপকরণগুলো পর্যবেক্ষণ করেছি। ১০. বর্তমান মামলায় পিটিশনারের বিজ্ঞ আইনজীবী আমাদের প্রভাবিত করার চেষ্টা করেছেন যে, অ্যাটর্নি চেকের 'পেয়ী' বা 'হোল্ডার ইন ডিউ কোর্স' না হওয়ায় আদালতে অভিযোগের আবেদন দাখিল করার কোনো কর্তৃত্ব ছিল না এবং তাই কার্যক্রমটি অবৈধ এবং এখতিয়ারবিহীন। ১১. ৫৬ ডিএলআর (এডি) ১৭-এ রিপোর্ট করা হাসিবুল বাশার বনাম গুলজার রহমান এবং অন্যান্যদের মামলায়, এই ডিভিশন ১৯৯৬ বিএলডি (এডি) ২০৬ : ১ বিএলসি (এডি) ১৬৯-এ রিপোর্ট করা তমিজুল হক বনাম আনিসুল হকের মামলার উপর নির্ভর করে পর্যবেক্ষণ করেছেন যে: "অন্য কথায়, পিটিশনারের যুক্তি হলো তার বিরুদ্ধে নেগোশিয়েবল ইন্সট্রুমেন্টস আইনের ১৩৮ ধারার অধীনে নালিশী দরখাস্তের উপর আমলে গ্রহণ করা হয়েছে, যা আইনত নিষিদ্ধ। পিটিশনারের এই যুক্তি হাইকোর্ট বিভাগ কর্তৃক সম্বোধন করা হয়েছে। বিজ্ঞ অ্যাডভোকেট-অন-রেকর্ড ১৯৯৬ বিএলডি (এডি) ২০৬-এ রিপোর্ট করা মামলার রেশিও থেকে ভিন্ন মত নিতে আমাদের রাজি করাতে কোনো ম্যাটেরিয়াল উপস্থাপন করতে পারেননি। রিপোর্ট করা মামলায়, ফৌজদারি কার্যবিধির ২০০ ধারার অধীনে যথাযথ পরীক্ষার পর অ্যাটর্নি কর্তৃক দাখিল করা নালিশী দরখাস্তের উপর আমলে গ্রহণ করাকে "সম্পূর্ণরূপে বৈধ এবং উপযুক্ত" বলে ধরা হয়েছে। বর্তমান মামলায়, যেহেতু আনোয়ারুল ইসলামের অ্যাটর্নির পরীক্ষার উপর আমলে গ্রহণ করা হয়েছে যার অনুকূলে চেক ইস্যু করা হয়েছিল কিন্তু অবশেষে প্রত্যাখ্যান করা হয়েছিল এবং নোটিশ জারি করা সত্ত্বেও অভিযুক্ত-পিটিশনার চেকের-পরিমাণ পরিশোধ করেননি এবং এর মাধ্যমে নেগোশিয়েবল ইন্সট্রুমেন্টস আইনের ১৩৮ ধারার অধীনে অপরাধ করেছেন বলে বলা হয়েছে।" ২. ২০১৭ বিএলডি (এডি) ২০২-এ রিপোর্ট করা মোঃ নূর হোসেন বনাম মোঃ আলমগীর আলমের মামলায়, এই ডিভিশন রায় দিয়েছেন যে: "বর্তমান মামলায় এটা স্বীকৃত যে, বিতর্কিত চেকটি আবু খায়ের মোঃ শাখাওয়াত উল্লাহর নামে ইস্যু করা হয়েছিল এবং নালিশী দরখাস্তে মোঃ আলমগীর আলম কর্তৃক দাখিল করা হয়েছিল। ১৪১(ক) ধারা বলে যে, আদালত ১৩৮ ধারার অধীনে শাস্তিযোগ্য অপরাধের জ্ঞান গ্রহণ করবে একটি অভিযোগের উপর, লিখিতভাবে, "পেয়ী" বা, প্রযোজ্য ক্ষেত্রে, "চেকের হোল্ডার ইন ডিউ কোর্স" দ্বারা করা। এখানে, নালিশী দরখাস্ত "পেয়ী" বা "হোল্ডার ইন ডিউ কোর্স" দ্বারা দাখিল করা হয়নি। অভিযোগকারী একজন বহিরাগত, তার বর্তমান লেনদেনের সাথে কোনো সম্পর্ক ছিল না। তিনি বিনিময় মূল্যের মাধ্যমে চেকের ধারক নন এবং চেকটি তার কাছে হস্তান্তর করা হয়নি। নেগোশিয়েবল ইন্সট্রুমেন্টস আইনের ১৩৮ এবং ১৪১ ধারায় প্রদত্ত বিধিবদ্ধ প্রয়োজনীয়তাগুলো এই মামলায় অভিযোগ দাখিলের সময় মেনে চলা হয়নি।" ১৩. উপরের মামলায়, অভিযোগটি একজন বহিরাগত কর্তৃক দাখিল করা হয়েছিল যিনি 'পেয়ী' বা 'চেকের হোল্ডার ইন ডিউ কোর্স' বা অভিযোগকারীর অ্যাটর্নি নন। কিন্তু এই বিশেষ মামলায় অভিযোগকারী তার অ্যাটর্নির মাধ্যমে ম্যাজিস্ট্রেটের সংশ্লিষ্ট আদালতে নালিশী দরখাস্ত উপস্থাপন করেন এবং নালিশী দরখাস্তে স্পষ্টভাবে বলা হয়েছে যে, যেহেতু অভিযোগকারী জেল হাজতে ছিলেন, তাই তিনি তামাদির সময় এড়াতে তার অ্যাটর্নির মাধ্যমে নালিশী দরখাস্ত দাখিল করতে বাধ্য হন। ১৪. এসি নারায়ণন বনাম মহারাষ্ট্র রাজ্য, জি কামলাকর বনাম এম/এস সুরানা সিকিউরিটিজ লিমিটেড, এআইআর ২০১৪ এসসি ৬৩০-এ রিপোর্ট করা মামলায়, ভারতের সুপ্রিম কোর্ট নিম্নলিখিত পদ্ধতিতে অনুরূপ বিষয়টি মোকাবিলা করেছেন: "রেফারেন্স আদেশ অনুসারে, বেঞ্চ দ্বারা নিম্নলিখিত প্রশ্নগুলো সিদ্ধান্ত নিতে হবে: (i) অ্যাটর্নি ধারক অভিযোগকারীর পক্ষে নালিশী দরখাস্তে স্বাক্ষর এবং দাখিল করতে পারেন কিনা? / নালিশী দরখাস্তটি যদি চেকের পেয়ী বা হোল্ডার ইন ডিউ কোর্সের নামে দাখিল করা হয় তবে এনআই আইনের ১৪২(ক) ধারায় নির্ধারিত যোগ্যতার মানদণ্ড পূরণ হবে কিনা? (ii) ফৌজদারি কার্যবিধির ২০০ ধারার অধীনে অ্যাটর্নি ধারককে শপথের অধীনে যাচাই করা যেতে পারে কিনা? (iii) বিতর্কিত লেনদেনে অ্যাটর্নি ধারকের জ্ঞান সম্পর্কে নির্দিষ্ট বক্তব্য নালিশী দরখাস্তে স্পষ্টভাবে নিশ্চিত করা উচিত কিনা? (iv) অ্যাটর্নি ধারক যদি নালিশী দরখাস্তে স্পষ্টভাবে তার জ্ঞান নিশ্চিত করতে ব্যর্থ হন, তবে অ্যাটর্নি ধারক কি জ্ঞানের এই অনুমান অনুসারে শপথের অধীনে অভিযোগ যাচাই করতে পারেন? (v) ২০০২ সালে একটি সংশোধনের মাধ্যমে প্রবর্তিত এনআই আইনের ১৪৫ ধারার আলোকে ফৌজদারি কার্যবিধির ২০০ ধারার অধীনে পরিকল্পিত কার্যক্রমগুলো বাতিল করা যেতে পারে কিনা?" ১৫. এবং, অবশেষে ভারতের সুপ্রিম কোর্ট নিম্নলিখিত পদ্ধতিতে উপরের সমস্যাগুলো নিষ্পত্তি করেছে: (i) অ্যাটর্নির মাধ্যমে এনআই আইনের ১৩৮ ধারার অধীনে নালিশী দরখাস্ত দাখিল করা সম্পূর্ণরূপে আইনি এবং সক্ষম। (ii) অভিযোগের বিষয়বস্তু প্রমাণ করার জন্য অ্যাটর্নি ধারক আদালতের সামনে শপথের অধীনে সাক্ষ্য দিতে এবং যাচাই করতে পারেন। তবে, অ্যাটর্নি ধারককে পেয়ী/হোল্ডার ইন ডিউ কোর্সের প্রতিনিধি হিসাবে লেনদেনের সাক্ষী হতে হবে বা উক্ত লেনদেন সম্পর্কে যথাযথ জ্ঞান থাকতে হবে। (iii) অভিযোগপত্রে লেনদেনে অ্যাটর্নি ধারকের জ্ঞান সম্পর্কে স্পষ্টভাবে নির্দিষ্ট বক্তব্য দেওয়া অভিযোগকারীর জন্য প্রয়োজনীয় এবং যে অ্যাটর্নি ধারকের লেনদেন সম্পর্কে কোনো জ্ঞান নেই তাকে মামলার সাক্ষী হিসেবে পরীক্ষা করা যাবে না। (iv) এনআই আইনের ১৪৫ ধারার আলোকে, এনআই আইনের ১৩৮ ধারার অধীনে অভিযোগের সমর্থনে অভিযোগকারীর দ্বারা দাখিল করা হলফনামার আকারে যাচাইকরণের উপর নির্ভর করা ম্যাজিস্ট্রেটের জন্য উন্মুক্ত এবং এনআই আইনের ১৩৮ ধারার অধীনে অভিযোগের উপর প্রসেস জারি করা হবে কিনা সে বিষয়ে সিদ্ধান্ত নেওয়ার জন্য ম্যাজিস্ট্রেটকে বাধ্যতামূলকভাবে অভিযোগকারীকে আদালতের সামনে উপস্থিত হওয়ার জন্য আহ্বান করা বা অভিযোগকারী বা তার সাক্ষীকে শপথের অধীনে পরীক্ষা করা প্রয়োজন নয়। (v) অ্যাটর্নির সাধারণ ক্ষমতার অধীনে কাজগুলো অ্যাটর্নির ক্ষমতায় একই অনুমতি দেওয়ার জন্য নির্দিষ্ট ধারা ছাড়া অন্য ব্যক্তির কাছে অর্পণ করা যাবে না। তবুও, সাধারণ অ্যাটর্নি ক্ষমতা নিজেই বাতিল করা যেতে পারে এবং অন্য ব্যক্তিকে দেওয়া যেতে পারে।" ১৬. বিশ্ব মিত্তার বনাম ও.পি. পোদ্দার, মানু/এসসি/০৩৭৮/১৯৮৩: ১৯৮৪ ক্রিএলজে ১-এ রিপোর্ট করা মামলায়, ভারতের সুপ্রিম কোর্ট নিম্নোক্তভাবে পর্যবেক্ষণ করেছে: "এটা স্পষ্ট যে, আমলে গ্রহণের অধিকারী ম্যাজিস্ট্রেটের সামনে অপরাধ গঠনকারী ঘটনাগুলোর অভিযোগ দাখিল করে যে কেউ ফৌজদারি আইন চালু করতে পারে। রায় দেয়া হয়েছে যে, অভিযোগকারী অভিযোগ দাখিল করতে সক্ষম ছিলেন না এই একমাত্র কারণে কোনো আদালত আমলে গ্রহণ করতে অস্বীকার করতে পারে না। এটা সিদ্ধান্ত হয়েছে যে, যদি কোনো বিশেষ সংবিধি অপরাধ নির্ধারণ করে এবং সংবিধির অধীনে এই ধরনের অপরাধের আমলে গ্রহণের জন্য কোনো বিশেষ বিধান তৈরি করে, তবে ম্যাজিস্ট্রেটকে অপরাধের আমলে গ্রহণের অনুরোধকারী অভিযোগকারীকে সংবিধি দ্বারা নির্ধারিত যোগ্যতার মানদণ্ড পূরণ করতে হবে। বর্তমান মামলায়, ১৪২ ধারা দ্বারা নির্ধারিত একমাত্র যোগ্যতার মানদণ্ড হলো অভিযোগটি পেয়ী বা হোল্ডার ইন ডিউ কোর্স দ্বারা হতে হবে। এই মানদণ্ড পূরণ করা হয়েছে কারণ অভিযোগটি আপীলকারী কোম্পানির নামে এবং পক্ষে।" ১৭. অ্যাসোসিয়েটেড সিমেন্ট কোং লিমিটেড বনাম কেশবানন্দ, মানু/এসসি/০৮৯৪/১৯৯৮ ১৯৯৮ ক্রিএলজে ৮৫৬-এ রিপোর্ট করা মামলায়, ভারতের সুপ্রিম কোর্ট দ্বারা সিদ্ধান্ত হয়েছে যে: "অভিযোগকারীকে একজন শারীরিক ব্যক্তি হতে হবে যিনি আদালতে শারীরিকভাবে উপস্থিত হতে সক্ষম। এটা সিদ্ধান্ত হয়েছে যে, যদি কোনো অশরীরী ব্যক্তির (যেমন একটি কোম্পানি বা কর্পোরেশন) নামে অভিযোগ করা হয়, তবে আদালতে এই ধরনের আইনি ব্যক্তির প্রতিনিধিত্ব করা একজন প্রাকৃতিক ব্যক্তির জন্য প্রয়োজনীয়। এটা সিদ্ধান্ত হয়েছে যে, আদালত সমস্ত ব্যবহারিক উদ্দেশ্যে প্রাকৃতিক ব্যক্তিকে অভিযোগকারী হিসাবে দেখে। এটা সিদ্ধান্ত হয়েছে যে, যখন অভিযোগকারী একটি বডি কর্পোরেট হয়, তখন এটি ডি জুর অভিযোগকারী এবং আদালত কার্যক্রমে পূর্বেরটির প্রতিনিধিত্ব করার জন্য ডি ফ্যাক্টো অভিযোগকারী হিসাবে একজন মানুষকে যুক্ত করা আবশ্যক। আরও সিদ্ধান্ত হয়েছে যে, কোনো ম্যাজিস্ট্রেট জোর দেবেন না যে, প্রথম দৃষ্টান্তে যার বিবৃতি শপথের অধীনে নেওয়া হয়েছিল, তিনিই কার্যক্রমের শেষ পর্যন্ত কোম্পানির প্রতিনিধিত্ব করতে পারবেন। এটা সিদ্ধান্ত হয়েছে যে, এমন উপলক্ষ থাকতে পারে যখন বিভিন্ন ব্যক্তি কোম্পানির প্রতিনিধিত্ব করতে পারে। এটা সিদ্ধান্ত হয়েছে যে, আদালতে কোম্পানির প্রতিনিধিত্ব করার জন্য অন্য কোনো ব্যক্তিকে পাঠানোর জন্য আদালতের অনুমতি চাওয়া ডি জুর অভিযোগকারী কোম্পানির জন্য উন্মুক্ত। এইভাবে, প্রাথমিকভাবে কোনো কর্তৃত্ব ছিল না বলেও অনুমান করা হলে, কোম্পানি যেকোনো পর্যায়ে সেই ত্রুটি সংশোধন করতে পারে। পরবর্তী পর্যায়ে কোম্পানি এমন একজন ব্যক্তিকে পাঠাতে পারে যিনি কোম্পানির প্রতিনিধিত্ব করতে সক্ষম। এইভাবে, এই ভিত্তিতে অভিযোগগুলো বাতিল করা যেত না।" ১৮. আমরা ইতিমধ্যেই লক্ষ্য করেছি যে, অভিযোগকারী জেল হাজতে থাকাকালীন তামাদি এড়াতে তার অ্যাটর্নির মাধ্যমে ম্যাজিস্ট্রেটের সংশ্লিষ্ট আদালতে অভিযোগ দাখিল করেন এবং সেই উদ্দেশ্যে সন্তোষজনক ব্যাখ্যা দেওয়া হয়েছে এবং তাই, আমরা অ্যাটর্নি কর্তৃক অভিযোগ দাখিলের এই বাধ্যতামূলক পরিস্থিতি উপেক্ষা করতে পারি না। বর্তমান মামলায়, 'চেকের হোল্ডার ইন ডিউ কোর্স' নিজেই অভিযোগকারী এবং এটি অ্যাটর্নির মাধ্যমে আদালতে উপস্থাপন করা হয়েছিল। ১৯. অ্যাটর্নির মাধ্যমে নালিশী দরখাস্ত দাখিল এবং বর্তমান মামলার উপস্থিত ঘটনা এবং পরিস্থিতি সম্পর্কে উপরের আইনের প্রস্তাবনাগুলো বিবেচনা করলে, আমাদের সিদ্ধান্ত নিতে কোনো দ্বিধা নেই যে, অ্যাটর্নি কর্তৃক অভিযোগ দাখিলে কোনো অবৈধতা করা হয়নি এবং বিজ্ঞ ম্যাজিস্ট্রেট আইনের প্রাসঙ্গিক বিধান মেনে অভিযুক্ত-পিটিশনারের বিরুদ্ধে মামলায় সঠিকভাবে আমলে গ্রহণ করেছেন। উপরে আলোচনা এবং বিবেচনা করার পরে, আমরা বর্তমান ফৌজদারি পিটিশন ফর লিভ টু আপিলে কোনো মেরিট খুঁজে পাই না। তদনুসারে, এটি খারিজ করা হলো। ইডি।








Petition of Complaint Through Attorney in NI Act Citation: 77 DLR (AD) (2025) Appellate Division (Criminal) Hon'ble Judges: Hasan Foez Siddique CJ M. Enayetur Rahim J Jahangir Hossain J Judgment: 30th July, 2023. Kabir Reza ...... Petitioner -VS- Shah Mohammad Ashraf Islam and others.. ...Respondents Referred Case: Md Nur Hussain vs Md Alamgir Alam, 2017 BLD (AD) 202; Hasibul Bashar vs Gulzar Rahman, 56 DLR (AD) 17; Tamizul Haque vs Anisul Haque, 1996 BLD (AD) 206: 1 BLC (AD) 169; AC Narayanan vs State of Maharashtra with G Kamalakar vs M/s Surana Securities Ltd., AIR 2014 SC 630; Vishwa Mitter vs OP Poddar, MANU/SC/0378/1983 1984 CriLJ 1 and Associated Cement Co. Ltd. vs Keshvanand, MANU/SC/0894/1998: 1998 CriLJ 856 ref. Advocates: Balayat Hussain, Advocate, instructed by Zainul Abedin, Advocate-on-Record-For the Petitioner M. Ali Murtaja, Advocate, instructed by Mahmuda Begum Advocate-on-Record-For the Respondent No. 1. Judgment M. Enayetur Rahim, J: This criminal petition for leave to appeal is directed against the judgement and order dated 06-5-2018 passed by a Division Bench of the High Court Division in Criminal Revision No.645 of 2017 discharging the Rule. 2. The facts relevant for filing this criminal petition, in short, are that the present opposite party No. 1 as complainant through his attorney filed a petition of complaint before the Metropolitan Magistrate Court No.1, Sylhet against the present accused-petitioner for allegedly committed offence under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. 1881. 3. In the petition of complaint it is alleged that the accused-petitioner issued two cheques vide cheque No. No. 4383624 amounting Taka 3,00,00,000 (three crore) and cheque No. No. 4383625 amounting Taka 3,00,00,000 (three crore) on his account, vide account No. 4008-1210-0020-030 with the Shahjalal Islami Bank Ltd. Uttara, Dhaka. The complainant on 31-3-2014. 2-4-2014 and lastly 09-6-2014 presented the said cheques to the concerned bank for encashment. However, those cheques were dishonoured due to payment stop by the accused. The complainant served legal notice. However, the accused did not pay the same amount. Since at the relevant time the complainant was in jail hajat in connection with a criminal case, he was compelled to file the petition of complaint through his attorney. 4. The concerned Magistrate after observing all legal formalities took cognizance of the offence under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 against the accused-petitioner and the case was registered as CR Case No. 768 of 2014. Eventually the case record was transmitted to the Court of Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Sylhet for trial. On 11-1-2017 the accused-petitioner filed an application under section 265(C) of the Code of Criminal Procedure for discharging him from the charge brought against him. 5. However, the trial Court by its order dated 6-2-2017 framed charge against the accused-petitioner under 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Challenging the said order the accused-petitioner moved before the High Court Division by filing an application under section 439 read with section 435 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. A Division Bench of the High Court Division after hearing the Rule by the impugned judgment and order dated 6-5-2018 discharged the same. 6. Feeling aggrieved by the said judgment and order the accused has filed the present criminal petition for leave to appeal before this Division. 7. Mr Balayat Hussain, learned Advocate. appearing for the accused-petitioner submits that in the instant case the complaint was filed through the attorney of the complainant and the said attorney is not a 'payee' or 'holder in due course of the cheque and in view of the proposition of law settled in the case of Md Nur Hussain vs Md Alamgir Alam, reported in 2017 BLD (AD) 202 the proceeding against the petitioner is barred under provision of sections 138 and 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. 8. Refuting the submission of the learned Advocate for the petitioner Mr Ali Murtaja, learned Advocate, appearing for the complainant-respondent having referred to the case of Hasibul Bashar vs Gulzar Rahman and another, reported in 56 DLR (AD) 17 submits that taking cognizance upon the petition of complaint filed by the attorney upon due examination under section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is perfectly valid and appropriate. 9. We have considered the submissions of the learned Advocates appearing for the respective parties, perused the petition of complaint, the impugned judgement and other materials as placed before us. 10. In the instant case the learned Advocate for the petitioner has tried to impress us that the attorney being not a 'payee' or 'holder in due course of the cheque had no authority to file the petition of complaint in the Court and, as such, the proceeding is illegal and without jurisdiction. 11. In the case of Hashibul Bashar vs Gulzar Rahman and another, reported in 56 DLR (AD)17 this Davison relied on the case of Tamizul Haque vs Anisul Haque, reported in 1996 BLD (AD) 206 : 1 BLC (AD) 169 has observed that: "In other words, it is the contention of the petitioner that cognisance against him under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act has been taken on a petition of complaint, which is legally barred. This contention of the petitioner has been addressed by the High Court Division. The learned Advocate-on-Record could not place any material to persuade us to take view different from the ratio of the case reported in 1996 BLD (AD) 206. In the reported case it has been held that taking of cognisance upon the petition of complaint filed by the Attorney upon due examination under section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is "perfectly valid and appropriate". In the instant case, since cognizance has been taken upon examination of the Attorney of Anwarul Islam in whose favour cheques were issued but finally dishonoured and that in spite of serving of notice the accused-petitioner did not pay the cheque-amount and thereby is said to have committed offence under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act." 12. In the case of Md Nur Hussain vs Md Alamgir Alam, reported in 2017 BLD (AD) 202 this Division held: "In the instant case admittedly impugned cheque was issued in the name of Abu Khair Md Shakhawat Ullah and the petition of complaint was filed by Md Alamgir Alam. Section 141(a) provides that the Court shall take cognizance of the offence punishable under section 138 upon a complaint, in writing, made by the "payee" or, as the case may be, "the holder in due course of the cheque". Here, petition of complaint has neither been filed by the "payee" nor by the "holder in due course". Complainant is an outsider, He had no connection with the instant transaction. He is not holder of the cheque for consideration and that the cheque was not transferred to him. That is the statutory requirements as provided in section 138 and 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act have not been complied with in respect of this case while filing the same." (under line supplied) 13. In the above case, complaint was filed by an outsider who is not the 'payee' or 'the holder in due course of the cheque' or the attorney of the complainant. But in this particulate case the complainant presented the petition of complaint before the concerned Court of Magistrate through his attorney and in the petition of complaint it has been categorically stated that since the complainant was in jail hajat he was compelled to file the petition of complaint through his attorney to avoid the period of limitation. 14. In the case of AC Narayanan vs State of Maharashtra with G Kamalakar vs M/s Surana Securities Ltd., reported in AIR 2014 SC 630 the Supreme Court of India has dealt the similar issue on the following manner: "In terms of the reference order, the following questions have to be decided by the Bench: (i) Whether a Power of attorney holder can sign a file a complaint petition on behalf of the complainant?/Whether the eligibility criteria prescribed by section 142(a) of NI Act would stand satisfied if the complaint petition itself is field in the name of the payee of the holder in due course of the cheque? (ii) Whether a Power of Attorney holder can be verified on oath under section 200 of the Code? (iii) Whether specific averments as to the knowledge of the Power of Attorney holder in the impugned transaction must be explicitly asserted in the complaint? (iv) If the Power of Attorney holder fails to assert explicitly his knowledge in the complaint then can the Power of Attorney holder verify the complaint on oath on such presumption of knowledge? (v) Whether the proceedings contemplated under section 200 of the Code can be dispensed with in the light of section 145 of the NI Act which was introduced by an amendment in the year 2002 ?" 15. And, finally the Supreme Court of India has settled the above issues in following manner: (i) Filing of complaint petition under section 138 of NI Act through power of attorney is perfectly legal and competent. (ii) The power of Attorney holder can depose and verify on oath before the Court in order to prove the contents of the complaint. However, the power of attorney holder must have witnessed the transaction as an agent of the payee/holder in due course or possess due knowledge regarding the said transactions. (iii) It is required by the complainant to make specific assertion as to the knowledge of the power of attorney holder in the said transaction explicitly in the complaint and the power of attorney holder who has no knowledge regarding the transactions cannot be examined as a witness in the case. (iv) In the light of section 145 of NI Act, it is open to the Magistrate to rely upon the verification in the form of affidavit filed by the complainant in support of the complaint under section 138 of the NI Act and the Magistrate is neither mandatorily obliged to call upon the complainant to remain present before the Court, nor to examine the complainant of his witness upon oath for taking the decision whether or not to issue process on the complaint under section 138 of the NI Act. (v) The functions under the general power of attorney cannot be delegated to another person without specific clause permitting the same in the power of attorney. Nevertheless, the general power of attorney itself can be cancelled and be given to another person." 16. In the case of Vishwa Mitter vs O.P. Poddar, reported in MANU/SC/0378/1983: 1984 CriLJ 1, the Supreme Court of India observed as under: "It is clear that anyone can set the criminal law in motion by filing a complaint of facts constituting an offence before a Magistrate entitled to take cognizance. It has been held that no court can decline to take cognizance on the sole ground that the complainant was not competent to file the complaint. It has been held that if any special statute prescribes offences and makes any special provision for taking cognizance of such offences under the statute, then the complainant requesting the Magistrate to take cognizance of the offence must satisfy the eligibility criterion prescribed by the statute. In the present case, the only eligibility criteria prescribed by section 142 is that the complaint must be by the payee or the holder in due course. This criteria is satisfied as the complaint is in the name and on behalf of the appellant Company." 17. In the case of Associated Cement Co. Ltd. vs Keshvanand, reported in MANU/SC/0894/1998 1998 CriLJ 856, it has been held by the Supreme Court of India that: "The complainant has to be a corporeal person who is capable of making a physical appearance in the court. It has been held that if a complaint is made in the name of an incorporeal person (like a company or corporation) it is necessary that a natural person represents such juristic person in the court. It is held that the Court looks upon the natural person to be complainant for all practical purposes. It is held that when the complainant is a body corporate it is the de jure complainant, and it must necessary associate a human being as de facto complaint to represent the former in court proceedings. It has further been held that no Magistrate shall insist that the particular person whose statement was taken on oath at the first instance, alone can continue to represent the company till the end of the proceedings. It has been held that there may be occasions when different persons can represent the company. It has been held that it is open to the de jure complainant company to seek permission of the court for sending any other person to represent the company in the court. Thus, even presuming, that initially there was no authority, still the Company can at any stage rectify that defect. At a subsequent stage the Company can send a person who is competent to represent the company. The complaints could thus nor have been quashed on this ground." 18. We have already noticed that the complainant while in jail hajat, filed the complaint before the concerned Court of Magistrate through his attorney to avoid the limitation and satisfactory explanation has been furnished to that effect and, as such, we cannot ignore this compelling circumstance in filing the complaint by the attorney. In the instant case, 'the holder in due course of the cheque himself is the complainant and same was presented before the Court through the attorney. 19. If we consider the above propositions of law in regard to the filing of petition of complaint through an attorney and the attending facts and circumstances of the present case, then we have no hesitation to hold that in filing the complaint by the attorney no illegality has been committed and the learned Magistrate rightly took cognizance into the case against the accused-petitioner having complied with the relevant provision of law. Having discussed and considered as above. we find no merit in the instant criminal petition for leave to appeal. Accordingly, the same is dismissed. Ed.








এন.আই.অ্যাক্টের ১৩৮ ধারার নালিশ পাওয়ার পর ম্যাজিস্ট্রেট উহা তদন্তের জন্য পুলিশের নিকট প্রেরণ করতে পারেন কিনা বা পুলিশ উহাতে চার্জশিট দাখিল করতে পারে কিনা? এই বিষয়ে কয়েকটি মামলার আলোকে আলোচনা করা হলো: ১৩৮ ধারার মামলা থানায় দায়ের করা যায় না। চেক ডিজঅনার হলে উহা সি.আর. মামলা হিসেবে প্রথম শ্রেণীর ম্যাজিস্ট্রেট বা মেট্রোপলিটন ম্যাজিস্ট্রেট আদালতে দায়ের করতে হয়। ম্যাজিস্ট্রেট নালিশকারীকে ফৌজদারী কার্যবিধির ২০০ ধারায় পরীক্ষা করার পর যদি সন্তুষ্ট হন যে নালিশের Prima facie ভিত্তি আছে, তাহলে তিনি উহা আমলে নিয়ে পরবর্তী বিচারিক কার্যক্রম গ্রহণ করবেন। ১৪১ (এ) ধারায় বলা হয়েছে যে, চেকের প্রাপক বা উহার ধারক কেবলমাত্র নালিশী দরখাস্ত দাখিল করতে পারেন এবং অন্য কাউকে ঐ ক্ষমতা দেয়া হয়নি। তাই ফৌজদারী কার্যবিধির ১৫৬ (৩) ধারা মোতাবেক পুলিশের মাধ্যমে তদন্তের নির্দেশ দেয়া সমীচীন নয়। বিষয়টি ব্যাখ্যা করতে গিয়ে কয়েকটি মামলার উদাহরণ দেওয়া হলো: কে. মহাদেবন বনাম ওয়াই. ভেঙ্কটেশ [(1992) 3 ALT 634] মামলায় এলাহাবাদ হাইকোর্ট মন্তব্য করেন: "Clause (a) of section 142 contemplates of falling of a private complaint only. This section does not give any indication to refer such a private complaint filed by the payee or the holder in due course to the police for investigation under section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure by the Magistrate before whom such a complaint is filed." অর্থাৎ, ১৪২ ধারার (ক) উপধারা শুধুমাত্র ব্যক্তিগত অভিযোগের কথা উল্লেখ করে। এই ধারা এমন কোনো ইঙ্গিত দেয় না যে প্রাপক বা যথোপযুক্ত ধারক কর্তৃক দায়ের করা কোনো ব্যক্তিগত অভিযোগ ম্যাজিস্ট্রেট কর্তৃক ফৌজদারী কার্যবিধির ১৫৬(৩) ধারার অধীনে তদন্তের জন্য পুলিশের কাছে পাঠানো হবে। একটি মামলায়, ১৩৮ ধারায় নালিশ পাওয়ার পর ম্যাজিস্ট্রেট নালিশকারীকে ফৌজদারী কার্যবিধির ২০০ ধারা মোতাবেক পরীক্ষা না করে নালিশটি তদন্তের জন্য থানার ভারপ্রাপ্ত কর্মকর্তার নিকট প্রেরণ করেন। জাগারলেমুদি সুরিয়া প্রসাদ বনাম স্টেট অফ এ.পি. [1992 Cr LJ 597] মামলায় অন্ধ্র প্রদেশ হাইকোর্ট ম্যাজিস্ট্রেট কর্তৃক ঐ ধরনের আদেশ প্রচার করা সঠিক হয়নি মর্মে অভিমত পোষণ করে রায়ের গর্ভে উল্লেখ করেন: "Before parting with this case, I would like to point out that the procedure adopted by the Magistrate by referring the private complaint to the police appears to be unnecessary and irregular.... He has no right or power to refer it for investigation to the police just like a private complaint filed in accordance with the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code." অর্থাৎ, এই মামলা শেষ করার আগে, আমি উল্লেখ করতে চাই যে ম্যাজিস্ট্রেট কর্তৃক ব্যক্তিগত অভিযোগ পুলিশের কাছে পাঠানোর পদ্ধতি অপ্রয়োজনীয় এবং অনিয়মিত। ফৌজদারী কার্যবিধির বিধান অনুযায়ী দায়ের করা ব্যক্তিগত অভিযোগের মতো তিনি এটিকে তদন্তের জন্য পুলিশের কাছে পাঠানোর কোনো অধিকার বা ক্ষমতা রাখেন না। আবার, কে. মহাদেবন বনাম ওয়াই. ভেঙ্কটেশ [1993 Cr LJ 2659 (A.P.)] মামলায় একই হাইকোর্ট উক্ত বিষয়ে পুলিশ কর্তৃক চার্জশিট দাখিল করা বৈধ হয়নি মর্মে বর্ণনা করেন। আদালতের ভাষায়: "Procedure for taking cognizance of an offence punishable under section 138 of the Act by a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate, First Class, is on private complaint only. Cognizance on a charge-sheet filed by the police is not proper." অর্থাৎ, মেট্রোপলিটন ম্যাজিস্ট্রেট বা প্রথম শ্রেণীর জুডিশিয়াল ম্যাজিস্ট্রেট কর্তৃক আইনের ১৩৮ ধারার অধীনে শাস্তিযোগ্য অপরাধের কনিজ্যান্স নেওয়ার পদ্ধতি শুধুমাত্র ব্যক্তিগত অভিযোগের ভিত্তিতে। পুলিশের দাখিল করা চার্জশিটের উপর কনিজ্যান্স নেওয়া সঠিক নয়। চেক ডিজঅনারের মামলার ভিত্তি হলো নালিশ এবং ঐ সূত্র ধরেই ক্ষমতাপ্রাপ্ত ম্যাজিস্ট্রেটকে মামলায় অগ্রসর হতে হবে। পুলিশের নিকট তদন্তের জন্য তা প্রেরণ করা যাবে না। বিষয়টি ব্যাখ্যা করতে গিয়ে ওয়াই. ভেঙ্কটেশ্বরা বনাম মহী হ্যান্ডলুমস [1993 Cr LJ 2362 (AP)] মামলায় অন্ধ্র প্রদেশ হাইকোর্ট বর্ণনা করেন: "It has been made clear in this case that the Magistrate, upon taking cognizance of the offence of dishonour of a cheque, must try the case himself and cannot refer it to the police for investigation. Again cognizance on police report is illegal. A written complaint by the payee or holder in due course of the cheque, as the case may be, would be necessary- Y. Venkateswara v. Mahee Handlooms 1993 Cr LJ 2362 (AP), and such a written complaint must be the basis for taking cognizance. It cannot be referred to police under section 156(3) of the Cr. P. Code for inquiry for investigation." অর্থাৎ, এই মামলায় স্পষ্টভাবে বলা হয়েছে যে, চেক ডিজঅনারের অপরাধের কনিজ্যান্স নেওয়ার পর ম্যাজিস্ট্রেটকে অবশ্যই নিজে মামলাটির বিচার করতে হবে এবং তদন্তের জন্য পুলিশের কাছে পাঠাতে পারবেন না। পুলিশের রিপোর্টের উপর কনিজ্যান্স নেওয়া অবৈধ। চেকের প্রাপক বা যথোপযুক্ত ধারক কর্তৃক লিখিত অভিযোগ, যেমন ক্ষেত্রে হতে পারে, প্রয়োজন হবে এবং এমন লিখিত অভিযোগ কনিজ্যান্স নেওয়ার ভিত্তি হতে হবে। ফৌজদারী কার্যবিধির ১৫৬(৩) ধারার অধীনে তদন্তের জন্য পুলিশের কাছে পাঠানো যাবে না। সংক্ষেপে, এন.আই.অ্যাক্টের ১৩৮ ধারার অধীনে দায়ের করা মামলায় ম্যাজিস্ট্রেট তদন্তের জন্য পুলিশের কাছে পাঠাতে পারেন না এবং পুলিশও এই মামলায় চার্জশিট দাখিল করতে পারে না। এই মামলার কার্যক্রম ব্যক্তিগত অভিযোগের ভিত্তিতে ম্যাজিস্ট্রেট কর্তৃক পরিচালিত হবে।








Section 138-Observations The Court below should have been more careful in quoting the subject matter or content of an application as well as in choosing the words and phrase while passing an order and dealing with such kind of applications since by the application said attorney sought permission of the court to conduct the case on behalf of the complainant and he did not seek for changing or substituting the complainant, a mere misquoting of words and phrases do not warrant any interference by this Court. Sajjad Hossain Milki alias Sajjadul Haque Khan Milki vs State, 75 DLR 506. Section 138-If the choque in question would have been a bearer choque, no doubt, it could be encashed by presenting the same in the concerned hank which issued the same. But in the instant case, the non-MICR cheque in question is admittedly a cross cheque, thus, it has to be encashed for collection through the Clearing House of the Bangladesh Bank. However, as per the circular of the Bangladesh Bank, unless the cheque is an MICR instrument it will not pass through the Clearing House of the Bangladesh Bank. In other words, said cheque is non-negotiable. Abu Sador Md Shamim vs State, 74 DLR 395. Section 138-Issuing and signing of the cheques would be proved at the trial. Whether he managed the affairs of the company or not is a disputed question of facts. The High Court Division was not justified in passing the impugned judgment considering the documents submitted before it. The High Court Division was based upon disputed question of facts and defence materials, those materials were not submitted at the trial Court, rather, directly submitted before the High Court Division for consideration in the proceedings under section 561A of the Code. The complainant has no occasion to know about the transfer of shares because it is the internal affairs of the accused and his company which ought not have scrutinized by the High Court Division while exercising its inherent jurisdiction. On the basis of such defence material quashing of the proceedings of the 3(three) cases out of 5(five) is serious error of law. Ashfaq Hossain vs State, 74 DLR (AD) 40. Section 138-Inconsistent administrative orders by different Sessions Judges in different Sessions Divisions may be cured by the common approach. AAM Ziaur Rahman vs Bangladesh, 73 DLR 170. Section 138-The criminal proceeding under section 138 serves two purposes: firstly, to punish the offender and secondly, to recover the value of the cheque. The object of adding sub-section (2) to section 138 is to alleviate the grievance of the complainant. There can be no dispute in so far as the sentence of imprisonment is concerned that it should commensurate with the gravity of the crime. Court has to deal with the offenders by imposing proper sentence by taking into consideration of facts and circumstances of each case. It is not only the rights of the offenders which are required to be looked into at the time of the imposition of sentence, but also of the victims of the crime and society at large, also by considering the object sought to be achieved by the particular legislation. Aman Ullah vs State, 73 DLR 541. Section 138-Institution of the artha rin suit is not valid a ground for quashment of or interference with the proceeding in the Sessions Case under section 138 of the Act. The issues raised in an Artha Rin Suit are confined to the realization of money along with the interest thereon. The suit does not involve any criminal liability. On the other hand, a case under section 138 of the Act involves a strict criminal liability which means that, the offence thereunder, may not involve a mens rea and institution of an artha rin suit does not exempt the offender from the criminal of liability being the penalty of a maximum imprisonment of 1 (one) year or specified quantum of fine or both. Nasir Uddin Umar (Md) @ Nasir Uddin Mohammad Omar vs Chowdhury Jahangir Jahural Ambia Al-Baki, 73 DLR 638. Section 138-If the petitioner is given a chance to obtain the opinion of the hand writing expert as to the genuineness of the signature upon the cheque in question. The trial court is directed to send the cheque to the hand writing expert, CID, Dhaka, for obtaining opinion from the agency within shortest possible time. The CID authority is directed to give their opinion upon the matter within 30 days from the date of receipt of the order from the court concerned. MH Mawdud Hussain vs State, 72 DLR 396. Section 138-Section 65 of the Act does not provide any power to the Court to treat or admit a private document as primary or secondary evidence upon an application of either of the parties to a judicial proceeding without any formal proof thereof. Rezwanur Rab Zia vs State, 72 DLR 717. Section 138-If the claim of a person for getting expert opinion in relation to a dishonored cheque is allowed in every case, it may lead to the collapse of the banking system relating to cheques. Because such decision will encourage a shrewd litigant to file cases against the banks and others and to seek expert opinion on the signature and other writings. It will inevitably result in delay in disposal of court cases. Mamunur Rashid @ Abdullah-al-Mamun vs State, 72 DLR 728. Section 138-If the trial court considers that for ascertaining the genuineness of the signature the evidence on record is not adequate, it may call for expert opinion on the signature appearing on the disputed cheque and the specimen signature preserved and produced by the Bank. Mamunur Rashid @ Abdullah-al-Mamun vs State, 72 DLR 728. Section 138-Pendency of a civil suit will not hinder proceeding of a criminal case and vice versa. Eastern Bank Limited vs Md Sirajuddula, 72 DLR (AD) 79. Section 138 Provisions of section 138 of the Negotiable Act to the best of our ability and find the provision with regard to serve notice in the well circulated Bangla National Newspaper is mere directory not mandatory, since there is no legal mandate to stop or dismiss the case, if notice is not served through a daily Bangla National Bangla newspaper having wide circulation. The complainant published a legal notice through the daily newspaper named "গণসংহতি" which is a wide circulated daily Bangla National Newspaper or not that is a disputed question of fact to be ascertained at the trial on taking evidence and when evidence is required to settle the dispute, the proceedings cannot be quashed. Jalal Sarder (Md) vs State, 71 DLR 480. Section 138-The cheque is the subject matter of both the Sessions Case and the Artha Rin Case, as such, the Sessions Case is illegal and without lawful authority. Suruj Miah vs Government of Bangladesh, 71 DLR 517. Section 138-The term "national newspaper" as occurring in section 138 means a daily newspaper published from within the territory of Bangladesh, whether from the capital city Dhaka or from a place outside Dhaka. Akramuzzaman Chowhdury (Md) vs State, 71 DLR 458. Section 138-Since the Act does not restrict the presentation of a cheque for more than once within the specified 6 (six) months period and consequently a demand notice may be issued within 30 days after each dishonor. The logical result is that the cause of action may arise after each notice. The Act does not restrict the cause of action as a one-time event for filing a case under section 138. Akramuzzaman Chowhdury (Md) vs State. 71 DLR 458. Section 138-We are not of the opinion that a case under section 138 of the Act. is barred by the provision of the Artha Rin Adalat Ain but we are deciding here that the scheduled bank should follow the appropriate provision of law first for realization of the borrowed money. Nure Alam Siddique (Tulu) va State, 71 DLR 570. Section 138-The accused is at liberty to take his defense plea in the trial and to produce supporting evidence in accordance with law. Shariful Haque (Md) vs State represented by the Deputy Commissioner, 70 DLR 209. Section 138-Once a cheque is drawn it has to be presented within 6 (six) months from the date it is drawn or within the period of it's validity; if dishonoured on placing it for encashment the payee has to make a demand for payment by giving a notice in writing within 30 (thirty) days on receipt of information from the bank regarding the return of the cheque and that the cause of action shall arise if the drawer failed to pay within 30 (thirty) days of receipt of such notice. Nurul Islam vs State, 69 DLR 312. Section 138-At the time of charge hearing, the Court of Joint Metropolitan Session in true sense had no legal scope to consider or decide those facts and it was therefore well justified to refuse the prayer filed under section 265C of the Code. Majharul Hoque Monsur (Md) vs Mir Kashim Chowdhury, 69 DLR 241. Section 138-There are no legal restrictions upon parties to commence legal proceedings both under section 138 of the Act simultaneously with a civil suit, i.e. the Artha Rin suit. The offence committed under section 138 of the Act and its consequences are different to the consequences contemplated under the Artha Rin Suit. Artha Rin Suit relates to the realization of money whereas dishonouring of cheque relates to a statutory offence under the Act of 1881. Mofizur Rahman (Md) vs Bangladesh Represented by Secretary Ministry of Law, 69 DLR 402. Section 138-The offence committed under sections 420 and 406 are totally different from one committed under section 138(1) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. while the ingredients as, well as, the reliefs and punishments provided for, under two laws are different. Section 138(2) provides for imposing fine and to pay fine, to the extent of face value of the dishonoured cheque, to the "payee'/complainant. Section 138B provides for depositing not less than 50% of the dishonoured cheque in the trial court, for preferring appeal against conviction under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. There is no such provision under section 420 or 406 of the Penal Code. Besides, joinder of offence committed under section 138(1) of the Negotiable Instruments Act is not permitted with one committed under the Penal Code. Nurul Islam vs State, 69 DLR 308. Section 138-On a reading of the petition of complaint it is difficult to hold that there is any legal bar or the continuation of the proceeding will amount to an abuse of the process of the Court. The proposition of law is by now well settled that on the basis of the defence plea or materials, the criminal proceedings should not be stified before trial, when there is a prima-facie case for going to the trial. Nurul Huda (Md) vs State, 69 DLR 241 486. Section 138-Notice under section 138 is required to be served upon "the drawer" of the cheque so as to give the drawer an opportunity to make the payment and escape the penal consequences. Shahidul Alam @ S Alam vs Dr Jahid Hossain Prodhan, 69 DLR 547. Section 138-The person who writes a cheque or draft instructs the drawer to pay someone else. The company is the "drawer" of the cheque. The wordings as used in section 138 is very clear to make only the "drawer" liable and thus, leaves no room for any doubt or ambiguity. Shahidul Alam @ S Alam vs Dr Jahid Hossain Prodhan, 69 DLR 547. Section 138-Since company is a juristic person, it would be managed by living persons who guided the act of such a juristic person to commit such a glaring default and hence, should be held responsible. Shahidul Alam @ S Alam vs Dr Jahid Hossain Prodhan, 69 DLR 547. Section 138-The Managing Director being the chief executive of the company his knowledge may be deemed to be the knowledge of the company and the directors as well. Shahidul Alam @ S Alam vs Dr Jahid Hossain Prodhan, 69 DLR 547. Section 138-A single notice of demand issued to the Managing Director of the company will henceforth, be considered to have been issued to the directors as well and the liability of directors can arise on the basis of such notice. Shahidul Alam S Alam vs Dr Jahid Hossain Prodhan, 69 DLR 547. Section 138-Since the cheque in question had been issued by the Company as drawer, it constitutes single cause of action and there cannot be any question of splitting up of the cause of action where the accused No. 2 remains absconding and the law does not contemplate separate notice to be given to every director. Shahidul Alam S Alam vs Dr Jahid Hossain Prodhan, 69 DLR 547. Section 138-Legislature do not intent to serve notice one after another, in fact any one form therein is enough to serve the notice if it is found to be served properly as per law, in the premises if the notice returned unserved when it is served through registered post it is enough, and to be held as good service and thus it is not the legislative mandate to publish the notice in the daily news paper again for drawing attention to the drawer of the cheque. Ferdous Khan (Md) vs State, 68 DLR 334. Section 138-Since the criminal proceeding can be proceeded independently of the civil suit, there is no bar to proceed with the criminal proceedings. Abu Sayeed Chowdhury vs State, 68 DLR 169. Section 138-When the cheque was dishonoured by the bank on the ground of 'insufficiency of fund in the respondent's account, a proceeding under section 138 of the Act cannot be frustrated merely on a technical ground. Hasan vs State, 68 DLR 225. Section 138-Cheque, which is otherwise complete except the date, will be treated as an inchoate document handed over to the payee with implied authority (unless an express authority is annexed) to write the date on the cheque. It is the choice and decision of the drawer of a cheque to hand over a date, post-dated or undated cheque to the payee. He (drawer) cannot subsequently come with the plea that an undated or post dated cheque handed over to the payee. In such case he is stopped by his conduct, called estoppels by conduct, and cannot be allowed to deny his obligation only on the excuse that an undated cheque was given to the payee. Almad Ullah vs Md Younus, 68 DLR 228. Section 138 The offence is not deemed to have been committed against the State. The proceeding is initiated by the "payee", of a "holder in due course', who has proprietary right and interest in the property of the dishonoured cheque. The State is not a necessary party, though it may be a proper party in such a case. NI Act case is unlike a case filed under Penal Code etc. In a case under NI Act, cost may be awarded to the aggrieved party for causing financial hardship. Leading a person or a family to the verge of ruination, for harassment and inflicting mental agony on frivolous grounds or by resorting to dilatory tactics or on issues of law already settled by the Appellate Division, ie. when the accused-petitioner does not come in clean hands for seeking justice, but with collateral purpose. Harun-or-Rashid vs State, 68 DLR 535. Section 138-Once a cheque is drawn and handed over to the drawee and the latter has presented it in his account for encashment and thereafter, if the cheque is returned to him with an endorsement that the amount of moncy standing to the credit of the account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid for that account or that it was dishonoured because of 'stop payment instructed by the Bank, an offence punishable under the section would constitute provided that if the drawee fulfills the conditions provided in the proviso to sub-section (1). If the drawer of the cheque is a Company, firm or an association of individuals the said money. firm or association of individuals would also be prosecuted for commission of offence under section 138 subject to the fulfilment of the conditions. (Per SK Sinha, CJ majority) Eusof Babu (Md) vs State, 68 DLR (AD) 298. Section 138 Onus-The onus on the part of the drawee is primary being based on the maxim e.i.: 'incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat this is because the liability envisaged in sub-section (1) is on the person in-charge of, and was responsible to the business of the company is fixed by the legislature because he is directly responsible for the offence. (Per SK Sinha, CJ majority) Eusof Babu (Md) vs State, 68 DLR (AD) 298. Section 138-The dishonour of a cheque does not itself constitute an offence under section 138. If the drawer of such cheque fails to make payment of the amount of money to the payee within thirty days of receipt of the notice, the cause of action for constituting the offence will arise, and if a complaint is filed within one month of the date on which the cause of action arises, the court shall take cognizance of the offence. So, the cause of action will arise if the drawer fails to make payment to the payee. Now. If the same drawer fails to make payment of the amount of money covered by the cheque (s) within the stipulated time, does it constitute the cause of action ? It does. If it does constitute the cause of action, there will be no legal bar to file a case for prosecuting the drawer for the cause of action. Here the cause of action is not distinct but the same. (Per SK Sinha, CJ majority) Eusof Babu (Md) vs State, 68 DLR (AD) 298. Section 138-The complainant(s)/drawee(s) of the cheques may, if so advised, arraign by adding the Companies in the category of accused if they feel that for getting effective relief in the cases the presence of the companies is necessary in the cases. (Per SK Sinha, CJ majority) Eusof Babu (Md) vs State, 68 DLR (AD) 298. Section 138-Liability of bank to payee of cheque-The complainant served a legal notice within 15 days of the receipt of the information of return of the cheques. So there is no valid ground for quashing the proceeding under section 138 of the Act. Habibur Ralunan Howlader vs State, 53 DLR (AD) III. Section 138-Where there is no non-obstante clause the jurisdiction of the court, constituted under the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot be taken away or barred-the court below committed no illegality in taking cognizance or framing of charge under the general provision of law. Moniruzzaman vs ANM Didar-e-Alam, 54 DLR 445. Section 138-In the petition of complaint it is stated that the complainant opposite party No. 1 issued notice demanding payment of the amount of money stated in the cheque within 7 (seven) days. By issuing such notice there was no breach of the provision of law as contained in proviso (b) to section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act. The legal implication is that the issuing date of notice must not exceed 15 (Fifteen) days and notice can very well be given 7 (Seven) days time. Noor Hossain (Md) vs State, 7 BLC 241. Section 138-Since under section 138 of the Act an offence is committed if a cheque is dishonoured and if payment is not within 15 days after receipt of a legal notice, criminal proceeding can be proceeded independently of the civil suit. Since there is a prima-facie case the criminal proceedings cannot be quashed. Md Monzur Alam vs State, 2002 BLD (AD) 228. Section 138-Under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act an offence is committed if a cheque is dishonoured and if payment is not made within 15 days after receipt of a legal notice. It is a settled law that criminal proceeding can be proceeded independently of the civil suit. Monzur Alam vs State, 55 DLR (AD) 62. Section 138-The convict respondent admitted about the loan, issuance of cheques by him and dishonour of cheques and that a notice under section 138(1)(b) has been given by the complainant. Thus, all the legal requirements are present to bring the offence under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Amir Hossain vs MA Malek. 56 DLR (AD) 146. Section 138-Admittedly, in the present case the cheque was presented to the bank after expiry of 6 months from the date of drawing of the cheque. So, obviously this case under section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act is not maintainable in view of the restriction imposed by proviso (a) to the said section. So, the proceeding is liable to be quashed. MA Mazid vs Md Abdul Motaleb, 56 DLR 636. Section 138-In the instant case the plain subject matter of this case is the dishonour of the cheque issued by the accused now late Khalilur Rahman in favour of the complainant which clearly comes within the mischief of section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act since the impugned cheque has been returned unpiad for insufficiency of fund.. Khalilur Rahman vs Md Habibullah, 57 DLR 603. Section 138-When the reason for return of the cheque has been mentioned as "refer to drawer" or insufficiency of fund, it is the primary duty of the drawer of the cheque to make payment of the money to the payee within 15 days from the receipt of the notice. Khalilur Rahman vs Md Habibullah, 57 DLR 603. Section 138-From the heading of the section it becomes clear that the legislature never intended dishonour of the cheques to be made punishable only in case of insufficiency of fund or exceeds the amount arranged to be paid since the word "ete" has also been used there by the caption of the section. So, it can be presumed that legislature contemplated various other reasons where the cheque is dishonoured. Khalilur Rahman vs Md Habibullah, 57 DLR 603. Section 138-Proceeding under 138 of the Act cannot be quashed on the ground of no-production of original cheque at the time of taking cognizance. Kazi Abu Bakar Siddique Hannan vs Md Rafiqul Islam Bhuiyan, 28 BLC 37. Section 138-The facts of the case is identical with the reported case of 25 BLC (AD) 81 and the point raised by the learned advocate for the accused-petitioner are same which has been answered adequately by the Appellate Division. Since the point raised by the learned advocate for the accused-petitioner has already been decided by our apex Court we are not inclined to revert back to the High Court Division to decide the same point again. Ismail (Md) vs State, 28 BLC 449. Section 138-Notice was not served under section 138 of the Act. which is essentially a question of fact, to be proved by adducing evidence at the time of trial, in as much as there is specific assertion in the petition of complaint that such a notice was, in fact, served. This fact cannot be decided by exercising jurisdiction under section 561A of the Code. Abdur Razzak Mozumder vs State, 27 BLC 41. Section 138-Sub-section (3) of section 138 of the Act, has clearly provided that notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1) and (2) thereof, the holder of the cheque(s) shall retain his right to establish his claim through civil Court if whole or any part of the value of the cheque(s) remains unrealized. One filed under the Artha Rin Ain, 2003 and another under section 138 of the Act, 1881 can stand together. Kamal Ahmad-uz-zoha (Md) @ Kamal Ahmad-uz-zoha vs State, 27 BLC 103. Section 138-The cheque having been issued on 15-5-2017, the beginning day of the 16-5-2017. Because clause (a) of the proviso to sub-section 138(1) contains the word "from." So the "six months" expired on 15-11-2017. However the cheque was presented on 12-11-2017. It follows that the presentation was made within the permissible time limit of six months. Kazi Al-Amin Abdullah vs State, 26 BLC 66. Section 138-In specifying the various time limits, the proviso to sub-section 138(1) of the Act specifies two types of expressions namely "six months" in clause (a) and "thirty days" (not month) in clauses (b) and (c). Upon a combined reading of the three provisions of the two Acts, the statutory period of 6 (six) months is to be reckoned in following manner: Kazi Al-Amin Abdullah vs State, 26 BLC 66. Section 138-Sub-section (1) of section 138 has not made any qualification of the cheque so returned unpaid either post-dated given as a security for repayment of the loan availed by the loanee has alleged by the accused or any other cheque issued by the drawer for encashment currently. When the legislature has not made any difference between a post-dated cheque issued as security for the repayment of the loan availed by the loanee, the petitioner, being the loanee has issued a cheque for encashment currently, we do not see any scope of making any such difference. Haroon (Md) vs Bank Asia Limited, 26 BLC 315. Section 138-The direct presence of the company being a mere technical flaw cannot raise any question upon the maintainability of the case nor can it otherwise cause any impediment in the proceedings of the case. Jahangir Akram (Kazol), va State, 25 BLC 174. Section 138-Since the charge has already been framed, the accused has/had every opportunity to agitate his grievances before the trial Court by adducing proper evidence. Before trial we cannot examine the disputed question of facts under the inherent jurisdiction of section 561A of the Code. Golam Faruque Chowdhury (Md) vs Islami Bank Bangladesh, 25 BLC 878. Section 138-Upon subsequent presentation of the cheque for payment, if it is again dishonoured another opportunity will accrue to the beneficiary to take action as provided under section 138(1) of the Act, and again, in accordance with the provisions of section 141, the' beneficiary of the cheque will be obliged to make complaint against such subsequent dishonour within a period of one month from the cause of action arising under proviso (c) to section 138(1) of the Act. Nizam Uddin Mahmud Hossain vs State, 25 BLC (AD) 81. Section 138-Where the amount promised shall depend on some other complementary facts or fulfillment of another promise and if any cheque is issued on that basis, but that promise is not fulfilled it will not create any obligation on the part of the drawer of the cheque or any right which can be claimed by the holder of the cheque. As such dishonesty or fraud cannot be attributed in giving stop payment instructions. The question of commit-ting an offence by the accused punishable under section 138 of the Act does not arise. It is clear from the agreement exhibit -5 and other materials on record in the cases that the respondent issued cheques for a sum of taka 4,50,00,000 (four crore fifty lac) on condition that complainant shall sell the disputed property of the accused respondent as per market value and if he is able to sell the same he would be entitled to get a percentage of consideration of the property sold in view of such act. It is the defence case that the condition under which the cheque was issued had not been complied with by the complainant appellant. Thus, the respondent instructs the bank to stop the payment of cheque, accordingly, the bank returned the cheques with endorsement "payment stopped by the drawer". Abul Kaher Shahin (Md) vs Emran Rashid, 25 BLC (AD) 115. Section 138-The date of issuance of the cheque is a question of fact to be ascertained at the time of trial. Non-disclosure of such fact in the petition of complaint or in the legal notice cannot offer the proceeding liable to be quashed. Clause (a) to the provision of section 138(1) of the Act, refers to six months from the date from which the cheque was drawn not from the date the cheque was handed over. Fazlul Hoque (Md) vs State, 24 BLC 634. Section 138-The proposition of law is well settled that on the basis of defence plea or materials, the proceedings should not be stifled before trial, when there is a prima-facie case for going to the trial. Abdul Awal (Md) vs State, 24 BLC 180. Section 138-Writing the cheque is not material but it is the signature which is important to decide the matter. Subroto Pal vs State, 24 BLC 368. Section 138-Stop payment-Since the cheque was returned by bank with the endorsement "payment stopped by the drawer" it is to be presumed that the cheque was returned unpaid because the amount of money standing to the credit of that account was insufficient to honour the cheque. Subroto Pal vs State, 24 BLC 368. Section 138- There is no bar to realize the loan amount by any financial institution by producing post-dated cheques for encashment. Ehetasamul Haque vs State, 24 BLC (AD) 43. Section 138-Any alteration without the consent of the party who issued the cheque rendered the same invalid. However, question of issuance of blank cheque and fraudulent insertion of larger amount than actual liabilities is a question of fact. Insertion of larger amount in blank cheque than actual liability is an ingredient of fraud which cannot be approved since fraud goes to the root of the transection. Where there is an intention to deceive and means of the deceit to obtain an advantage there is fraud. Alauddin (Md) vs State, represented by the Deputy Commissioner, Chittagong, 24 BLC (AD) 139. Section 138 The High Court Division on an application under section 561A of the Code is not authorized to quash a proceeding adjudicating a disputed question of fact. Once issuance of cheque and signature thereon are found to be genuine, the court shall proceed with the proceeding. Question of fraud or fraudulent insertion can only be determined by recording and considering evidence by the trial Court after holding trial. However, if blank cheque is issued towards liability or as security, when the liability is proved, if the cheque is filled up and presented to the bank, the person who had drawn the cheque cannot avoid criminal liability. Alauddin (Md) vs State, represented by the Deputy Commissioner, Chittagong, 24 BLC (AD) 139. Section 138 The offence under section 138 of the Act is not a natural crime like hurt or murder. it is an offence created by a legal fiction, in the statute. It is a civil liability, transformed into a criminal liability under restricted conditions by way of an amendment of the Act. Alauddin (Md) vs State, represented by the Deputy Commissioner, Chittagong, 24 BLC (AD) 139. Section 138-The language used in section 138 of the Act is significant. The commencement of section stands with the words, 'where any cheque'. Those three words are of more significance, in particular, by reason of the user of the word 'any' the first three words suggest that in fact for whatever reason if a cheque is drawn on an account maintained by him with a banker in favour of another person for whatever reason it may be, the liability under this provision cannot be avoided, if the same stands returned by the banker unpaid. Alauddin (Md) vs State, represented by the Deputy Commissioner, Chittagong, 24 BLC (AD) 139. Section 138 The post-dated cheque becomes a cheque within the meaning of section 138 of the Act on the date which is written thereon and the 6 months period has to be reckoned for the purposes of Proviso (a) to section 138 of the Act from the said date. Alauddin vs State, represented by the DC, Chittagong. 24 BLC (AD) 139. Section 138-Once the loan was disbursed and installments have been taken due on the cheque as per the agreement, dishonour of such cheques would fall under section 138 of the Act. Alauddin (Md) vs State, represented by the Deputy Commissioner, Chittagong, 24 BLC (AD) 139. Section 138-The criminal proceeding under section 138 serves two purposes: firstly, to punish the offender and secondly, to recover the value of the cheque. The object of adding sub-section (2) to section 138 is to alleviate the grievance of the complainant. Mahmudul Hasan (Md) vs State, 23 BLC 575. Section 138-Since the transfer of share has been approved by the company and duly notified to the Registrar of Joint Stock Companies before the date of issuance of the cheques in question, the accused had no authority to sign any cheque on behalf of the company at the relevant time as he was nobody to the company. These facts leave no manner of doubt to find that on the date the offence was committed by the company and since at that relevant time the petitioner was not the Managing Director, he had nothing to do with the affairs of the company. No ingredients of section 138 of the Act attracts the accused to be tried in a criminal prosecution. Shahidul Islam (Md) vs State, 23 BLC 436. Section 138-The complainant clearly asserted that he served the legal notice upon the accused petitioner under section 138 of the Act asking him to pay the cheques amount within 7 days. But the section 138(1)(b) of the Act, does not mandate the complainant to issue such type of notice affording 7 days notice. Legal notice was though served after 16 days of the notice the petition of complaint was filed beyond the stipulation of section 141(b) of the Act. The proceeding was initiated and, proceeded in violation of section 138(1)(b) as well as 141(b) of the Act. Maloy vs Md Sekander Chockder @ Md Shahadat Hossain, 22 BLC 449. Section 138-Notice to the petitioner company had returned undelivered with the endorsement "party was absent every time". Whether the accused petitioner received the legal notice or not, these are disputed question of fact which can only be adjudicated by taking evidence through trial. Firoz Alam vs State, 21 BLC 190. Section 138-All legal formalities as laid down under section 138 of the Act have been complied with. It appears that company is not a made party in the proceedings. This is a criminal case not a civil case, in fact, civil case is required to be party but there is no defect of party or necessary party is required for criminal justice system therefore, the question raised by the petitioner is not correct proposition of law. Firoz Alam vs State, 21 BLC 190. Section 138-Filing an application for production of the original documents in the Court by the accused at the time of hearing of the case is not at all necessary, if the accused petitioner had any defence plea he could have taken any such accusation or defence to the pro-secution witnesses at the trial in cross-exami-nation. Hasan Ali vs State, 21 BLC 301. Section 138-Non-impleading of the Company as an accused is a mere irregularity not affacting the merit of the case the question of quashment of the proceedings for its non-impleadment as an accused in the proceeding does not arise. Tipu Sultan vs State, 21 BLC 341. Section 138-Cheque was returned with an endorsement that signature differs and that was done just to deprive and defraud the Opposite-Party and in its crux such facts are to be looked into only by scanning evidence to be adduced during the trial. But on a date fixed for framing of charge or deciding a petition under section 265C of the Code, Session Judge had no scope at all to consider those facts letting the petitioner off or absolving him from the charge as framed under section 138 of the Act. Sirajul Islam vs Md Zaman, 21 BLC 367. Section 138-It would be tantamount that notice was duly served upon the addressee or the accused petitioner if any letter posted by complainant in accordance with law giving acknowledgement due with registered post to the correct address of the accused petitioner or addressee as the case may be. Abdul Hamid vs State, 21 BLC 370. Section 138-Artha Rin Suit is for realiza-tion of money and the criminal case under section 138 of the Act is for the offence committed by the petitioner on dishonoured the cheque. Since the criminal proceeding can be proceeded independently of the civil suit, there is no bar to proceed with the criminal proceedings. Abu Sayeed Chowdhury (Samrat) vs State, 21 BLC 388. Section 138-The intent of the legislature is very much clear from all these amendments that, this piece of legislation is a welfare legislation, enacted and amended to protect benefit the payees or 'holders in due course of a negotiable instrument. The drawee of a dishonoured cheque cannot escape his liability except in the manner laid down in section 82 of the Act. i.e. either (1) by cancellation, or (II) by release, or (III) by payment. On no other excuse or plea. Abdul Mannan vs State, 21 BLC 402. Section 138-Once the cheque has been issued it is admitted that the accused had dues to the complainant. This admitted position is summary in nature and there is little scope for taking defence in this particular case since the accused-respondent has admitted the dues by issuance of cheques which were dishonoured. The complainant served legal notice through his lawyer but the accused failed to arrange to pay the same. SM Alim vs Abdul Hoque Khan, 21 BLC 833. Section 138-The alleged omission of impleading the Company in the proceeding is an irregularity and the same is not fatal and that though the company is not made a party in the proceeding but the persons concerned representing the company, who are party in the issuance of the dishonoured cheque in reference, having been made party in the proceeding, the proceeding cannot be said to be bad for defect of party inasmuch as the punishment if any on proof, is to be inflicted upon the natural persons involved in the offence committed. Joynul Karim vs State, 21 BLC (AD) 1. Section 138-For dishonour of a cheque there can be more offences under different definitions of the penal statues. As such dishonour of a cheque may also be an offence not only under section 138 of the Act but also under section 420 of the Penal Code. To constitute an offence punishable under section 138 an initial intention of cheating need not be established. It is sine qua non for an offence punishable under section 420 of the Code. For an offence of cheating there must be dishonest or fraudulent misrepresentation, that is to say, deception and inducement of the person deceived to part with the property must be established. Motaleb Hossain (Md) vs Abdul Haque Limon, 21 BLC (AD) 174. Section 138-Facts disclosed in the case also make out a case under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. In such a case, it is all too open to the complainant to proceed under any of the two Penal Code laws available to him. Learned Magistrate duly applied his judicial mind into the facts and circumstances of the case and the materials on record and rightly framed charge against the accused-petitioners under section 420 of the Penal Code which does not suffer from any illegality or legal infirmity occasioning failure of justice and as such the proceeding is not liable to be quashed. Aminur Rahman vs State, 8 BLC 518. Section 138-Under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. an offence is committed if a cheque is dishonoured and if payment is not made within 15 days after receipt of a legal notice. So, if an offence is committed under the above section, the Criminal Court will be competent to try the case and pendency of civil suit will not put any hindrance to proceed with the criminal cases because there is no possibility of any conflicting decision in the civil suit and criminal cases. Monzur Alam (Md) vs State, 9 BLC 88. Section 138-It appears that though the appellant presented the cheque on four dates but after the cheque was dishonoured for the last time on 26-10-2000, he served the required notice on 6-11-2000, well within statutory period and as such filing of the instant complaint on 11-12-2000 cannot be regarded as illegal. Munshi Md Rashed Kamal vs Abdus Salam, 10 BLC (AD) 186. Section 138-When the Bank returns the cheque referring it to the drawer for want of sufficient fund and the matter is brought to the notice of the drawer, a duty is immediately cast upon the author of the cheque to make immediate arrangement for payment of the money covered by the cheque for saving himself from criminal liability. In the instant case, dishonest intention being apparent on the face of the record, awarding a sentence of fine only without any substantive sentence of imprisonment is wholly unjustified and improper. Considering the provision of section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and the scheme behind making the provision, it will be justified if the accused-respondent is sentenced to imprisonment for 6 (six) months in addition to fine already imposed. Abdul Halim Chowdhury (Md) vs GMM Rahman, Managing Director, 10 BLC 747. Section 138-It appears from the record that the post-dated cheques were returned unpaid to the opposite party, who took steps against the petitioner in accordance with the provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act, where-upon the learned Magistrate took cognisance of the offence under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act against the petitioner. In the petition of complaint there are some omissions as to disclosure of some material facts and such omissions will not make the prosecution case fatal. The instant transaction disclosed civil liability and the criminal offence under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act as well inas-much as the criminal case stands for the offence when the civil suit is for realisation of money and, as such, it calls for no interference with the criminal proceeding. Shamsul Islam Chowdhury (Md) vs Uttara Bank Lid, 11 BLC 116. Section 138-It appears that lastly, three post-dated cheques were presented but the bank on the same day, that is on 17-1-99, returned the same unpaid and then the complainant took legal steps under section 138(b) of the Negotiable Instruments Act by issuing legal notice on 24-1-99 which was received by the petitioner on 28-1-99 and then the petitioner promised to settle the entire outstanding dues by 4-2-99 but then he refused to repay on 15-2-99. On receipt of the petition of complaint, the learned Magistrate examined complainant and took cognisance of the offence under sections 406 and 420 of the Penal Code read with section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. It is submitted on behalf of the petitioner that the offences committed under the general law cannot be tried with the offences under special law. An offence under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is for dishonour of the cheque simpliciter for insufficient fund, etc. whereas an offence under section 420 of the Penal Code of cheating is a distinct offence. In case of holding trial the general law and special law are not material, it is only to be seen what the offence in FIR prima-facie discloses. It is not a case of want of jurisdiction. In the instant case, the charge has not yet been framed for which the issue as raised may be settled at the time of framing charge or after framing of charge. Initial intention of deception can be gathered by the subsequent act of the accused and that there is no bar to prosecute the accused for criminal offence apart from civil liability. Shamsul Islam Chowdhury (Md) vs Uttara Bank Lad, 11 BLC 119. Section 138-The offence under section 138 of the Act can be completed with the concentration of a number of facts ie. (i) drawing of the cheque, (ii) presentation of the cheque, (iii) returning of the cheque unpaid by the drawee bank. (iv) giving notice in writing to the drawer of the cheque demanding payment of the cheque amount and (v) failure of the drawer to make payment within 15 days of receipt of the notice. As per provisions of sections 177, 178, 179 and 180 of the Code of Criminal Procedure if the aforesaid five different acts were done in five different localities any of the Courts exercising jurisdiction in one of the five local areas can become the place of trial for the offence under section 138 of the Act and complainant can choose any one of the Courts in whose jurisdiction any of the 5 components of the said offence was done. The legal notice was issued from a lawyer at Chittagong District Bar and the complainant, for encashing the cheques, presented the same at a bank at Chittagong. As such, on the ground of initiating the proceeding at Chittagong this proceeding cannot be quashed. Abdul Alim vs Biswajit Dey, 59 DLR 236. Section 138-Since the accused-petitioner at no point of time denied his signature on the cheque he must have to discharge the onus as to why he signed the cheque when the cheque was delivered/ given to the complainant. A legitimate claim of the complainant cannot be frustrated on mere technicality. Abdul Alim vs Biswajit Dey, 59 DLR 236. Section 138-Since the date of receipt is a question of fact to be ascertained at the time of trial non-disclosure of such fact in the complaint petition cannot render the proceeding liable to be quashed to the great prejudice of the complainant who is entitled to prove his case on evidence. Nizamuddin Mahmood vs Abdul Hamid Bhuiyan, 60 DLR (AD) 195. Section 138-The object of crossing is to secure payment not to any particular bank, but to a banker, in order that it may be easily traced for whose use the money was received. The crossing operates as a caution to the banker. Khokan Bhuiyan vs Md Ahsanullah, 60 DLR 377. Section 138-Whether the accused received the legal notice or not, it is merely a disputed question of fact and the same should be decided in trial. The plea of the accused is nothing but the defence plea. Be that as it may, the proposition of law is now well settled that on the basis of defence plea or materials the criminal proceedings should not be stifled before trial. when there is a prima-facie case for going for trial. Shamsul Alam vs State, 60 DLR 677. Section 138-Section 138 of the Act gives special law of limitation and it starts from the date of presenting the cheque and 'on' receipt of the information from the Bank, on receipt of the information means and includes as and when the drawee received the notice of dishonouring of the cheque. Abul Kalam Azad vs State, 61 DLR 91. Section 138-Stay of proceeding in criminal matter when not entertainable-The proceeding under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act appears to be quite independent in nature with a very limited scope for adjudication which is not at all related to the issues involved in the Civil Suit. Moreover, at the fag end of trial of the criminal case, such an application praying for stay order was not at all justified and entertainable. Zafar Ahmed vs Mir Iftekharuddin, 61 DLR 732. Section 138-Whether the notice as required to be served under section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act is essentially a question of fact to be proved by adducing evidence at the time of trial, inasmuch as there is specific assertion in the complaint petition that such a notice was, served. Sheikh Mashuk Rahman vs State, 62 DLR 28. Section 138-Intention of the legislators have been made further clear by incorporating section 138A in the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, prescribing provision for depositing not less than 50% of the amount of the dishonoured cheque is a pre-condition for filing appeal against any order or sentence under sub-section (1) of section 138. Sheikh Mashuk Rahman vs State, 62 DLR 28. Section 138-Joint Signature "Stop payment instruction" cannot exonerate the drawer of a cheque from the criminal liability under section 138 of the Act. Similarly, if the drawer of the cheque intentionally issues a cheque on the joint account by putting his single signature with a malafide intention of getting it dishonoured, he cannot also avoid liability of being prosecuted under section 138 of the Act. Shah Alam (Md) vs State, 63 DLR 137. Section 138-Non disclosure of the date of receipt of notice under section 138(1)(b) of the Negotiable Instruments Act is a question of fact which will be decided at the time of trial. Noor Jamal vs State, 63 DLR 531. Section 138- Filing the petition of complaint before arising cause of action, after expiry of 30 days from the date of receipt of the legal notice, the cause of action arose and, as such, the trial Court did not commit any illegality by framing charge against the petitioner under section 138 of the Act. Shahidul Islam va State, 63 DLR 536. Section 138-Unless law is strike down or amended we have no authority or scope to interfere with the proceeding or to quash the same on the ground that the existing law is bad one or inconsistence with its object, in exercising the power under section 561A of the Code. Mahmudur Rahman Nazla vs State, 64 DLR 179. Section 138-The requirement is a notice in writing to the drawer of the cheque within fifteen (15) days of the receipt of the information by him from the Bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid. The legal implication is that notice must not exceed fifteen(15) days and notice can very well be given seven (7) days time. Sayed Hasan Imam Litu vs Al-Arafah Islami Bank, 64 DLR 255. Section 138-When a cheque is issued for payment of any amount of money, drawer of the cheque is under obligation to honour the same or arrange payment. If it does not arrange payment of the cheque money and the cheque is dishonoured, such an act may constitute an offence of cheating punishable under section 420 of the Code. Abul Khair Chandu vs State, 65 DLR 230. Section 138-Stop Payment-Since the cheques were returned by bank with the endorsement "payment stopped by the drawer" it is to be presumed that those were returned unpaid because the amount of money standing to the credit of that account was insufficient to honour of the cheque as envisaged in section 138 of the Act. Of course this is a rebuttable presumption. The defence can be considered at the time of holding trial and not in an application under section 561A of the Code. SM Redwan vs Md Rezaul Islam, 66 DLR (AD) 169. Section 138-The cheque was dishonoured with the endorsement "payment stopped by the drawer", a clear prima-facie case of the commission of the offence punishable under section 138 of the Act, has been made out against the accused. Ahmed Lal Mia vs State, 66 DLR (AD) 204. Section 138-It is true that in the judgment sought to be reviewed, there has been no detailed discussions as to the point raised before the High Court Division that the respective petition of complaint having been filed before expiry of the statutory period as stipulated in clause (c) of the proviso to section 138(1) of the Act, was barred by law, this Division having affirmed the judgment and order passed by the High Court Division which took the view that though the respective petition of complaint was filed before expiry of thirty days from the date of receipt of the notice issued under clause (b) of the proviso to section 138, was maintainable in law, in fact, gave the answer. Sarwar Hossain Moni (Md) vs State, 66 DLR (AD) 283. Section 138-The cheque was drawn some time in 2004 and it was presented in the Bank in the month of September, 2007 i.e. beyond the period of six months from the date on which it was drawn. A cheque receiving in the year 2004, filling up the various columns later on, at the sweet will of the complainant, if presented in the Bank after a long gap of 3/4 years, undoubtedly the same is a fraud upon the drawer of the cheque and if Court allow to continue such practice, that would be sheer indulgence to the creditors to be more oppressive to the debtors. Mohammad Ali Fatik vs State, 66 DLR 228. Section 138-Whenever a cheque is drawn by a person in order to make payment of any amount, the amount must be given in it by the drawer of the cheque. Since the amount was not given by the drawer of the cheque having no intention for making any payment, such a cheque cannot be considered as a cheque to serve the purpose of section 138 of the Act. Dr Shyamal Baidya vs Islami Bank Bangladesh Ltd. 66 DLR 547. Section 138-The proposition of law which is consistent and no longer a resintegra is that a criminal case and civil case though arising out of the same transaction can proceed simultaneously. Aminul Karim vs Government of Bangladesh, 67 DLR 354. Section 138-A close reading of sub-section (1) of section 138 of the Act, shows that it has noting to do with the recovery of loan amount. The whole scheme of the law is to haul up the drawer of the unpaid/dishonoured cheque(s) for not arranging the funds against the issuance of such cheque(s) and then its/his failure to make the payment of the amount of the money of the unpaid/dishonoured cheque(s) on demand by the payee or, as the case be, by the holder in due course of the cheque(s) in writing within thirty days of the receipt of such notice as provided in clauses (b) and (c) respectively of sub-section (1) of section 138 of the Act. Aminul Karim vs Govt. of Bangladesh, 67 DLR 354. Section 138 There is nothing in law precluding a criminal case on account of a civil suit pending against the petitioners on the same facts. The criminal case stands for the offence, while the civil suit is for realization of money. Both can stand together. Aminul Karim vs Government of Bangladesh, 67 DLR 354. Section 138-When the complainant stated that he had served a legal notice within 15 days from the date of the receipt of information of the return of the cheque, non-discloser of the date of service of notice in the complaint petition cannot be a ground for quashing the proceeding. Golam Rasul vs Habibullah Shakir, 20 BLC (AD) 58. Section 138 The operation of section 138 of the Act, cannot be obstructed or, in any way, circumvented by the mere fact of filing of a suit by the drawer of the dishonoured cheque in civil Court whatever allegations may be in the plaint about the same and the relief prayed for therein, because such a device shall totally make the section itself nugatory. Arif-uz-Zaman (Md) vs State, 17 BLC (AD) 167. Section 138-Since the materials on record discloses a prima-facie case under section 138(a) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, and in passing an incidental order directing the Court below to frame charge under section 138(1) of the said Act, would be just and proper. Kamal Hossain (Md) vs State, 16 BLC 479. Section 138-Since the offence under section 138 of Negotiable Instrument Act is petty one and the dispute between the parties settled by compromise is of basically civil in nature, therefore, in the light of the decisions referred to I do not hesitate to accept the joint compromise petition filed in both the appeals for disposing the same in terms of the said agreement. Ferozuddin vs Eshan Re-Rolling Mill Ltd., 15 BLC 384. Section 138-The provision of section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act has been enacted with the clear intention to bring those persons to book, who deceitfully issued the cheque pretending payment of money without making any arrangement for encashment of the same. Instruction by the drawer to stop payment of his own cheque is nothing but to default payment which he promised to pay be issuing cheque. That is to say, a deceitful intention was there for giving instruction of not payment money. Therefore, instruction of stopping payment as ground of dishonour of the cheque has been included in the punishable offence under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. Shafiqul Islam (Md) vs State, 15 BLC 593. Section 138-From the impugned order it appears that the learned Sessions Judge gave the direction to the petitioner to pay Taka 5,00,000 (five lakh) to the complainant in order to ensure realization of his claim without looking at the provisions of section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act inasmuch as section 138 of the Act has not at all empowered a Court to ensure the realization of the claim amount of the complainant. Nazimuddin Khan (Md) vs State, 15 BLC 815. Section 138-In the petition of complaint of the instant case, it does not disclose the date of the presentation of the cheques nor disclose when the complainant received the information from the Bank and moreso, in the instant case, repeated notices were issued which is not permissible under section 138 of the Act. Whatever was done in the instant case was done by the accused petitioner as proprietor of the Regent Auto under an agreement in between two companies, but Regent Auto has not been made a party in the proceeding. Negotiable Instruments Act is a special law and provisions of this Act is to be construed strictly. Slight deviation giving a different meaning of the intent of the legislature is not permissible. Considering all these aspects of the case the Rule was made absolute the petitioner. Ahsan Habib Chowdhury vs Multidrive Ltd., 14 BLC 66. Section 138-In the petition of complaint there are some omissions as to disclosure of some material facts and such omissions will not make the prosecution case fatal. The instant transaction disclosed civil liability and the criminal offence under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act as well in as much as the criminal case stands for the offence when the civil suit is for realisation of money and, as such, it calls for no interference with the criminal proceeding. Shamsul Islam Chowdhury (Md) vs Uttara Bank Lad., 11 BLC 116. Section 138-It appears that the prosecution as set out in the petition of complaint as evidenced by 'Annexure-A' to the application has got prima-facie ingredients of the offence under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The fact as to the complainant-opposite party No. 1 himself on 21-2-2005 received Taka 6,00,000 in cash from the accused petitioner against the 3(three) cheques including disputed 2 cheques amount as canvassed by Mr Md Abdul Aleem, the learned Advocate for the accused petitioner, is a disputed question of fact, which can be decided only by the trial Magistrate after taking evidence. Be that as it may, it is now well settled that on the basis of the defence plea or materials the criminal proceeding should not be stifled before trial when there is a prima-facie case for going to the trial. Anil Chakraborty vs State, 12 BLC 784 Section 138-The reply of the Bank "refer to drawer" means and indicates that the bank is unable to honour the cheque as there is shortage of fund in the account in question. The argument of the Learned Advocate therefore, is found to be devoid of any sense. The plea of stopping payment in the instant case does not therefore save the accused from the liability of the offence punishable under section 138 of the Act. The petitioner could not make out a case calling for quashing the proceeding and, as such, the High Court Division decided the case correctly. Faridul Alam va State, 13 BLC (AD) 61. Section 138-On careful consideration of the materials on record it appears that meanwhile the complainant was examined as PW I who deposed that the cheque was dishonoured on 28-8-2006. On 9-9-2006 he served the legal notice, which was received by the accused. He proved the same as Exhibits 3-5. So, all legal formalities as laid down in section 138 of the Act have been duly complied. Moreover, from the record it appears that the trial of the case has already been concluded and the case is now at the stage of argument. So, the course of justice instead of being advanced should not be stifled and the grounds taken for quashing are not good grounds of quashing. Alauddin vs Md Abbasuddin, 13 BLC 892. Section 138-When a "Drawer" of an account maintained with a bank, be it creditor bank or other bank issues a cheque for payment of any amount out of that account other than to himself/herself it shall be deemed that such cheque has been issued "to another person" and if that cheque is returned by the bank unpaid for any of the causes mentioned in sub-section (1) of section 138 of the Act the offence under the section shall be complete. Sohrab Hossain (Md) vs State, 18 BLC 215. Section 138 The formalities before filing the petition of complaint matters to be thrashed out during the trial and the accused-petitioners shall have ample scope to take those objections at the trial. Sohrab Hossain (Md) vs State, 18 BLC 215. Section 138-Even if it is found that the case was filed prior to the expiry date of legal notice, then also the case has attained its maturity after expiry of the statutory period. Sk Ahmedullah (Babul) vs Alhaj Md A Rashid, 18 BLC 399. Section 138-If a holder or the payee gets hold of a dishonoured cheque by any illegal means the drawer of the cheque shall have the liberty to take such defence during the trial. Sahab Uddin (Md) vs State, 19 BLC (AD) 86. Section 138-Person who issued the cheque (accused-petitioner) having full knowledge about the fact that the cheque could not be encashed on the basis of his signature, issued the same with the malafide intention to frustrate the claim of the complainant. Shah Alam (Md) vs State, represented by the DC, Chittagong. 19 BLC (AD) 319. Section 138-The amount covered by the cheque nor any higher or lesser amount of the cheque and if the demand is made for a lesser amount or for a bigger amount not covered by the cheque, which was dishonoured the prosecution case must fail. Belal Uddin (Md) vs Md Lutfor Rahman 19 BLC 604. Section 138-The cheque is returned unpaid because the amount available in the drawer's account is insufficient for paying the cheque. Refusal by the bank because of its suit against the drawer and his account was held to be dishonoured, complaint not quashed, Pawankumar vs Ashish Enterprises, (1993) 78 Company Cases 346 Bom. Section 138-The payee has given a notice to the drawer claiming the amount within 15 days of the receipt of the information by the bank. The Court can examine the documents accompanying the complaint to find out whether it is sustainable and not merely the complaint itself. Where the complaint failed to state the reason for the dishonour but the bank memo attached with it carried the remark "exceeds arrangement" and the failure to state the date of notice were held to be not sufficient for quashing the complaint, N Velayutham vs Sri Ganesh Steel Syndicate, (1995) 83 Company Cases 785 Mad: Ad Cirele P Lid vs Shankar, (1993) 76 Company Cases 764 Delhi. Section 138-The drawer has failed to pay within 15 days from the date of the receipt of notice. Abdul Samad vs Sat Narayan Mahawar. Averments of facts constituting the offence must be stated therein, banker's remark is not material, even if it says that the amount is closed, all such matters are to be examined at the trial. (1993) 76 Company Cases 241, 243. Section 138-One Cheque, One Offence-The payee or holder of a cheque has the right to present the cheque for payment for any number of times and he may have it repeatedly dishonoured, but he can prosecute the drawer only once. "It is common knowledge that a cheque can be presented any number of times within the period of its validity. The principle of autrefois acquit or autrefois convict will also come into pay and the drawer of the cheque cannot be subjected to repeated prosecutions and convictions on the strength of one cheque. So we feel that as there is no restriction with regard to the presentment of the cheque any number of times within the validity period and it is not open to the court by adding anything more to hold that a cheque cannot be presented a second time, double prosecution on the same cheque is out of question". Syed Rasool & Sons vs Aildas & Co, (1993) 78 Company Cases 738: (1992) Cri LJ 4048 AP: NC Kumaran vs Ameerappa, (1992) 74 Company Cases 848 Ker; Mahadevan Sunil Kumar vs Bhadran, (1992) 74 Company Cases 805. Section 138-Holder in due course or Payee-In order to enable a person to exercise this special statutory remedy, it is necessary that he should be the payee of the cheque or a holder in due course. Where a person became the recipient of a cheque with knowledge that the cheque has been dishonoured by the bank, he could not become a holder in due course though he received the cheque for consideration. He was the brother of the payee and was aware of the fact of the dishonour. His proceedings under the section were not maintainable. Sukhanraj Khimraja vs N Rajagopalan, (1989) 1 Law Weekly 401. Section 138-Where the payee died before the complaint, a complaint by his son in his capacity as executor of the will of his father was not allowed. PK Koya Moideen va G Hariharan, (1996) 86 Company Cases 399 Section 138-An endorsee from payee becomes a holder and every holder is presumed under section 118 to be a holder in due course. He gets the right to proceed against the drawer as well as the payee under section 138. He has not to prove that he is a holder in due course. The burden would be on the opposite party to show that he had paid no consideration or that he had reason to believe that a defect existed in the title of the payee from whom he received the cheque. Praveen Metal Agencies vs M Balasubramaniam, (1995) 84 Company Cases 782 Knt, the drawer and payee held jointly and severally liable. Section 138 The holder of a blank signed cheque was not allowed to claim the protection of the cheque. He had obtained the blank cheque in order to enable him to prosecute his borrower if he had failed to pay the amount due under a promissory note. The court said that the section was introduced to avoid the malignant trade practice of indiscriminately issuing cheques without sufficient funds. The complainant in this case presented the cheque only with a view to get the endorsement of dishonour. If this were allowed, every creditor would make abusive use of section 138 by putting the debtor in fear of prosecution. Taher N Khambat vs Vinayak Enterprises, (1996) 86 Company Cases 471 AP, the cheque was presented within six months from the date filled by the holder and so the presentment was held to be valid. Section 138-Stop payment instructions cannot obviate the liability of the drawer under section 138 of the Act, for issuing cheque without funds and on failure to pay despite the notice. Electronics Trade & Technology Devp. Corpn Ltd vs Indian Technologists & Engrs. P Ltd, (1996) 2 SCC 739: (1996) 86 Company Cases 30: AIR 1996 SC 2339. Section 138-The court said that failure to pay after receiving notice shows dishonest intention and, therefore, the offence under the section is made out. The unique contribution of the decision is that refusal to pay because of stop payment notice is a dishonour within the meaning of the provisions dealing with dishonour of cheques and this is so irrespective of the remarks of the bank on the dishonour slip. 1996 Supreme Court Yearly Digest 711. Section 138-In this particular case, the contention of the respondent was that the cheque had been returned on account of stop payment instructions and not on account of insufficiency of funds and thus all the ingredients of the section were not available. According to section 138 it is only when the cheque bounces on account of inadequate balance in the account that a complaint is maintainable and if this ground is not available, the complaint is not maintainable and there would be no justification to let the proceedings to continue. Abdul Samad vs Satya Narayan Mahawar, (1990) 2 PLR 269; (1990) 2 В.С.Р. 305: (1993) 79 Company Cases 241. Section 138-The offence under section 138 of the Act cannot depend on the endorsement made by the banker while returning the cheque. Irrespective of the endorsement made by the banker, it is established that in fact the cheque was returned unpaid either because the amount of the money standing to the credit of the account of the drawer is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with the bank, the offence will be established. The endorsement made by the banker while returning the cheque cannot be the decisive factor. Thomas Varghese vs P Jerome, 1992 Cri LJ 308; 76 Company Cases 28 AP. Section 138-The Court has held that "in the light of the specific scheme of section 138, the return of the cheque by the banker with any of the endorsements "Refer to Drawer", "Insufficiency of funds", "Funds not arranged" or "Account closed" ultimately connotes dishonour of the cheque on account of fault on the part of the person who has issued the cheque in not providing sufficient funds or in not arranging for the funds or in closing the account. We should keep in mind the fact that in the scheme of the Act the legislature has provided an opportunity to the drawer to explain the endorsement made by the banker, and it is always open to the drawer of the cheque to explain and establish that dishonouring of the cheque was not referable to insufficiency of funds or he did not make provision of necessary funds. The object of the legislature while introducing Chapter XVII in the Act cannot be allowed to be frustrated. Dada Silk Mills vs Indian Overseas Bank, (1995) 82 Company Cases 35. Section 138-Where a cheque issued by the petitioner was returned unpaid with the endorsement "Effects not cleared, please present again" and upon being presented again, was again returned with the endorsement "Payment stopped by the Drawer" there was no indication that the retum was not due to insufficiency of funds or exceeding the amount arranged to be paid. The complaint could not be quashed. V Arunmugham vs MK Ponnusamy, (1995) 82 Company Cases 296 Mad. Section 138-When a cheque is drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with the banker for payment of any amount of money to another person out of the account for the discharge of the debt in whole or in part or other liability and is returned by the bank with the endorsement like (1) "refer to the drawer" (2) "instructions for stoppage of payment" and (3) "exceeds arrangement", it amounts to dishonour within the meaning of section 138 of the Act. On issuance of the notice by the payee or the holder in due course after dishonour, to the drawer demanding payment within 15 days from the date of the receipt of such a notice, if he does not pay the same, the statutory presumption of dishonest intention in instruction the bank to stop payment is evident from the conduct of the accused. Hence, he is liable for the offence under section 138. Electronics Trade & Technology Development Corpn Lid vs Indian Technologists & Engineers (Electronics) Pvt. Ltd. (1996) 2 SCC 739. Section 138-Even if the payment of a post-dated cheque is countermanded before due date, the offence would be made out unless the drawer is able to show that he had sufficient money in the bank for the cheque and that its payment was stopped for some other reason. Deepak Agarwal vs S S Jain, (1996) 85 Company Cases 771 All Rama Gupta vs Bakeman's Home Products Ltd., (1992) II CCR 1484: (1992) ISJ (Banking) 269 P&H. Section 138-Refer to Drawer-It has been held by the High Court that the endorsement "refer to drawer" necessarily in banking parlance mens that "the cheque has been returned for want of funds in the account of the drawer of the cheque." Syed Rasool & Sons vs Aildas & Co., (1992) Criminal Law Journal 4048. Refer to drawer means cheque has been returned for wants of funds. Dada Silk Mills vs Indian Overseas Bank, (1995) 82 Company Cases 35, "Refer to drawer" means that the cheque has been returned for want of funds. MM Malik vs PK Goyal, (1991) Cri LJ 2594. Section 138-By the use of the phraseology the banker euphemistically by way of courtesy to his customer informs the payee that the bank account is not credited with money sufficient to honour the cheque and that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from the account by an arrangement made to the bank. This is to convey the reason in a most civilised manner and in a courteous way without hurting the customer's feelings. The banker's remark is not decisive of the matter. The reality behind the dishonour should be the guiding factor. Thomas Varghese vs P Jerome, (1993) 76 Company Cases 380 Ker. Section 138-Appearance of complainant-When a complaint raises all pleas regarding ingredients of the offence under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, then at the time of taking cognizance, the Magistrate cannot be expected to go into the niceties of the case which would be set up by the accused and for which complainant's personal presence should be needed. Pearey Lal Rajendra Kumar Pvt Lad vs State of Rajasthan, (1994) 3 Crimes 308. The complainant was by a Government company through its manager. The manager was exempted from personal attendance. The counsel of the company did not appear on the listed date. The dismissal of the complaint for such non-appearance was held to be not justified. The was nothing to show lack of diligence to prosecute the complaint. Steel Authority of India Lid vs Vishwakarma Agro and Allied Industries. (1996) 86 Company Cases 929 P&H. Section 138-Proper evidence-When the accused challenged the prosecution for the offence under section 138 of the Act on the ground that goods supplied by the complainant were defective and having been rejected there would be no liability to pay, it was held that without proper evidence at the stage of the accused being summoned, it could not be said that the accused company did not have the liability for which cheque was issued. Dilip Kumar Jaiswal vs D Banerjee, (1992) | Crimes 1233. Section 138-Where a complaint was filed on the basis of three cheques in a year, the court demanded the complainant to make up his mind as to the cheque on which the prosecution was to continue. Printo Stick vs HC Oswal, (1996) 86 Company Cases 942 Mad. Section 138-Clause (c) of the proviso makes it clear that it is only when the drawer of the cheque fails to make the payment within 15 days of the receipt of notice that the offence shall be deemed to have been committed. Sugesan Finance Investment vs Union of India, (1992) 75 Company Cases 298. Section 138-The notice should contain the demand and should not merely be in the nature of show-cause why proceedings should not be launched. Harbinder Singh vs Suman Rani, (1996) 87 Company Cases 135 P&H. Section 138-A complaint filed before the expiry of fifteen days is liable to be quashed, Kanchana Kamalnathan vs Nagaraj. (1996) 84 Company Cases 959 Mad. Section 138-Limitation for complaint-A complaint for an offence under section 138 can be filed within one month from the date of cause of action. The cause of action starts from expiry of 15 days from the date of service of notice to the accused. One month to be calculated from the date of expiry of 15 days from the date of service of notice served on 14-7-1990, 15 days time to pay expired on 30-7-1990, a complaint should be filed within one month from 30-7-1990. Venu vs Krishnappa, (1992) 2 Crimes 542. Section 138-Under section 138(c) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 15 days' time is given for payment of the amount due under the cheque from the date of receipt of notice regarding dishonour issued by the payee. Therefore, the payee has to wait for 15 days anticipating payment of the amount by the drawer. After the expiry of fifteen days, if the drawer does not pay the amount, the cause of action starts from the sixteenth day onwards. The limitation to file a complaint as prescribed under section 142(b) of the Act is one month. The period of limitation, therefore, starts from the sixteenth day after receipt of notice by the drawer. Mahalakshmi Enterprises vs Vishnu Trading Co; (1993) 77 Company Cases 249; 1991 Bank J 493: (1991) 1 BC 415 (AP). Section 138-Where the drawer of the cheque denied his liability to pay the cheque amount within 15 days after receiving notice, it was held that he could still pay off before the expiry of 15 days so as to wipe out his liability. V Suresh Kumar vs C Shree Krishnan, (1995) 83 Company Cases Mad. 103. Section 138-Requirement as to notice [clause (b), proviso]-As regards liability for dishonour of cheque under section 138 it is necessary to prima-facie show that even after 15 days of receipt of the notice as contemplated under section 138(b), the accused failed to pay the amount. In order to fasten a criminal liability on person, the requirement of law has to be fully complied with. Therefore, where the notice of demand as required under section 138(b) was not served on the opposite party, по prosecution and cognizance of offence was permissible. Rajiv Kumar vs State of UP, (1991) All LJ 994: (1993) 78 Company Cases 507 All. Arsoka Engineer vs Duroka Fuse, (1992) 3 CCR 2982. Section 138-Issue of notice is a must and it is mandatory. The notice may even be sent by a telegram and in case it is refused then it gives a cause of action. Ghanshyam M Swamy vs Classic Steel Products, (1992) 1 BC 240: (1992) 75 Company Cases 695 (Guj). A notice is also valid if it is for a part of a large claim. Revathi vs Asha Bagree, (1992) 75 Company Cases 372: (1992) 1 Crimes 743. Section 138-In the case of a firm, if the receipt of the notice is by one partner who is habitually acting for the business of the firm, it shall be deemed to be a notice to the firm. Renu Vora vs Shruyans KN Paper Mills, (1993) 2 CCR 1471. Section 138-In case a complainant does not issue notice, there cannot be any cause of action. Ghanshyam Swamy vs Classic Steel Products, (1992) 75 Company Cases 695. Section 138-Drawing of a cheque does not constitute any offence in itself. It is when the cheque is presented within time and dishonoured for reasons specified that one of the requirements is completed. It becomes an offence only after the expiry of 15 days from the date of written demand. KS Auto vs Union of India, (1993) 76 Company Cases 105. The date of the cheque is relevant only for the purpose of a finding whether the cheque was presented within six months from its date, otherwise the offence is constituted by notice and default after notice. Anil K Mehra vs Hans Raj. (1993) 78 Comp Cas 784 P&H. Section 138-Service of notice-Where the notice was returned by the post office with the remark that the addressee was not found, it was held to be no notice for the purposes of a complaint. The court noted the language used in section 138(c) "receipt of the said notice" and said that this unambiguously pointed to the actual notice to the other party. The return of the notice must show at least wilful evasion. L Mani vs Kandan Finance, (1996) 86 Company Cases 205 Mad. Section 138-Mode of communication-lt is not necessary that the notice of dishonour (notice in writing) which is required under section 138(b) should be sent by registered post. It may be sent by an ordinary letter or even by a telegram. MV Muthuramalingam vs D Narayanas-wamy, (1995) 83 Company Cases 77 Mad. Section 138-Where a complaint was filed after the dishonour of a cheque but was dismissed because of the absence of the complainant and he presented the cheque again, obtained dishonour and proceeded again. the second complaint was held to be maintainable. The earlier acquittal was not a bar upon subsequent prosecution. P Jawahar vs SS Pillai, (1994) 81 Company Cases 34 Mad. Section 138-A cheque may be presented more than once. The cause of action arises only upon refusal to pay after notice. P Ravindranathan vs CV Hussain, (1994) 79 Comp Cases 78 Ker. Section 138-There is no compulsion on the holder that he should issue notice on first default. A single complaint in respect of eleven cheques would not cause any prejudice to the drawer. Hence, it was maintainable. Stalion Shox Co P Lid vs Auto Tensions P Ltd. (1994) 79 Company Cases 808 Delhi. Section 138-Cause of action-The cause of action under the proviso (b) and (c) of section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, for filing complaint cannot be said to arise merely on the cheque being dishonoured but will arise only after the giving of notice of demand of the amount of the cheque by payee or holder in due course of the cheque to the drawer of the cheque and coupled with the failure of the drawer of the cheque to pay the amount within fifteen days of the date of the service or receipt of the notice on or by him. VD Agarwal vs Ist Addi. Munsif Magistrate, (1993) 11 LCD 1108 All. Section 138-Mere presentment and dishonour do not create the cause of action. It is the notice which gives the cause. There is no restriction on the number of times of presenting the cheque for payment. Accordingly, any one of those presentments, within the time limit of six months, may be chosen for giving notice and lunching prosecution. K Annakodi Ammal vs K Ethiraj, (1994) 80 Company Cases 870 Mad. Section 138-Stay of proceedings-After the issue of notice to the drawer of the dishonour of his cheque, he filed a civil suit denying his liability to pay and, therefore, contending that section 138 was not attracted and obtained an interlocutory injunction restraining the payee of the cheque from proceeding under section 138. The grant of the injunction was held to be illegal. Aristo Printers P Lid vs Purbanchal Erade Centre, AIR 1992 Gau 81. Section 138-Where a civil suit was pending at the time when criminal proceedings were launched for the dishonour of a cheque and the High Court stayed the civil proceedings under the apprehension that the defendant's defences in the criminal case would become disclosed in advance, the Supreme Court held that this approach of the High Court was not correct. The court noted that the defence in the criminal case had already been filed and therefore, nothing remained which deserved protection from disclosure. State of Rajasthan vs Kalyan Sundaram Cement Industries Ltd, (1996) 3 SCC 87: (1996) 86 Company Cases 433. Section 138-Civil and criminal proceedings are simultaneously possible. Hence, a complaint is not liable to be stayed pending the disposal of a civil suit. The court said that a civil suit cannot debar a criminal prosecution. The successful end of a civil suit cannot by itself amount to abuse of the process of the court. Sanjiv Kumar vs Surendra Steel Rolling Mills, (1996) 86 Company Case 418 P&H. Section 138-Jurisdiction-Where a cheque issued for business purchased at one place and the recipient of the cheque also deposited the cheque into his account at that very place, but, after dishonour, he issued notice of dishonour from his place of business in some other town, it was held that a complaint filed at that place was competent. The cause of action partly arose there because to discharge his liability the drawer would have to make arrangement for payment at the recipient's place. Kirti Dal Udyog. Nagpur vs Bhanwarlal, (1996) AIHC 330 Bom. Section 138-Complaint through power of attorney-Complaint may be filed through the holder of a power of attorney on behalf of the payee. S Ramaswamy vs K Sudarsan Rao, (1995) 83 Company Cases 673 (Mad). Section 138-It has to be presumed that a cheque is issued in discharge of any debt or other liability. The presumption can be rebutted by adducing evidence and the burden of proof is on the person who wants to rebut the presumption. This presumption coupled with the object of Chapter XVII of the Act leads to the conclusion that by countermanding payment of post-dated cheque, a party should not be allowed to get away from the penal provision of section 138 of the Act. A contrary view would render section 138 a dead letter and will provide a to persons trying to avoid payment under legal obligations undertaken by them through their own acts which in other words can be said to be taking advantage of one's own wrong. Therefore, section 138 of the Act is attracted in the facts of the present case. However, whether a case for punishment under that provision is made out, will depend on the outcome of the trial. The cases are being remanded to the Judicial Magistrate concerned for deciding the complaints filed by the appellant herein on merits in accordance with the law, Goa Plast (P) Ltd vs Chico Ursula D'Souza, (2003) 3 SCC 232. Section 138-Interpretation-Where the notice was served on the director who had signed the cheque, it was held to be good notice for proceeding against the company as well. The Supreme Court said that the requirement of notice should not be considered in a narrow technical manner. Technicalities of law procedural wrangles should not be allowed to erode the faith of the business community dealing in trade and mercantile matters. Bharat Barrels & Drum Mfg Co vs Amin Chand Pyarelal, (1999) 3 SCC 35; AIR 1999 SC 1008; (1999) 97 Comp Cas 786. Section 138-Civil wrong, deemed offence Section 138 has the effect of converting by a fiction of law a civil transaction into an offence. The requirement of notice after dishonour makes the dishonour a crime when notice has been served and not when sent. Dalmia Cement (Bharat) Lid vs Galaxy Traders & Agencies Ltd, (2001) 6 SCC 463: 2001 SCC (Cri) 1163. Section 138-Cheque issued by President of Society-The cheque which was dishonoured was issued by the president of a society in his capacity as such. There was averment in the complaint that the cheque was issued in discharge of an existing and enforceable debt. The mere omission to array the society as a party accused was held to be not a ground for quashing the complaint. The court surveyed the authorities and found a clear emphasis upon the fact that liability is also incurred by the person issuing the cheque "for and on behalf" even though not on personal behalf. 1997 Cri LJ 1525. Section 138-Where the cheque had been returned with the remarks "refer to drawer" and the complaint was dismissed, it was held that a close scrutiny of records and evidence showed that the cheque was dishonoured for insufficient funds and the offence was made out. AD Circle (P) Ltd vs Shankar, 76 Comp Cas 764. Section 138-In banking parlance the "reasons refer to drawer" when cheques are returned unpaid is used generally for returning the cheque for want of funds in the drawer's account of because of service of a garnishee order. This is a matter of evidence. The bank should be able to justify before the court the reasons for which the cheque was returned. VS Krishnan vs Narayanan, 1991 Cri LJ 609; Voltas Ltd vs Hiralal Agarwal, (1991) 71 Comp Cas 275. Section 138-Date of Cheque-There is a presumption that cheque is drawn on the date it bears and it is to be presented within six months of the date of the cheque though beyond six months of the date of delivery. Offence is committed within six months from the date it bears irrespective of when the cheque was written or delivered. Manoj K Seth vs RJ Fernandez, (1991) 2 Ker LT 65 Ker DB: (1992) 73 Comp Cas 441 Ker. Section 138-Alteration of date-Consenting Parties-The Supreme Court has held that the party consenting to an alteration and the party making the alteration are not entitled to complain about it. The drawer changed the date of the bounced cheque to a later date. The cheque again bounced. The payee served a legal notice on the drawer, who said in reply that she had been forced to change the date against her will. The payee said that the drawer had requested for some more time to enable her to pay and that the date had been changed for that purpose. The court said that in the circumstances of the case the question whether the drawer had been a willing party to the alteration was a question of fact which could be decided on evidence. It was an error to answer the question in the negative in the drawer's petition and that on the basis of the drawer's reply to the legal notice and also quashing the proceeding of that ground. At this stage there was no basis to arrive at the conclusion that the respondent was not a willing party to the alteration in question. In the impugned judgment it was correctly had that this was a question of fact. This was a fact which would have to established on evidence during trial. At this stage the High Court could not have quashed the complaint merely on the basis of an assertion in the reply. Veera Exports vs T Kalavathy, (2002) 1 SCC 97: 2002 SCC (Cri) 85: AIR 2002 SC 38: 2002 Cri LJ 203. Section 138-Failure to pay after notice [clause (c) proviso]-Clause (c) of the proviso makes it clear that it is only when the drawer of the cheque fails to make the payment within 15 days of the receipt of notice that the offence shall be deemed to have been committed. The notice should contain the demand and should not merely be in the nature of show-cause why proceedings should not be launched. Clause (c) of the proviso of section 138 gives the cause of action and, therefore, the court cannot take any cognizance prior to elapse of 15 days under clause (c). Rakesh Nemkumar Porwal vs Narayan Dhondu Joglekar, (1993) 78 Comp Cas 822 Bom. Section 138-In case a complainant does not issue notice, there cannot be any cause of action. Ghanshyan Swamy vs Classic Steel Products, (1992) 75 Comp Cas 695. Section 138-Drawing of a cheque does not constitute any offence in itself. If is when the cheque is presented within time and dishonoured for reasons specified that one of the requirements is completed. It becomes an offence only after the expiry of 15 days from the date of receipt of written demand. KS Anto vs Union of India, (1993) 76 Comp Cas 105. Section 138-Service of notice-Where the notice was returned by the post office with the remark that the addressee was not found, it was held to be no notice for the purposes of a complaint. The court noted the language used in section 138 (c) receipt of the said notice" and said that this unambiguously pointed to the actual notice to the other party. The return of the notice must show at least willful evasion. L Mani vs Kandan Finance, (1996) 86 Comp Cas 205 Mad. Section 138(1)-A plain reading of sub-section (1) of the section 138 of the Act, shows that an offence shall be deemed to have been committed, the moment a cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with a bank for payment of any amount of money to another person from out of that account is bounced by the bank unpaid on any of the grounds mentioned therein. Sub-section (1) of section 138 has not made any qualification of the cheque so returned unpaid either post dated given as a security for repayment of the money as alleged by the accused or any other cheque issued by the drawer from encashment currently. The legislature has not made any difference between a post dated cheque issued as security and a cheque issued for encashment currently. Zakir Hussain (Md) vs Md Jalal Khan, 74 DLR 147. Section 138(1)-When the reason for return of the cheque has been mentioned as "refer to drawer' or 'insufficiency of fund, it is primary duty of the drawer of the cheque to make payment of the amount within stipulated time from the receipt of notice. Rokeya Builders, represented by Motiur Rahman Mamun vs State, 74 DLR 453. Section 138(1)-While the main part of section 138(1) of the Act provides the definition of an offence, identity of the offender and the quantum of punishment, its proviso sets out three conditions for application of the main provision. Aleya vs State, 70 DLR 303. Section 138(1)-If a drawer of the cheque is allowed to escape his liability under section 138(1) of the Act, on any frivolous ground or on mere technicality then a lot of payee or beneficiary of the cheques and the financial institutions and the Bank will be at the verge of ruination and the resultant havoc in the transactions, done in ordinary course since long. based on cheques are bound to erode the prevailing practices. If the fraud and deception are allowed to function freely in the economic system and various economic transaction and the fraud and cheaters are allowed to let go with impunity the financial institutions as well as the individual payees will be ruined. Ahmad Ullah vs Md Younus, 68 DLR 228. Section 138(1)-Service of notice-If a notice is issued upon the Managing Director of the company who is in-charge of the affairs of the Company and signed the cheque on behalf of the company, the service of notice upon the Managing Director is sufficient to infer that the company has received the notice. This will fasten the company as well as the commission of the offence. This is because the Managing Director being the chief executive of the company his knowledge may be deemed to be the knowledge of the company. (Per SK Sinha, CJ majority) Eusof Babu (Md) vs State, 68 DLR (AD) 298. Section 138(1)-The account is not maintained in the name of the accused-petitioner; rather it is maintained in the name of her husband. The cheque was not bounced because of insufficiency of funds or excess of the amount arranged to be paid as agreed upon between the drawer and the Bank. In such a posture of things, section 138(1) cannot be applied against the accused-petitioner. Shahnaj Begum Munni vs State 63 DLR 279. Section 138(1)- The cheque was issued to discharge, either in whole or in part, a legally enforceable debt or liability. The accused-petitioner had never any debt or liability to discharge. It is the husband of the accused-petitioner who had the debt or liability to discharge. The liability or debt of the husband of the accused-petitioner cannot be thrust on to the shoulder of the accused-petitioner. Given this scenario, if the accused-petitioner is made liable for the debt or liability of her husband, that will go against the spirit of the mandate of section 138(1) of the Act. Shahnaj Begum Munni vs State 63 DLR 279. Section 138(1)-Section 138(1) empowers the trial Court to punish with imprisonment for a maximum period of one year, or with fine which may extend to thrice the amount of the cheque or both. The powers given to the Court is discretionary. The language used in the section is not such that the Court must impose fine thrice the amount of the cheque. The legislature has left the matter to the discretion of the trial Court while awarding the sentence of imprisonment and fine. Shahidur Rahman Khadem vs State 64 DLR (AD) 103. Section 138(1)-The "account payee cheque" mentioned in the complaint-petition has not lost it's character as negotiable instrument, the same can be easily brought within the mischief of "any cheque" mentioned in section 138(1) of the Act because cheque includes "account payee cheque". Mohammad Ali vs State 64 DLR 426. Section 138(1)-Under the scheme of the Act the offence punishable under section 138 would be complete only upon the failure by the drawer to pay within fortnight of the receipt of notice from the payee of the dishonour of the cheque. When drawer fails to make payment within the period specified in clause (c) of the proviso the offence is complete. Khalilur Rahman vs Md Habibullah, 57 DLR 603. Section 138(1)-Non-signing the legal notice is a mere irregularity. It does not create any cause to the accused to be prejudiced. It is only to be seen, whether by this mistake of non-signing the legal notice was sent within the time by a registered post with acknowledge-ment to the proper address of the recipient and particulars of the cheque in question were described regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid from the bank as prescribed in section 138(1)(b) of the Act. Manik (Md) vs State, 27 BLC 747. Section 138(1)-The words 'account closed', has clearly indicated insufficiency of fund as contemplated in the section 138(1) of the Act which comes within the criminal liability of the drawer. Rafiqul Islam (Md) va Babul, 20 BLC 488. Section 138(1)-"Any cheque"-Since the "account payee cheque" mentioned in the complaint-petition has not lost its character as negotiable instrument, the same can be easily brought within the mischief of "any cheque" employed in section 138(1) of the Act because cheque includes "account payee cheque" also. Dr. Abdullahel Bari vs Md Rahat Chowdhury, 19 BLC (AD) 167. Section 138(1)-Sub-section (1) of section 138 has not made any qualification of the cheque so returned unpaid either post-dated given as a security for repayment of the loan availed by a loanee as alleged by the accused or any other cheque issued by the drawer for encashment currently. Majed Hossain vs State, 17 BLC (AD) 177. Section 138(1)-By no logic, it can be said that the drawer of the cheque does not know the consequence if a cheque is returned unpaid /dishonoured for the reasons as provided in sub-section (1) of section 138 of the Act, because ignorance of law is no plea. Majed Hossain vs State 17 BLC (AD) 177. Section 138(1)-The Act, being a Special Law, its provisions have to be strictly adhered to and it must also be seen that the purpose of the law is not frustrated for putting too many unnecessary legal bar upon the payee or, as the case may be, upon the holder in due course of the cheque in approaching the court for hauling up the drawer of the cheque (s) who issued the same without arranging sufficient fund against the issuance of such cheque (s). Majed Hossain vs State, 17 BLC (AD) 177. Section 138(1)-The crucial fact to be considered in deciding the issue whether separate petition of complaint shall have to be filed for the commission of offence under the section against each unpaid/dishonoured cheque(s) or one complaint would do in respect of more than one cheque(s) shall depend upon the notice to be served under clause (b) by the payee, or as the case may be, by the holder in due course of the cheque read with clause(c) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of section 138 of the Act. Majed Hossain vs State, 17 BLC (AD) 177. Section 138(1)-The whole scheme of the law as discussed hereinbefore, is to haul up the drawer of the unpaid/dishonoured cheque(s) for not arranging the funds against the issuance of such cheque(s) and then its/his failure to make the payment of the amount of the money of the unpaid/dishonoured cheque(s) on demand by the payee or, as the case be. by the holder in due course of the cheque(s) in writing within thirty days of the receipt of such notice as provided in clauses (b) and (c) respectively of sub-section (1) of section 138 of the Act. Majed Hossain vs State 17 BLC (AD) 177. Section 138(1) Cause of action of the case arose after expiry of 30 days of receipt of the notice, that is, on 3-5-2007. But the case was filed on 30-4-2007, that is 3 days ahead of arising cause of action. Thus the case when filed was premature. On 3-5-2007, that is, after expiry of 30 days of receipt of notice, the case became mature as the cheque amount was not paid till that date. So the case is not liable to be quashed on the ground of it's filing before arising cause of action. Jamir Uddin vs SM Safi, 16 BLC 577. Sections 138(1) and 7-From a bare reading of section 138(1) of the Act, it is manifestly clear that the cheque drawn by a person on any account must be maintained by him. For the purpose of section 138(1) of the Act, the account has to be maintained by the drawer of the cheque. The expression 'drawer' is defined in section 7 of the Act. As per that section, the maker of a bill of exchange or cheque is called the drawer. Shahnaj Begum Munni vs State, 63 DLR 279. Section 138(1)(b)-Since the complainant filed the complaint after expiry of the statutory period of 30 days from the date of issuance of notice under proviso of section 138(1)(b) of the Act and as such taking cognizance of complaint by the Magistrate was not legal and since taking of cognizance is illegal, the continuation of the proceeding will create abuse of the process of the Court. Rafiqul Islam vs State, 62 DLR 377. Section 138(1)(b)-As required notices were issued by registered post, one at the home address and another at the business address of the accined petitioner but the same were retsmed by the postal peon. The very correctness of serving legal notice under section 138(1)(b) of the Act and receipe of the same by the drawer of the cheque can only be adjudicated at the trial. Such proceedings cannot be quashed for factual aspect of a case. (Per Md Ataur Ralman Khan J) Zahed Hossain vs State, 61 DLR 386 Section 138(1)(b)-Notice under section 138(1)(b) of the Act is a question of fact which will be decided at the time of trial after taking evidence. So, the & dishonoured cheques issued through single notice and initiating single proceeding, the petitioner would not have any prejudice by filing of one complaint for 8 (eight) cheques between the same parties and dishonoured on the same date cannot render the proceedings under section. 561A of the Code of Criminal Procedure liable to be quashed. (Per Md Atour Rahman Khan J). Zahed Hossain vs State, 61 DLR 386. Section 138(1)(b)-Whether the notice was a demand notice or not as contemplated under section 138(1)(b) of the Act is a disputed question of fact which could not be decided by the High Court Division while exercising jurisdiction under section 561A of the Code. Rashedul Alam Chowdhury vs ASM Shahajahan, 17 BLC (AD) 39. Section 138(1)(c)-In the instant case, the cheque was presented on 9-11-2004 and thereafter, on 20-11-2004 and 22-11-2004. It appears that notices were sent on 6-12-2004 and thereafter, the instant proceeding was initiated. It appears, from the petition of complaint that no date of receiving the information of the dishonour of the cheque was mentioned in the petition of complaint. Legal notice was sent on 6-12-2004. The complaint was made on 4-1-2005 ie. more than 15 days as contemplated under section 138(1)(c) of the Act, and is barred under section 138(1)(C) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. Hence, it does not disclose any cause of action for initiating the proceeding Moreover, a single cheque was made subject matter of two complaint cases. It is the option of the complainant to choose any of the procedures when a single transaction is amenable both under special or Penal law but one cheque cannot be the subject matter of two proceedings, one under Special and another under Penal Law. Dr. Md Salehuddin Sayeed vs Medidrive Ltd., 13 BLC 718. Section 138(1)(c)-Section 141(1)(b) Cause of action-clause (b) of section 141, read with sub-section (1) of section 138 of the Act, clearly signifies that dishonour of a cheque per se would not bring the drawer of the dishonoured cheque within the mischief of sub-section (1) of section 138. There must have arisen a cause of action for taking cognizance under clause (1) of section 141 of the Act. Such cause of action arises upon failure of the drawer of cheque to make payment of "the amount of money", within 30 days of receiving the notice demanding payment of the amount under the dishonoured cheque and not within 30 days of dishonour of a cheque. Nurun Nabi vs Md Abu Taher Khan 62 DLR 317. Section 138(1)(c)-Section 141(1)(b) Cause of action-Complaint petition-Since, in the demand notice the total amount of the 3(three) cheques amounting to Taka 12,84,600 has been demanded and the drawer of the cheque having failed to make payment of the "said amount of money" within 30 days, only one cause of action has arisen and, legally. for one cause of action there should be one complaint petition, which has exactly been done in the impugned proceeding.. Nurun Nabi vs Md Abu Taher Khan, 62 DLR 317. Section 138(1) read with Section 141(b) -While failure to comply with any one of the three conditions set out in clauses (a) to (c) of the proviso to section 138(1) of the Act shall result in non-commission of the offence inscribed in the main part of section 138(1) of the Act, non-compliance of the condition stipulated in section 141(b) of the Act shall make the Magistrate incompetent to take cognizance of the offence. Aleya vs State, 70 DLR 303. Section 138(1A)-Service of notice under clause (b) of sub-section (1) of section 138 of the Act means any of the 3(three) modes as provided under clause (a), (b) and (c) of sub-section (1A) of section 138 of the Act. The legislature while prescribing the 3 (three) modes of service of notice has used the words "or" and thus, makes each clause disjunctive. The duty of the payee is discharged once he served notice either under clause (a) or (b) or (c) of sub section (1A) of section 138 of the Act. No where within the four corners of sub section (IA) the legislature has put burden upon the payee to further exhaust the mode of service of notice as prescribed under clause (c) of sub-section (IA) by paper publication when the drawer is found absent in his last known address. Nurul Islam vs State, 69 DLR 312. Section 138(1A)-Before insertion of this sub-section 1A there was some ambiguities as regard the service of notice. To dispel such ambiguity sub-section 1A of section 138 of the Act was inserted in order to further clarify the method of "service" of "notice" and to fortify the earlier section 138 in respect of service of notice. This provision brings about an additional measure which the legislature in its wisdom thought it proper to be inserted by IA and this provision, has been added to the original laws. governing the field only to strengthen the procedure of service of 'notice' that existed before. Though the provisions under section 27 of the Act were there, even then the legislature further clarified this substantive issue and set it at rest once for all. Mofizur Rahman (Md) vs Bangladesh Represented by Secretary Ministry of Law, 69 DLR 402. Section 138(1A) The provisions under challenge (1A) suggested 3 (three) methods consecutively, but all the methods are alternative method since the word 'or' appears employing a construction of making the same disjunctive and, as such, it can easily be inferred that legislature consciously did this only to further simplify the procedure in respect of service of notice. Mofizur Rahman (Md) vs Bangladesh Represented by Secretary Ministry of Law, 69 DLR 402. Section 138(1A) Service of notice is a question of fact which can be determined by the trial court upon taking evidence. Quashment of proceedings at the stage when trial already began and prosecution witnesses are being examined, is not permissible. Roma Morshed vs State, 23 BLC 131. Section 138(1)(b) and (c)-While, in practice, mostly the date of dishonouring of the cheque and the date of receiving information from the bank about the dishonouring of cheque are the same date, however, there may be cases where the payce might be notified by the bank about dishonouring the cheque on a later date. Similarly, counting of thirty days stipulated in clause (c) of the proviso to section 138(1) of the Act should be commenced from the date of receiving the notice issued by the payee and, thus, calculation of thirty days should not be counted from the date of sending the demand notice. Aleya vs State, 70 DLR 303. Section 138(1)(2)(3)- Upon a careful reading of section 138(1)(2)(3) it appears that these provisions have been designed to compensate the disappointed holder of the cheque, where any interest of the State or its entitlement to fine has been overlooked. If it remains concluded that an offence under section 138 of the Act is compoundable, then recognition of entitlement to fine by the State sounds conflicting. Even in compoundable offences defined in the Penal Code, if those end in compromise, and the law does not raise the State between the parties compromising, as a claimant of jail for the accused or as a claimant of fine. Imposition of fine making it payable to the State cannot be encouraged. Bulbul Sharif (Md) vs State, 68 DLR 314. Sections 138(1) and 141-Certain conditions precedent are stipulated in the provision of section 138(1) of the Act which are to be complied with before imposing any criminal liability to the drawer. From the scheme of the Act, it is clear that following the dishonour of cheque a notice is to be issued in writing to the person who has issued the cheque inviting his attention to the fact that the cheque has been issued for reason stated in the return memo and that he is liable for penal consequences under section 138 read with section 141 of the Act. Mohiuddin Chowdhury (Md) vs State, 23 BLC 534. Sections 138(1) & 141(b)-There is nothing in section 141(b) to suggest that the cause of action cannot arise more than once under clause (c) of the proviso to section 138(1). The procedural limitation provided in section 141(b) cannot take away the substantive right accruing to the beneficiary of a cheque to prosecute any number of subsequent presentation of the cheque on its dishonour. Similarly, each dishonour will give rise to a concomitant right to serve notice under proviso (b) to section 138(1) of the Act and demand payment, failing which the bearer of the cheque will have the right to make a complaint in writing in accordance with section 141(a) of the Act. It will be entirely up to the bearer of the cheque to proceed in respect of any particular dishonour of the cheque, keeping in mind that each step of the process has to be taken within the period stipulate by the law. Hence, we hold that decision in the case of Dr Md Mofizur Rahman vs Md Bashirullah and another, 55 DLR 630 was incorrect and is accordingly overruled. Nizam Uddin Mahmud Hossain vs State, 25 BLC (AD) 81. Sections 138(1) & 141(b)-The intention of the legislature in enacting section 141(b) is to provide a time limit within which the complaint against the defaulting drawer of the cheque is to be made. This section does not preclude the holder of the cheque from presenting the cheque to the bank again for payment, subject only to the condition that the second and subsequent presentation of the cheque must be within six months from the date on which the cheque was drawn in order to be able to prosecute the drawer of the cheque criminally under section 138 of the Act. Nizam Uddin Mahmud Hossain vs State, 25 BLC (AD) 81. Section 138(2)-Court has to deal with the offenders by imposing proper sentence by taking into consideration of facts and circumstances of each case. It is not only the rights of the offenders which are required to be looked into at the time of the imposition of sentence, but also of the victims of the crime and society at large, also by considering the object sought to be achieved by the particular legislation. The sentence of imprisonment would be a harsh sentence having no penal objective to be achieved. Mahmudul Hasan vs State, 26 BLC 348. Section 138(2) Since sub-section (2) of section 138 make clear provision for getting the face value of the cheque by the holder of the cheque, so there should have been black and white order in the judgment otherwise it may create confusion as to the entitlement by the holder of the cheque. Muraduzzaman Polash (Md) vs State, 67 DLR 501. Section 138(3)-Since the cheque in question was issued by the petitioner in connection with recovery of loan amount the bank may take recourse to forum as provided under section 138(3) of the Act and or the forum created under the Artha Rin Adalat Ain, 2003. Abu Sadat Md Shamim vs State, 74 DLR 395. Section 138(3)-The complainant may initiate a criminal proceeding against them under section 420 of the Penal Code, if he is so advised. Besides, the door of the Civil Court is always open to the complainant to recover the loan amount by filing a money suit against the party concerned. Shahnaj Begum Munni vs State, 63 DLR 279. Section 138(3)-Sub-section (3) of section 138 gives additional authority to the civil Court to satisfy the complainant if any other grievances is found to be left out. Khalilur Rahman being dead his heirs Mrs Nazma Begum vs Md Habibullah, 57 DLR 603. Section 138(a) Cheques were presented to the bank twice within six months from the date it was drawn-Computation of 15 days for serving notice should be done from the date on which the cheques lastly returned by the bank-This having were been done the application under section 561A of Code of Criminal Procedure is misconceived. Habibur Rahman Howlader vs State, 55 DLR 199. Section 138(b) The complainant published the legal notice through "Dainik Suprovat Bangladesh" on asking to pay the cheque's amount within 30 days but the accused petitioner failed to pay the cheque's amount and thereafter, the complainant filed the case on within the period of one month in compliance with clause (b) of section 141 of the Act. The proposition of law is by now well settled that on the basis of the defence plea or materials, the criminal proceedings should not be stifled before trial, when there is a prima-facie case for going to the trial. Hasan Jahangir Alam vs State, 69 DLR 363. Section 138(b)-The petitioner would get opportunity to raise the point whether the cheque was presented within time at the time of framing charge and the question when the cheque was presented to the bank for the 1st time cannot be decided in this application under section 561A of the Code of Criminal Procedure which is a disputed question of fact. Hasibul Bashar (Md) vs Dilshed Huda, 55 DLR 200. Section 138(b)(c)-Legislature has not created any absolute bar in filing a petition of complaint before expiry of thirty days of the receipt of the notice issued under clause (b) of the proviso to section 138 as created in case of filing a petition of complaint after expiry of one month of the date on which the cause of action arises under clause (c) of the proviso to section 138. Prematurity shall be cured the moment the period of thirty days expires and the payment of the dishonoured cheque is not made within the said period. Zahidul Islam (Md) vs Md Kamal Hossain, 66 DLR (AD) 180. Section 138(b)(c)-In the absence of any date when steps are taken according to the provisions of section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act the instant proceeding under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is not maintainable in view of the restriction by proviso (b)(c) of section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and thus the instant criminal proceeding is liable to be quashed. Emdadul Hasan Chowdhury (Md) vs Kowser Ahmed, 12 BLC 324. Section 138(c)-The allegations as embodied in the petition of complaint, even if they are taken as a whole and accepted on its face value, do not constitute the offence under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 since the complainant in the complaint petition did not disclose the date of arising cause of action for filing the complaint as required by section 138(c) of the Act. Emdadul Hasan Chowdhury (Md) vs Kowser Ahmed, 12 BLC 324. Sections 138 and 1(1) -Section 138 of the Act shall not applicable if the cheque was presented after expire of its validity period of six months from the date on which it is drawn. Suruj Miah vs Government of Bangladesh, 71 DLR 517. Sections 138, 5 and 6-Reasons for imposing directions are innumerous, now-a-days we are dealing with hundreds/thousands of case under section 561A of the Code of Criminal Procedure are being filed before the highest judiciary in different pleas and different reasons. Most of the reasons are the cheques were not written or filled up by the drawer as mandated under sections 5 and 6. The directions are as follows:- (1) We direct the cognizance court to receive an affidavit of facts specify that the drawer has filled up all spaces of the cheque and signed with the petition of complaint under section 138 of the Act. (2) The cognizance must be satisfied on the contention of complaint petition. If he signed a cheque he must ascertain what amount of money was written and in whose favour the cheque was issued and what was the date of placing the cheque for encashment. It should be construed strictly, as it is special law failing one of the conditions the drawer will be liable for criminal prosecution. Nothing should be written behind his back. Nurul Hakim (Md) vs State, 29 BLC 108. Sections 138, 9 and 118-In a case under section 138 of the Act, the legal presumption exists in favour of the "holder in due course of the cheque" that he got the cheque for consideration and that has been ensured by the provisions of sections 9 and 118 of the Act but at the same time this presumption is a rebuttable presumption. Whenever any accused leads the evidence to rebut such presumption the burden again shifts to the complainant who is the holder in due course of the cheque to proof by the legal evidence that the cheque was drawn in his favour for consideration. Muksedur Rahman Badal (Md) vs State, 20 BLC 668. Sections 138 and 43-Trial Court has ample power to allow the accused to take any defence as provided for under sections 4, 6, 8, 9, 43, 58 and 118 of the Act. The complaint petition should contain the circumstances of obtaining such cheque and reasons for issuing cheque by the issuer so that the accused can take a meaningful defence stand at the trial under all circumstances. However, even in the absence of any such statement in the complaint there is no embargo under the Act, to take any defence by the accused person in the light of sections 4, 6, 8, 9, 43, 58 and 118 of the Act and that the trial court shall give the accused persons adequate opportunity to take any such defence during the course of trial. Shafiqul Islam vs Bangladesh, 68 DLR 283. Sections 138 and 118-The burden of proof of the accused to disprove the presumption under sections 118 and 138 of the Act is not so heavy. The preponderance of probability through direct or substantial evidence is sufficient enough to shift the onus to the complainant. Inference of preponderance of probabilities can be drawn from the materials on record and also by reference to the circumstances upon which the party relies. When a presumption is rebuttable, it only points out that the party on whom lies the duty of going forward with evidence, on the fact presumed and when that party has produced evidence fairly and reasonably tending to show that the real fact is not as presumed, the purpose of the presumption is over. To rebut the statutory presumptions an accused is not expected to prove his defence beyond reasonable doubt as is expected of the complainant in a criminal trial. The accused may adduce direct evidence to prove that the cheque in question was not supported by consideration. However, the court need not insist in every case that the accused should disprove the non-existence of consideration and debt by leading direct evidence because the existence of negative evidence is neither possible nor contemplated. At the same time, it is clear that bare denial of the passing of consideration apparently would not serve the purpose of the accused. Something which is probable has to be brought on record for getting the burden of proof shifted to the complainant. The burden of proof of the accused to disprove the presumption under sections 118 and 138 of the Act is not so heavy. The preponderance of probability through direct or substantial evidence is sufficient enough to shift the onus to the complainant. Inference of preponderance of probabilities can be drawn from the materials on record and also by reference to the circumstances upon which the party relies. Abul Kaher Shahin (Md) vs Emran Rashid, 25 BLC (AD) 115. Sections 138 and 118(a) The presumption under section 118(a) of the Act, is always rebutable and the standard of proof of doing so is that of the preponderance of probabilities. The accused either adducing evidence or by cross-examining the PWs are entitled to rebut the presumption. The accused is not bound to prove his innocence by adducing evidence. A negative fact cannot be proved by adducing positive evidence. The issue as to whether the presumption stood rebutted or not must be determined based on the evidence adduced by the parties. AH Ershadul Haque, Advocate vs State, 75 DLR 447. Sections 138 and 118(a) The words "for the discharge in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability" has been omitted in 2000 by the amendment but section 118(a) of the Act still allows the defence to rebut the presumption that the cheque was drawn for any consideration. When the defence can prove that the cheque was drawn without any consideration the onus again shifts to the complainant to show and to prove that the cheque was drawn for consideration. Muksedur Rahman Badal (Md) vs State, 20 BLC 668. Sections 138 and 138A-On perusal of section 138A of the Act as amended on 9-2-2006 and on consideration of the whole enactment, it appears that the Negotiable Instruments Act being a procedural law, there is no bar in giving its effect retrospectively. The requirement of 50% deposit of cheque amount at the time of filing an appeal in the Court under the provisions of section 138A of the Act is not unconstitutional or violative to the provisions of the Constitution. Hence, question of violation of the right as guaranteed under Articles 27, 31, 40 and 42 of the Constitution does not arise at all. Jahid Faisal vs Bangladesh, 14 BLC 259. Sections 138, 138A & 140-A prosecution launched under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is different from one launched under sections 420/406 of the Penal Code. Not only the ingredients are different between the offences punishable under these two statutes, rather the liability under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, as imposed for dishonour of cheque, is a strict liability. Sheikh Mashuk Rahman vs State, 62 DLR 28. Sections 138, 138A and 141 (c)-If a case is tried by Court of Session. the cause of justice will be better served as the Sessions Courts are manned by Senior Judicial Officers unlike the Courts of Magistrate. The petitioner should rather be happy as his case is being tried by a senior judicial officer well versed in criminal law. By the amendment of clause (C) of section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the petitioner is, indeed, benefited. Therefore, the petitioner cannot have any grievance by the transfer of the case from the Court of Magistrate to the Court of Session. Mere filing of an appeal does not operate as stay of the judgment of conviction and sentence passed by the trial Court. The appellate Court may or may not stay the operation of judgment of conviction and sentence and may not enlarge the accused on bail. In that event the accused will have to pay the entire amount of the dishonoured cheque(s). Therefore, depositing 50% of the face value of the dishonoured cheque cannot be said to be illegal in case of a pending case ended up in conviction and sentence. It is now well settled that a procedural law always takes effect retrospectively. In the case in hand, section 138A and clause (C) of section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act being procedural law, the latest amendments to those sections shall apply to the case of the petitioner. The contention that the insertion of section 138A and amendment of clause (C) of section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is ultra vires of the Constitution could not be substantiated. AHN Kabir vs Bangladesh 13 BLC 686. Sections 138, 139, 140, 141 and 142-in all these cases, the notices were served demanding for payment of the money within 15 (fifteen) days of the date of the last dishonour of the cheques and that the complaint petitions were filed within 1(one) month of the date on which the cause of action arises under clause (e) of the proviso to section 138 of the Act. Therefores the complaints were made within statutory period of limitation as provided in clause (b) of section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The learned Magistrate in the premises have committed no error of law in taking cognizance of offence. The proceedings were legally initiated in accordance with law and the learned Magistrates were justified in taking cognizance of offence against the accused-petitioners. Sarwar M Kamal vs State 9 BLC 436. Sections 138 and 140-When a cheque is issued by the company and the same is dishonoured, there is no doubt that the company is the principal offender under section 138 of the Act but that alone does not mean that it is solely liable for the offence. The other two categories of persons are also similarly liable for the same offence by fiction of law. Fahmida Mizan vs Stute, 75 DLR 338. Sections 138 & 140-lt is now well settled that there is no bar to proceed with the, case under section 138 of the Act, if it is claimed that the alleged cheque is blank and security cheque because it is disputed question of fact and it can only be decided upon recording evidence. Moslem Uddin Bulu (Md) vs State, 72 DLR 452. Sections 138 and 140-The purport and scope of section 140 does not lay down any requirement that in the eventuality of an offence under section 138, the directors must individually be issued separate notices under section 138. Shahidul Alam @ SAlam vs Dr Jahid Hossain Prodhan, 69 DLR 547. Sections 138 and 140-Sections 138 and 140 of the Act do not make the directors principal offenders but accessories before the fact or liable vicariously. It is the company which is the principal offender, which has indeed committed the offence by issuing the cheques that were bounced. and hence question of choice is out of context. (Per AHM Shamsuddin Choudhury, J disscusting) Eusof Babu (Md) vs State, 68 DLR (AD) 298. Sections 138 and 140-Prosecution minus the company was not maintainable, I find no necessity to consider other grounds the appellants/leave petitioners have aired. So, the issue before me is very narrow indeed, but the flare and the dimension of it is too extensive and pervasive. Eusof Babu (Md) vs State, 68 DLR (AD) 298. Sections 138 and 140-The difference between sections 138 and 140 is that in respect of section 138 the offence is committed by human being that is to say, natural person and in section 140 though the expression "the person" is used which is qualified by a company which means "any body corporate and includes a firm of other association of individuals" which is a juristic person or not. It can be prosecuted for the offence under section 138. (Per SK Sinha, CJ majority) Eusof Babu (Md) vs State, 68 DLR (AD) 298. Sections 138 and 140-Petitioner was Managing Director of the Company at the time of offence committed and all acts are committed or done within his knowledge. He is responsible for the conduct of the business of the company and in such situation when the Managing Director of the Company is made party, there is no necessity for making the Company a party. Younus-uz-zaman (Badal) vs State, 66 DLR 249. Sections 138 and 140-For not making any allegation in the complaint petition of committing any offence under section 138 by the drawer-company, provisions of section 140 of the Act would not be applicable and there is no scope in law to hold the accused guilty in the case or to initiate and continue the proceeding. Ferdous Khan vs Islami Bank Bangladesh Ltd., 63 DLR 540. Sections 138 and 140-When an offence under section 138 of the Act is committed by the company, the complainant is required to implead the company as accused No. 1, then the signatory of the cheque should be made accused No. 2, then the directors of the company and, thereafter, if there is any officer of the company, against whom it is proved through a Judicial Enquiry or other form of enquiry that s/he has consented to/connived with in commission of the offence. However, if the company is not impleaded as accused in the petition of complaint, but other class or classes accused were made accused following serving the demand notice upon them within time for payment of the cheque amount, then, certainly legal cause of action to file a case under sections 138 & 140 of the Act against the other person/s arose. Engineer Sirajul Islam vs State, 24 BLC 386. Sections 138 and 140-Given the propensity of the accused-directors of the companies to invoke inherent power of this Court on this or that ground, mostly, in an attempt to frustrate the trial of the cases under section 138 read with 140 of the Act, this Court, as a part of its Constitutional obligation under Article 109 of the Constitution, finds it to be a demand of this time to formulate some guidelines for the Judicial Magistrates who are assigned to take cognizance of the offence under section 138 read with section 140 of the Act, in an expectation that the accused-directors would not seek to find any fault in the performance of the Magistrates on the basis of which they usually approach this Court. State vs Shah Alam Kazi, 24 BLC 386. Sections 138 and 140-নালিশী দরখাস্তে কোম্পানী ব্যতীত অন্যান্য আসামীদের আলাদা ভাবে আর্থিক দায় উল্লেখ না থাকলে বা বিচারিক আদালত যৌথভাবে কোম্পানীসহ একাধিক ব্যক্তিকে আইনের ১৩৮/১৪০ ধারার বিধানমতে সাজা বা দন্ডাদেশ প্রদান করার ক্ষেত্রে দন্ডপ্রাপ্ত ব্যক্তিদের আর্থিক দায় (liability) সুস্পষ্টভাবে উল্লেখ না করলে ধরে নিতে হবে যে কোম্পানী ব্যতীত দন্ডপ্রাপ্ত ব্যক্তিগণ আনুপাতিক হারে দায়ী (proprotionately liable)। সেক্ষেত্রে কোন মামলায় উক্ত ১৩৮/১৪০ ধারায় কোম্পানীসহ ৬ জনের বিরুদ্ধে দন্ডাদেশ হলে এবং তর্কিত চেকে উল্লেখিত টাকার পরিমান ১ কোটি টাকা হলে শুধুমাত্র দন্ডাদেশের বিরুদ্ধে কোম্পানী ব্যতীত অন্যান্য ব্যক্তি কর্তৃক আপীল দায়েরের ক্ষেত্রে দন্ডপ্রাপ্ত প্রত্যেক কে উক্ত ১ কোটি টাকার ৫০% এর ১/৫ (পাঁচ ভাগের একভাগ) অংশ অর্থ্যাৎ ১০ লক্ষ টাকা বিচারিক আদালতে জমা দিয়ে আপীল দায়ের করতে পারবেন। যদি উক্ত কোম্পানীর পক্ষে আলাদা আপীল দায়ের করা হয় সেক্ষেত্রে চেকে উল্লেখিত টাকার ৫০% বিচারিক আদালতে জমা প্রদান পূর্বক কোম্পানীকে আপীল দায়ের করতে হবে। Showkat Ali vs State, 26 BLC 518. Sections 138 and 140-The expression "abuse of process" in section 561A means in effect anything done by the Court. Inherent power of the Court is extraordinary in its nature and is exercised ex debito justitiae, that is to say, for the purpose of doing justice that real and substantial justice for the administration of which the Courts of law exist. The inherent jurisdiction is attracted firstly, "to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order of the Code". Secondly, "to prevent abuse of the process of any Court" and lastly, "otherwise to secure ends of justice". Though prima facie case has been disclosed in the complaint petitions, the inherent juris-diction under second and last categories is attracted. Further prolongation of the proceedings would amount to harassment to the accused-petitioner and abuse of the process of the Court. Mamun (Md) vs State, 25 BLC 275. Sections 138 and 140-As the cheque in question was neither signed by the accused nor it was specifically asserted in the petition of complaint that they have by any means instigated or gave their consent to sign the cheque, there is no scope to bring vicarious arraignment against the accused with the offence and as such the proceeding is liable to be quashed at least as against them. Zubaidun Nahar Begum vs State, 25 BLC 450. Sections 138 and 140-It is now as well settled law that criminal proceeding can be proceeded independently of the civil suit and there is nothing in law precluding a criminal case on account of a civil suit pending against the petitioners on the same facts. The criminal case stands for the offence, while the civil suit is for realization of money. Both can stand together. Nur Alam Mahadi vs IDLC Finance Limited, 25 BLC 568. Sections 138 and 140-To prove that the cheque in question was not drawn in connivance with accused-petitioners cannot be determined without taking evidence by the trial court. Rashiduzzaman Millat vs State, 23 BLC 490. Sections 138 and 140-The liability under section 138 can be termed as a strict liability offence. Pursuant to section 140, the person, who issued the cheque, whether on his own behalf or on behalf of a company of which he is in charge or for which he is responsible cannot escape liability under the Act. Morever, if for any reason whatsoever, let alone the omission of the company as an accused, the other persons who are in charge of the affairs of the company or have knowledge about the affairs of the company cannot escape from criminal liability if they are served with the notice. Islami Bank Bangladesh Ltd vs Ferdous Khan @ Alamgir, 22 BLC (AD) 209. Sections 138 & 141-An offence under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is for dishonour of cheque simpliciter for insufficiency of fund, etc. whereas an offence under section 420 of the Penal Code for cheating is a distinct offence. The rule of law about the peremptory application of the special law in place of the general law for trial of an offence hardly applies when the offences are distinct under the two laws. Nurul Islam vs State, 49 DLR 464. Sections 138 & 141-Even though the case is pre-mature and it was filed before the expiry of 15 days from the date of receipt of the notice, the proceeding is not liable to be quashed. Satya Harayan Poddar vs State, 53 DLR 403. Sections 138 & 141-Subsequent allegations will not save limitation for prosecution-The requirement under the law is that the complaint against non-payment of money has to be filed within one month of the date on which the cause of action arises-The High Court Division wrongly rejected the application for quashing. SM Anwar Hossain vs Md Shafiul Alam (Chand), 51 DLR (AD) 218. Sections 138 & 141-In view of discussions made in the facts and circumstance of the case, there was no other alternative but to quash the proceeding as the opposite party No. 1 complainant had earlier taken recourse to clause (b) of section 138 of the Act in an unsuccessful manner which does not in any way give rise to further cause of action as cause of action as provided under sections 138 and 141 of the Act arises only for once. Dr Md Mofizur Rahman and ors vs Md Bashirullah, 55 DLR 630. Sections 138 & 141-Taking of cognisance upon the petition of complaint filed by the Attorney upon due examination under section 200 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is "perfectly valid and appropriate". Hashibul Bashar vs Gulzar Rahman, 56 DLR (AD) 17. Sections 138 and 141-The onus to prove, standard being "beyond reasonable doubt', that the cheques were drawn for consideration, shifted to the prosecution, but it failed to discharge the onus and the foundation of the prosecution case (business transactions and passing of consideration) has fallen apart. Hence, the inevitable conclusion is that in spite of facts that the cheques in question were signed by the accused and the complainant company was the payee, those were drawn without consideration. Ershad Ali (Md) Md Ershad Ullah vs State, 26 BLC 93. Sections 138 and 141-The cause of action for prosecution will arise under clause (c) of the proviso to section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act on the failure of the appellant to pay the amount within 15 days of the receipt of the notice of the complainant. In the present case, the cause of action arose on 19-1-96 and the petition of complaint was required to be filed within one month from 19-1-96 in compliance with clause (b) of section 141 of the Act which having not been done by the complainant the cognizance of the offence cannot be taken upon such complaint and hence the impugned proceeding is quashed. SM Anwar Hossain vs Shafiul Alam (Chand), 4 BLC (AD) 106. Sections 138 & 141-The combined reading of the clause (c) of the proviso to section 138(1) and the section 141 of the Act leaves no room for doubt that cause of action within the meaning of section 141(c) arises and can arise only once. Thus, the settled position of law is that the payee or holder of a cheque in due course can present a cheque as many times as he or she wishes within the period of validity of the cheque and at his or her option can choose on which bouncing of the cheque shall initiate a proceeding under section 138 of the Act. Nazrul Islam Mallik vs Tofazzal Hossain, 8 BLC 443. Sections 138 & 141-If any cheque is presented to the Bank twice or on many more times, within six months from the date it was drawn. computation of the period for prosecution under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act should be done from which the cheque is lastly returned. In the instant case, in view of the non-disclosure of the date as to receipt of notice by the accused and failure to mention any legal cause of action in the petition of complaint, the proceeding cannot be allowed to continue and as such it is liable to be quashed. Nizam Uddin Mahmood vs Abdul Hamid Bhuiyan 9 BLC (AD) 177. Sections 138 and 141-There is no legal bar to try the offence under same transaction under one case. Zahed Hossain vs State 61 DLR 386. Sections 138 and 141-Admittedly there was a transaction between the parties and the petitioner issued the cheque in question but the law of limitation stands as an impediment to proceed further with the case in view of clause (b) of section 138 and clause (b) to section 141 of the Act. Time is a great factor of human life specially when it comes into play for legal purpose. The proceeding of the CR case is quashed. Abdus Salam vs Md Munshi Rashed Kamal, 54 DLR 234. Sections 138 and 141-Since the cheques issued by the petitioner were dishonoured for insufficient fund and he failed to pay the amount of the dishonoured cheques in time, offence under section 138 of the Act has been disclosed agianst him. The facts narrated in the complaint do constitute prima-facie offence under section 138 of the Act and, as such, question of quashing the proceeding does not arise. Solaiman vs State 62 DLR 385. Sections 138 and 141-Since there is no legal bar against the initiation, framing of charge, and continuation of the proceedings and, as such, the proceedings do not amount to an abuse of the process of the Court. Abeda Chowdhury vs State 63 DLR 118. Sections 138 and 141-Cause of Action-There is no legal lacuna in sending the letter to the accused petitioner although notice was not served upon the petitioner but it is return back. Therefore, cause of action would be arisen after expiry of 30 days from the date of return of the legal notice as date of return of legal notice mentioned in the complaint of petition. Abdul Hamid vs State, 21 BLC 370. Sections 138 and 141-The sending of two notices against the petitioner have not prejudiced the petitioner and in such case, filing of one case against two dishonoured cheques will have not created any legal bar because the parties are same. There is no legal bar to try the offence under same transaction under one case. Atiqullah Pathan vs State 16 BLC 175. Sections 138 and 141-As per section 177 and 183 of the Code of Criminal Procedure if the six different acts were done in six different localities, any of the Courts exercising jurisdiction in one of the six local areas can become the place of trial for the offence under section 138 of the Act and the complainant can choose any one of the Courts in whose jurisdiction any of the 6 components of the said offence was done. The first occurrence of talk and agreement loan took place at Cox's Bazar and as such the learned Sessions Judge, Cox's Bazar has jurisdiction to try the case. Nadira Alam vs State, 16 BLC 218. Sections 138 and 141-There is no legal bar in filing a criminal case for criminal liability before the Court having jurisdiction notwithstanding the fact that a civil suit is pending over a self same matter. An aggrieved person cannot be precluded from filing a criminal case if criminal offence is committed in spite of the fact that there is an arbitration clause in an agreement made between the parties. Shahnawaz Akhandvs State, 16 BLC 438. Sections 138 and 141-By now, it is well settled that on the basis of the defence plea or meterials criminal proceedings should not be stifled before trial when there is prima-facie case for holding trial. Mere non-mentioning the date of dishonoured cheques in the petition of complaint, the proceeding should not be stopped readily and it should not be quashed. Shahjahan (Md) vs State, 16 BLC 686. Sections 138 and 139-On plain reading of the provisions of the sections 138 and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 it appears that when a cheque is given for discharge of any "debt or liability" and if such cheque is dishonoured the issuer of the cheque is liable for the consequence under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and further it appears that the very cheque itself has a "presumptive value as to debt or liability". Whether any debt or liability at all exits or not is a question to be determined in the proceeding under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. One of the ingredients for initiating a proceeding under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is refusal to honour a cheque and when there is such prima-facie case, the proceeding cannot be quashed. SM Emdadul Hossain vs Jinnur Hossain, 15 BLC (AD) 146. Sections 138 to 141-The cause of action of a Criminal Case should be ascertained in its entirety i.e. from the initiation of the proceeding to its end. For the cause of non mentioning the date of receipt of the legal notice and cause of action in the petition of complaint, the course of justice should not be interrupted readily and proceedings should not be quashed. Iddris Sheikh (Md) vs State, 13 BLC 423. Sections 138 to 141-The proceeding under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 is only related to the dishonour of a negotiable instrument which may proceed independent of any other claim to be decided through civil proceeding. No question of defective title arises in the instant case since the complainant-opposite party categorically stated in the petition that the cheque was dated one and, as such, the factual aspect as to whether the cheque was dated one or not cannot be decided by this Court which is a matter for evidence in the trial Court and therefore, the question relating to such fact cannot be considered at this stage. Syed Anowar Towhid vs Syed Zahed Ali, 13 BLC 428. Sections 138 and 141-Non disclosure of the date of receipt of notice under section 138(1)(b) of the Negotiable Instruments Act is a question of fact which will be decided at the time of trial after taking evidence and thus non-disclosure of date of receipt of notice and consequently, the failure to disclose the cause of action cannot render the proceedings under section 561A of the Code of Criminal Procedure liable to be quashed. If the cause of action is matured during the pendency of the proceeding, the defect of pre-maturity of cause of action could be cured. Sirajul Islam vs Tauhiduddin Ahmed, 15 BLC 39. Sections 138 and 141-The using of a non-obstante clause in section 141 of the Act also makes it clear that the jurisdiction of the Court of taking cognizance of the offence before arising of the cause of action or after one month of arising of the cause of action has been ousted. In the instant case the cognizance of the alleged offence was taken before arising of the cause of action which is without jurisdiction and such illegality cannot be cured by applying any provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure, because the scope of application of the provisions of the Code has been taken away purposely by incorporation of the non-obstante clause in section 141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and as such the proceeding of the impugned case is liable to be quashed. Jubayer vs State, 15 BLC 432. Sections 138 and 141-In the cases of SA Sultan vs State reported in 44 DLR (AD) 139, Aminur Rahman vs State reported in 8 BLC 518 and Nurul Islam vs State reported in 49 DLR 464 it has been held that Criminal Case under section 420 of the Penal Code is maintainable when the cheque is dishonoured and a prima-facie case of cheating is made out. In view of the facts and circumstances and the decisions as referred to above, we are inclined to hold that the proceeding of the impugned case is liable to be quashed. Jubayer vs State, 15 BLC 432, Sections 138 and 141-In the instant case, we have already found that 30 days expired on 24-5-2008, which was the last date for filing the case. But we have seen from the calendar that in the year 2008, the dates 23-5-2008 and 24-5-2008 were weekly holidays, and, as such, the complainant had to file the Petition of Complaint on 25-5-2008, the re-opening day, which is permissible under section 10 of the General Clauses Act. In such view of the matter, we do not find any reason to hold that the case was filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation. Since there is a prima-facie case to proceed against the accused-petitioner, it is not a fit case to interfere with the impugned proceeding. Shafiqul Islam vs State, 15 BLC 593. Section 138A-Right of appeal is a substantive right and it becomes a vested right when the original proceeding is initiated and this right is not defeated by the repeal of the statute conferring the right of appeal. But there are two exceptions to this rule, namely, when by a competent enactment, such right of appeal is taken away expressly or impliedly with retrospective effect, and when the Court or tribunal to which appeal lay at the commencement of the original proceeding stands abolished without providing another forum. A litigant has, however, no vested right to any particular forum and where a new forum is provided by the repealing Act, the right of appeal is to be exercised in the new forum. A change of law imposing any restriction on the right of appeal, in the absence of any contrary intention, will not affect the right of appeal as it stood at the commencement of the original proceeding. Parvin Akhter vs Bangladesh, 70 DLR 413. Section 138A-Since the Act is a special law providing special procedure for filing appeal in section 138A of the Act by overriding the provisions of the CrPC. Abdul Kader (Md) alias Karim vs State, 25 BLC 99. Section 138A-This Court is of the view that said amendment dated 9-2-2006 will have prospective effect on all cases to be filed after the amendment came into force as in the amending enactment as above no intention was expressly stated about retrospective effect of the same. Accordingly, there was no need for deposit of 50% of the amount of dishonoured cheque before filing of the concerned appeal. Impugned order of rejection of the memo of appeal being against the spirit of section 6 of General Clauses Act the same cannot be sustainable. Akhter Hossain Md vs Hasmat Ali and State, 60 DLR 368. Sections 138A, 138 & 140-A prosecution launched under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is different from one launched under sections 420/406 of the Penal Code. Not only the ingredients are different between the offences punishable under these two statutes, rather the liability under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, as imposed for dishonour of cheque, is a strict liability. Sheikh Mashuk Rahman vs State 62 DLR 28. Sections 138A and 141(C)-The intention of the legislature is very much clear that the Act, being a special law, special provision has been inserted to restrain lingering of the disposal of such cases and also to discourage preferring frivolous appeals. This piece of legislation by its nature is a beneficial one and the cheque-defaulter should not be indulged in a manner so that the legislative intent is allowed to be frustrated. Tofayel Ahmed vs State, 24 BLC 682. Sections 138A and 138-On perusal of section 138A of the Act as amended on 9-2-2006 and on consideration of the whole enactment, it appears that the Negotiable Instruments Act being a procedural law, there is no bar in giving its effect retrospectively. The requirement of 50% deposit of cheque amount at the time of filing an appeal in the Court under the provisions of section 138A of the Act is not unconstitutional or violative to the provisions of the Constitution. Hence, question of violation of the right as guaranteed under Articles 27, 31, 40 and 42 of the Constitution does not arise at all. Jahid Faisal vs Bangladesh, 14 BLC 259. Section 140-Section 140 of the Act is a penal provision creating vicarious liability which must be strictly construed. So far as of the appellants are concerned the provisions section 140 of the Act have no manner of application to the case in hand. Yusuf A Nazom vs State, 73 DLR 336. Section 140-Merely being a director of a company is not sufficient to make the person liable under section 140. A director in a company cannot be deemed to be in charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of its business. The requirement of section 140 is that the person sought to be made liable should be in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company at the relevant time. A director who was not in charge of and was not responsible for the conduct of the business of the company at the relevant time, will not be liable under the provision. While there are no averments in the petition of complaint specifying charge and responsibility of the petitioners as directors in the conduct of the business at the relevant time and they are not being the signatory of the cheque there is no bar to entertain a quashment petition even at the early stage of the proceeding. Parvez Bhuiyan (Md) vs State, 72 DLR 134. Section 140-A company being a juristic person, all its deeds and functions are the result of the acts of Managing Director. A Managing Director of the company is responsible for acts done in the name of the company. The accused-petitioner was Managing Director of the company at the time of offence committed or done within his knowledge. He is responsible for the conduct of the business of the company and in such situation when the Managing Director of the company is made party, there is no necessity for making the company as party. Didarul Alam vs State, 71 DLR 629. Section 140-The trial Court should amend the charge by incorporating a reference to 140 of the Act, with a further statement that the accused issued the cheque as an office bearer of the Company and that he is liable to be prosecuted. The accused should be allowed to produce his defense evidence in accordance with law. Shariful Haque (Md) vs State represented by the Deputy Commissioner, 70 DLR 209. Section 140-In the first part of section 140 of the Act contain the offence committed by the person, who are responsible as well as in charge of the company at the time of commission of offence, shall be deemed to be guilty. But the 2nd part of section 140 of the Act provides that any director, manager, secretary or other officer of the company would be held guilty of that offence if at that time they had active part of company as well as consent or connivance of, or is attributable to, any neglect on the part of any director. manager. secretary or other officer of the company. Mozahar Sowdagor (Md) vs State, 69 DLR 204. Section 140-The directors only signed the company's cheques and thereby acted as the fuel injectors in the Company's commission of the offence. Section 140 of the Act made them vicariously liable as per me decision of the larger Bench of the Indian Supreme Court. Question is not founded on the applicability of the civil law principle of non-joinder but that of the criminal jurisprudence which ordains that a criminal proceeding is non-est for aiders or abettors if the principal offender is not booked. (Per AHM Shamsuddin Choudhury, J disscusting) Eusof Babu (Md) vs State, 68 DLR (AD) 298. Section 140-Section 140 does not contain that the prosecution of company is indisputable for the prosecution of the other categories of persons. If the company any is not prosecuted, the other two categories of persons cannot, on that ground alone, escape from criminal liability. (Per SK Sinha, CJ majority) Eusof Babu (Md) vs State, 68 DLR (AD) 298. Section 140 Company is a distinct personality, independent of its Directors and share-holders and it is the company who is liable for offence committed by it and that the directors who steer the affairs of the company are not liable as the principal offenders but either vicariously or as aiding or abetting agents. For this view I take in aid observations expressed in re-Sir Dinshai Petit, supra, to the effect that when a company is duly incorporated the Court should start with the presumption that it is a separate entity from the individuals. (Per AHM Shamsuddin Choudhury, J disscusting) Eusof Babu (Md) vs State, 68 DLR (AD) 298. Section 140-There must be specific accusation against each of the persons impleaded that such person was in charge of and responsible for the conduct of the business of the company at the relevant time when offence was committed by the company. In the entire body of the complaint no assertion has been made that the accused petitioner at the relevant time was responsible or was in day-to-day affairs or was in know of or taking part in issuing the cheque on behalf of the Company. The accused petitioner made out a case within section 140(1) of the Act and if this proceeding is allowed to continue against him that will not give any fruitful result to the complainant and that will perpetuate an injustice to the accused petitioner which will defeat ends of justice and to secure ends of justice, the proceeding against the accused petitioner being an abuse of process of the Court, there is no other alternative but to quash the proceeding against the accused petitioner. AKM Siddique vs Md Momenul Haque, 11 BLC 454. Section 140-From the plain reading of the provisions of section 140 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, it appears that when any offence under this Act has been committed by a company and it is proved that the offence has been committed with the consent or connivance by any director. manager, secretary or other officer of the company, such director, manager, secretary or other officer shall be deemed to be guilty of that offence. Therefore, the section itself negates the argument as advanced by the advocate, inasmuch as admittedly the accused petitioners being Managing Director and Directors of a private company named 'Salex Apparel Limited' issued 2 cheques of total Taka 6,50,000 in favour of the complainant opposite party No.2 and on presentation, those cheques in the bank for encashment were bounced for insufficient fund. Sahajahan Bhuiya and others vs State, 11 BLC 625. Section 140-The extent of liability of the accused has to be established by evidence during trial. Where the Magistrate found that the allegations made in the complaint made out a prima-facie offence and that all the accused partners, being responsible for carrying on the business of the partnership firm, prima-facie committed the offence and therefore, took cognizance of the offence and issued process against all the accused, it was held that the High Court erred in holding that some of the accused were not responsible for the managreement and conduct of the firm and on that basis in quashing the proceeding against the accused. Drugs Inspector vs BK Krishnaiah, AIR 1981 SC 1164: (1981) 2 SCC 454. Section 140-Where there was no allegation inthe complaint that the directors were in charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company. Where a cheque was in fact issued by the managing director and not by directors named in the complaint, it was held that the directors could not be held responsible for dishonour. Sharda Agarwal vs Addl. Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, II Kanpur, 1992 All LJ 571: 1992 Cri LJ 1442: (1993) 78 Company Cases 123 All. Section 140-So far as a complaint by a company is concerned, an authorised person of the company can sign the complaint. The action of the Magistrate of returning the complaint that the complainant was not the payee or holder in due course and hence he could not file the complaint, was not sustainable. The representative was only representing the company. Hence, company was the complainant and not the representative. CBS Gramophone Records & Types (India) Lid vs PA Noorudeen, (1992) 73 Company Cases 494. Section 140-Where the complaint was filed by a person who was described as the senior accountant and who was authorised by a deed of power of attorney, the complaint was held to be properly instituted. Jayalakshmi Nataraj vs Jeena & Co. (1996) 86 Comp Cas 265 Mad. Section 140-A complaint filed by the managing partner of the payee, partnership firm was held to be competent. S Krishnamurthy vs AR Rajan, (1996) 87 Company Cases 212 Mad A complaint filed by a manager was held to be incompetent and also in the same case that a cheque issued by the son of the proprietor of a firm would not permit proceedings against the proprietor, Sudesh Kumar Sharma vs KS Selvamani, (1995) 84 Comp Case 806 Mad. Section 140-A company as a payee is competent to maintain petition. Nandagopal vs NEPC Agro Foods Ltd, (1995) 83 Comp Cas 213 (Mad). Section 140-A duly authorised manager of a company was held to be competent. Solar Solvent Extractions Ltd vs South India Viscose Ltd., (1995) 83 Company Cases 540 Mad, following Gopalakrishna Trading Co vs Baskaran (D), (1994) 80 Comp Cas 53 Mad. Section 140-Where the managing director of a company issued his personal cheque to meet the liability of the company which was dishonoured, it was held that an offence had been committed by the company. Jagarlamudi Surya Prasad vs State of AP (1992) 1 BC 120. Where the managing partner issued the cheque on behalf of the firm, the other partners could not be made liable, ESSB Food Specialities vs Kapoor Bros., 1992 CriLJ 739 P&H. Section 140-Unless company is made an accused, the person who is in charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company cannot be made an accused. UP Pollution Control Board vs Modi Distillery, (1987) 3 SCC 684: 1987 SCC (Cri) 632. Section 140 Offences by Firms or Association of Individuals-Where a cheque is issued on behalf of a firm by partner of the firm and the cheque is dishonoured and notice in terms of clause (b) of the proviso to section 138 of the Act is issued to the firm, the firm is the drawer of the cheque and there is no question of issuing the notices to all the partners. It is sufficient that there is an averment in the complaint that all partners of the firm were taking part in the running of the business of the firm and all the partners are liable to be prosecuted against by virtue of sub-clause (1) of section 141. Oswal Ispat Udyog vs Salem Steel Suppliers, (1991) 1 BC 559. Section 140-An action under section 138 cannot be taken against a person who is a sleeping partner and who has not been shown to be in charge of business or affairs of the firm. Amrit Rani vs Malhotra Industrial Corpn., (1992) J BC 262. Section 140-A sole proprietary concern is outside the purview of the Explanation to section 140, i.e, it is not a company within the meaning of "company" as defined under the Explanation to section 140 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, thus sole proprietary concern could not be made a party in the complaint apart from the sole proprietor. P Muthuraman vs Padmavathi Finance Regd., (1994) 80 Company Cases 656. Sivasakthi Industries vs Arihant Metal Corpn., (1992) 74 Company Cases 749; Habibunisa Akhtar vs S&S Engrs and Enterprises Ltd., (1995) 83 Company Cases 593 Mad. Section 140 Notice of dishonour served on the firm has been held to be sufficient to entail the prosecution of all the partners who were alleged in the complaint to be actively taking part in running the business of the firm. There was no question of serving notices on all the partners. Onwal Ispat Udyog vs Salem Steel, (1993) 78 Company Cases 512 Mad Section 140-Where the cheque in question was issued by the managing partner and there was no allegation that his copartner was in charge of affairs, it was held that the managing partner alone could be prosecuted. Ess Bee Bood Specialties vs Kapoor Bros., (1993) 78 Company Cases 570 P&H. Section 140-A managing director was not allowed to be prosecuted without jointing the company. Krishan Bai vs Arti Press. (1994) 80 Comp CAx 750 Mod Section 140-Complaints by companies, firms ete-Where a company or a partnership firm is the payee of a cheque, its manager, managing partner, partner, director or any other person authorised for the purpose can file a complaint. Gopalkrishna Trading Co vs D Bhaskaran, (1994) 80 Company Cases 53 Mad Section 140-Period of limitation-The complaint has to be made within one month from the date of the cause of action. The period of one month starts running from the 16th day after receipt of notice of dishonour by the drawer Under section 138(c) there is 15 days time for payment of the amount due under the cheque from the date on which the drawer is given the notice of the dishonour. If he does not pay up to the expiry of the 15th day, the cause of action takes birth from the 16th day and remains alive up to one month from that day. In this case the notice was received by he drawer on 24-8-1989. He had 15 days time to pay from that day. The period started after the expiry of 15 days, namely, from 9-9-1989, the 16th day. The complaint was filed on 5-10-1989 and the same was held to be within time. Ghanshyam M Swamy vs Classical Steel Products, (1992) 75 Company Cases 695 Gaj, KT Kuriyan vs KK Shreedharan (1992) 74 Comp Cas 853 Ker Venu vs Krishanappa (1992) 74 Company Cases 734 Knt. Section 140-Under section 138 the requirement is that of "giving notice in writing". This would naturally impose the requirement of giving notice." A person notifies or gives notice to another by taking such steps as may reasonably be required to inform the other in the ordinary course (of things) whether or not such other actually comes to know of it." Ghanshyan M Swamy vs Classical Steel Products, (1992) 74 Company Cases 695 Guj: K Madhu vs Omega Pipes Ltd 1994 Cri LJ 3439 Ker Section 140-Where the complaint served on the opposite party did not carry the date seal of the court on it so as to enable the higher court to know whether it was filed within time or not, the court looked at the fact from the relevant evidence that the complaint was filed out of time. The court emphasized the need of putting the stamp seal and date of filing before the complaint is served upon the opposite party. T Vanamamalai vs TD Sundra Vardhan, (1996) 36 Comp Cas 188 Mad. Section 140-Condonation of delay. The period of limitation has to be reckoned from the expiry of fifteen days. Where a complaint is filed after the expiry of the prescribed period, it being in the nature of a petition. section 5 of the Limitation Act, becomes applicable. Hence, delay may be condoned on a sufficient cause shown and cognizance taken accordingly. Janardhan Mohapatra vs Saroj Kumar Choudhury, (1994) 79 Comp Cas 821 Ori, the matter was remanded for reconsideration. Delay should not be condoned without hearing the party proposed to be proceeded against. P. Sengupta vs ROC, (1991) 72 Comp Cas 421 Cal. Section 140(2)-As per sub-section (2) of section 140 of the Act, the third category of the persons can be exonerated from being prosecuted if the drawee of the cheque fails to prove that the offence has been committed with their consent or connivance or negligence. The onus is primarily upon the drawee of the cheque. This is also deducible from the facts and circumstances of the case and it can only be shown and proved by evidence during trial. Fahmida Mizan vs State, 75 DLR 338. Sections 140 and 138-When a cheque is issued by the company and the same is dishonoured, there is no doubt that the company is the principal offender under section 138 of the Act but that alone does not mean that it is solely liable for the offence. The other two categories of persons are also similarly liable for the same offence by fiction of law. Fahmida Mizan vs State, 75 DLR 338. Sections 140 and 138-It is now well settled that there is no bar to proceed with the, case under section 138 of the Act, if it is claimed that the alleged cheque is blank and security cheque because it is disputed question of fact and it can only be decided upon recording evidence. Moslem Uddin Bulu (Md) vs State, 72 DLR 452 Sections 140 and 138-The purport and scope of section 140 does not lay down any requirement that in the eventuality of an offence under section 138, the directors must individually be issued separate notices under section 138. Shahidul Alam @ S Alam vs Dr Jahid Hossain Prodhan, 69 DLR 547. Sections 140 and 138-Sections 138 and 140 of the Act do not make the directors principal offenders but accessories before the fact or liable vicariously. It is the company which is the principal offender, which has indeed committed the offence by issuing the cheques that were bounced, and hence question of choice is out of context. (Per AHM Shamsuddin Choudhury, I disscusting) Eusof Babu (Md) vs State, 68 DLR (AD) 298. Sections 140 and 138-Prosecution minus the company was not maintainable, I find no necessity to consider other grounds the appellants/leave petitioners have aired. So, the issue before me is very narrow indeed, but the flare and the dimension of it is too extensive and pervasive. Eusof Babu (Md) vs State, 68 DLR (AD) 298. Sections 140 and 138-The difference between sections 138 and 140 is that in respect of section 138 the offence is committed by human being that is to say, natural person and in section 140 though the expression "the person" is used which is qualified by a company which means "any body corporate and includes a firm of other association of individuals" which is a juristic person or not. It can be prosecuted for the offence under section 138. (Per SK Sinha, CJ majority) Eusof Babu (Md) vs State, 68 DLR (AD) 298. Sections 140 and 138-নালিশী দরখাস্তে কোম্পানী ব্যতীত অন্যান্য আসামীদের আলাদা ভাবে আর্থিক দায় উল্লেখ না থাকলে বা বিচারিক আদালত যৌথভাবে কোম্পানীসহ একাধিক ব্যক্তিকে আইনের ১৩৮/১৪০ ধারার বিধানমতে সাজা বা দন্ডাদেশ প্রদান করার ক্ষেত্রে দন্ডপ্রাপ্ত ব্যক্তিদের আর্থিক দায় (liability) সুস্পষ্টভাবে উল্লেখ না করলে ধরে নিতে হবে যে কোম্পানী ব্যতীত দন্ডপ্রাপ্ত ব্যক্তিগণ আনুপাতিক হারে দায়ী (proprotionately liable)। সেক্ষেত্রে কোন মামলায় উক্ত ১৩৮/১৪০ ধারায় কোম্পানীসহ ৬ জনের বিরুদ্ধে দন্ডাদেশ হলে এবং তর্কিত চেকে উল্লেখিত টাকার পরিমান ১ কোটি টাকা হলে শুধুমাত্র দন্ডাদেশের বিরুদ্ধে কোম্পানী ব্যতীত অন্যান্য ব্যক্তি কর্তৃক আপীল দায়েরের ক্ষেত্রে দন্ডপ্রাপ্ত প্রত্যেক কে উক্ত ১ কোটি টাকার ৫০% এর ১/৫ (পাঁচ ভাগের একভাগ) অংশ অর্থ্যাৎ ১০ লক্ষ টাকা বিচারিক আদালতে জমা দিয়ে আপীল দায়ের করতে পারবেন। যদি উক্ত কোম্পানীর পক্ষে আলাদা আপীল দায়ের করা হয় সেক্ষেত্রে চেকে উল্লেখিত টাকার ৫০% বিচারিক আদালতে জমা প্রদান পূর্বক কোম্পানীকে আপীল দায়ের করতে হবে। Showkat Ali vs State, 26 BLC 518. Sections 140 and 138-The expression "abuse of process" in section 561A means in effect anything done by the Court. Inherent power of the Court is extraordinary in its nature and is exercised ex debito justitiae, that is to say, for the purpose of doing justice that real and substantial justice for the administration of which the Courts of law exist. The inherent jurisdiction is attracted firstly, "to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order of the Code". Secondly, "to prevent abuse of the process of any Court" and lastly, "otherwise to secure ends of justice". Though prima facie case has been disclosed in the complaint petitions, the inherent juris-diction under second and last categories is attracted. Further prolongation of the proceedings would amount to harassment to the accused-petitioner and abuse of the process of the Court. Mamun (Md) vs State, 25 BLC 275. Sections 140 and 138-As the cheque in question was neither signed by the accused nor it was specifically asserted in the petition of complaint that they have by any means instigated or gave their consent to sign the cheque, there is no scope to bring vicarious arraignment against the accused with the offence and as such the proceeding is liable to be quashed at least as against them. Zubaidun Nahar Begum vs State, 25 BLC 450. Sections 140 and 138-It is now as well settled law that criminal proceeding can be proceeded independently of the civil suit and there is nothing in law precluding a criminal case on account of a civil suit pending against the petitioners on the same facts. The criminal case stands for the offence, while the civil suit is for realization of money. Both can stand together. Nur Alam Mahadi vs IDLC Finance Limited, 25 BLC 568. Sections 140 and 138-When an offence under section 138 of the Act is committed by the company, the complainant is required to implead the company as accused No. 1, then the signatory of the cheque should be made accused No. 2, then the directors of the company and, thereafter, if there is any officer of the company, against whom it is proved through a Judicial Enquiry or other form of enquiry that she has consented to/connived with in commission of the offence. However, if the company is not impleaded as accused in the petition of complaint, but other class or classes accused were made accused following serving the demand notice upon them within time for payment of the cheque amount, then, certainly legal cause of action to file a case under sections 138 & 140 of the Act against the other person/s arose. Engineer Sirajul Islam vs State, 24 BLC 386. Sections 140 and 138-Given the propensity of the accused-directors of the companies to invoke inherent power of this Court on this or that ground, mostly, in an attempt to frustrate the trial of the cases under section 138 read with 140 of the Act, this Court, as a part of its Constitutional obligation under Article 109 of the Constitution, finds it to be a demand of this time to formulate some guidelines for the Judicial Magistrates who are assigned to take cognizance of the offence under section 138 read with section 140 of the Act, in an expectation that the accused-directors would not seek to find any fault in the performance of the Magistrates on the basis of which they usually approach this Court. State vs Shah Alam Kazi, 24 BLC 386. Sections 140 and 138-To prove that the cheque in question was not drawn in connivance with accused-petitioners cannot be determined without taking evidence by the trial court. Rashiduzzaman Millat vs State, 23 BLC 490. Sections 140 and 138-The liability under section 138 can be termed as a strict liability offence. Pursuant to section 140, the person, who issued the cheque, whether on his own behalf or on behalf of a company of which he is in charge or for which he is responsible cannot escape liability under the Act. Morever, if for any reason whatsoever, let alone the omission of the company as an accused, the other persons who are in charge of the affairs of the company or have knowledge about the affairs of the company cannot escape from criminal liability if they are served with the notice. Islami Bank Bangladesh Ltd vs Ferdous Khan @ Alamgir, 22 BLC (AD) 209. Sections 140, 138 and 138A-A prosecution launched under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is different from one launched under sections 420/406 of the Penal Code. Not only the ingredients are different between the offences punishable under these two statutes, rather the liability under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, as imposed for dishonour of cheque, is a strict liability. Sheikh Mashuk Rahman vs State 62 DLR 28. Section 141-Quashing-Initiation-Since there is no legal bar against the initiation and continuation of the proceedings and, as such, the proceedings do not amount to an abuse of the process of the Court. Raj Kumar Khetan vs Mercantile Bank Ltd, 64 DLR 272. Sections 141 & 138-Even though the case is pre-mature and it was filed before the expiry of 15 days from the date of receipt of the notice, the proceeding is not liable to be quashed. Satya Narayan Poddar vs State, 53 DLR 403. Sections 141 & 138-An offence under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is for dishonour of cheque simpliciter for insufficiency of fund, etc. whereas an offence under section 420 of the Penal Code for cheating is a distinct offence. The rule of law about the peremptory application of the special law in place of the general law for trial of an offence hardly applies when the offences are distinct under the two laws. Nurul Islam vs State, 49 DLR 464. Sections 141 & 138-Admittedly there was a transaction between the parties and the petitioner issued the cheque in question but the law of limitation stands as an impediment to proceed further with the case in view of clause (b) of section 138 and clause (b) to section 141 of the Act. Time is a great factor of human life specially when it comes into play for legal purpose. The proceeding of the CR case is quashed. Abdus Salam vs Md Munshi Rashed Kamal, 54 DLR 234. Sections 141 & 138-The cause of action for prosecution will arise under clause (c) of the proviso to section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act on the failure of the appellant to pay the amount within 15 days of the receipt of the notice of the complainant. In the present case, the cause of action arose on 19-1-1996 and the petition of complaint was required to be filed within one month from 19-1-1996 in compliance with clause (b) of section 141 of the Act which having not been done by the complainant the cognizance of the offence cannot be taken upon such complaint and hence the impugned proceeding is quashed. SM Anwar Hossain vs Shafiul Alam (Chand), 4 BLC (AD) 106. Sections 141 and 138-The onus to prove, standard being 'beyond reasonable doubt, that the cheques were drawn for consideration, shifted to the prosecution, but it failed to discharge the onus and the foundation of the prosecution case (business transactions and passing of consideration) has fallen apart. Hence, the inevitable conclusion is that in spite of facts that the cheques in question were signed by the accused and the complainant company was the payee, those were drawn without consideration. Ershad Ali (Md) @ Md Ershad Ullah vs State, 26 BLC 93. Sections 141 and 138(1)-Certain conditions precedent are stipulated in the provision of section 138(1) of the Act which are to be complied with before imposing any criminal liability to the drawer. From the scheme of the Act, it is clear that following the dishonour of cheque a notice is to be issued in writing to the person who has issued the cheque inviting his attention to the fact that the cheque has been issued for reason stated in the return memo and that he is liable for penal consequences under section 138 read with section 141 of the Act. Mohiuddin Chowdhury (Md) vs State, 23 BLC 534. Sections 141(b) and 138(1)-There is nothing in section 141(b) to suggest that the cause of action cannot arise more than once under clause (c) of the proviso to section 138(1). The procedural limitation provided in section 141(b) cannot take away the substantive right accruing to the beneficiary of a cheque to prosecute any number of subsequent presenta-tion of the cheque on its dishonour. Similarly, each dishonour will give rise to a concomitant right to serve notice under proviso (b) to section 138(1) of the Act and demand payment, failing which the bearer of the cheque will have the right to make a complaint in writing in accordance with section 141(a) of the Act. It will be entirely up to the bearer of the cheque to proceed in respect of any particular dishonour of the cheque, keeping in mind that each step of the process has to be taken within the period stipulate by the law. Hence, we hold that decision in the case of Dr Md Mofizur Rahman vs Md Bashirullah and another, 55 DLR 630 was incorrect and is accordingly overruled. Nizam Uddin Mahmud Hossain vs State, 25 BLC (AD) 81. Sections 141(b) and 138(1)-The intention of the legislature in enacting section 141(b) is to provide a time limit within which the complaint against the defaulting drawer of the cheque is to be made. This section does not preclude the holder of the cheque from presenting the cheque to the bank again for payment, subject only to the condition that the second and subsequent presentation of the cheque must be within six months from the date on which the cheque was drawn in order to be able to prosecute the drawer of the cheque criminally under section 138 of the Act. Nizam Uddin Mahmud Hossain vs State, 25 BLC (AD) 81. Sections 141(C) and 138A-The intention of the legislature is very much clear that the Act, being a special law, special provision has been inserted to restrain lingering of the disposal of such cases and also to discourage preferring frivolous appeals. This piece of legislation by its nature is a beneficial one and the cheque-defaulter should not be indulged in a manner so that the legislative intent is allowed to be frustrated. Tofayel Ahmed vs State, 24 BLC 682. Section 1-Scope-The Act legalises the system under which claims upon certain mercantile instruments can be treated like ordinary goods passing from one hand to another. AIR-1914 Cal 566 (DB). Section 1-Contract Act and Negotiable Instruments Act-The Contract Act is a general statute dealing with contracts. Negotiable Instruments Act is a statute dealing with particular form of contracts, and the law laid down for special cases must always overrule provisions of general character. AIR 1933 Rang.131. Section 1-Negotiable instruments-Negotiability can be attached to documents by mercantile usage. A document is negotiable if by customs of the money market it is transferable as it were cash and its bona fide transferee obtains a good title even though his transferor had none. AIR 1918 Low Bur 122 = 9 Low Bur Rul 143 (DB). Section 1-Construction of negotiable instrument-There must be no reasonable possibility of ambiguity in the construction of a negotiable security which is meant to pass from hand to hand; its meaning should be instantly recognisable and not after an elaborate analysis in Courts. AIR 1936 Nag 252. Sections 1(1) and 138-Section 138 of the Act shall not applicable if the cheque was presented after expire of its validity period of six months from the date on which it is drawn. Suruj Miah vs Government of Bangladesh, 71 DLR 517. Section 4-Scope-Promissory note is independent of other dealings between parties. Prima facie the object of a promissory note is to show that the particular transaction represented by the note is a separate transaction, and it is intended that the remedies in respect of that transaction should be separately pursued, even though the parties had several dealings with each other and there is a running account between them. (1903) 430 C 627. Section 4 Scope-The definition of 'promissory note' in section 2(22), Stamp Act is more comprehensive and in addition to the promissory note as defined in the Negotiable Instruments Act. It includes a note promising the payment of any sum of money out of any particular fund which may or may not be available or upon any condition or contingency which may or may not be performed or happened. AIR 1947 Nag. 145 = ILR 1946 Nag. 796 (DB). Section 4 Promissory note-A promissory note payable on demand does not imply that a demand must be made and the words "on demand" only mean that a note is payable immediately or at sight. Rabia Khatun vs Ram Kali Mahajan, 2 DLR 385. Section 4 Promissory Note It is an instrument in writing (not being a bank-note or a currency-note) containing an unconditional undertaking, signed by the maker, to pay on demand or at a fixed or determinable further time a certain sum of money only to, or to the order of, a certain person, or to the bearer of the instrument. Sonali Bank vs Hare Krishna Das, 49 DLR 282. Section 4 Promissory note-explained-A promissory note is defined in section 4 of the Negotiable Instruments Act as an instrument in writing (not being a bank note or a currency note) containing an unconditional undertaking, signed by the maker, to pay on demand or at a fixed determinable future time, a certain sum of money only to, or to the order of a certain person, or to the bearer of the instrument. It should be noticed that there is no mention of consideration in the definition and in that it differs from consideration in the definition and in that it differs from the definition of an agreement under the Contract Act. The maker or a holder of negotiable instrument, e.g. a promissory note, may eridorse it by signing the same otherwise than as much maker, for the purpose of negotiation. He is thereupon called the 'endorser'. Ismail vs Fida Ally, 17 DLR (SC) 531. Section 4-Distinction between promissory note and other instruments in which there is a promise to pay money-To determine the nature of an instrument where there is a promise to pay, the best is to see what is the intention of the parties and what is the instrument in the common acceptance of men of business or persons among whom it is commonly used. PLD 1956 Dacca 14 = 6 DLR 50. Section 4-Request of loan-A letter written by A to B requesting B for a loan and promising to repay the money, if advanced within a certain time is not a promissory note. 13 Bom 669+1883 Pun. Re. No.195 P 586 +27 Mad. Section 4-Essentials of promissory note-In order that a document should be a promissory note it is necessary that there should be (i) an unconditional undertaking to pay, (ii) the sum should be a sum of money and should be certain, (iii) the payment should be to or to the order of a person who is certain, or to the bearer, of the instrument, (iv) and the maker should sign it. If these four conditions are present a document becomes a promissory note. AIR 1955 Raj 85 (DB)+AIR 1959 Raj. 156 + AIR 1957 Raj. 360. Section 4-Essentials of promissory note-The question whether an instrument is a promissory note or not, should be judged by the words used. A document promising to pay on demand a sum for the price of cloth, is a promissory note. 36 Mad. 370-12 Ind Cas. 542. Section 4-Bond-Where the language of a document showed that it was written for evidencing the debt obtained by the debtor and an express promise to pay the debt within a specified time was given therein, and the instrument was attested by a witness and it was not payable to order or bearer, the document was a bond and not a promissory note. AIR 1957 Raj 387. Section 4-Non-negotiable promissory notes-Where promissory notes are executed as a further security for repayment of advance received under a contract they are not negotiable and the cancellation of that contract by an act of the Government will not make them negotiable. AIR 1928 Pat. 568=133 Ind. Cas. 698. Section 4-Intention of maker-In order to find out whether the document in question is a promissory note or not, the intention of the parties at the time of the execution of the document is to be looked into. The promise to pay must be the substance of the instrument and there must be nothing inconsistent with the character of the instrument as substantially a promise to pay. PLD 1956 Dacca 14 = 6 DLR 50 + AIR 1959 Raj. 156. Section 4-Maker must sign it-Under section 4 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, a promissory note must be signed by the maker or some one on his behalf. Where the document reads that B is charged under it to pay the amount mentioned therein on demand, and it is signed by N and he does not purport to sign on behalf of B, it cannot be said that the document is signed by the maker. ILR (1959) 9 Raj. 187. Section 4-'Hundi'-A hundi may or may not be a promissory note. Therefore mere inscription of the words "Hundi" and "accepted" on the upper part of the stamp does not make the document a bill of exchange, when the document is a promissory note. The real character of a document has to be determined by looking to the provisions of the document itself and not by the name used for it. AIR 1941 Cal 498 = ILR (1941) 2 Cal. 107. Section 4-'Hundi'-When a hundi is either a promissory note or a bill of exchange, it is governed by the Contract Act and not by Negotiable Instruments Act. AIR 1919 Nag. 39. Section 4 Place of payment-A promissory note does not lose its character as such merely because it contains a promise to pay at a certain place. AIR 1944 Bom. 235. Section 4 Certainty is necessary-One of the most essential characteristics of a promissory note is certainty certainty both as regards person by whom and to whom payment is to be made. AIR 1931 Cal. 387-58 Cal.752+AIR 1920 Nag. 274. Section 4-Only money can be made payable-A promissory note can relate only to a certain sum of money. An undertaking to deliver grain, 6 Bom. HCR (AC) 107+AIR 1924. Section 4 Only money can be made payable-A promise to pay a certain sum of money and deliver a certain quantity of grain is not a promissory note. 4 Mad. 296 (FB). Section 4 Only money can be made payable-A promise to pay money and also to give the promisee a life policy and the lease of a house is not a promissory note as it contains a promise to pay money and also to do some other act. (1849) 4 Ex. 410 = 19 LJ Ex. 6. Section 5-Bill of exchange-An essential character of a bill of exchange is that it shall contain an order to accept or to pay and that acceptor should accept it. And in the absence of such a direction to pay, the document will not be a bill of exchange or a hundi. AIR 1955 Cal. 562-ILR (1956) 2 Cal. 318. Section 5 Sections 5 and 85A of the Negotiable Instruments Act make it clear that prima facie the relationship between the holder of the draft and any prior party is that of a creditor and debtor as prescribed by section 36 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. I PLR (Dac.) 20. Section 5-Bill of exchange payable on demand-A bill of exchange (not being a bond, bank note or currency note) payable otherwise than on demand and drawn singly does not come under clause (a) of this section and cannot be stamped with an adhesive stamp. 2 Mad. 173 (DB) (Bill of exchange payable otherwise than on demand and drawn or made in British India cannot be stamped with adhesive stamp) + 8 Cal. 721 (DB). Section 5-Same drawer and drawee of bill-There is nothing in section 5 to show that if the drawer and drawee be the same person, the instrument cannot be described as a bill of exchange. No doubt where drawer and drawee is the same person that person is not entitled to treat the instrument as bill of exchange but the holder of the bill may treat it as a bill of exchange. AIR 1930 Pat 239 (DB) = AIR 1928 Cal. 566 (SB) = AIR 1932 Mad. 765. Sections 5 and 6-The prosecution initiated for harassing the petitioner by ignoring sections 5 and 6 of the Act, cheque of Taka 1,80,00,000 was has been written by the complainant and initiate the criminal prosecution against the petitioner. Nurul Hakim (Md) vs State, 29 BLC 108. Sections 5 and 6-A cheque is a bill of exchange drawn on a banker payable on demand. A bill of exchange is a negotiable instrument in writing containing instruction to a third party to pay a stated sum of money at a designated future date or on demand. A cheque on the other hand, is a bill of exchange drawn on a bank by the holder of an account payable on demand. A cheque under section 6 of the Act is also a bill of exchange but it is drawn on a banker and is payable on demand. An instrument can be construed as a cheque only if such document satisfies the require-ments under section 5 read with section 6 of the Act. The Court will have to examine whether the instrument involved in cheque as defined under section 5 read with section 6 of the Act or not. Abul Kaher Shahin (Md) vs Emran Rashid, 25 BLC (AD) 115. Sections 5, 6 and 138-Reasons for imposing directions are innumerous, now-a-days we are dealing with hundreds/thousands of case under section 561A of the Code of Criminal Procedure are being filed before the highest judiciary in different pleas and different reasons. Most of the reasons are the cheques were not written or filled up by the drawer as mandated under sections 5 and 6. The directions are as follows:- (1) We direct the cognizance court to receive an affidavit of facts specify that the drawer has filled up all spaces of the cheque and signed with the petition of complaint under section 138 of the Act. (2) The cognizance must be satisfied on the contention of complaint petition. If he signed a cheque he must ascertain what amount of money was written and in whose favour the cheque was issued and what was the date of placing the cheque for encashment. It should be construed strictly, as it is special law failing one of the conditions the drawer will be liable for criminal prosecution. Nothing should be written behind his back. Nurul Hakim (Md) vs State, 29 BLC 108. Sections 5 & 9-A holder of a bill of exchange in due course is entitled to encash the same on maturity and payment to him cannot be restrained even if the drawer of the bill defrauded the drawee after acceptance of the bill by the drawee. (Exporters India vs Rupashi Garments) 11 BLD (HCD) 65. Section 118-Whenever a person will be holder in due course he must become holder in due course for consideration and section 118 of the Act has given more privileges to the holder in due course which provides that until the contrary is proved it is to be presumed that every negotiable instrument was made or drawn for consideration, that is, the law itself prescribed a privilege in favour of the holder of a cheque that for consideration the cheque was drawn in his favour but this presumption is a rebutable presumption. Shariful Alam vs State, 67 DLR 182. Section 118-Ends of justice would be served if the accused petitioner is given a chance to place his defence case before the trial Court for examination which the law has allowed him to rebut a presumption in favour of the complainant as laid down in section 118 of the Act. Shariful Alam vs State, 67 DLR 182. Section 118-Scope-The 'special rules of evidence' laid down in section 118 apply on as between parties to instrument of those claiming under them. In other cases, presumption will only be in terms of section 114 of the Evidence Act. AIR 1937 Mad. 182-ILR 1937 Mad. 299 (DB). Section 118-Purpose of loan-When a loan been taken and is evidence by a document such as a promissory note, oral evidence is not excluded to show what the purpose of the loan was and especially when the document is silent on the point. By such oral evidence the terms of the document are not varied. AIR 1940 Cal. 137 (DB)+AIR 1922 Low Bur. 10. Section 118-Denial of execution-Where in a suit on a pronote, the defendant while admitting his signature contended that his signature was taken on a blank paper. It was held, that the statement amounted to a denial and not admission of execution and that the burden was on the plaintiff to prove the execution of the pronote. AIR 1934 Lah. 293=36 PLR 275=151 Ind. Cas. 60 (DB). Section 118 Presumption as to consideration-Where execution of a promissory note is proved. Until contrary is proved there would be presumption that every negotiable instrument was made or drawn for consideration, and that such instrument when accepted, endorsed, negotiated or transferred, was endorsed, negotiated or transferred for consideration. PLD 1986 Quetta 232=KLR 1986 CC 714 NLR 1987 AC 84 (DB). Section 118-No presumption as to nature or consideration Where a promissory note was given in consideration of a sum of money, it is a question of fact in each case whether the sum of money was given as a loan or not as a loan. In the absence of all evidence the presumption is that it was given by way of a loan, and there is a further presumption that the promissory note was given in conditional payment of the loan. AIR 1943 All 220-ILR 1943 All 610 (FB). Section 118-Purpose of consideration-Section 118 raises presumption only regarding existence of consideration and does not presume that consideration of a promissory note was advanced for legal necessity and burden of proving legal necessity rests on the plaintiff making the advance. AIR 1935 Nag. 127-31 Nag. LR 243. Section 118 Post-dated negotiable instrument-Post-dating of a promissory note does not denote "per se" that there is no consideration because consideration can be paid at any time and also when the promissory note is originally executed and need not necessarily be left over to be paid on the date which the promissory note bears. AIR 1952 Nag. 308-ILR 1953 Nag. 233 (DB). Section 118-Presumption is rebutable-Under section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 there is an initial presumption that a negotiable instrument is made, drawn, accepted or endorsed for consideration, but this presumption is a rebutable presumption. NLR 1990 UC 788+1973 SCMR 100+PLD 1963 SC 163-15 DLR (SC) 86+PLD 1958 Lah. 208+PLD 1947 PC 82+AIR 1938 PC 123+AIR 1924 Lah. 39 (DB)+AIR 1920 Lah. Section 118-Minor executant-Where the executant of a promissory note is minor and the accounts of the creditor are defective and his conduct is suspicious, there is a presumption against the creditor and not against the executant. AIR 1930 Oudh 108. SSection 118-Minor, bond by-A bond executed by a minor being void is not a negotiable instrument, nor can such a presumption even arise with regard to a contract made by a minor. AIR 1938 Oudh 14-17) Ind. Cas. 96. Section 118-Renewed note-Where a promissory note is executed to renew a previous note and the executrix of promissory note admits that she was executing it for a sum remaining due on the previous note executed by her, the creditor need not produce evidence regarding previous transactions. Burden shifts on her to disprove existence of previous promissory note. AIR 1938 Nag. 294. Section 118-Quantum of consideration-Presumption under section 118 is that an instrument is supported by some consideration. adequate or inadequate and is not a nudum pactum. There is no presumption regarding the quantum of consideration and the amount or value mentioned in a negotiable instrument should not be presumed to have been given or taken under the instrument. A recital in a negotiable instrument as to the passing of consideration is, no doubt, prima facie evidence of such consideration having passed and the parties to the instrument are bound by the recital till the contrary is proved. AIR 1920 Mad. 219+AIR 1961 Orissa 8+AIR 1935 Mad. 769+AIR 1959 Andh Pra. 370. Section 118-Holder presumption as to-When an endorsee has no sufficient cause to believe that there was any defect in title of the person from whom he derived title, section 118 will raise a presumption in his favour that he is a holder in due course and that the endorsement was for consideration. AIR 1924 Put. 521. Section 118-Holder, presumption as to-An endorsee from the payee of a hundi is presuned, until contrary is proved, to be holder in due course, by reason of section 118(g) and is unaffected by absence of failure of consideration as between drawer and payee. AIR 1914 Bom. 136 (DB). Section 118-Claim for recovery of money by a Bank, whether can be decreed in the absence of any evidence as to actual payment of the amount-In view of the fact that title deeds were deposited with the bank along with all other usual documents, executed by the predecessor of defendant company and regular entries in the ledger and clean cash book of the Bank in respect of the loan the claim is established-There is also admission of the Managing Director of defendant company as to the liability to the Bank-Moreover there is presumption under the Negotiable Instruments Act, Bankers Book of Evidence Act and banking Companies Ordinance. Planters (Bangladesh) Ltd. vs Mahaluxmi Bank Ltd., 37 DLR (AD) 129. Section 118-The defence has the authority to prove the contrary fact of the presumption that every negotiable instrument was made or drawn for consideration in favour of the holder in due course. Maksedur Rahman Badal (Md) vs State, 20 BLC 668. Section 118(a) The presumption is that the negotiable instrument was drawn for consideration but, of course, that presumption is a rebuttable presumption. But this presumption can only be rebutted by adducing evidence to the contrary at the trial. Parvin Akhter vs Bangladesh, 70 DLR 413. Sections 118(a) and 138-The presumption under section 118(a) of the Act, is always rebutable and the standard of proof of doing so is that of the preponderance of probabilities. The accused either adducing evidence or by cross-examining the PWs are entitled to rebut the presumption. The accused is not bound to prove his innocence by adducing evidence. A negative fact cannot be proved by adducing positive evidence. The issue as to whether the presumption stood rebutted or not must be determined based on the evidence adduced by the parties. AH Ershadul Haque, Advocate vs State, 75 DLR 447. Sections 118(a) and 138-The words "for the discharge in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability" has been omitted in 2000 by the amendment but section 118(a) of the Act still allows the defence to rebut the presumption that the cheque was drawn for any consideration. When the defence can prove that the cheque was drawn without any consideration the onus again shifts to the complainant to show and to prove that the cheque was drawn for consideration. Muksedur Rahman Badal (Md) vs State, 20 BLC 668. Sections 118, 9 and 138-In a case under section 138 of the Act, the legal presumption exists in favour of the "holder in due course of the cheque" that he got the cheque for consideration and that has been ensured by the provisions of sections 9 and 118 of the Act but at the same time this presumption is a rebuttable presumption. Whenever any accused leads the evidence to rebut such presumption the burden again shifts to the complainant who is the holder in due course of the cheque to proof by the legal evidence that the cheque was drawn in his favour for consideration. Muksedur Rahman Badal (Md) vs State, 20 BLC 668. Sections 118 and 138-The burden of proof of the accused to disprove the presumption under sections 118 and 138 of the Act is not so heavy. The preponderance of probability through direct or substantial evidence is sufficient enough to shift the onus to the complainant. Inference of preponderance of probabilities can be drawn from the materials on record and also by reference to the circumstances upon which the party relies. When a presumption is rebuttable, it only points out that the party on whom lies the duty of going forward with evidence, on the fact presumed and when that party has produced evidence fairly and reasonably tending to show that the real fact is not as presumed, the purpose of the presumption is over. To rebut the statutory presumptions an accused is not expected to prove his defence beyond reasonable doubt as is expected of the complainant in a criminal trial. The accused may adduce direct evidence to prove that the cheque in question was not supported by consideration. However, the court need not insist in every case that the accused should disprove the non-existence of consideration and debt by leading direct evidence because the existence of negative evidence is neither possible nor contemplated. At the same time, it is clear that bare denial of the passing of consideration apparently would not serve the purpose of the accused. Something which is probable has to be brought on record for getting the burden of proof shifted to the complainant. The burden of proof of the accused to disprove the presumption under sections 118 and 138 of the Act is not so heavy. The preponderance of probability through direct or substantial evidence is sufficient enough to shift the onus to the complainant. Inference of preponderance of probabilities can be drawn from the materials on record and also by reference to the circumstances upon which the party relies. Abul Kaher Shahin (Md) vs Emran Rashid, 25 BLC (AD) 115.